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During ¡cost of the nineteenth century, Great Britain 
maintained eight foreign naval stations, for the protection 
of her subjects and commerce. This thesis concerns the 
North American and Yfest Indian Station and its commander, 
Hear Admiral Sir Alexander I'dlne, K.C.B., in the years 
I80O-IO64.
The first year of hilno1 a command was relatively 
quiet and enabled him to learn the essentials, and to 
visit the important places of this, his first station 
command. The Prince of "hies had visited North America 
in I860, but ibis had gone very smoothly, 1861 saw the 
beginning of the American Civil V?ar and the •toeting'1 
time for the admiral and his officers. Duo to the poor 
communications with England, Milne made many of his own 
decisions; for example, he sent his warships to inspect 
the federal blockade when it was just being put into 
effect, and there are many other instances of this initia­
tive.
The offensive and defensive capacity of the station 
is examined at the time of the Trent affair, as well as 
the allied expedition to Mexico at the earao time, December
1861, The second and third years of the war are concer­
ned largely with the legal and diplomatic problems that 
arose: Milne’s opposition to the sustenance and repair 
of blockade .runners, conflicts with colonial governors 
over the role of naval officers vis-a-vis the belli­
gerents, and other matters.
The administration and problems of the station are 
not neglected. The chain of command is explained and the 
two most endemic problems of the area: desertion and 
yellow fever,are examined. With the engagement between, 
the Monitor and Merrlmao, the conflict between ordnance 
and armour was accelerated. The introduction of the 
Armstrong gun and the reasons for its failure are detailed 
This was a critical situation as it meant that a largo 
Part of the armament of nearly every British warship was, 
from ls6l to IS64, defective. The British view ox" 
American forts, weapons and warships is also recounted,. .
No serious writer has accused Milno of being partial 
to either side in the American struggle. But he was 
criticised for being «ore of a ’diplomat’ than a ’fighter! 
There can be no doubt, however, tlrt his x.pt a nosition 
°f great delicacy and he handled the problems with 
consummate skill.
IiTTROSTICflOH
This is the story of the Worth .American and Jest 
Indian Station during the four years that it was commanded 
by Sir Alexander Milne, K.C.B, Rear, later Yice Admiral 
Milne served in American waters from the 13th of ¿¿arch» 
I860, until the 15th of March, I864. Before this appoint­
ment he had commanded several warships .and served nearly 
twelve years as a Lord,of the,Admiralty, thus bringing 
great administrative, as. well as practical experience to 
his task, Ac far as the writer can determine, no one has 
ever made a study of any of the eight foreign naval 
stations maintained by Britain for a largo part of the 1 9 th 
century, the period of hex* greatest world-wide influence. 
These were the instruments behind tho country’s foi'oign 
policy, be it ’gunboat’ or pacific. The years covered, 
IO6O-I864, aro particularly appropriate because after the 
■Banish' war of I864, British prestige on the Continent 
diminished and the rise of Prussia begins, Later in the 
century, Loth the II.0.A. and Japan emerge as world powers,
Prom the favourable situation engendered by the. 
settlement of their major disputes and the visit of the 
Brines of Males in I860, Anglo-American, relations boi*on
to deteriorate with the outbreak of the Civil War« Kilno's 
Correspondence with Lord Lyons, the Minister to Washington, 
shows the desire of both British representatives to main- 
tain a strict neutrality in the contest. Because of the 
lack of swift communications with England - the one-way 
voyage took ten to twelve days - Sir Alexander exercised 
great personal responsibility throughout his years on the 
station. He determined,fear example, to inspect the Union 
blockade and sent out his warships for this purpose} he 
also set the precedent of sending a ship to protect British 
interests in the area of Federal operations against the 
Confederates, The navy co-operated with Lord Lyons to the 
fullest extent. Since great difficulties had arisen when 
the British consuls in the South attempted to contact the 
Washington legation by travelling overland, coi.u/unic.-.tion 
with the consuls by sen was decided upon and the initial 
voyage is recounted.
The Trent crisis measured the readiness of the station 
for a war with the U.B, Of Milne's three main basess 
Jamaica, Halifax and Bermuda, the lest was the most central 
and the nost important. The history of its defences is 
traced as well ns its state of preparedness in 1061. The 
ability of the station generally to withstand a w?ir with.
the iiorth is covered» end also the final denouement of 
the affair.
'flie expedition, with France and Spain, to compel 
Mexico to pay her debts was planned before, and launched 
during the Trent crisis« This meant that i-uilne*o force 
was divided between Bermuda'and Vera Crus, a dangerous but 
unavoidable situation. Commodore Dunlop, commander of 
the'Jamaica Division of the Station played'a principal 
role in this intervention. : l/ith his colleague. Sir C.L, 
Wyke, he succeeded in delaying allied Military action 
until the ambitions 'of the French' became apparent to both 
the Spanish end British. Then they could and did, leave 
Mexico' without1 loss of honour. Since one-way co^mnica­
tion with England took five weeks, Dunlop end %ke also 
exorcised a groat deal of personal responsibility, and their 
decisions were later largely approved by Sari Bussell.
As the C?vil *;fer entered its second and third years, 
Vice Admiral Milne found that his policy of trying to 
remain steudfv/stly neutral, was fraught with legal difficul­
ties. ’ He approved the initiative of his subordinate,
Coumunder Hinckley in seising - at hasoau - the C ue to 
as a disguised warship. Although U.b. Secretary of Utate 
Seward said this wms the first friendly British act during 
the war, the vessel was released on legal ¿rounds raid soon
7became the Confederate raider Florida» Milne believed 
that the blockade-runners were violating the Foreign 
Enlistment Act and he forbade their use of the Bermuda
naval yard for repairs} but these views were not shared by 
the homo government, The most blatant infraction of Milne's 
neutrality orders to his captains was the prolonged visit to
Charleston and the boarding of tho C.S.S, Palmetto State 
by one of his officers in.January-1863» Because this 
officer affirmed, with 1he British consul, that tho blockade 
of Charleston was raised, duo to a single attack of coverai 
Confederate v/arships, the ¿forth was- enraged - end .Seward. 
demanded that Lyons order the British captain out of 
Charleston. This incident might have led the Poderale to 
close their ports to British worships, who would then be 
unable to gain information on U,3. movements, weapons, etc. 
—oro importantly, Milne would be 'blind' to any Federal 
force preparing to attack Bermuda or other British posses­
sions in. tho area. But Sir Alexander promptly disavowed 
his officer's actions and transferred his to the Jinovirrd 
Islands; and tho incident was soon forgotten, The 
visit of Milne to the Forth later in I0u3 was probably 
the first such trip by any British admiral since the , , 
hov. lufcion. lie met Lincoln, Seward, etc., and Lyons said
later that the U.S. government thought that 'harmonious 
relations' between the two countries were maintained by 
Hilne1s 'judgement and firm but temperate and conciliatory 
conduct'.
The practical working of the station is not neglected. 
Some of the topics treated ares the chain of commend, the 
elimination of excessive paperwork, the handling of the most 
persistent problems on the stations desertion and yellow 
fever, some comparisons.between the Royal aid Union navies, 
and the civil and naval functions of the fishery patrol on 
the llewfoundland coast, '
Though the French had pioneered the ironclad ship, 
the first British ironclad battleship,K,u.S, ¿grriojry\vas 
launched the year that illInc began his.command in..North 
. America, All’ of his sea-going warships were unnrmoured 
steamers, most v;ero propeller-driven* The changes in 
armour and ordnance that had begun in the earlier years of 
the century accelerated rapidly after the Ilonltor and 
herri mro engagement of 18t>2, Those wore 'the yoars of 
Genuine transition from wood-to ironclad ship and from the 
old cast gun to whole now cyst eras of cannon making, ¿such 
n system v,t.3 the Armstrong gun, the first modern bi’occh 
load ox*. Introduced on the station in 1861» it was with­
drawn in 1864; the reasons for its failure are examined.
The strategic implications of this failure were serious 
as it meant that part of the main armament of nearly every 
British'warship was defective. The British view of 
American weapons, forts, ships, etc,, when reported, to 
iiilnQ led to an. uneasiness on nis part lest the North sur­
pass Britain in naval and military'development.
This study concludes with an appreciation of Sir 
Alexander Udine as well as the criticism that he was more 
of a *diplomatist’ than a 'fighting man*. Inevitably, 
because Britain was rarely a neutral in a maritime war, her 
policy: recognition of blockades,denial of entry to her ports 
: of belligerent prices, etc., favoured the power with the 
largest fleet, the United States. But tho writer believes 
that Sir Alexander was a neutral in the truest sense -and d ■ 
tried to hold his subordinates to this course, As hi a 
command extended over those years which caw the most sus­
tained period of crisis - ainoe the \i-x of 1812 - in 
Anglo-American relations curing the nineteenth century, 
hie views and actions nro of no small importance,
The completion of the Atlantic cable in 1866 ended, 
to a largo extent, tho personal power of tho station 
commander. By Ifop there was a cable* to Havana,
Thereafter, the great latitude exercised by Commodore Dunlop 
during the Mexican expedition would never again be seen.
From about 1070, naval officers became more end more the 
instruments end not the interpreters of foreign policy.
With Lord Fisher’s reforms early in the.20th century, the 
station ’idea’ of a permanent force maintained at elaborate 
overseas bases for the protection of British subjects and 
commerce was virtually eliminated. It was replaced by a 
series of highly mobile cruising squadrons. Because of the 
growing German menace, Britain was forced to concentrate her 
naval forces largely in home waters. The era of Scapa 
Flow begins and it is the end of those great years when full, 
ships were frequently seen cruising ’on the public, service’ 
from China to the coast of Labrador,
"/hat if cur Country must compete 
Before the time is long,
With Russia’s new *unsunken* .fleet 
Or. .Prance's"navy strong 
Or Yankee gunboats - bosh and brag 
We of Prince Edward" Isle 
»•'ill trust our lives to Britain's Flag 
And 'Heroes of the lile.'
iorus! . :::
Then three times three for Britain's Queen 
liy Countrymen in style!
And three to greet her gallant men"
The Keroso of the 'Kilo'.
.....dedicated to 
flagship, 11.11,3» / 
resident of P.F.I
the men of mine's 
Kile,; by:J, Lepage, 
20 August, 1062.
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CHAPTER!
Bis Father’s Command; Sir Alexander Returns to the Station
In I860, when Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne took up
his new command, Anglo-American relations were better than
they had been for many years*^ The previous year Britain
had given the sovereignty of the Bay Islands and the Moskito
Coast to the Republic of Honduras, so that except for Belize,
there was no longer a British ’presence’ in Central America,
In December of I860, both countries agreed to submit the San
Juan question to arbitration, although it was to be some years
gbefore this question was definitely settled* There now 
seemed no legal obstacles to improved relations.
British North America was prosperous right through the 
fifties and sixties* The creation of a unified Dominion 
was still,in I860, seven years away; but the movement 
toward Confederation would shortly be given a new impetus 
by American threats arising out of the Civil War.
* Williams, M. .Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy _I8I5-I9I5_ 
(London,1916),p.266.
2 Ward,Sir A,W. and , r..p. ( ad.) .Cambridge History.of British Foreign Policy(Cambridge,1923),11,p*488*
The defence of their North American colonies m s  a burden, on 
the British tex-payer* one which Colden» Bright and the 
other Manchester Free-Traders were anxious to be rid of*
They argued that the expenses of colonial defence preclueed 
any reduction of duty on British imports5 ‘Canada, Hew 
Zealand and South Africa were the worst encumbrances, because 
of perpetual wars or dangers of wars,’  ^ Yihiie troops and 
arms were rushed to British ¿forth America.during tlx© l.r*mt 
crisis, the military defence of the colonywas to b^ cusne, 
more and more, a local responsibility. The emphasis was on 
concentrating British troops at home*^ For most oflGol, the 
entire garrison of Canada comprised only 4»200 m n. The navy 
however,was to aid in the defence of these distant possessions- 
The fisheries of the North American colonies had often boon a 
fertile source of dispute, both with the b’.S, and with 
European - powers« At this time the Reciprocity Treaty.:wau .
1».force between, tho&e colonies and the United States.
For twelve years, from 1654 to 1066, it had a beneficial 
influence on the often turbulent fishermen of the area. It 
provided for mutual free trade in many products, including 
.fish and fish products. • Utile Canadians could fish south
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along the American*a coast,- the latter could tides almost every 
kind of fish on the coasts of British North America, without 
restriction, as to distance from chore• ^ dear Aomiral «lilne
kept a man-of-war on the fishing grounds from May to October 
to protect and help the fishermen, during the four years he was 
on the Station. Comnunications between Sngland and the
northern colonies were still rather slow. rfhe Atlantic 
cable laid to Sydney, Cape Breton in 1850» had lasted barely 
a month; there was to he no new cable link until 1 B66. k’he 
regular Cun-turd packet provided the fastest communication 
between, the old world and the news Halifax to Liverpool in 
ten to twelve days.^
While the individual in the northern British colonies 
was enjoying greater participation in his local .government 
at this time,the individual in the British West Indies was 
losing more and more cf his governing privileges. most of 
the B.w.I. v;ere then governed by the Old Representative oystera#
5 *Graham, 17. , ’The fisheries of British North 'America and
the United States Fishermen’,. Collectiona.o p fegjfcgft
Scotia Historical Society, XIV, (1910)» p.19«
.’homo, relative to- -the !«♦ .American and W. Indian station’».. 
¿•iLlT^ lOp/o, The Hilns papers, tire at the Hsiticniil j-.iiritj.i.ic 
Museum, Greenwich.': See -.also* - ..Staff» iV* -ffhs. - dap_u^ o. 
b'-dl (London, I956).
ere appointed by, and responsible to,Under it the governors 
the Colonial Office in London. However, on some matters,
particularly finance, a governor was usually dependent on a
locally elected - and often irresponsible - House oi -Assembly•
After the Negroes were emancipated in the 1830’s, the Old
Representative System broke down. With an uneducated
majority, having no experience in parliamentary government, it
7was impossible to continue in the old way. The power
remained for a time in the hands of the wealthy whites.
With the passage of the Sugar Duties Act in 1846, ¿'’re© Trade 
came to the West Indies, The protective tariff barriers 
which had shielded them from the cheaper slave-grown sugar of 
Cuba and Brazil were completely eliminated by 1851» The Free 
Trade policy spelt the end of the family run sugar plantation 
«•ad its paternal owner. Consolidation became necessary and 
the ’limited company’ sugar estates were created. Yet these
measures were only partially effective, .so that in I860, tua 
»vest Indian colonies were in a depressed period.
.The 3.W.I, wore also deprived of troops about:this.time. 
In the early fifties, moat of the British garrisons in the 
islands were .removed r.nd concentrated in the military'head- ,
Angler, F.R., The Ifeklng of the West Indies (London, I960)A 
Pp. ¿28-9} Lovienthri, D, (miTy T^tie^ /ea t I nil iao Fedora t i on 
Uow York, I96l), pp. 35-7« Dee also* Trollope, A.
_j\e Jest -India«. (London, 1059). for conditions in the isl-nds 
at this timST"“'- -
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quarters at Barbados. The Committee on Colonial Military 
Defence end Expenditure of 1861 recommended the entire 
withdrawal of West Indian troops, 'being useless for defence
Qand unsuitable as police1. " There were then only 2,300 
British soldiers in the windward and Leeward islands. 
Communications from England came via Nova Scotia and the U.S, 
to St. Thomas and from there branch steamers, for example, 
the Trent, connected with Havana, Vara Cruz, Jamaica, Colon, 
the Windward Islands and Demerara. There were also frequent 
sailings of merchant ships, to whom mails as well as news­
papers, etc., were entrusted. Sear Admiral Milne often used 
his cruising warships to deliver despatches and orders.
In I865, the Jamaican natives revolted. Seeing that it 
would be impossible to give power to this uneducated majority, 
the legislature was dissolved and Jamaica became a Crown 
Colony in 1866. The other West Indian colonies soon 
followed this example and by 1875 only Barbados and the 
Bahamas retained their old constitutions.^ The governor of 
& Crown Colony wras appointed by the Colonial Office and he
“ Rose, J.H., H'rton, A.P..^»
The Cambridge History of \ , -
ii, p.832. . . '
 ^Lowenthal, oo. cit., p.33.
selected the members of his unicameral legiolaturo» It was
a definite retrogression from democratic foros but in the 
circumstances could hardly be condemned.
In England, Lord Palmerston had entered into his second 
and last ministry» It was to be a long one, from Juno 1859 
until his death in October 1065. The reform of the fran­
chise, while debated in the House, was shelved until 1067, 
Lord John Russell was at the Foreign Office, Gladstone was 
at the Exchequer, while the Luke of Newcastle was 
secretary of state for the colonies» The Luke believed 
that the colonies should pay most of their military 
expenses, but that naval protection should be given to them 
by the home government, '... To him the strongest link (of 
colony to mother country) was Great Britain's obligation 
to protect the colonies.1 lu Edward A. Seymour, twelfth 
Luke of Somerset,was the first lord of the Admiralty. The 
original lords of.the Admiralty appointed in June 1859 and
those who served while mine held the North America command 
were: . 10
10 Clarke, L.P., on. cit., p.63. For a good description 
of Palmerston’s government in the years■ .1859-1065» see,- 
Walpole, Sir 3,, The History of Twenty-Five Years, 
(London, 1904), vola. 1 end 2.
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First Lord; the Duke of Somerset,
First Naval Lord; Vice Adm, Hon. Sir R.S. Dundas, K.C.R., 
died in June 1061, replaced by Rear Adra, Sir 
F. Grey, K.C.B.
Second Naval Lord: Rear Ada, Hon. F.T. Pelham, C.B.,
retired in June 1861, replaced by Ca.pt, C.
Eden, C.B.
S llrd Favai Lord.: Capt, C. Eden, advanced in June 1861 to 
second naval lord and replaced, by Capi.
C, Frederick.
Fourth, Naval Lords Capt. C. Frederick, advanced in June
1861 to third naval lord and replaced by Capt. 
J.R. Drummond,
Civil Lord, Samuel Whitbread, left March 1863,
replaced by the Marquis of Hartington, Li.?,, 
who left in April 1063» His replacement was 
James Stansfield, M.P., who left in April-1864»
iiSliar^ ent^ ry Secretary; Rear Adm. Lord C. haget,: O.B,, M.P.
£S£Eiane_nt Secret ary t \f.G."Roaaiji€>." ' H .
Jihe Admiralty in the period under study was-between :
oir *^^03 Graham’s reforms in 1832 and those of the Right
11
‘Manning-Personnel’, Iddl/p/d/sCa) ; Navy Lists ,1260-1865
Hon, Huj$i Childers - in 1869« Graham had brougnt the «avy 
Boards under direct Admiralty control. Each Admiralty 
lord was responsible for one of the Civil .Departments, 
formerly Navy Boards. These departments were headed by a 
principal officer who did tho day to day work. They were: 
the Controller or Surveyor-General* the Accountant-General» 
the Storekeeper-General* the Controller of Victualling* and 
the Director-General of the Medical Department, The five 
Admiralty lords were only collectively and not personally 
responsible,for their departments and this was a.source of 
frequent - criticism.12 The parliamentary &ecretary; atten­
ded meetings of the lords and noted every decision arrived 
at$ he also often spoke for the Admiralty in pari.iament.
The second or permanent secretary received despatches 
from the different stations and was responsible for the-daily 
routine of the office. The first lord, a civilian, was 
supreme. The first naval lord was his professional advisor. 
If there was any disagreenent between the first lord and the 
naval lords, the lattar could only register their disapproval : 
by resigning. - 'Public debate between the lords Coiaadsaionors •. 
of the - Admiralty was not permitted, Somerset left office
12 ' 
' Bartlett, C.J., Groat Britain and Gea Power 
Oxford, I963), p.10. Coe also* Brijg.-;, Mir J.U.,
l^vel Ailmini3tr-~tion 1637*1092 (London, IO96)? Adnir/q.ty. ; 
Administration, Its'Faults and Its-Defetiltg, n.a,, ¿AAi/16 9;
, «hey, aa.r e ,, Admiralty Administration, a - pamphlet at _the :. 
Admiralty. Library, written "in 1C66| X«xU Pcpors, V (1061) 
Vwojort from tho Delect Conmiittee on' the Board of Admiralty
whan the administration changed in July 13oo. i*xt Alexander 
liilne, writing in 1888 said, »no. better arrangement could he 
made for Admiralty work. 1 worked tills system for nearly 
twelve years from 20th December, 1047 until 1859* n junior 
Lord and Superintendent Lord of the Store, - Victualling ana 
Transport and ¿ledical Department*. 13 Palmerston’s was a 
remarkably stable government due largely,perhaps, to absence 
of any burning domestic issues.
But there was distraction enough-in the.foreign problems 
of the early sixties. At this time, Edmund Hammond - that 
typical Victorian- spoke of Japoleon 1 X1  as ’the devil’s own 
child'. / Shore was a I«*ench scare for,three main reasons. 
Louis Napoleon’s annexation of. «ice.and Savoy,.the growing 
complex of dockyard, arsenal and fortification at Cherbourg 
less than a hundred miles from England - and the launching 
of the first iron clad man-of-war, the Gloire. , «inen this .. 
vessel .went--down the--weys• in 1859» there was deep concern 
over the apparent french lead in this, now form of.üxfonsivo 
weapon. Britain's undefended coastline and harbours seemed 
to invite French•aggression and fortifications.wars.built, at • 
rancy of the principal ports. The Volunteer movement spread
13 milne’o •Notebook', hilne Homo papers uncatalogued at the 
Kational Liar i time Lluseum.
. ^  Anderson, II*A^ , Edmund Hammond, Permanent Under Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs. 1854-1873* ,Ph.D. thesis* 
University‘oFhonlon, 1956, p,87» : .
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rapidly after its inauguration in May 1859* 'Illus­
trated London Hews* for I860 is full of 'Volunteer reviews . 
Ordinary citizens gave up their week-ends to prepare for 
the arrival of a second Bonaparte# They were not regulars, 
hut they had learned the rudiments of discipline and drill# 
Although they had just concluded a Free Trade treaty and. 
had fought together in the Crimea and in China, yet John 
Bull was almost incurably suspicious of France, whether 
Imperial or Republican. As Palmerston said' of Louis 
Kapoleon in June 1861 *...#. at the bottom of hie heart 
there rankles a deep and inextinguishable desire to humble 
end punish Bug! and....1 ;V'
Then Sir Alexander Milne arrived., at-Bermuda in HJ.i.S, . 
Bnierald on the Olh of March, I860, he was no stranger to 
the Horth American and ’dost Indian Station* no had served 
there as a Midshipman in his first ship, the Lender,. in; "1817..1 
This was the flagship of his father, then Rear :Admiral and . 
later Admiral, 8ir David Milne, one of the most distinguished
15 „
Palmerston to Somerset, private, 23 June ICyl, Somersov , 
papers, County Record Office, Aylesbury, Bucks#.;
LR3 and ’ Autobiogiavkical Material’, l(LR/f/c/l-3 for 
information on Milne.- -This is; tho .first .study:-of r.the* ;m - 
R. American and W. Indian Station.a British naval forces ; 
had been In these v: iters since Uni 16th Century. In 1823 
the station, heretofore three'separata divisions, was 
. . . combined into -one. cosuaand. ■ See Adm*-1 and Twuu» 1.28 series ■ 
for the records of tho early and later years of the station, 
at the Public Record Office.
seamen in British Naval history, During a career in the 
navy spanning sixty-six years, he had blockaded Boston 
harbour during the War of 1812, taken a prominent part 
in the bombardment of Algiers in 18 16 and served as 
oommnnder-in-chief on the North American, station from 1816 
to 1819. Sir David built a home on the Tweed with prise 
money earned during the French arid American ’wars. It 
still stands today; his portrait by Raeburn hangs in the 
dining room and in a glass. cabinet are the swords and 
decorations of Sir David and his sons, t Sir Alexander .had 
served on the Brasilian and North ■'American.' Stations and in 
18 3 7 1 while captain of II.H.3, Snake, he haa captured two 
slavers. In this early period of-his career ho had spent 
five years on the North America Station, anu was tuen posted 
as Flag Captain at Portsmouth and .Davenport,• After that he 
served from I847 until 1859 eo a junior lord of the Admiralty.
vmile at the Admiralty, I-lllne was responsible for many 
improvements, Ha v/a.s the author of the Good Conduct Badge 
scheme, a great boon to steady men; he established the new 
ratings of Chief Patty Officer and Leading Seaman and was 
the moving force behind the adoption of a more systematic 
uniform for petty officers and seamen, with their distin­
guishing emblems. Sir Alexander also revised the signal
books of ..the .-float and introduced new signals which:-were •..
required for sterna vessels. He ted the contracts for salt 
meat thrown open to all countries; it had formerly teen 
limited to-British.Udders and they had often sold inferior 
foreign meat to the Admiralty. The Crimean war revealed a 
lamentable degree of inefficiency and mismanagement xn the 
services. In May 1855» Sir James Graham, who had just left 
the office of First Lord of the Admiralty,gave evidence 
fore a special committee of the House, enquiring into the 
reasons for this incompetence. Graham praised ..dine 
handling of the Transport Service and he believed that if 
Milne could have devoted his attention exclusively to it 
*.,. it would have been more efficiently conducted than by 
any Board.* 17 For his work during the war, he was made a 
X.C.B. (Civil) in 1858,and promoted to Roar Admiral of the 
Blue that same year.
This then, was no ordinary naval officer who or «as out 
to the station in the spring of I860. It was a fifty-four 
year oU administrator with a solid background of Admiralty 
experience. Ho swivel-chair sailor, he ted.poivyd. in -ix 
different ships and co.urxnclod three. After official¡ y  
relieving Vice Admiral Sir Huston Otewr-rt, nilno begun a 
tour of the islands in hi a command, Th'i limits of too rt°rth
’Bvidence of Sir J. Graham*,17 oto.,Milne Homo tepora.
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American and Vfest' Indian Station wares
On the North by the 55th degree of H. Latitude.
On the South by the coast of South America to Cape 
Orange, the northernmost extremity of Portuguese 
Guiana.
On the West by the shores of America.
On the East by the 36th degree of \7. Longitude.
The station was subdivided into a Jamaica division 
with headquarters at Port Royal and a Barbados division 
with its command centred at that island.
making up to eleven and a half knots in ¿mergldjL ^h© 
rear admiral stopped first at Antigua. Ke was satisfied 
with the condition of the dockyard but noted a sad result 
of the policy of concentrating British troops at Barbados.
The natives were poverty-stricken because tneir only source 
of regular income - doing the soldier’s laundry - Led uis-
appeared. On arrival at Barbados the admiral landed in 
state.*
Such a ikies. A great crowd of people of all 
descriptions, a Guard of Honour of the 49 th 
Regiment and Band and a salute of 13 Guns from the 
Royal Artillery and then pop into the Governors 
Carriage with a Black mounted policeman at each win­
dow of the carriage. All the Blacks calling out 
and cheering there g-o &e Hew Admiral* ho bo very 
young Admiral 9
"... Standing Orders for the Soundron JHaloved on the !<orth_...to^ ij?an 
anj »fes t, IniTiatt
***¿^ =3 to J, iiixl ne Louie, private, 3 April• XBCO,. >J*G/10 f/3 * ,
of his favourite subjects -On 5 April, writing on one
the supply of coal to II.M. warships - he complained of
conditions at Barbados,. Milne told Pelham, the second naval
lord, that all dust is received and paid for as coal'.... it
does not do for an old member of the Store Department to cows
out to a foreign Station, X think ere long X will bo able to
do you some good in many small ways.' I<rom Barbados,
Sir Alexander visited the naval base and hospital at Port
Royal, Jamaica, Thence to the Central American coast; he
touched at Col^n and Greytovn. Turning eastward, Milne
•*?
visited Havana and returned to Bermuda in late Hay. At Port 
Royal he praised the high state of efficiency of the naval 
establishment, but said that the captain of the Guard Ship,
*•., is getting dried up into a mummy, any man who servos 
in Port Royal Harbour is certainly deserving of consideration.‘ 
The captain had been there for nearly three years and was see­
king a transfer.
The roar adr.iral's first co»tact>ith imorioangar »Ml»
Roanoke. flagoccurred at Colon, The heavy frigates
Officer McCluney, end Sabine were there. Maine thought
' , 22 -wth of his officers heRoanoke ‘immense’ but slow. «ith *-■-
tXXno to 
2 1 Milne to
> Pelham, private, 5 April 10(50, MLM/107/3*
? Dunclas, private, 20 ¿1 21 April, .1C60, -MLIi/107 /;
22 Milne to Baynes, private, 2$ April 1660, MLH/lOf/3
travelled as free guests on the railroad, to-Panama on the 
Pacific side. Built - in 1655 - and run by Americans, 
it consisted of a single track, except at stations, v/here 
sidings were provided for trains to.pass* xhe passage 
from Colon to Panama took three to four hours. Sir 
Alexander thought it ’admirably conducted’ and considered
that:
. 1  never met a more civil and obliging set of
.p^le.\'But the A n ^ r i c a n s w i t h o u t  a
on their ovm interest. They ix® 23
ship of war and generally two at eaon end.,..
H.I.I.S, Clio was on the Pacific side waiting with seven
invalids for another British warship which was to t,fke them
home via Cape Horn. Paying the railroad £5 apiece, hilne
took these men beck to his ship. As isiihSSM
return to England at the end of the ac.nth, a journey of
five to six months around South America was avoi
station commonder urged the Admiralty to *urti •-
this valuable link between the two oceans. In the tuxt
four years, replacements (eupernuraerios) were frequently
transferred from one side to the other, , 23
23 tains to Dundas, private, 9
Kilns to t(»rts) C(«1« U « m ) of t
2 liny. I860, iill/103/l/A*
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Sir Alexander thought that his wife Buphemia and 
their four children would be at Bermuda when he returned 
from his tour of the Yisst Indies, He had expected theta 
to embark in his permanent flagship, H.L.S, Nile. 90» at 
Plymouth on April 4. As Ivlilne had reached Bormuaa in just 
over twenty days, he felt certain that the Hilo, would be 
there when he arrived in late Hay, But his flagship did 
not arrive until the 2nd of June, forty-five days from
England, Contrary winds and storms had blown her off
course and lengthened her voyage* The ililne children were 
2avid Alexander, nine years old, Berkeley*.fiv®-«* later,to 
become an admiral « and the•two•young girls, Grace, Alice, 
®ix, and Uargaret Alice, seven. At sea - after a single 
day's sea-sickness the children had done their lessons 
beneath canvas awnings. They studied from ten till twelve 
and two till four every day. His mother wrote tnat 
Berkeley had exactly the build of a sailor,and is the 
funniest little figure in his sailor dress,,, hitches up his 
trousers just as sailors do’. During the trip hawaa the 
'Plaything of..,' all the idlers in the poop.’ But when the 
arrived at Bermuda, Sir Alexander had then been without
24
sleep for two days from worry and ’wsa looking very pale’ 
onid hi«, wife, 24
E. S U »  to tho fcoTOC« w y  ::i]ne, privote, 5
l’ilne He-me nepers. Y,r.H* Henderson was a Ip y«** old Liaohipuuh,
in this time ,nd ¿vea a Uvoly account of toe Uxp.
Lis papers are at tho National Haritimo .oisenm, **— */ }
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The family had barely settled in when the squadron m s  
off to Halifax for the summer. It was custernary for the 
station commander to spend the winter at ¿»enauaa ana the sum­
mer at his base in the north. They loft dermuua on 14- June 
and arrived at Halifax six days later. Itllne v?as e/.ceediti^ ly 
pleased with his flagship. The Kile, built as a sailing 
ship in 1C39, had received engines in 1854 and these had been 
lately improved at Levonport for this three year commission.
Nile could sail at thirteen knots and Sir Alexander thought
O f"
she had a fine ship’s company, ^  v/ith his ¿amixy looged 
in Admiralty House, overlooking the dockyard, the commander- 
in-chief began to sort out his problems*
Albert fkhvard, Prince of «Tales, was eighteen that Bummer,
The Queen, in response to appeals from British Korth America 
and from the United States, consented to his tour of the 
colony and the He- ublic. The Kero «bearing the. rrince, • 
sailed from Southampton on July 9» I860, with 
nnd Arl&d.ne as escorts. It was the first visit of & nritiwu 
heir-apparent to the Korth American continent, .That July,, 
oir Alexander wrote, concerning the.colonies *.
qr
hilne to Pelham, private, 20 June 18o0, -Xi»/107/3» . xircmi 
1875 until 1953, Kile served-as a training chip for merchant: ■ 
hnvy officer cadets. See ilnaefield, J. The.. QongLSl (London, .1511)
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... the grlatest loyalty and good feeling towards tie 
Throne nnd Mother Country neons to nniiii;.uo aj.l parties, 
however nuch they may bo^ nt variance on. cues uion<> of 
purely local politics. 2o
The royal party’s first landing was at ot. uohn’s, .»stoiOunu- 
land, on 23 July. There the whole pattern of the tour was 
illustrated: mooting dignitaries, inspecting troops and 
receiving addresses from various groups. The local offi-
27cials road fourteen separate speeches of welcome and loyalty.
H.R.H. arrived at Halifax on 30 July and was greeted by Hear 
Admiral Milne and the colonial authorities.
Sir Alexander was in a dilemma at this point* He had 
received no instructions from home other’ than-to give the 
Prince *all due honour*. H.R.H, was scheduled to go with his 
three-ship squadron to Quebec. He would then leave then end 
take a shallow draught commercial paddle stumer up. to Montreal, 
without'a naval escort. Milne noted that ueny Canadians 
had come to Halifax end v?ere asking how many chips would bo 
fining on to Quebec and Montreal. He knew that five or six 
ships would be at the U.S. when the Prince»a tour was completed. 
Sir Alexander believed that the Canadians would feel■slighted 
If they received less attention than the Americana; he slso
Milne to LCA, 26 July I860, MCN/103/d/A.
27 Leeef 8. t.King 711.7 (Loudon,; 1923}» ;P*
felt it would be a rood thing to have some oi a..-., ships 
present when the Prince opened the now two-mile Ion,; *t 
Victoria railroad bridge at Montreal. But llilne did not 
wish to offend Commodore Seymour, who represented the naval 
element in the Prince's entourage, by putting him in a 
secondary position» As no one on lI.d.H. 's staff coulu. 
five him any definite advice; for ‘political*.reasons, he 
decided to go. Newcastle, a member of the Prince's group, 
thought he had made the right decision.cS Thus when II.II.H. 
arrived at Quebec on 18 August, in addition to his.own three 
ships, he was greeted by Iodine's warships: Kile, Moroua 
and Styx. At Quebec Sir Alexander left Pile for the 
lighter draught - 19 feet - Valorous, in order to accompany 
the Prince to Montreal, ?.hen the small paddle 3teenier with 
the royal heir reached Montreal, it was welcomed by Valorous, 
¿tyx. and Plying Fish.
At Montreal occurred the first tragedy of the journey. 
Valorni^ £na, Plying Fish had four men killed and several,, y 
badly injured while saluting. The gunners seemed to have 
rafnmed the powder cartridge homo with the.'sponge instead of 
the rammer, The sponge apparently had several burning pieces. I
23 I lilne to Bun las, private, 4 Aug, I860, ilLIi/lO?/}} Hi Inc 
to LG A’, 5 Aug. I860, VLK/103/1/A.-The-Huke of' Kowcastle 
said however that he had asked liilne to . go to Quebec. 
Newcastle. to Somerset," private, 6 Aug. I860, Somerset pa porn 
the County Record Office,Aylesbury,Bucks.
These burningfror:; the previous carti'idgo stuck to it, 
fragments exploded the charge prematurely and the non were 
’blown from her guns*. Milne wrote, 'I am terribly dis­
tressed about tills,' ^
Lady Ililne had cone from Halifax with their oldest 
boy, Alexander David, to see the ceremonies, With Sir 
Alexander they accompanied the royal party to Montreal» 
Ottawa, Toronto and ILL agar a Falls, At Ottawa, II,li.H. had 
laid the foundation stone cf the new Parliament House, The 
hallo were illumin-.ted for the Prince's visit and the daring 
frenchman, Blondin, performed his balancing feats high above 
the roaring cataract, The royal party entered Detroit on
20 September for the American half of their tour, Hie 'mines 
bad returned to Montreal, joined Valorous and sailed for Quebec 
on the 6tH, On their arrival that same day, Alexander David
was suddenly taken 111, After only a few hours of sickness, 
be died of scarlet fever on 7 September, Writing to Sir ; 
Richard Dundas, "ililne said * My wife is keeping up but there 
is a sad blank'with us'; end. to .Pelham, -.’We can only bear' 
tip and say Gods will be done.* ^
29 Milne to no name or date, lIL'i/107/3; LCA to m in e , _14 Sejpt. I 860, Ifm / io i/ i.30 Hi Inc to Dundas, private, 10 3ept, 1060, .: 1 .1007/3;llilne to Pelham, priv- te , 19 October in6o , ::li0 ov/3.
The Prince's reception in New York was a good example of 
the warm welcome he received in the United States, Five 
thousand people attended a Ball in his honour and later, while 
he stood on his hotel balcony, six thousand firemen bearing- 
torches marched past, a chain of flame in the night.
Scarcely a week before,another type of torch-light parade 
took place in New York City, 'Five Files of Wide-Awakes 
in the Streets', said the headline in the New York World 
for 4 October. Tills was a Republican Party demonstration' 
in favour of 'Honest Old Aba - the Rail Splitter',
On the 20th of October, the Prince of Wales drove
through the streets of Portland, Faina and down to his
waiting squadron. Yards were manned and Ws le, Styx,
Ariadne, Flying Fish end the Prince's own ship, the Kero
boomed salutes across the water, ¡'.¡line accompanied Ii.R.H,
out cf the harbour end then Kile and Stye returned to Halifax,
while the future - Icing: sailed for homo, ; Of what permanent
value to relations between cam tries was a tour such as this?
J.L. liotley, American historian end diplomatist, who '.was in
London in 1861, believed that the great welcome given to the
Prince by the U,S, helped to fora English, opinion on the 
31Civil War. Tlds seems rather doubtful, Sidney Lee,
Edward VII»s biographer, said,»Gratitude to tho llorth for
^  L e, 3., op, cit., p. 109.
the attentions recently "bestowed on the son swayed the
32political judgement of the parents'. Certainly the
Prince Consort did help the Union by softening Palmerston's 
crucial despatch during the Trent crisis.
Early in the new year, Milne wrote to one of his 
officers on the coast of Mexico, about conditions at home,
•I have not one word of any news ... everything' is stagnant. 
Whatever the situation in England, the station commander 
would certainly be busy in the new year. The Federal Union 
in the United States was on the point of dissolution and 
before 1861 had ended, an American war with Britain seemed 
to be a distinct possibility.
32 Ibid..
^  Milne toAldham, private, 27 Jan. 1061, lILN/107/3#
CHAPTER II 38
♦Could You Forward a Letter for me to Antigua?*:
The First Problems Raised by the American Conflict.
Early in the winter of I860»Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne 
could be reasonably contented with the condition of the station 
under his command. He had visited many of the islands and had met 
most of the colonial administrators under his protection} he had 
introduced to North America the first heir to the British throne 
ever to visit that continent,and the admiral's preparations had 
enabled that royal personage to sail from the harbour of Portland, 
Maine,without? any untoward incident.Moreover,that September,one 
of Milne's officera,Commander Nowell Salmon,had skilfully elim­
inated the most dangerous of the American filibusters,William 
Walker,without any international complications. In short,at the 
end of the first year of his first foreign command,the fifty-four 
year old rear admiral could view the passing year with some 
satisfaction.
His two main problems were those endemic to the North 
American Station: desertion and Yellow fever. He was taking 
energetic measures to deal with both. Milne's official and 
privat» correspondence during this period reveals little comment 
on American affairs-his concerns were those of any officer on a 
'shakedown' cruise: his men,his ships and the care of British
interests in the vast area under his command»
The first official hint of possible trouble in the United 
States was an Admiralty despatch written On 22 December I860. 
This cautioned Milne to abstains
...from any measure or demonstration likely to give 
umbrage to any party in the United States,or to bear the appearance of partizanship on either side,if the 
internal dissention in those States should be carried to the extent of separation. I
As was often the case,this despatch was accompanied by several 
others sent to Milne,'for your information* and intended as 
a guide. I
I
I LCA to Milne,22 Dec.I860,MLN/I05/I. Professor J.P.Bflxter’s articles are the only specific studies to date of Sir Alex­ander Milne and the N.Ameriean and W,Indian Station during the American Civil War. They are;’The British Government 
and Neutral Rights.I86I-I865’.American Historical Review, 
XXXI7,(1928),pp.9-29,and ’Some British Opinions as to Neutral Rights,1861-1865*.American Journal of International Law,xmil.(1929).pp.517-537. The 1928 volume of the Amer­ican Historical Review also contains Milne’s instructions 
to his cruisers in the 'Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights'.compiled by Prof.Baxter,pp.77-84. Since 
these articles have appeared,Capt.A.Milne Home,RN(ret'd.), a descendant of the admiral,has donated a large collection of Sir Alexander’s papers to the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich,in 1949 and 1965. These Include hundreds of private letters as well as much of the admiral's official correspondence.
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In the first enclosure, the British minister to Washington,
Lord Lyons, urged Lord Russell, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, not to allow a British man-of-war to appear off the 
coast of South Carolina '... at the present moment ... under 
existing circumstances it could hardly fail to be misinterpreted’. 
Russell replied, on 21 December, in a second enclosure, that 
HM Government would not send a warship to Charleston or any other 
place unless British persons or property were endangered. Milne 
was often given ’indirect’ instructions in this manner. He would 
frequently receive, besides Admiralty despatches, consular reports,
tForeign Office memoranda, Law Officers’ opinions and sometimes 
advice from the various colonial governors on the station. Consular 
reports, particularly those of the able E.M, Archibald at New York 
City,2 were of great value to the rear admiral. From the British 
Consuls, both north and south, Milne procured many things of value, 
ranging from copies of Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 
to data on the armaments of both belligerents. Most of the 
information Milne subsequently received was first channelled 
through the Foreign Office, to the Admiralty and then out to the
2 For an informative, though not sufficiently detailed study of this distinguished Nova Scotian, see Life and Letters of Sir E.M. Archibald. KCMC. CB (Toronto,1924)»by a relation, Edith J. Archibald. He served as British Consul at New York from 1857 till 1883, awl was generally, as his biographer' says, p.127, pro-Norihem in his political sentiments during the Civil War.
commander-in-chief of the station. It is a measure of the 
confidence in which he was held as well as of the sagacity of 
those in the Palmerston government that their naval man-on-the- 
spot usually had the latest and best information on any current 
question between Britain and the belligerents. In several cases 
Milne was given the opinion of the government and then left to 
deal with the situation largely as he saw fit. The joint British- 
French and Spanish expedition to Mexico in 1861-62 is a good 
illustration of this fact. It will be dealt with in detail in 
the fmrtb chapter.
Sir Alexander also benefited from frequent correspondence
with the British Minister at Washington, Lord Lyons, Beginning
about December I860, the minister and the admiral kept each
other fully informed of their respective situations) their
private and official correspondence only ceased when Mine left
the station in March 1864, As Sir Alexander had spent twelve
years at the Admiralty before his appointment to the station,
he had many friends in Whitehall* Mine enjoyed letters from his
■aold friend, the First Naval Lord, Sir R, Dundas, and when that 
admiral died in June 1861, his successor, Sir Frederick Grey, took 
up the task of keeping Mine privately informed on home affairs, 3
3 Vice Admiral Sir Richard S, Dundas was, in 1855,thecommander of the naval forces in the Baltic during theCrimean war.
The civilian First Lord of the Admiralty, the Duke of Somerset 
had never written privately to Milne, the rear admiral felt 
that the Duke was disinclined to do so,^ However, as American 
affairs became more serious, Somerset too became a not infrequent 
contributor to Milne's private mailbag* It will be seen then, 
that the station commander was not merely a cypher taking orders 
from an impersonal authority; rather, Sir Alexander was often 
able to influence and shape policy according to his own view of 
the particular circumstances.
After the initial Admiralty warning in December I860, 
regarding a possible American conflict, there was a lull in 
station affairs* As was the custom, Milne left Halifax that 
December and sailed south to winter at Bermuda. In early January, 
he toured the West Indies, as he had done on first assuming the 
command in the previous year* Visiting Antigua, Barbados, Trinidad 
Port Royal, and Nassau, he then returned to Bermuda. With the 
exception of Trinidad these were his main bases on the southern 
half of the station* He was thus fully au courant with the 
capabilities as well as the limitations of his Caribbean outposts* 
Milne delayed his departure from Barbados so as to welcome Prince 
Alfred, second son of the Queen. The Prince, a midshipman in the 4
4 Milne to Grey, private, 27 June 1861, MLN/107*
±3
battleship St.George arrived in February 1861,and was immediately 
taken on an unceasing round of receptions,picnics and balls. 
Though the Queen had sent the seventeen-year-old lad out to the 
colonies thinking the trip would benefit him, Sir Alexander 
feared that the unacclimatized youth,subjected to such great 
exertions in a warm climate,might fall victim to Yellow fever. ® 
Happily, as with the Prince of Wales' visit the previous year to 
North America, all went well-Victoria's progeny seemed to have 
had unusual stamina. With time out for leave,Alfred stayed on 
the station until February 1862,when he was sent home because of 
the death of his father,the Prince Consort. Milne thought well 
of the young prince and in later years Alfred often sought his 
advice.
Initial British Policies ■
In the early spring, disquieting messages arrived from several 
sources. Consul Archibald at New York advised the Foreign Office 
on 6 April that several TJ.S. armed vessels,among them the Powhatan 
were to leave that day on an unknown mission. Some people,he 
wrote,believed they were going to relieve Fort Pickens in Florida 
or Fort Sumter in South Carolina, The consul thought that the 
expedition was going to Texas to protect the western frontier of 
that state. Archibald's 'confidential agent ' -who was tidily paid 5
5 Milne to Dundas,private,26 Feb.1861,MLN/I07/3•
by Milne from his pettycash fund - assured the consul that the 
armaments and complement of the Powhatan were correctly stated 
in the newspaper* This information was speedily sent to Sir 
Alexander on 20 April 1861.^ The Powhatan reinforced Fort Picken3 
in Florida and the rest of the small squadron under Gustavus Fox 
went to the relief of Fort Sumter, But Fox was too late; the fort 
was being shelled by the State of South Carolina when his ships 
appeared off the bar; the little force returned to New York; the 
Civil War had begun.
Milne had arrived at Bermuda from his station tour on 2$ April. 
The next day he received a note from the Consul General at Havana* 
Joseph Crawford, informing him that hostilities had broken out between
nthe Northern and Southern sections of the United States* Information 
and advice soon began to flow in to Admiralty House in Bermuda* On 
4 May* the First Naval Lord wrote to Sir Alexander that he believed 
a conflict 'inevitable', noted that there was much talk of letters 
of marque and blockades, which subjects he said the Law Officers of 
the Crown were then considering; and offered Milne some 'unofficial' 
advice:
make no unnecessary show of force in any quarters and above all things to be strictly neutral ••• if blockades^ are declared by either party you will have no questions to ask, except to consider whether the force to maintain them is effective... all British vessels however will be entitled 67
6 LCA to Milne, 20 April 1861, MLN/105/2.
7 The Admiral's Journals, entry for 26 April 1861* ADM *>0/303j from the Public Record Office. Other material from this source cited as F,0, (Foreign Office) and PRO 30/22 series, the Russell Papers, as well as C.G. (.Colonial Office) and W^0.(War Office),
to due notice of every Blockade and due warning before they can be legally captured or prevented from quitting a blockaded port*®
A dm. Dundas told Milne to advise British ship masters to show 
•excessive civility' to *Yankee officers', but 'never to concede 
undoubted rights'. This was the veteran admiral's last letter to 
Milne, He died on 3 June 1861 and Sir Frederick Grey became 
First Naval Lord,
But Sir Alexander himself,previous to the receipt of Dundas' 
letter^had been giving some thought to the problems raised by the 
nascent American conflict. Though not officially informed of the 
fact as yet, he knew by 1 May of Lincoln's initial proclamation of 
19 April ordering the blockade of southern ports. He also knew of 
President Davis' invitation to privateers to accept letters of 
marque. On 1 May, then, he wrote the Admiralty for advice on several 
relevant questions. These enquiries reveal the as yet unsettled 
state of international law regarding belligerent naval rights and 
obligations. Though there existed some rather tenuous Judicial 
precedents arising mostly from prise cases, the only substantial 
international agreement on these rights had been the Declaration of 
Paris, in 1856,9 This document had never been signed by the U.S„
8?. Dundas to Milne, private, 4 May 1861, MLN/107«
9„ For further information on the Declaration of Paris, andthe diplomatic misunderstanding it engenderedj see E,D. Adams' Great Britain and the American Civil War (New York, I925)*i,l37 ff
primarily because, as a nation without a large standing navy, she had 
in her previous wars always relied to a lqrge extent on privateering, 
which the Declaration had abolished. The three other rules adopted 
"by Britain, France and several other powers at that time were*
2. The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the 
exception of contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, 
are not liable to capture under the enemy’s flag.
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective,
that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really 
to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. 10
Milne was therefore responsible for asking the first specific 
questions in an actual wartime situation, regarding the general­
ize tionsof the Declaration of Paris. His letter of 1 May asked, 
regarding the North and South*
1» Are they to be considered in a state of actual war?
2. If so, how far is the Paris Declaration of 1856 in respect to 
free ships making free goods, if not contraband of war, and 
neutral goods, not contraband, not being seizable in Enemies ships, to be considered applicable to British ships conveying 
goods, the property of either of the Belligerents) or their 
ships conveying British goods?
3. Are the Belligerents to be allowed to visit and search our 
Merchant Ships on the High Seas? 45
4. Contraband of war will probably be defined by each of the 
Belligerents?
5. The validity of a Blockade held to be dependent on its efficiency? 
The admiral ended his letter by noting the »extreme importance*
these rules had to British commerce generally, and ©specially questions 
2*3, and 4 as regards »our lines of Packets, both ocean and inter­
colonial*. He thus anticipated the problems raised by the Trent affair.
10 Ibid.. t>. 140.
-1* : Milne to ECA, 1 May 1861, MLN/103/2/B.
The Admiralty, after consultation with the Foreign Office and the 
law Officers, answered Milne’s questions exactly one month later* 
Their Lordships affirmed that a state of war was to be considered 
as in effect between the North and South. As to Milne’s second 
question they pointed out that as neither side had signed the 
Declaration of Paris ’••• the rules laid down in that Declaration 
"will not be applicable to British vessels and goods.’ Both sides 
could search British vessels; except as to obvious contraband such 
as ammunition and military stores, each belligerent should define 
’"'hat they consider to be contraband* Lastly, the Admiralty stated 
that the ’validity of a Blockade must be held to be dependant on 
its efficiency’. 12
On 12 May, Lyons wrote to the rear admiral apprizing him that 
the present British policy is to keep entirely aloof from the
12 LCA to Milne, 1 June 1861, MLN/105/2, The Federals issued a list of the goods they considered contraband. It was sent to Russell by Lyons on 25 May, FO 414 A7, Confidential, Among the items listed was coal. While a member of the Board of Admiralty, Milne wrote a Minute 
on 24 May.. 1859 which held that if Britain were at war with a maritime nation, then I think there can be no doubt that that country would declare coal to be contraband of war’, and that fif a coal depot were allowed to be kept on shore, or afloat, it would be considered a breach of neutrality,’ He asked the Law Officers'opinion on these points. On 10 June 1859, the Law Officers agreed with Milne that if coal was declared contraband, it could not be sold to a belligerent from a neutral’s government stores« but it might be purchased from private merchants, MLN/p/b/3 (h)Coaling 1852-1870. This opinion was confirmed by Russell when he prohibited the belligerents from establishing coal depots in British ports but permitted them to purchase coal. in limited quantllifsand at stated times, from private sources in British possessions.
q.uarrel’, that Her Majesty’s warships ’...should not interfere 
either with the Blockade or with the Southern Privateers'. But 
Lyons added that the protection of British persons and property 
was of paramount interest. The minister thought the most 
important thing was '...to have the means of communicating with 
you as fast as possible in case of need'. As Milne was then 
at Bermuda and could only be reached by ship- a three to five day 
trip from the mainland- Lyons was understandably worried. The 
rear admiral however, soon left Bermuda and arrived in Halifax 
on 21 May. This enabled him to be in telegraphic,packet.postal 
and personal messenger communication with Lord Lyons. The month 
Of May 1861 was an anxious one for the British naval and dip­
lomatic representatives in Month America. Milne agreed fully with 
Lyons about the inexpediency of any British naval force appearing 
off the American coast unless absolutely necessary. The Admiral 
ty advised Milne on 18 May to ’exeroise your discretion’ in
15sending any of his ships to TJ.S. or C.S. ports.
During the summer of 1861, Lord Lyons was daily becoming
more and more worried about a possible war with the North. Be
came to believe that Secretary of State Seward was determined to
16re-unite the shattered country by means of a foreign war.
Lyons to Milne,private,12 May I86I,MLN/I07.
I4, Milne to Lyons,10 May 1 8 6 1,MLN/I03/I0/J.
LCA to Milne,18 May I86I.MLN/I05/2.
16 Adams, op, oit., p.124.
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One of the initial shocks to Lyons* composure was Sewards 
declaration in May that a Canadian steamer, the >
then rumoured to be fitting out on Lake Ontario as a rebel 
privateer, would be seized regardless of her ownership.
Troubled by the ‘arrogant spirit* of the American Government, 
Lyons reminded Seward *of the extreme susceptibility which had 
at all times been manifested by the Americans themselves on the 
subject of any interference with vessels under their own flag**17 
In the event, little further was heard of the incident. Lyons 
told Russell in December of the 'ludicrous* outcome; the vessel, 
he claimed, had all the time been purchased by the U.S. Govern­
ment itself.18 It is doubtful if Seward knew of the purchase 
when he protested; probably the local authorities bought the ship 
without telling Washington at the time.
Her Majesty's Warships on the American Coast
At Halifax, Rear Admiral Milne was carefully watching the 
developing situation; he was preparing to inspect the blockade. 
Russell had written to the Admiralty on 1 May asking them to 
reinforce the station and »11 through that summer ships and 
supernumeraries were arriving from England. As he had not yet
17 Lyons to Russell, Confidential, 2 May 1861, FO 414/17»
18 Same to same, Confidential, 6 Dec,1861, FO 414A7.
received an answer to his despatch of I May to the Admiralty-
19h e ‘was not to receive their instructions until late June * - 
Milne sent a telegram to Lyons on 24 May. As soon as the packets 
from both Boston and Liverpool reached Halifax thus giving him 
the latest advices from both Lyons and the Admiralty,Milne pro­
posed to dispatch ships to cruise ’in the Gulf of Florida and 
on the coast of the Southern States*.20 Sir Alexander asked 
Lyons where his ships might communicate most conveniently with 
the minister and asked his Opinion about their appearing off 
blockaded southern ports. Milne considered it inadvisable that 
his ships should actually enter any of the southern ports-bloe- 
kaded or not. Lyons replied on the next day,agreeing with all of, 
Milne’s plans and intimating that no time should be lost in 
protecting British commerce,as’...Privateers are already at work 
at New Orleans'.21 The British minister believed that EM warships 
were only necessary on the American coast at this time to protect 
British merchant vessels from privateers;*...but for this purpose’ 
he added,'the presence of British men-of-war may be very necessary’.
19 Supra.,p. ¿7 ,for these instructions.
20 Lyons to Milne,25 May 1861,FO 5/764.
21 Jbid.The main British objections to privateers,of whatever naticm, can be summed up in Lyons to Russell,X8 April 1861,FQ 5/763: 'Privateers are not ordinarily very scrupulous in discriminating 
between hostile and friendly flags when profit is to be acquired 
and risk of detection seems small*. 2
22 Lyons to Milne,25 May,1861,FO 5/764.
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While he had no specific objection to Milne’s ships 
communicating with British consuls in southern ports, he concurred 
with the rear admiral in believing that they should go there 
as infrequently as possible* Lyons confided to Milne at this 
date that 'an officer of the U.S. is under considerable 
temptation to obtain for himself popular applause by violent 
proceedings against Great Britain*.23 In six months these words 
were to become ironically true - but not because of any conflict 
between a British cruiser and a Union blockader.
On the 31st the rear admiral thanked Lyons for bis advice
of the 25th and told the minister that he had on the previous day,
sent out two ships with sealed orders, which were to be opened
on leaving the harbour* Hi© Jason 21, Capt* von Donop, was
'to cruise between the south and southwest coast of Florida and
the mouths of the Mississippi, calling fortnightly at the Havana',
HMS 'Gladiator 6, Commander Hickley, was to cruise 'between Cape
Fear, North Carolina and New York where she will call once a fort-
92»
night to communicate with the British Consul there' *
23 Lyons to Milne, 25 May 1861, FO a shorter notewritten on the same date as that of his main despatch
quoted above,
2^  Milne to Iyons, 31 May 1861, MLN/l03/l0/j * Many of the actualsailing orders to each ship are in * Sailing Orders, MLN/llO/l/CC,
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Milne noted that some of his instructions embraced certain 
points »upon which although HM'S Government have not furnished 
precise instructions, it was my duty to advert* so that his 
officers in this 'delicate duty' might be prepared ' ••• to act 
with confidence and not solely upon their own responsibility'#2^
On 6 June HMS Racer 11. Qimndr# Lyons, arrived at Halifax 
and left on the 1 1 th to cruise between the southern part of 
Florida and Cape Fear, 26 On 30 May Milne had instructed 
Commpndore Hugh Dunlop, the commander of the Jamaica Division, 
that because of the relative isolation of Port Royal naval station 
from the American coast,he should make his temporary headquarters 
at Havana# Scarcely'' a month then, after Lincoln's announcement 
of the blockade of southern ports and a fortnight after the Queen's 
proclamation of neutrality had been printed in the American news­
papers (28 May), Admiral Milne had an effective system of inspect­
ing the Federal blockade and rendering assistance to British subjects 
in full operation# By August British warships were covering the
25 Milne to Lyons, Confidential, 31 May 1861, F05/765#
26 Algernon McLennon Lyons was a cousin of Lord Lyons# He had been on the station since 1860# Though Lyons irritated Milne by grounding his ship several times and by 'reprimanding' a British consul, strictly a Foreign Office function,yet he matured rapidly# His reports on the blockade and on u.S#^ defences in November 1862 amply prove his intelligence and 
insight# He commanded the station from 1886-1889#
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entire U.S, coast from ^ exas to Fortress Monroe. If the blockade 
was found to be deficient at any port the commanders of the 
British cruisers were to apprise the nearest Union blockading 
officer of the fact. This somewhat offensive procedure was 
discontinued in October 1861,27 Milne's principal reason for 
Inspecting the blockade was, he told his officers, '...., so that 
any British Sufferers, whose right to claim redress might
eventually be recognised by HM Government may have the benefit of
reference to your reclamations made on the spot*. 2^ These ships
were usually relieved every three months* They continued cruising
all that summer, fall and winter, only being recalled when, after
the Trent crisis, Lord Russell recognised, for all practical
29purposes, the efficiency of the Union blockade*
27
28
29
Milne to Commanders of Steady and Racer. Confidential Memo,
16 Oct. 1861, MLN/103 A 6 A J.
Baxter, J.P* ‘Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights* American Historical Review. XXXIV (1928),pp* 77-84. This document section contains Milne * s complete instructions to his cruisers, 
together with all changes suggested by the Queen's Advocate.
The French squadron in American waters, though with fewer ships 
and on a smaller seal®, also inspected the Union blockade in 1861* 'pour montrer le pavillon et détermina autant que faire se pourrant l’efficacité et la force du blocus'. From a report by M M 3  Catlnat. in Lyons to Russell 5 Sept. 1861, F.0.4L4/20, The French government asked for a copy of Mine's Instructions 
which were given to the French admiral in North America. The 
C-ln-c of the French station told his officers in late July, 
'Pour le moment Jusqu’« nouvel ordre,ces blocus sont reconnus effectif,..’ French Archives,MAR BB4 798,Adm. to officers,25 July,1861, See this number for reportB of French warships that inspected the blockade. They seemed to have stopped this prac­
tice early in 1862,at the same time as the British.
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The station commander’s original instructions to his 
cruisers were supplemented on 20 June after he had received the 
Law Officers'answers to his questions of 1 Kay* On 25 June he 
received the observations of the Queens Advocate to his original 
instructions of 30 May* Lyons considered the observations ’super­
fluous', but they were incorporated into the instructions# The 
only important point, Lyons thought, was that of British subjects 
captured as privateersmen* The Federal authorities had threatened 
to hang southern privateersmen as pirates and the British Minister 
wa3 concerned, as ’there are four British Subjects in this plight 
now on trial at New York'*^° Article nine of Milne's original 
instructions held 'that British subjects, who are only hostile 
privateersmen cannot rightfully, when captured as such on the 
high seas, be treated as Pirates "jure gentiilm" by President 
Lincoln’* The four Britishers were threatened with hanging by 
the New York Court. President Davis, however, said if they were 
hung he would hang an equal number of Union prisoners; the Federals 
backed down and the privateersmen were saved from the gallows#
In the event, British cruiser commanders never had to deal with the 
possibility of Federals hanging British privateersmen - so, on the 
station, that article of the instructions turned out to be of 30
30 Lyons to Milne, private, 8 July 1861, MLN/L07* 'Punch' magazine, usually so sensitive to slights on British subjects believed that any such, caught as Privateersmen, should be hanged, buried at the foot of the *^ endlet their epitapn be "A good Riddance of bad Rubbish , quote
from the issue of 1 June 1861, p#220*
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minimal importance. Probably the only important addition to 
the instructions made on 20 June m s  the closing of all 
British and Colonial ports to prises of either belligerent, 
lord Russell felt that this order 'ought to be considered a 
friendly act'. 31 by the North, as indeed it vas. Though his 
prediction was not to prove correct, Seward said it would 
probably prove to be a death blow to Southern Privateering'.
The last additions to Mine's instructions were made on 12
November 1861. Two of these were based on the experience
of the station's cruising warships; Article B stipulated that
in cases of British vessels debarred from entry or exit to
blockaded ports, no British naval officer would interfere -
the matter would be settled by Her Majesty's Government. This
was a direct outgrowth of the ¿ n k s s a  “ se whleh “ill shortly
be examined. Article D ordered HM naval officers a. a general
rule to 'abstain from making known the particular nature of the
orders you may be acting under'. This was an outgrowth of the __
Jason imbroglio at Pensacola, which episode will also be recounted.
After the additions of 12 November 1861, these instruction.
remained the 'standard orders' for HM Ships deling with the Northern
and Southern belligerents, until the end of the war. There were,
v , /  from time to time to all cruisershowever, additional orders issued rrom
to cover specific situations*
31 Russell to Lyons, private, 22 June 1861, PRO 30/22/96.
32 Lyons to Russell, 17 June 1861, F.O. kXk/17*
33 Dunlop to yilne, 1 August 1861, ADM 128/$6.
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Iyons, in a letter to Milne of 10 June 1861, which was 
received by the admiral four days later, heartily agreed with 
the instructions to the cruisers* He added, however, confidentially,
’I do not regard a sudden declaration of War against U3 by the 
United States as an event altogether impossible at any moment*
If I think the danger imminent and am precluded from telegraph­
ing in cypher I will send you the following telegrams 
"Could you forward a letter for me to Antigua?" 34 There was a 
great deal of agitation against England at this time both officially 
and in the newspapers largely because of the Queen’s Proclamation 
of Neutrality, which led, in the North to a feeling of ’betrayal* 
by the .Mother: Country.^ Lyons put his finger on an important 
distinction between the belligerents in this same letters
We should I suppose,make a slight shade of difference 
as far as honoursand such things are concerned, between the United States which we recognise as de .jure and de facto as a friendly and legitimate Government and the Confederates 
whom we only regard as de facto belligerents*
As can he imagined Milne was immediately alarmed by Lyons’ fears*
He wrote to the Admiralty on 27 June informing their Lordships that
34 Lyons to Milne, Private, 10 June 1861, MLN/107,
35 Mr, 1, Cunard of the shipping family, writing to Lyons from New 
York on 29 May 1861 believed the North had some grounds for resenting British neutrality ’..* when we remenfcer the large ^  quantity of powder, arms and provisions which were purchased byour Government in this City during the Crimean War and shipped . in American Vessels to England, and direct to Sebastopol.’ F0 5/7&5.
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 ^ . - xA the Bermuda Dockyard commandant,he had sent a secret telegram to the cermu ^
t , „ „ „  cnwrd. States may declare varIt read 'Most secret be on your gua
suddenly, tell Governor'. If the federal, "hould
concentrate their blockading force., the roar admiral thought
that Bermuda ’might offer great temptation to an enterprising
American c o l d e r - .  Kline also sent warnings to his crui.lhg
ships. Ha wished, on receiving Lyons' warning, to col
his forces at Halifax, but he re,Used that the demands for the pro-
tection of British commerce on the American coast prohibit
xu -ecv. admiral requested a further a move. In June, therefore, the rear
immediate increase of ships, '.socially «g at e ,  and Corvettes'
- small vessels useful in American shoal waters. Kilne wrote a
length to the Admiralty describing th. ^ e q u a t e  «•*»“ “  ot 
command. He had a total of twenty-five ships and only -on. avail-
u, • i c*w iee0 6  The home government hadable ship for any special service »
* a +ua+ summer and also steadily reinforced the troops in Canada tha
. , . ¿ 1  there were over thirtyincreased Milne's force. By November 1 $
xu x H a w  *nd the Trent crisis brought an effective ships on the station ana tne -- ■
to over forty men-of-war,immediate strengthening of the squadron . 3 7
„ station since the War of 18X2* This was the largest force seen on the station
36 Kline to LCA, Secret, 27 June 1861, M U A 0 3 A A .
37 For a month by month taUcatlonot comndsaloniduring the Civil War see the
ADM 8/139-43.
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Ona of the principal reasons for Lyons* anxiety at this 
time, was the 'Southern Ports Bill»,* one of whose sections would 
close all the southern ports by legislative figt* This would 
effect a 'paper' blockade, something which Britain would always 
oppose as it meant that British merchant ships could be intercepted
anywhere near one belligerent's' coast without the other belllg
being forced to undertake an expensive and hazardous blockade. On
,, . Tsv.iriani'i 'would not observe a 19 July Russell notified Lyons that England oui
xv 38 The Bill was passed
’legislative closing’ of the southern p •
by Congress that month but Seward told Lyons that It was merely an 
'enabling not operative Aet, that it depended entirely upon the 
President whether or not it was even put into execution.' Seward said 
that anything from England whieh irritated the Northern people, 
might render it imposaibl. to postpone bringing the Bill into
39operation by Proclamation*
' . a n « -  in veiled threats* The U,S,Seward certainly did not believe in
j_ one of the few times he seems Minister to Britain* C,F* Warns, ■
... M s  chief * confided to Lord, to have been at cross purposes with his
»would be a violation of theRussell that such a proclamation
, e* which requires all the ports of the
Constitution of the United Stat m
, 40 gut like so many of these early a s  Union to be equally open •
and excursions'. the crisis evaporated. On 16 August Seward told
38 SE^ - ’ P‘ ^  , Confidential* 20 duly 1861. f«b 30/22/35.
39 Lyons to Russell, Private and Conf
fc Bussell to lyons, 6 duly 1661. P*° 30/22/96.
59
Lyons «confidentially..... that there was no question now of 
issuing the Proclamation closing the Ports*. «He had no doubt*, 
Lyons added, »heard of the increase of Admiral M i ne ’s Squadron. 
A little success in raising money and a small turn of fortune 
in the field, may render a further sedation of the same kind 
desirable*. 41
A Dangerous Place for a Neutral Warship
The only incident of any importance involving Milne*3 cruising 
ships occurred when Captain von Donop of HMS Jason anchored off 
Confederate-held Pensacola in late June. The New York Times for 
9 July announced that a British steam frigate was then at Pensacola} 
Lbs commander, the Times asserted,had given Milne’s views on the 
blockade:
The Treaty of Paris has not laid down any rules by which 
we may know what is and what is not an effective blockade.Admiral Milne makes up for the deficiency. Here tg his definition as furnished by one of his subordinate commanders:1* No port is blockaded efficiently if any vessel can enter or depart from it unknown to or in spite of the guarding 
men of war,2. An efficient blockade necessitates the complete cutting off of all maritime ingress or egress, except in regard to harbor islands having no outlet to the sea, save under the 
guns of the fleet.3. The escape of the third vessel from the blockading squadron 
signalizes the invalidity of the blockade.
Lyons to Russell,16 August, 1861, PRO 30/22/35.
Mine was troubled by these 'preposterous statements* and 
felt 'that in the present feverish anxiety of the commercial 
world' on the subject of the blockade great importance might 
he attached to them»^ Lyons added to the admiral* s vexation 
hy saying M s  supposed rules had 'created some sensation' in
Washington but that the minister when asked, claimed that the
L3Rimes' 'rules' were not those of the British admiral«
Prom Halifax, on 15 July, Mine wrote to Commodore Dunlop,
▼on Donop's immediate superior''- in the Gulf• and asked for an 
explanation of the incident, Pensacola, being in Confederate 
hands, he noted, was one of the places to be avoided, principally 
because it was undesirable to place HM ships in the position of 
having to render honours to the Secession-Flag,^* Captain von 
Donop in his report to Mine said that as -fJasoja1 passed the 
blockading ships before Pensacola ’they played our national air*. 
There being no specific instructions against it, the captain 
there upon decided to pay a visit to the Union naval officers. He 
vas politely received and the Federal officer expressed a 'desire 
bo see our Armstrong Gun, And as it was getting dark, X determined 
bo anchor for bhe night to enable him to see ib*« ^  &
&  Mine toLCA, 17 July 1861, KLNA03/3/C.
^  Lyons to Milne, privabe, 22 July 1861, MLN/lO?.
^  Mine to Dunlop, 1 5 July 1861,'MLN/L03/15/Q *
^5 Von Donop to Milne, 1 July 1861, ADM 1/5759F*
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It was apparently at this time that the New York Times reporter 
spoke to one of Jason’s officers or perhaps concocted the story 
himself regarding Milne’s blockade orders. The Armstrong was 
Just being introduced to the navy in 1861 and though it was to 
Prove faulty,this did not become evident for some time. Another 
U-S. officer who inspected Jason’s new cannon that summer was 
David Dixon Porter and he wrote to his old friend,Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox,on 5 July:
I went on board a small English screw sloop the other day(the Jason)and with her one Armstrong gun{which some folks say is a failure,but which I say is not)she would whip the largest ship in the Navy out of her boots,or more properly speaking her pumps,as ships don’t wear 
boots. The point blank range of this Armstrong gun is 
l|- miles which settles the question for none of our guns will more than reach that with the greatest elevation.
Of course,the station commander knew nothing of the confidential 
correspondence between Porter and Fox. In the event,Milne 
aPProved of the Union officers being shown the new piece of 
ordnance.
The New York Times was,however,not quite finished with the 
British rear admiral. From Fort Pickens on 7 July came another 
long article entitled,’The British Admiral’s Opinion of the 
Blockade,His Report to the British Admiralty,He Considers the 
Blockade Totally Inefficient’. It was printed on 25 July 
**4 was more sinister than the first as it professed to be
actual despatch from the commander-in-chief of the station to the 46
46 Thompson.R.M. and WalnwrighttR.(ed.) T^ e Confidentlal Correspond; gnce of Gustavus Vasa Fox,I8oI-I8S5{New York,I?I8j,li,p./0.
Admiralty, In the article, Milne cast scornon the confusion and
niis-managsment of the blockade. He spoke of the,
! perfect inefficiency of the men-of-war, in rega^ j;0 
stopping of commercial intercourse with ports before which
they have appeared... the lack of vigilance of^ , •
squadron, I sent Cpt. von Donop of the JaSon look after the interests of our shipping ... He mentions 
numerous cases of ships ... escaping the cruisers.1
On 7 August an exasperated Kilne wrote the Admiralty, calling
the »despatch», »utterly devoid of foundation»The Yankees had
certainly made the most of Captain von Donop»s visitj but the
rear admiral may unwittingly have also scored a point with Porter’s
vivid description of the new British long range cannon to the
Secretary of the Havy’s chief assistant,
What did Sir Alexander himself think of the struggle in these 
first few months of the war? It is difficult to sayj his personal 
correspondence was seldom speculative - it was usually directed at 
an immediate problem or idea. On the 12 July he did however, 
write to his stepmother, the Dowager Lady Milne, at Inveresk,
Scotland*
47 Milne to LCA, 7 August 1861, ML»A03/3/&.
I aee no hope or chance of reconciliation and 
yet I cannot bring myself to believe that a vast country is to be broken up into separate states, a few weeks must decide the question, for the present proceed­
ings must bring ruin in both North and South.r 48
It can be said that the Station commander-in-chief as the agent 
°f his government, pursued in the early stages of the war the 
policy- of his superiors* that of steadfast neutrality*
From June onwards Mine’s cruising ships sent highly accurate 
reports through him to the Admiralty. They showed many weaknesses 
in the blockading forces] but a glance at one chart compiled by 
HMS -Gladiator’s Cmmdr. Hickley, for June, July and August 1 8 a 
shows the increasing appearance of Federal warships before the 
southern ports. Milne informed the First Naval Lord on 5 September 
that while the blockade south of Cape Henry had not been effective, 
the Union ships in the Gulf ’are very efficient and always on 
the move and very zealous’. 49 Two of his officers also noted that 
’all the naval officers of the United States Ships are very civil..* 5°
48
49
50
Milne to the Dowager Lady Milne,12July private papers
of the Milne Home family. Capt. A. ssion to
Milne (d. 1938) to the National Maritime Museum, Greenwicn.
Klin, to Grey, private, 5 Sept. 18 6 1. W U / 10 7,P.rl.p.p.r^XX(l862),P
Miln©* to Grey.op.cit»,ULN/I07»
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The British government, as the world1» largest nava 
power, considered the blockade as a weapon which if not 
uniquely its own ranked high in its armoury 
instruments.?1 The British were understandably loath to 
question too closely th. workings of this weapon by the 
Federal», lest precedents be set which could one day be used 
against her. As early as 6 November, Bussell, while asking 
Lyons' opinion on th. matter, thought that th. conclusions 
Which -I draw from these Consular!) reports compiled with the 
information received from the co*nd.r. of HM Cruisers is that 
the blockade mu3t be regarded as generally effective agai 
foreign trade'. ?2 Two days later, the Foreign Secretary 
allowed that 'British interests may profit to some extent y 
the imperfect manner in which th. blockade may be maintained and
, <M„ David Milne, (1763-18«) commanded,
51 Milne’s famous father Admiral Sir Cherbourg blockading Squadron, 
for a time during the Frenchwars, Boston harbour. For «* ' •
During the War of 1812, he Report on th.interesting account of 0f Wedderburn. Castle,N.B. »
Manuscripts of Col. David ^ ® ^ % n d o n , 1902),pp. 145-176. Sir Historical Manuscripts Co^"A ^j7 7 of Boston »writing on 30 May 181k* David maintained a close bloc^ ® v disaPpointed when I would not 1 they fhe ’Americans} are very mu ghore?. For an authentic record _ even allow them to trade along 0f blockading see Capt.Basilof the often high-handed Sritish^ma^r i04o),e.g.,p.47» __H a ll's  Fv.mmyiPnt.Fi o f Vovagg* *n i^j'uTtrn seen several dozen ship s,
wherein thS author to belying a league or two off Ptish ships. This was before the ^  searched for French goods by Britisn P ^ Hall’s son served
of 1&2 and the vessels were m o s t ^ ¿ ^ riCan* Pwith Milne on the station in the 18bU s.
52 Russell to Lyons, Confidential, 6. Kovemher ISO., F.0, M li /20,
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it is questionable how far they would be advanced by the 
attention of the U.S, government being called to the ineffective­
ness of the blockade** 53 Despite his earlier pessimistic thoughts 
on the ability of the Federáis to blockade three thousand miles 
of coastline, by the fall of 1861 Lord John was evidently willing to 
give them the benefit of the doubt* That November, Lyons wrote to 
Russell that though vessels could run the blockade
1 it is very far from being a mere Paper Blockade,,,, if it were as inefficient as Mr. Jefferson Davis says,,, 
he would not be so very anxious to get rid of it,* 5**
It will be seen then that Russell had really acquiesced in the Union
blockade some four months before his letter of 15 February 1862,
which, published in the Parliamentary Papers of that year, caused
such distress to Southern statesmen. This letter put the seal of
British approval on Northern efforts to shut off the south from
s®a borne succour. It declared:
Assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and 
also that a number of ships is stationed and remain at the entrance of a port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident danger of entering or leaving It,and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it ... will not of itself prevent the _blockade from being an effective one by international law. * 55
53 Russell to Lyons, Confidential» 8 Nov. 1861, F,0, 414/20.
54 Adams, ofc^cit^ip, 254.
55 Russell to Iyons, Confidential, 15 Feb, 1862» F.O. 414/20; also in Baxter ’The British Government and Neutral Rights*, 2E*£lt., p,12j see also Pari. Papers,£l862j^ LX2I, pt.l.
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A Pitfall Avoided
Hear l ^ r a l  « 1 »
incident with- a blockade running skipper in the summer
It is a good illustration of the judgement of the sta
, state of the finer points
commander as well as of the unsettl
l »„must Milne received a letter of blockade law at the time. On 6 Augu
„ * the < alliance* of Liverpool,from a Samuel D. Forest, Master of the M i - ---
, o from Halifax on the 14th toCapt, Forest said that he was sailing rr
u- .eked S ir Alexander’s advice on Havana on a trading voyage. He asked air
the following points*
How near the Blockaded coast * 2 ^  ô w r t a S k  and endoreed
without being subject to h^ve rny PaP to reach my
by U.S. Cruisers. If d*sÎS;V S t s  of the blockadedestination or a port beyond theixmi^ without serious risk
offering proper facilities I°r rJ^ghôuld I bear away for the of loss of vessel, cargo and »  ^ Would my vessel and cargo nearest Port on the blockaded coast under suchbe liable to forfeiture for approaching
circumstances? 5®
__.„d nil3 trip from LiverpoolCaptain Forest did mention that on a pr®
a the coast by a Union warship, to Charleston he had been warned
avowing th at he could not
Milne answered Forest on 8 ugus * .
v. ised that the Captain probablywithold his advice because he reali®
, - . c0cnsel on the subject from anycould not obtain experienced legal *
, .-v-rvuined that his opinions were in other source. Sir Alexander expla 56
56 Milne to LCA, 8 August 1861» ADM 1/5759P.
6?,  , _ e r s . Belligerent's courts,’no way binding on the American
l9Wi, He believed ’•••• that a interpreting their own prize la rie h t to  endorse notice of,Belligerent Cruizer has a perf
, t vhich notice is good for theBlockade on a Neutrals papers
Emitted that the U.S. warships voyage*, Milne thus tacitly admi
could endorse a neutral’s papers at any stage of that party^ 
journey. Secondly, he advised the captain of the A
that, if disabled, he should make for a British por
impossible, Kilne said the that, a Northern port. If this was P
, 4- c+ a U S Cruiser from whom he wouldcaptain should txy and contact a • •
fWlral Closed his letter with a receive assistance. The rear admiral cio
, 4. « that the entries in your logwarning to take ’great care ••• wa.
shall be correct as to prove that your proceedings are ■■
and above suspicion which of course I assume they would
i 4 a in a report to Kiltie t>y 
The next, we hear of the 13 111
4 the Union blockade, Cramdr*one of his ships cruising to inspe
. a ™  1 October that the AU^BS« and Hewett of HMS Rinaldo reported on 1 Wwere in Beajifort, N,C, when he
another blockade runner, the GondaX
had lately passed that port.5* The British vice consul there,
William Walker,told Hewett that since both ships had entered
' . no blockade was effectedBeaufort on 23 August and, he claim » ,Mtled to leave. Walker pointed
till 6 September - both ships were entitled 57
57 Milne to  Samuel D, Forest, 8 August 1661, MLNA03A1A.
53 LCA to Hammond, Confidential, 30 Oct. 1861. F O - A
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 ^-u
, ,, . -Ml3a m  southern harbours toout that Sewards' rules allowed ship
+hp blockade commenced*59 There leave up to a fortnight after t
, .. correspondence involving
followed a long, acidulous and r., federates and Kline to find
Lyons, Consul Bunch, the U.S., e
The U S. claimed that the blockade the true facts of the case. Tb® u*:>#, . arrived and that theyhad been established before either sh P
had both slipped in illegally; Bunch upheld Vic. Consul W * « .  
while Captain Hewett of advised both sUppena hot to ry
to run the blockade out of Beaufort while the case was being
. m,. correspondence between
investigated by the British governmen . officersx „nd the Federal naval officers
Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, 
before Beaufort, became so bitter that Bunch, sa
. » vice consultWalkerYstating _!... not long ago wrote to a vice _  ^  m  tn use forgg.
that he would recommend the capta jnoleated by the Blockading^ 
if two ships then in Beaufort ttention to the subject, 
ships. I have called I^rd Lyons a «
citrftd Bunch, telling him Lyons was 'aghast' and promptly censure
i*.eP >s making war upon the
•.. that surely so s®r^ 3 ? °JieW which he and a captain ^  U.S, is not to depend upon the v Blockade question,of a man of war may happen to take o
. +ft *he Admiralty noting that LordMilne on 11 October wrote to th -t
« . , , tv, nuance's captain was cRussell had decided his advice to t a-—
Lordships that the ship had run the 
and judicious and informing their .it therefore congratulate myself
blockade into a southern port*
59 Hewett to Milne, 1 Oct, 1661, ADM 1/5759?.
0 Miiae to Grey, private,17 Oct. 1661, KLN/107. 
61 Lyons to Milne, private,24 Nov. 1861, MLNA07.
he added,
•that the reply I T t h X h ^ f a r t e ^ w i e h e d ^ e n t r a p  me’as it is now evident that h in a manner have
into giving him such to the blockaded coastsjustified him in keeping¿loser voyage to the
than was necessary in making bound.,, 52West Indies where he proposed he was do
Sir Alexander ended his despatch with the rueful comment 
... no such name as «Samuel D. «crest« appears at*>ng the 
Certified Masters in the Merchant Navy U s t  of 1861 • The ly
Captain Forest’s ship never did escape from Beaufort,
__ to the combinedApril 26, 1862, Fort Macon, N,C, surren
Onion land-sen force» urvier Colander Lockwood and Brigadier
General John 0. Parke. Both the i U k E S S  End ~ n<^ i ’ 8 U U  
in Beaufort, were captured when the fort, which protected the
harbour, capitulated, .
. replied that the communication»Marly in the conflict it wa Natives in America - Lord between the British diplomatic representatives
a * 4 . British naval power - Rear Lyotra - and the representative slb le
+ h* as speedy and reliable as possible Admiral Milne - would have to be as P
B2 Milne to LCA, 11 Oct. 18&> H i l A ® / 3/2, _
«  * *  Department, ^  * »
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on a numerical code based on In May Milne and Lyons agreed on a
^ to be used in case3 or
Wilmoths Boot Signals» lg57 edition,
4. mu tt q authorities allowed this code to be sent necessity. The U.S. authorxu
on the normal t.l.gra* U -  *  « “ fcrth* ^  ^
their pique, for a time they charged the full price tor one
. R.f0re the authorities agreedword - for each number sent. Befor 
to reduce the price I*ona had
for the last quarter of 1861 the British legation spent £30,
k) * u  tt q Post Office was another source in cypher telegrams. ^ The U.S.
. taine that a report from the of friction. In June Iyons told Miln
, -.,+ined for the admiral hadnaval storekeeper in the Bahamas
, , i „ m c e  in Mew York. At that been opened at the U.S, dead let er
,. anfl the storekeeper had neglected time all mail had to be prepaid and th_ >»1 the details of the naval
to do this. As a result, said Lyons,
u a fallen into Union hands, This armaments stores in the Bahamas ha
„ , «,1 ration of the British representativesincident reinforced the determine
, 4f at all possible* 
to avoid using the regular U.S. pos ,
•«crers at Boston and New York
From that summer, I^ons had mess4 U  w ts  They would receive from the
to meet the weekly English packets.
. _ despatches or letters forB ritish  Post Office agent aboard any
ir Mutton. The packets stopped
Lyons and then go directly to Vashingt
64 to 10A, 29 Nov, 1S61, MLNA03/3/C.
65 Lyons to Milne, 26 ~ »PM. 12 8/5 6.
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. often sent his letterstofortnightly at Halifax and Kitae
T action, the consuls at Boston and Lyons by this route, In addi
, messenger directly to Washington 
New York had orders to send a
4 i imoortance were received from if any letters of special importan
¿/ . . ,led to inspect the blockade wouldAdmiral Milne,66 The ships detailed, wew York, whence other
leave their reports with the cons , .with a mil agent aboard wouldRoyal Nary ships or British packets
take them to Halifax . - m  the «ew fork cons, the ships wo.d
often pick up the crews- and officers- mil f o r w a r d  Hal
»«„««da at Boston and more
Thus the two northern consuls - . .
« > , . . . . — *  -  -  - “  \ M .
.. , w  « * .  « «  M U *
v ^ 4  nted out earlier, when air 
in British hands. As has been points
, , the British Legation m
Alexander was at Halifax his links wit
+ 4 r tttorv* by telegraph** otl® ^  or J‘ * Washington were very satisfac J > ^  COKmander® 1662 onwards tne navax
by ship* about two days* From ea y ,. fthios at Hew fork City to facilitate always tried to have one or two Pam. a* was at this time an
this connection with Lord lyons. There .
, M e n  at cape Race, Mewfoundland, the
American owned telegraph station _ .
w .. imerican Continent. Small boa 
eastern most part of th. Hort ^  ^  ^  short excerpts
would intercept the west hen. ^  ^  before
of the latest news directly to t _v v Thus communications between Europe
the packet reached New York, Th ^
»I days j of course
and North America* ~vere reduced to seven
66 Lyons to mine, 21 July kTM
?2
on, atUl had to wait the usual «X«van or twelve day, for th,
complete details furnished by newspapers, weekli
. 67 As this service at Cape Hace
etc,, brought by the packet* ii wasn't used
was operated by an American press agen , 
directly by either Milne or Lyons,
. ^ e r  was at Bermuda as he usually was When, however, Sir Alexand r for him to keep in contact
from November to May, it was ea
... Tvons. because he was then 
with his ships and stations than wi
4 M  star* from his two ancillary naval 
centrally located, almost equidistant xro
, wa8 a monthly mail steamer
bases at Jamaica and Halifax, , ,
^  and after the Trent crisis
from Halifax to Bermuda at this tim #
at Fortress Monroe, to be at th 
Milne usually kept two warships at
, The Fortress was about three
Immediate disposal of Lord Lyons*
„ . sir Alexander had another reason
days by steamer from Bermuda*., omee„  at Fortress »mo.. Th.
for wanting to keep some of his of „„™mentea 4K O a «sifor Federal movements
district was the great dep^t and s g ..+ , the British admiral wanted to keep it 
against the Confederates and the or
FMeral authorities in the area 
under his surveillance. The Federal a. the British merr-of-wart
offered their complete facilitl*3 .. .11 manner of supplies. VAlne 
coal, hospitals, ship repairs, and
. M s these facilities »lesscautioned his ship captains not - >
V- insiatsd they purchase coal from absolutely necessary, e,g#*he inVto deplete Union supplies *t the
civilian contractors so a3 not t P ¿gof British neutrality*
Fortress, and of course as a sym
MeuuYiHanita 'R e l a t i v e
a i.1,« j* <_y* v \ti
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The U.S. and Royal Navy officers often exchanged visits
and not infrequently, dined together.
Co^nnication vith th. aoutham consul, vaa »noth« 
matter.« After th. Knr^Bunch incident in A n ^ t ,  vh.n Mur.
_ ... h ronSuL at Charleston's a friend of Robert Bunch, British , -I #yiA and th® 0009^* ®intercepted in the North with private
. . the former seeming to implicate
despatch bag - the contents of the
, n _ Seward withdrew
Bunch in a ’negotiation* with the re
, rt.mch had been trying, on 
Bunch’s exequatur in October 1&61*
. . oet the Confederates to agreeForeign Office instruction,to get tn
. t«««« wrote to Russell on 24to the Declaration of Paris. Lyons
September that:
5 the Southern Governments ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i l l u c k  of the 
and discreet on their part. . which Mr. Robert
seizure of the foolish private 1 object would have
Mure was so imprudent as to carf*^ J. ¿70 
been attained, without any dra a *
«u the Declaration of ParisThe Confederate Congress did accep _
.,.1e on Privateering, which form 
on 13 August, except for the artic
* rhief naval weapon,of warfare was of course, their cni
69 Fop , Btudv of this topic seo Bonham K.L. The British Cqnjjgls
? S S 3  d o c S t s .
used various American sources but oruy ora-vum — —  ■
70 Lyons to Russell, 24 Sept. 1S61, PRO 30/22/35.
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Clearly, the safest aud least complicated - t W  ot
whan announcing the tlocKade, agreed to let neutral men-oi-var
, believed it was necessary to communicateenter southern ports* Lyons bel „c„,ble He had heard little enough 
with the consuls a3 quickly as p •
, . there were complaints offrom them after the war broke out an
a. ,, _ confederate armies, rumours of the 
British subjects drafted into
. Qf British subjects and other equally confiscation of the property of Brxx-asu
unpleasant violations *  neutral rights. *  addition, , r -  wished
to hear r e ^ r l y  the British consuls their opinions on th.
„ vflll as their views on theinternal state of the Confederacy a
a n»<s=tell also wished a speedy efficiency of the blockade, Lord Bu w
, , a. from Consul Bunch, though lyons
explanation of the ’Mure’ inciden
«hnrt time before this requesthad sent Steady to Charleston a 3 ....
received, and was gratified that hefrom the Foreign Secretary was received, a
, ^  Secretary of State Seward agreed had anticipated Bussell’s orders,
, . „a,,9ed the following noticeto facilitate this communication and
to appear in the newspapers on IB Septemb
It is ascertained at t h e ^ P ^ ^ ^ i g ^ C t o y e r n m e n t  and its^ 
after, communications ^ e?n^ c t i o n a i y  States will,
Consuls in the Ports of th6inJe carried on by means of a the consent of our ^ ^ ® ^ ^ 1irse^dll obviate the embarrassments 
British Vessel of war. ^^/communications through other which hitherto attended these commu
channels, 71
certainly the right name for a
Accordingly, HIS Ste^C 5, ** New York '^ „aiied that September from New XorK
ship on a mission of this sort —
71 Iyons to Grant, 19 Sept. 1S61, KLUA^/ •
for Charleston, lions’ instruction, to Buneh, f o U o « d  In the 
nain by all British warships *l=h co-nnicated with the South 
during the war, show the caution emphasised by the British
government toward both belligerents•
.«+■«* for receiving and sending 1. You will make such arrangements vi H  make itDespatches to the boat of the Steady ^
unnecessary f°r i*1® officer
. . a -v-ort a time as possible.2. You will detain the boat as short
j. wa«aotr«*nt any necessity for. 3. You will take precautions i° P . shore otherwise than the officers’ communicating with the sn r
through yourself.
, I - ®ihl.Ti9 aT*6 pO34. You will bear in mind Her Y ^ e  Southern States,
enjoined not to enter any harb®^ remain as short a tame
and that it is desiTabl^ ti!7ntiEhbourhood of any such as possible in the immediate neign
harbour. fMnff likely to place the
5* You will be careful to avoid d compliments by the’Steady’ in a position to be tend r a compllment may
local authorities or in a P?3 . those Authorities,be expected to be tendered by her to tn
* +viat Her Majesty’8 SHips6* You will in particular re® ° ^ e® 1ut. the Confederate Flag# are positively ordered E2£ J . they should be placed in an and it is very undesirable that ,J. 4 themselves by aembarrassing situation by being salutea
Confederate Ship or Fort. ' ., ■ instructions as applicable7* You will, of course, consider th that of any othernot to the case of the ’Steady’ o n g  ’™  ftof HM Ships that may communicate wi.
. ia4.nnz objections’ to sending Lyons added that despite Milne s—  ^ r a l .  after Lyons request, his warships to southern port3, the a
agree, to perait it. Bot the British «ini.t.r w ocM « .  ^
facilities 'sparingly' and if it ».cs* inconvenient -not at al .
- +he consuls in the other southernLyons instructed Bunch to have thnd Very Confidential, 19 Sept. 1861 72 lyons to Bunch, Immediate and v ^
KLN/104/2.
states send their despatches through H1“ * Elln’ 8 0rd 
to steady'B Crandr. Grant were similar to Lyons orders to 
Bunch with the exception ttat if any of the Confederate 
forts or warships saluted the British flag 'you have *
authority to return if. 73 Happily this * »  of 'recognition'
* as a form of recognitiondid not occur* The saluting of a S
may seem to be very small beer indeed, but Seward was extremely 
sensitive to any sort of foreign acceptance of people wh 
North considered as rebels and insurgents and he had as 
resident British Minister, Lord Lyons, a determined n
With caution then, »  Ste^ on 23 Sept. 1361 approached
, The Union blockader
Charleston harbour, her British flag ly •
'Tandalia'. C-dr. L.F. Lee, sailed out. with h.r »«n at quarters
and put a shot across 'Safe'* * * •  0,-r* ^  i“ ediately 
cleared for action and sent a boat to the V g n d ^  to demand an
explanation.™ Con-dr. Lee apologised profusely, maintaining
however, that even though Steady showed her Brlti
, P i «e colours (which we know is a smart steamer moving under xa . ^ies Admirals Nelson done and which your great Naval a ri#t to use) bentand Collingwood, admitted an « u saiiing vessel lying to on running the Blockade can slip by 5^ a 
without steam and near the bar.. • •
73 Kilne to Grant, 9 Sept. 1861, H,!JA°3A5/0.
74 Grant to JOlne, 7 Oct. 1861, 1 M A < V 2*
75 L.P. Lee to Grant. 23 Sept. 1861,
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The cohs.1 accepted aud delivered up hie deepatchee without 
further incident and when Grant reported the shot acr 
how, Milne cho.e to overlook it. But this was the beginning
of a whole series of proceedings of this nature, especially
t- ran into Mobile flyingafter the Florida in September 1862 ra
British colours. Finally, Sir Alexander issued an order on
25 March 1863 notifying his warships that while
,, v _ a. to the Federal authorities when representations would be made t
. , at the same time Her Majesty’sthese incidents occurred ... at.
Ships vfcen approaching Blockading Squadrons arc to take every
ear« in steering, regulating their speed etc., so as to give
„ 4 +n suspect that» deceptionno ground for the Federal Cruisers to su-pe
_  *76 The next month the Secretaryis being practised on them. j ion to U.S. warshipsof the Navy Welles also issued an instruction
which stated*
’...in order to preserve a friendg ^ ^ ¿ ’¿’with blank 
be well, as a rule tohaveone ^ f ^ ^ t o r y  signal of_ cartridge to be used by day as tn P gea service.^warning in accordance with the usage ox
... southern consuls were For some time communications with' , varships Of the French
continued on this irregular basis»
_ i+.(.rmting with those of their North American squadron often alt and delivering despatches
British opposite numbers in receiving 
for both countries.
n  A<talralty Letters, KLNA°5/6. , Cont.a,r«te Navies 1»
77 Qffield Becorde cf the __ ['J'I yi - y ) , '  jthe »aref the KabelliQSAwaS|bi 2 * . ^  visits of
French warahins to the CSA.see I b i d . » P P * ^ ^
British i Shadows’ for FederalOPH^l^
The year 1861 wae In ~ n y  ways a bitter and disappointing
or any importance» the battle of Bhll<s Bon C-Tanhee’s Bon’
« , . in a Union rout. TheLord Palmerston called it) had r
n into the Secessionists1
huge navy yard at Norfolk had fal
hands and despite the belated firing of the lofts, ships and 
stores, approximately three ho„ired new Dahlgren guns had been
seised by the rebels.?* By Aogust the neoly appointed General
about Washington and McClellan was directing the defences a
i rt’T Kor'th into tho ArflQT o beginning to turn the raw levies . . v,. commander-in-chief of allthe Potomac. In November he would be
« +n ha a long and earnestthe Federal armies. Plainly the war W3- importance in  1861 was the one. The only Northern success o f any P
,, This was a necessary victory» capture of Port Royal, South Carolina,_ —isy»»***! tout &iso foi* t onot only from the standpoint of Nor fit the time the U .S , coast
efficiency of the blockading forces,
r^onde was seeing more and more from the Chesapeake to the Rio Gra
4 off the major southernports. 
Federal warships anchored and cruisin»
. zed on a reg'&ar ^ asisj onThe blockade was rapidly being orga ,n r, m  was appointed to  command the South18 September Captain S,F. DuPont «inf? the area from South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, comprising w„ ■ ' Officer Goldsborou^  assumedCarolina to  the t ip  o f F lo rid a , r l a£
+*(• Blockading Squadron on 23 September» command of the North Atlantic
. - Virginia and North Carolina» ^w0which covered the coasts of Virg
_ «»t*d for the Gulf “ oneother blockading squadrons were also
to +he Mississippi and the other
to close the area from Florida
_ . muft only repair and coaling
from that river to the Rio Grand •
. +v.An at Key West, Florida» 
station south of Hampton Roads wa
* Yellow fever and the heat.It was often almost unusable because
„ on the east coast.Obviously, an intermediate base was n
. _ . , ideaa of using the Bahamas asBritain quickly discouraged Federal id a
«Vi discussion in Washington,Fort Royal, 
a coaling depot. After much discuss
it was almost equidistant from
S.C. was selected for two reasons, it
the tip of Florida and Fortress Monroe,and.it posse
excellent harbour.
j .. assault did not go unnoticedThe massive preparation for
- ,, October Lyons wrote to Milne of anby the British Minister. On 14 Oatot> r w„id include some 15,000 troops
expedition being formed which would
. * Vi* a.id. was unknown. Someand many warships. Its destination 80. others said New Orleans.thought it was going to attack Savanna ,
. . naval representatives An ^ 0'*'Among the British diplomatic and navax
. «h.t protection should be given America the question then arose: what prou
to be attacked? Milne disliked
to British subjects in the area to be a
' following the expedition as
the idea of any of his ships actually
law»«t lealousy’ among the Union forces 
it would, he believed, excite ’great 3 7980
79 C W m , p art I - l 8 6 1 , p .  27»
80 Lyons to Milne, private, 14 Oct. 1861» MLN/107.
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f.
. «i newly arrived from England,
He, however, sent HM3 Tmortalite 51* 17
to Hew York so as to te l i d í a t e *  available to us« as Itfons
sa« fit* In the end, Lyons told Sir Alexander
_ i t -i i v mor® conpetant than a
'that an Admiral was e s s e of a Ships being 
Minister to judge of 
wanted to protect British >->u j *
There were rumours that the French intended to have a ship 
accompany the expedition, or he in the area and lyons thou^t
that
4- ranterv in England if we
•... we migjit have had a grea . t our subjects than had shown less willingness to protest
the French did « e
Mine told the Admiralty that this a r g e n t  was the detain* 
factor in his decision to sen! a British warship to -observe-
the U.S. expedition.03
Accordingly, HMS "left l0* 0n'* * *
the soens of action, M l *  established this precedent -with s«e
-, a. ^ M a  order® to iMno^taOltejs. hesitation’ which is reflected in hi
j '4— v  termed ’an officer of 
captain, George Hancock, whom the admlr
discreet and sound Judgement'.® Hancock was told - to afford any
legitimate protection to ®  Consul aui »  Subjects residing at ^  
x ■ , .. we was to tell the commander of thethe Ports or Places attacked’• He was
„ ' ' ■ .re on no account to precede or in
H.S, forces that ’your orders ar
any way to cause embarrassment to the expedition but simply to 81234
81 Kilns to Lyons, 30 Oct. 160., PrtTOte (draft),*m A07.
82 lyons to Kilne, 9 Nov. 1861, private ,HU0.O7.
83 Milne to I£A, B Nov* 1861,
84 Ibid.
be ready to give protection to British life 
closed with a characteristic Milne warning
^  These orders 
to economise on coal.
This was a necessary precaution at this time of relatively 
inemcient steam engines vhich'had a high fuel cons.ption.
Steam power was to be reserved for emergencies, such as
manoeuvering in dangerous American shoal waters. From fear
h„ Hancock neither written of complications»Lord Lyons gave Captain banco
. .. piyitish Consuls in the South nor verbal despatches to any of the
This was to be clearly a trial run*
When Hancock sailed from his anchorage at Staten Island,
New York, he had no precise idea where the U.S. expedition was,
nor what was its destirmtlon. He believed it to be at Charleston,
, that port» he learnedbut falling in with the U«S.S* Su^juejB----
_ . « p • ond that on the 8ththat DuPont’s force was at Port Royal, •*»
, . +.._ies in that harbour* Hancockit had captured the Confederate batterie
a. « 1 on 20 November presented hissailed directly for Port Royal and on ^
4.« m av Officer DuPont in the Wj&ssh, reasons for being in the area to *
ftA « was perhaps fortunate in thatflagship of the expedition*66 Hancock P
i 4w,n was Commodore Samuel F .DuPont, the commander of the Federal squadro
85 Milne to Hancock, 31 Oct. 1861, MLN/llo/l/CC.
86 Hancock to Milne, 17 Oec. 1861, ^ ^ t h e ^ d i l S ^ ^ t o ^ t c h  theone of a class of frigates laid down j * c #s in ie55, of whom . -
five »large1 frigates v°ted_by ¿qo HP screw steamer displacing
the Wabash was one. 5l ^ g ,  The Wabash displace^3059 tons, with a crew of 5?° ^ J e m e n t  of 500 men and was also a 3200 tons, carried 50 guns, a complement 01 5
screw steamer.
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*
a naval officer of the »old school*. Fifty-eight years old 
in 1861, DuPont had been in the navy since 18 15 and had served 
in most quarters of the ¿Lobe, He had taken W.B, Reed* the D.5. 
minister to China, to that country in I858 and while there had 
made firm friends with many British naval officers, including 
Sir Michael Seymour and Captain W, King Hall» ^
After mentioning the purpose of his mission, Capt* Hancock
said his admiral had instructed him:
••.» that I am most carefully to abstain from any act or from any movement, that you may consider prejudicial to _plan of operations ... my officers have been strictly prohibited 
from carrying any informationj letters papers, etc,, from one 
port of the coast to another »..under these circumstances I trust that my presence generally in the Neighbourhood of your operations will not be deemed by you, as in any way prejudicial to those operations, but you will ... consider that I am only affording that protection to Her Majesty»| 
Subjects which they may rightfully expect and claim...
DuPont replied the next day. Stating that he fully understood the
necessity for Hancock’s visit, he having been on the same type of
service in his career, DuPont said *••• 1 shall be most happy •»* 7
&7 DuPont’s voluminous correspondence with various British navalofficers is available at the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Delaware, U.S.A. Hancock and DuPont exchanged many letters after their initial meeting at Port Royalj Hancock tried to convince the commodore that the Union could never be reconstructed as it once was, while DuPont maintained that it would be. See also* Hgar Admiral 5.F. DuPont USN. H.A. DuPont (New York, 1926). DuPont visited Admiral Milne when that officer was at New York in 1863.
Hancock to DuPont. 20 Nov. 1861, KLN/104/2.
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to add my own assistance to your efforts» whenever it can contribute to the security or convenience of your Countrymen' •
But the Flag officer added ’...I would deem it objectionable
to be followed systematically in my progress from Point to Point'#
He concluded by offering Hancock 'the highest proof of my
confidence' which would be the revelation to the British officer
of the expedition's next point of attack» so that Hancock could
89judge whether his presence was necessary in the area#
Capt, Hancock stayed at Port Royal from 20 November until 10 
Bee ember 1861, replenishing supplies, giving Milne a vivid account 
of the battle and exchanging visits with Union naval officers#
Hancock believed that the plan of attack on Port Royal was 
conceived in a 'bold and able manner» and that it was carried out 
with much Gallantry and Skill... all my intercourse with him |DuPont] 
as also with all other members of the Expedition has been most 
gratifying and agreeable*,2° The British captain believed that the 
effect of the ships*fire on the batteries was remarkable. Previously, 
it had been the usual custom for ships attacking fortifications 
to anchor and then fire - often with little success against any well 
constructed fort,JThe Attacking Fleet, you will perceive», he 
wrote to Milne, 'kept under weigh and working upon an elliptic arc 
kept passing and repassing the Batteries on either side and always 
at a variable though prearranged distance, thus their shot all
DuPont to Hancock, 21 Nov. 1861, MLN/104/2.
90 Hancock to Milne, 17 Dec# 1861, MLN/104/2#
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told whilst those from the Batteries never got the range 
correctly',^- Hancock praised the restraititof the Federal 
forces, was saddened by the gutted ’Villas' of Beaufort and 
noted that much of the cotton in the area had been left 
unpicked,^2
The Immortalite was at Port Royal when the news of the Trent 
incident was received, Hancock spoke of the Union officers'
'uneasiness' concerning Captain Wilkes' proceedings, 'they 
readily admit the madness it would be on the part of their 
Government to do anything to promote a War with England*, 93 
Accordingly, satisfied that British subjects would not be ill 
treated by the Federals and anxious to reinforce Milne at Bermuda, 
as well as to be out of range of Union guns, Hancock left Port Royal 
on 10 December and arrived in Bermuda on the 17th, Before he left, 
the captain wrote a last message to Commodore DuPont, He thanked 
him and his officers for their kindness:
• •• and the recollections of my sojourn in these waters will always cause me to feel a deep sympathy and high regard for those gallant men who are obeying their country's call and doing honor to the Flag they serve - and to the old stock from whom they sprung'» 94 1
91 Hancock to Milne, 24 Nov. 1861, MLNA07.
92 same to same, 17 Dec, 1861, MLHA04/2,see CWNC, Part I -1861 
pp, 30-34 for details of this expedition, the largest combined naval and military force ever assembled by the U,S, to that date.It comprised 77 vessels, with 16,000 troops. The Port Royal area swiftly became the workshop and liberty port for blockaders on the east coast. Writing from there on 19 Feb,1863.DuPont said*'If I had not induced the Department to establish a floating machine shop, which I had seen the French have in China, the blockade would have been a total failure', gWHC, Part,111-1863, p«31«
93 Hancock to Milne, 17 Dec, 1861, MLNA04/2»
94 Hancock to DuPont, n,d., Eleutherian Kills Historical Ubrary,o£ecits
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ImmortwHta was thus the first British warship to remain in the
area of Union military and naval operations for the express
purpose of protecting British subjects. Mine wrote to the
Admiralty on 18 December expressing his approval bf the
correspondence between Hancock and DuPont adding
».... it is satisfactory to me to find that my intentions in sending the ‘Immortalité» .... were not misunderstood by the Commodore»,95
The precedent having been established» Sir Alexander occasionally 
sent his warships on similar missions to the embattled American 
coast. A rather unfortunate example was the attempted visit of 
HMS Llffey. Capt. G. Preedy, C.B. to New Orleans. This fifty-one 
gun frigate arrived about 15 April 1862 at the mouth of the 
Mississippi with the intention of going to New Orleans to protect 
British subjects during the expected Federal attack on the city.
the Liffey drew twenty-four feet and was unable to cross the 
bar at the entrance to the river.^ Perhaps it was just as wellj 
the Fédérais attacked on 24 and 25 April 1862, forcing their way 
past the Confederate batteries and obstructions in the river* The 
French warship Milan was then at New Orleans and its commander 
graciously offered his vessel as a refuge for any distressed 
British subjects in the area.
95 Milne to LCA, 18 Dec. 1861, KLNA03/3/C.
96 Coppell to Lyons, 9 ’May 1862, ADM 128/57.
As the year 1861 waned, Lord Lyons became, though 
always anxious, rather more settled in his relations with 
the Federal government. On 29 September he wrote to Milne 
that ’things are still going on smoothly here',97 and on 1 1  
November, 'I have no immediate apprehensions, certainly none 
of anything s u d d e n * Y e t  four days before Lyons wrote 
this last letter to Milne, the event which was to produce 
the greatest crisis in nineteenth-century British-American 
relations had taken place. But in the seven months of the 
conflict before the Trent affair, the British diplomatic 
representative in the United States and the British naval 
representative in American waters had, with tact and firmness 
served well both Britain’s subjects and her interests.
97 Lyons to Milne, 29 S e p t. 1861, p riv a te , MLNAo? .
98 Lyons to Milne, 11 Nov, 1861, private, ILN A ^ 7 •
CHAPTER III
The TRENT Affair and the Station’s Capacity for Offensive and
Defensive Action
It may honestly be said that the greatest crisis in 
British-Amerlean relations of the I9th century has, for Anglo- 
American historians of the 20th, become one of the greatest 
bores. The amount of material devoted to the intricacies of 
this incident has been enormous; much of it can be found listed 
in any standard history of the period.1 This chapter will 
attempt to cover the crisis primarily from the hitherto neglected 
viewpoint of Rear Admiral Milne; his appreciation of the 
defence problems of the two main bases, Bermuda and Halifax; 
big co-operation with colonial officials to construct an 
adequate defence in the ares, fend his correspondence with the 
home authorities on the measures needed to conduct a war 
against the North.
On 8 November 1861, the Federal warship San Jacinto 8,
Capt. Charles Wilkes, stopped the St. Thomas bound W. Indian 
Wail steamer Trent, in the Old Bahama Channel, close by the 
Cuban coast. Capt. Wilkes forceably removed the two Confederate 
Commissioners, James M. Mason and John Slidell and their
I The definitive diplomatic account remains E.D.Adams’,Great 
Britain end the American Civil War.op.cit.,l,ch«7. See also 
Pari. papers1 1862), »Correspondence respecting the Trent ’ 
and Dr. K. Bourne’s,’British Preparations for War with the 
North’ .English Historical Review,L3QC7I,(1961),pp.600-63S.
secretaries, and proceeded to Fortress Monroe, The Federal 
captain acted on his own responsibility, having heard that 
the Confederates were in Cuba awaiting passage to St,Thomas 
and thence to Europe. Ironically, on 4 November,the San Jacinto 
had fired a shot across the bow of another British ship,the 
man-of-war Landrail 5,which was en route to Key West and from 
there via the Bahamas to Bermuda, Capt. Wilkes was apparently 
annoyed as Landrail had carelessly delayed the hoisting of her
zflag and pennant;for which her captain was censured by Milne.
It is interesting to conjecture what would have happened if 
Landrail had been in the Old Bahama Channel-a short distance 
from her actual position-when Wilkes stopped the Trent. The 
British warship’s captain,Cmmdr.T.H.M.Martin knew that belli­
gerents could search British ships,but he had no instructions 
relating to the seizure of private persons from such vessels.
The only occasion when the commander-in-chief acted directly 
to protect the mail packets was on 5 December 1862 when Milne 
authorized the senior officer at Bermuda to use force if any 
Federal cruiser stopped the St.Thomas to Halifax packet.
He had heard a rumour that Wilkes,then cruising in the area, 
in command of a Union squadron, had determined to seize the vessel
2 Milne to Mart in, 29 Nov. 1861, MLN/IOJ5/I6/P.
if Confederate officers were found aboard her. This order
was speedily countermanded by the Admiralty, though Sir
Alexander later explained that it had become cancelled when he
3returned to Bermuda on 29 December, from a trip to Nassau.
Lyons heard of the Trent affair on 15 November, the very 
day that Wilkes sailed into Fortress Monroe with his prisoners.
On the 16th, the British Minister telegraphed in cypher to 
Milne informing him of the event. Sir Alexander was on the point 
of leaving Halifax for Bermuda and thence to Vera Crus to command 
the British contigent in the Mexican expedition. This event 
dislocated his plans. He decided to proceed to Bermuda but to 
postpone his departure for Vera Crus until he had received the 
mail of 17 December which would bring the latest advices from 
home. On 20 December the boat arrived with orders from the 
Admiralty. Their Lordships instructed Milne to remain at Bermuda 
because of the U,S, situation, they advised him to keep in close 
touch with Lynns and, while directing him to look to the safety 
of British colonial possessions, said 'we do not consider it 
advisable... to fetter you by any detailed orders,' ^ That same 
day, Sir Alexander wrote to Commodore Hugh Dunlop, commander of 
the Jamaica Division, ordering him to proceed to ifexico with the
3» Baxter, J.P, 'The British Government and Neutral Hints', op.clt.tp.19; Milne to LCA, 25 Feb, 1863, MLN/103/6/F, 4
4. LCA to Milne, 1 Dec, 1861, MLNA05/6.
British forces. The vice admiral - he had been given that 
local rank on 15 November - then turned all his energies to 
organising his command for a possible war with the Federals,
The Defences and Facilities of the Station
The most important naval bases on the North American and 
w* Indian Station in 1861 were those at Halifax, Bermuda and 
Jamaica* There were small naval installations at Nassau and 
Antigua, but at the former only ships drawing less than twelve 
feet could enter the harbour, there were few defences, and a 
shortage of water; while the latter, though possessing several 
good harbours, was inconveniently situated to leeward, with 
obsolete facilities and as Milne said, the defences were 
'utterly nil1. Barbados w^s the military headquarters of the 
W* Indies, and the depSt for the gold bullion furnished to the 
banks in the other Islands. Its harbour however, was open and 
untenable for any vessel during the stormy season. The defences 
were weak; its governor stated in October 1863 that if a large 
force attacked the island and there were no naval vessels there, 
then 'we are gone',5 The one big advantage of Barbados over 
Antigua was that its favourable position in the path of the 
Prevailing Trade Winds enabled a sailing vessel to reach any
5* C[plonial] Office] to LCA, 27 Nov. 1863, ADM 1/4849.
other part of the W. Indies on sail power alone. In those days
when steam was still looked upon as an auxiliary to sails, this
'"’as a great benefit, Jamaica had excellent naval facilities,
and a large hospital, but as to defences, Milne noted in June
1861 •... works badly contrived and worse executed,
unserviceable guns, decayed gun carriages, corroded shot, the absence of stores of all kinds, and of ammunition, with dilapidated and damp powder magazines,’ o
In addition, Jamaica was awkwardly situated for ships operating
on the American southern coast, Milne had asked Commodore Dunlop,
in the summer of 1861, to repair to Havana so that British
Warships could, with greater convenience, inspect the Union
blockade. Although the Spanish authorities made supplies readily
available to the commodore, the great defect with Havana was that
it was a pest hole. That summer, several British warships in
the area were crippled by yellow fever, Milne disliked, when
there was any chance of infection, sending his ships to the
Cuban port.
The one big advantage of all the British bases was that 
they had coal supplies. Thus in the W, Indies ships of the Royal 
Navy could count on coal and protection, however minimal, from 
®ix British sourcest Jamaica, Antigua, Nassau, Barbados, Trinidad 
and Beliae, The Federala had at this time no protected coal 
depots in the W, Indies except those at Key West and Colon, 6
6- Milne to LCA, 27 June 18 6 1, Secret, MLNA03/3/C.
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In 1863 they did establish one other, at Cape Haytian, with 
the permission of the Haytian government. But by then the 
situation in the Gulf was much more favourable to the Union 
forces: Kew Orleans surrendered in April 1862,and Pensacola 
with its navy yard was taken in the next month. Nevertheless, 
cruising British warships in the W. Indies, were never far 
from coal, largely supplied from their own bases. On the 
northern part of the station coal was available directly from 
the mines at Cape Breton and Picton, N.S., as well as from 
depots at St. John, N.B. and St. John's, Newfoundland, Of course, 
the Federals in the north had ample coal at Fortress Monroe, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, New York, Portland and many 
other places.
While the coal was plentiful, docking facilities on the 
station were the great want, there was no naval dock yard in the 
entire command. Various civilian blocks and grid slips were 
available, e.g,, at St. John, N.B. and Dartmouth, near Halifax.
But only the smaller ships could use them and they were often 
unsafe; in 1863 HMS Barracouta 6, slipped off the blocks at 
St. John, N.B., causing some damage to her hull. At Havana there 
was a floating dry dock suitable for vessels up to 2000 tons 
and 22 feet draught - but as most of the British ships of the 
larger class were over 25OO tons, pnd it was very expensive, /
Milne used it only twice.7 In the 18th end early 19th centuries 
this want of docks had not been a problem, Bermuda, Jamaica and 
Halifax all had careening wharves where, by means of capstans 
on the dockside, ships could be pulled over on their sides, 
scrapped, recoppered and repaired. But in 1861, though the 
ships were still wooden, they were all steamers and too heavy 
for the primitive methods of the past. Hot until 1869 was there 
a floating dry dock, capable of handling most of the larger 
ships, established at Bermuda. The Federals had a clear advantage 
Here, for they had excellent dry docks at New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Portsmouth, N.H., and Norfolk when that base was 
recaptured in May 1862.^ These docks were of vital importance 
because much of the American coast was bordered by shallow water. 
In the W, Indies and Bermuda, the tidal variation was. very slight 
so that once a ship had run aground, there was often little hope 
of refloating her. If a vessel, by lightening and the assistance 
of other ships, finally became free, she was likely to have 
sustained considerable damage in the process.
If American facilities were not to be used for the repair
of his larger ships’ defects, then the commander-in-chief had no
7fl ’Memorandum relative to the North American and West Indian Station’, MLN/I05/6, This memo contains much valuable 
information on the facilities of the station.
'List of the Chief Ports of the Federal Coast of the United 
States’, etc., compiled by the Admiralty Hydrographer,
15 December l«6l, MU0.O5/6,
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nlternative but to send them to England. On several occasions 
Milne used the services of a Mr.Murphy,a professional civilian 
diver,to make absolutely necessary repairs on ships' bottoms; 
but for stern post reinforcing and other major repairs,the 
civilian yards of the North were generally used. ^ Sir Alexander 
bold his captains to use,if at all possible,only civilian yards 
so as t0 maintain their neutral status.10 Nevertheless,several 
times his officers were forced to use government facilities be­
cause of the unavailability of private yards. Cmmdr.Watson of 
¿sterel^ II,while at Charleston delivering Lyons' despatches in 
January 1863,had to repair his rudder. The Confederate Commodore 
Ingraham offered him the use of the C.S, naval yard,but Watson 
refused and had the necessary work done at a civilian establish­
ment. HMS Vesuvius 6,one of the few paddle ships still on the 
station,had her hull repaired in the U.S. naval dockyard at 
Boston,in 1863. But this last had a political element. When Milne 
visited Washington in October of that year,Secretary of the Navy 
Welles urged the station commander to make use of Federal dockyards 
if necessary. Since Vesuvius needed repairing, Sir Alexander
9
Because of the propeller's vibration in the wooden hull,
repairs to the sterns of Milne's ships were very common.
10 Milne to Archibald,21 March 1862,MLN/I03/II/K.
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accomplished two objectives: the repair plus a detailed account 
of Federal ironclads and armaments from Vesuvius1 observant 
captain, Richard Vesey Hamilton.1*'
Halifax naval dockyard had no fortifications of its own.
It was within the town itself and lay some four miles from the 
mouth of Halifax harbour. Before an enemy squadron could reach 
the dockyard, it would have to pass batteries and forts on both 
sides of the harbour. Founded in 175®» bhe naval base had the 
advantage of being ice free all the year round* The harbour was 
easily entered and provided draught and space for the largest 
warships. It had been used as a supply base for ships blockading 
the American coast during the War of 1812j here the proud 
HMS Shannon towed in the defeated American frigate Chesapeake 
In 1813. In 1861 the town had as yet no railway communication with 
the rest of British North America,
Major General Hastings Doyle, commander of the troops in 
the Maritimes, wrote to the Secretary of State for Vfer on 28 
November 1861, Regarding the defensive capabilities of Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward’s Island, he stated 
that they weres
•*•», almost in a defenceless state, both from want of  ^sufficient number of troops and the means of defence being
U, Capt, R.V, Hamilton to Milne, 3 Bee. 1863, ADM 1/5821.
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in many instances totally inadequate for the purpose,,.,. X must therefore look to the Militia, but in vain..... it exists alone on paper ..... generally speaking too old for service, totally ignorant of drill and without adjutant or staff,
Doyle thought that there were, however, about three thousand 
Volunteers, a separate organization, in an efficient condition in 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick} he lamented the local legislatures 
lack of interest in ' voting funds for the Militia, As to the 
defences of Halifax, he said that 'three sides of the principal 
battery for the defense of this harbour,(Fort Charlotte)
[on St, George's Island] are in ruins and others are so much 
exposed that they would be very soon rendered useless by an 
enterprising enemy,' Doyle believed that both in Nova Scotia 
and on the coast of New Brunswick, 'we must at present look 
chiefly to our Fleet for protection.' 13 In a report on the 
defences of the harbours and coasts of British North America 
»wide on xo December 1861, Capt. J. Orlebar, who had many years 
experience in charting the region, echoed Doyle's thoughts on 
Halifax» 'Unless assisted by a naval force it is by no means 
strong enough to resist even the attack of a few frigates well 
armed.' 14 The first obstacle’ encountered on entering the 
harbour was York Bedodbt, which Orlebar considered an
12» Doyle to Secretary of State for Nar, 28 Nov.1861, C.0.217/228.
13. Ibid.
14* 'Heport on the Harbours and Coasts of British North America', 
C:apt, J, Orlebar, 10 Dec, 1661, ADM 7/624*
inefficient work. Once got by, a warship would have to pass 
Point Pleasant battery» then George Island and Clarence forts 
'••••• all must be passed within 1000 to 1400 yards but as few 
of these forts are well armed they would offer but small 
resistance to a determined enemy#' Orlebar noted that privateers 
could easily lurk in the many good harbours in the Halifax area, 
none of which had any defences# The science of mine laying, 
they were then called ’torpedoes’,was in its infancy in 1361#
The Russians had made limited use of them during the Crimean 
war - one of theirs from that time is at the National Maritime 
Museum - but it remained for the Confederates with their mined 
booms, galvanic detonators, etc#, at Charleston and elsewhere, 
to make significant contributions to the science of harbour 
protection. In 1861 Halifax had no mines or other underwater 
defences# Because of the Trent incident, the home government 
sent some 10,500 men that winter, to reinforce the troops in 
North America# This provided for a total British force of 
about 12,500 men in Canada and over 5,000 in the Maritimes,1?
The Halifax Citadel, I5O feet above sea level, commanded 
the harbour by a plunging fire - which type of fire created such 
havoc among Union warships running the gauntlet at Vicksburg# 
Nevertheless, the citadel alone, remarked the able and
Bourne, op.clt#. p# 614«
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ubiquitous Lt. Col* F,D. Jervois in his January I865 report,
•would not prevent an enemy's squadron entering the harbour and burning the dockyard and military storehouses, or capturing or destroying any of our ships that might be laying or refitting there,' 16
To prevent this,the fortifications leading to the dockyard must 
be made efficient; Jervois believed they offered little 
protection against a modern naval attack. The defences then 
consisted of some 1 2 , 24 and 32 pounder guns and a few 10 inch 
howitzers. York Redoubt, he said in this report written in the 
fall of I864, was an old tower of weak rubble masonry at the 
entrance, mounting three, 24 pounder guns; in all fifty four 
guns constituted the sea defences of the harbour, none larger 
than the 32 pounder. Apparently little progress had been made 
in the years since the *6l scare, although several works were 
then in process of construction^, Jervois recommended additional 
batteries,' some to feature the new Coles' turret, as well as 
barracks and floating obstructions, Halifax was not particularly 
vulnerable to land attack as much of the surrounding country was 
covered with thick forest and the citadel could not be taken with­
out a regular siege. Jervois believed that any attack which came 
from the sea would be on a comparatively small scale. This was 
because the nearest harbour suitable for use in large troop 
landing operations was Ship Harbour, some forty-five miles
16„ 'Report on the Defences of Canada and the British NavalStation in the North Atlantic', etc., Lt. Col.W.F.D. Jervois, 
Jan. I865, MLN/P/BAA.
from Halifax.
During the crisis, Milne kept only Hydra. 6,and later
Orlando 50, at Halifax; while believing that some naval force
should be kept there he felt that because of the cold his ships
would be of only limited effectiveness to the defences»1^ After
the Trent affair no ship was left there during the winter months,
while Sir Alexander held the command. His successors, however,
Vice Admirals Sir James Hope and Sir Rodney Mundy kept a ship
there in the winter of 1865-67 because of the Fenian threat
to Canada, Admiral Mundy observed that due to the cold the ships
had to be roofed over and were thus unavailable for any immediate
action,^® When he left the station in March 1864» Milne said
that while the defences of Halifax were being Improved*
I imagine in the event of a war, that the military would 
still look to the Navy to assist in protecting the Port, and that it will be in vain to point out as I have often had occasion to do that a Naval Port should serve as a place of refuge where a fleet may be protected while refitting, etc., and the dismantled Fleet should not be. relied on for the protection of the Port.19
Ao to the valuable coal mines at Sydney, Cape Breton,
Capt. Orlebar said in December 1861 that they might be rendered
'useless for months by the destruction of the machinery at the
Pits» mouth. » There existed then only a small volunteer force
Rt the mines; in 1864, there w»s still no regular defence, only a
17». Milne to Lyons, private, 3 Nov, -1861, MLNA°7«
18, »Memo, by Vice Admiral Sir Rodney Mundy*, August 1869,ADM 128/114«
19* »Memo,relative to the N.American and W.Indian Station'MLNA05/6.
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volunteer battery at Sydney# The coal mines at Pictou, N»S# 
were also guarded by only a small volunteer force, Orlebar 
felt that the French Canadians in the area could be depended upon 
in & war with the U.S., but in the event of a conflict with 
France, he thought that they would 'hoist the tricolour'. 20 
Milne also feared that in a French war the enemy would attempt 
to seize Cape Breton so as to supply their steam warships with 
coal. In October 1660, Sir Alexander noted ominously that 
Napoleon III had just sent a gold communion service to the 
Catholic church at Arichat, N.S, and had given a present to the 
church at Sydney, He also said at that time that a Frenchman 
had recently visited Cape Breton 'whose sole occupation 
appeared to be, taking the number and names of all the French 
inhabitants, and in some instances correcting the spelling of the 
names that appeared through ignorance to have been altered from 
the original French*' 2 1 Milne wrote in January 1861 that this 
person had been at Cape Breton for two years and that 'there are 
others persuing the same course in Lower Canada#*.# Sydney is the 
headquarters of the French ships from whence they receive supplies, 
their letters, etc##, confidentially ... my informant is the 
Roman Catholic archbishop at Halifax». 22 The station commander sent
20* 'Report on the Harbour'* etc,, Capt# J.Crlebar>QPiCl^*»ADM 7/624« 
21* Milne to LCA, 14 Oct. I860, MLN/103AA*
22, Milne to Dundas, private, 26 Jan. 1861, MLN/107/3*
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one of his ships to the French islands of St. Pierre end 
Miquelon, off the Newfoundland coast, to see if any plans, 
offensive or defensive, were in preparation* His officers re­
ported in the summer of I860 that all was quiet at the islands 
and that their defences were minimal.^ But Sir Alexander 
was right to be uneasy about the mines at Pictou and Sydney,
Though their coal was not as good as Welsh, yet they were the 
most important coal resources in British North America} they 
both had excellent deep harbours and by means of a small rail­
road at both places, the coal could be loaded directly from 
the mines to a ship.
The defence of the Great Lakes were deld era mentioned in 
Milne’s reports or correspondence. He had gone up the 
St, Lawrence with the Prince of Wales when that royal heir 
visited North America in I860, At that time the station commander 
had visited Quebec and Montreal and with his family, went as 
Tar inland as Niagara Falls} but later because of the American 
conflict, he spent his time exclusively on the coasts and 
islands of the station.
The Americans had an overwhelmingly superior numher 
of ships of all kinds on the lakes, though only one warship, 23
23. Milne to LCA, 11 July I860, ADM 128/19. T&® writer has read the reports of the local French naval officer,for 1860-61,and those of the commander at the islands and can find no trace of any war­
like preparations,French Archives,MAR BB4,786,795 and 79?»
the Michigan, because of the stipulations of the Treaty of 
1818.2/* However, as was done for the blockade of the South, 
many of the fast lake steamers could be armed at short notice.
It was true that Britain had the advantage over the Americans 
of being able to pass ships through the canals from the sea to 
the lakes; but the largest warship able to navigate the shallow 
canals was the Nimble Class, a five gun, eightyhorse power gun­
boat displacing twelve feet, and even these ships would have 
to be substantially lightened for the journey.25 Of course, 
from December to April the canals were frozen over and while 
Milne was on the station, none of his ships went into the 
lakes; they seldom went further up the St. Lawrence than 
Quebec, A British report of September 1862 recommended that 
iron plated vessels should be kept ready ‘at Ottawa and other 
convenient places ... whence they could be taken into Lakes 
Ontario and Erie.» 26 In February I865, Rear Adm.R.S, Robinson, 
the Comptroller of the Navy, wrote that any vessel used on the
24, In 1861 the U.S, had 1,229 ships with a tonnage of 223,953 on the lakes compared to the Canadian 356, with a tonnage 
of 75,659. The number of steam vessels at that time with their tonnage were» U.S. 94; 67,032 and Canada 78}25,669« 'Memo, of Sir J, Burgoynen on the Defences of Canada,'
Feb. 1862, MLN/P/BAA.
25 'Vessels suitable for the protection of the North American Lakes', 22 Feb, I865, Robert Spencer Robinson, MLN/P/9AA.
26 'Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider the Defences of Canada', Sept. 1862, Strictly Confidential,
mlnA/9/iA.
lakes must be armour plated, and considering the limited size 
of the locks,
’it seems impossible to construct on this side of the Atlantic anything that could pass from our harbours into 
the lakes, and be on its arrival a match for what 
would be found there.,..'
Robinson recommended that the parts for turret ships could be 
built in Britain and assembled at Kingston, Ontario, but,
'the cost’ he warned, 'would be prodigious.* ^  In the end, 
the British never embarked on an extensive system of naval 
defences for the lakes, Milne's successor, Sir James Hope 
did however, during the Fenian troubles at the close of the 
Civil War, use his officers and men to man Canadian steamers 
converted into gunboats: four on the St.Lawrence'and two on 
the lakes.
As the naval commander, Sir Alexander gave a great deal of 
his attention in those weeks of crisis to the defence of his 
most important naval base: Bermuda. In December 1861, he did 
have one ship at Barbados and one at Port Royal, Jamaica, 
but the bulk of his squadron, then about twenty-five seagoing 
warships was concentrated at Bermuda and Havana. In January 
1862, an additional force of five ships was sent out, including 
three - over eighty gun battleships - which raised the station's 
strength by the end of January to six battleships, as well as 
many frigates and smaller craft. The paper strength of the 
station was given as forty-two ships on 1 January 1862, This
27,, 'Vessels suitable* etc,, R.S.Robinson, ojo^Lt., MLN/P/bA A
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can be quite deceptive because it includes ships only suitable 
for harbour defences, e.g..Terror, Onyx, Nettle, as well as 
tugs and hulks* Pvramus. Kite, Itn«um, Weymouth and Cuba*. The 
list also Includes those vessels kept at New Yorks Rlnaldo 
and Racer: the one at Halifax: Hydra, and the wrecked - on 
29 December 1861 - battleship Conqueror. 1« addition, Steady 
was cruising to watch the American blockade while Cadmus was 
guarding Barbados and Cygnet was performing the same duty at 
Port Royal.2® The force at Havana had used that port only as 
a rendezvous, it left there in late December for Vera Cruz to 
take part in the Joint expedition to Mexico. This force 
remained stable at about ten warships while those ships available 
to Milne at Bermuda for offensive operations varied from five
to about sixteen, for the period December 1861 - January 1862. 28
28, The actual location of warships at any one time is an important indication of the station's defensive and offensive capability. Sources for this information are in the ADM 53 series, shijis logbooksj Milne's personal notebook, donated in Sept. 1965 to the National Maritime Museum and uncatalogued as yet, and the Admirals' Day-to-Day Journals: ADM 50/303-4 5. The lists of ships on the station given in ADM Bf.139-143 tell when a ship left England but not when it arrived. This list needs to be cross-checked with other 
sources as it is sometimes inaccurate.
Sir Alexander wrote to the senior officer at Port Royal, 
Jamaica, on 20 December, advising him of the possibility of 
war* The officer was told to look to the defences of the 
forts, to put guns on the guardship Imanm ’and moor her in 
the best position to command the entrance, arming any small 
vessels or boats fit to carry guns for the defence of the 
harbour', ^  There were few defences at Port Royal j a report 
to Milne in the spring of 18 6 1 stated that there were 88 guns, 
59 of which were supposed to be serviceable. The dockyard, 
it said, might be easily destroyed at a distance, 'and with 
little damage to an enemy', ^  The British troops in the 
W, Indies had been concentrated since 1853 largely at Barbados; 
they received no reinforcements during the crisis and their 
strength remained at a little less than five thousand men. None 
of the other British colonies in the W, Indies received any 
additional forces, they could only look to their local militia 
and whatever limited defences they possessed at the time,JX
«If Bermuda were in the hands of any other nation,' [Sir Alexander wrote on 31 December 1861), »the base of our operations would be removed to the two extremes, Halifax and Jamaica, and the loss of this Island as a Naval Establishment would be a National misfortune.' 32
29« Milne to Senior Officers, 20 December 1861, MLN/103A6A*• 
30, Milne to Maj, Gen, P, Taylor, 29 March 1861, ADM 128/44,
31 Bourne, op.cit., pp, 6 15, 623,
32v Milne to LCA, 31 December 1861, KLN/K>3/3 /C.
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This group of islands, which contained the most centrally 
located naval base on the station, were then only three days 
by steamer from the American mainland. They comprise five 
main islands, the aggregate being about twenty five miles 
kmg, and at no point does their width exceed a mile and a 
half, St, George at the eastern end was the chief commercial 
Port of the colony, while Ireland Island at the western end 
was the site of the naval installation. Dangerous reefs 
surrounded the islands on all sides with the exception of the 
southernmost coast* The naval dockyard at Ireland Island had 
been established in 1809 and shortly after that date fortific­
ations to protect it had been commenced, first by slave and 
latterly by convict labour. They were still being added to in 
the years of Milne's command,^ 3
33, An excellent privately published book on Bermuda and herdefences is U.S, Marine Col, R, Willock's Bulwark” of Empire. Bermuda»a Fortified Naval Base 1860-1920 (Princeton, 1965) , Willock maintains th*t the extensive system of fortifications undertaken from 1865-89 were designed expressly for the protection of the naval dockyard,p.36. Sir John Fisher, First Sea Lord, 1904-1910,downgraded Bermuda to a stand-by condition as he wished to pay more attention to home waters because of the growing German menace. Some informative books on Bermudas Trollope,A, The West Indies.etc.(London.1659); Godet,Dr,T.L* Bermuda,Its History.ctcTTLondon.I860) and Ogilvy Dr.J..An Account~~of Bermuda, Past »nd Present (Hamilton, 1883).There are a few modern books on the islands but a comprehensiv» history of Bermuda remains to be written.
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There had been commissions in 1823 and 1857 vhich
recommended various pi*ns, modifications and additions to
the growing fortress. The trouble w*s, as an officer who
had served in the garrison, wrote in 1857«
•It has been remarked that the places, i n . . which are almost impregnable by nature,arewell defended by artj but that the weak points are left wholly defenceless
What the officer was calling attention to was the anomalous
situation then existing in the islands« the only way for large
ships to reach the dockyard at Ireland Island was by a
tortuous passage, rightly called the Narrows, lying at a 
distance of 800 to 1,000 yards from the land and which was well 
covered by fortress artillery» However, virtually the entire 
southern coast of' the islands, where an enemy force might easily 
anchor in seven to ten fathoms, and march on the dockyard, this 
coast was almost without protection. The defences of Bermuda 
were grouped at both extremities of the colony. If an enemy 
squadron succeeded in passing the forts at the Narrows, it would 
not come under fire again until it was before the dockyard. The 
basic plan of defence had been formulated before the introduct­
ion of steam and the increased r*nge of ordnance had created 
new problems. The I857 report stressed that an attack through
the Narrows t 34
34 A Field Officer (F, Whittingh&m) Bermuda. A Colony, AFortress and a Frison. (London.18V?lp,8, This is a critical and interesting study. It h»s a good description of convict
life at Bermuda,
108
'would appear to have been the only mode of attack contemplated in the present system of Defence, for the whole of the southern coast, about 18 miles ••• have been left totally open and unprotected by 
works, 35
The largest ships, it noted, could lie only 200 to 600 yerdd 
from the shore. This was true, for the 1823 report, un­
concerned with steamers, did warn that boats might land on 
the southern coast without difficulty if the wind was 
northerly; but that the primary objective of Bermuda's defences 
was the command of the main channel - including the Narrows -
as its retention would enable the defenders to receive assist-
36ance from the sea,J
Reliance was placed on the intricacies of the reefs, It 
^as felt that a local and presumably loyal pilot would be needed
to navigate safely through them. But since Bermuda drew
nearly all of her food supplies from the States, many American 
shipmasters were familiar with the hazards of the islands. The 
dependence of Bermuda on outside provisions is well illustrated 
in a letter written by Milne in February 1862, when there were 
»any British men-of-war at the islands*
35*. {Report upon the Defences of Bermuda', 17 July I8 5 7#W.O. 55A 55I 1 p,6, This report - over a hundred pages - was the most detailed study at that date of the defences 
of the islands,
36* 'Report on the Defences of Bermuda', 1 Sept, 1823#W,0,55A55l
'We are giving leave here but altho only one week has elapsed since it was given there is no more Grog in the place and if the big ships are kept here there will be a famine in the Island, there is nothing 
to be got, no poultry, no eggs, no vegetables and scarecely any meat, it is becoming rather serious, and I will have to do something about it ere long, I would 
be inclined to give them a round of W, India Islands but I of course cannot do this unless I hear from home 
as I presume the affairs in the States must soon come to a crisis, 37
Both the 1823 and I857 reports mentioned that American merchant 
ship, captains knew how to navigate through the reefs. These 
captains might pilot light draught gunboats which could come 
in through the reefs, from the north, and shell the dockyard.
The I857 report noted that an American warship had just arrived 
in the colony from New York; it was looked upon as an ideal 
vessel for this purpose* an average speed of ten knots, it could 
be fitted for mortars and had a draught of 3' 3". Yet by I865,
as Col, Jervois wrote in his report of that year, only a single 
floating battery existed to prevent ships from coming through 
the reefs.^B
Among the recommendations of the I857 report were an 
increase in the garrison, the construction of additional and 
stronger fortifications, the sinking of stone laden hulks to 
close most of the channels in the reefs and the construction 
°f a strong work at Somerset Bridge, This last would bar the
37, Milne to Grey, private, 18 Feb, 1862, MLNA07/3.
38,, »Report on the Defences of Canada*, etc,, Jervois,op,clt., kln/p/bAA.
110
progress of any enemy forces which, having landed on the
south coast, were marching on the dockyard. They also 
reeommendid to be built, over . period of time, some fifteen 
batteries mounting about fifty-eight guns, on the south coastj 
the Somerset Bridge work was to serve until the permanent 
batteries had been completed.^ Unfortunately, by Decenb 
not even the Somerset fort had been built. There wa, a good 
road suitable for horse-drawn 'flying' artillery on the eouth 
coast. This would serve in ease measure to offset the 
regular batteries on that coast. The signers of the 1857 
report believed that the stopping-UP of the O h *  Out was the 
most important of the reef closing operations. With fourteen 
feet at low water, and easy to find, they feared that mortar 
boats would enter through it and shell the dockyard. It had 
not been closed by December 1861, though there were several 
hulk, in the dockyard which could be speedily sunk in the cut 
if necessary.
Even the ability of the large fortifications at the 
eastern end of the islands to atop an enemy was questioned 
in 16 5 7»
it is to be doubted whether even in the 
event of still greater additions being made to the St, George forts, a fleet of fast screw frigattes could not force this channel with comparative impunity,.* they
•Report upon the Defences of Bermuda», 1357* £ltpp.71-87♦
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would be rapidly passing the batteries at 1,000  yards distance...,* 40
Even if a vessel was sunk in the main channel, others would 
have room to pass, with the exception of one critical point, 
at Fort Catherine, The removal of the buoys would not be a 
real hinderance as the rocks were often visible in the clear 
water. If an enemy did shell the dockyard, how would it fare? 
The 1657 inspectors remarked that all of the ordinary buildings 
were shotproofs
...’but a single shell penetrating the slight sheet iron roofs of the naval storehouse and workshops might produce a general conflagration destroying everything 
the dockyard contained and rendering it useless for many years, 41
In his I857 book, the ’Field Officer' lamented that the dockyard
buildings were then rapidly rising on a plan independent of
their surrounding fortifications:
The Civil Engineer in charge of these works acts under 
the Naval Dept., but the new buildings (in the keep) are under the direction of the Royal Engineer Dept, «nd therefore display some regard to military principles - when finished they will be both protected and concealed from an assaulting enemy. Where»s the buildings of the civil engineer rise far above the 'enceinte' with the addition of needless towers, needless because the hills at both ends of the dockyard command an extensive view on every side, 42
40, Ibid., p, 92.
41- Ibid., p. 10.
42, A Field Officer, Bermuda. A Colony. A Fortress.etc,»op.clt.jp.179.
This was true, for the eastern naval store house, with its 
twin towers was a dangerous marker for enemy artillery, 
as can be seen from the photographs. In December 1861,
Bermuda's Governor Ord believed that in the event of an 
American attack they would hnve to be taken down for this 
reason.
The inhabitants numbered then about 11,000, of whom 
two-third3 were coloured. The Bermudians h“d many ties with 
the United States; a great many of their children emigrated 
to America as there was little scope for enterprise in the 
islands. Col. Jervois in his I865 report on the colonies' 
defences, did not believe that the white residents would 
'make any great effort to remain under British rule at all 
times'. The I857 report came to the same conclusion. Indeed, 
on 14 August 1775, the inhabitants had broken open the powder 
magazine at St, Georges and sold its contents to the American 
rebels, Jervois thought that the coloured residents however, 
would be adverse to becoming U.S. citizens and suggested 
'whether a portion of them might not be organized to assist 
in the defence.' The I857 report noted that the coloured 
people made excellent pilots and their 'loyalty is unquestionable* 
Nevertheless, it added rather sadly, it was true that they had 
never displayed any military tendencies. The convict population,
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then working daily in the dockyard, could hardly be relied 
upon. They numbered 644 men in December 186lj among them 
a number of Irish nationalists sentenced for agitation, who 
would certainly welcome an American attack,^ The 18$7 report 
suggested that in the event of a war with America, the convicts 
should be immediately put into some of the dockyard hulks and 
placed under the guns of the fortress. This seems ill-advised 
as the hulks would almost certainly be set afire in any action 
and there would be possibly great loss of life as well as much 
confusion,^ There was no provision made in the defence 
arrangements of Bermuda for the protection of the population.
They were »then, hardly as a group standing shoulder to shoulder 
behind the garrison but were themselves often of questionable 
loyalty.
Both the 1823 and I857 reports stated that if the Americans 
attacked Bermuda it would be a raid, not an occupation! the 
Field Officer*believed Bermuda might be taken by a sudden, 
surprise attack. All of these opinions reflected official 
British belief in a continued superiority at sea, only tempor­
arily and perhaps locally lost to any American fleet. But by
43. Gov,Ord to Newcastle, 14 Jan,1862,C,0,37A 8 2 ‘,Convicts' 
petition, March 1862, C.O, 37A&L.
44* In the event, by Jan, 2 1862,all the convicts had been removed from the hulks and placed in barracks at Boa* Island, Just south of the naval dockyard on Ireland Island and connected to it by a single bridge. They were thus isolated from the scene of any probable 
action! Milne to LCA, 2 Jan,1862, MLNA°3/4/D#
December 18 6 1, two of the major recommendations for blunting 
the effectiveness of a raid: the fort at Somerset bridge and 
the closing of Chub Cut - the opening in the reef nearest the 
dockyard - had still not been taken in hand. In addition, the 
islands were especially vulnerable to attack during the hot 
summer months - from May to November - when Milne was at 
Halifax, There were then few if any ships kept at Bermuda,
Improvisations and Faulty Defences:
Bermuda, December 1861 —  January 1862
On 30 December 1861, Col, Wm. Munro, commander of the forces 
at Bermuda, wrote to Milne in answer to an enquiry from the vice 
admiral as to the strength of his troops. There were then in the 
island, Munro said, 29 officers, $1 sergeants, 885 rank and file, 
including the band of the 39th regimentj 91 guns at St, George 
and 1 1 5 at Ireland Island - in all 206 guns - and about a thousand 
men. He had a good supply of arms and stores but feared that if 
any light draught boats got through the reefs and close to the 
dockyard, they would probably destroy It, even while themselves 
under British fire, ^5 Reinforcements were sent to the garrison 
at this time; by 1 February it reached the peak of its crisis 45
45, Col. Wa. Munro to Milne, 30 Dec, 1861, ADM 128/20,
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induced strength* 1445 officers and men.46
The Governor said to Milne in late December that the
fort3 at St, George were the key to the defence of the island.
Enemy ships must not be allowed to pass through them - if they
did - the defence of the dockyard would be very 'problematical,‘**7
Governor Ord also thought that the U,S, would send mortar and
gun boats through the reefs and, circulating to the north and
west of the dockyard at 3,000 to 4,000 yards '..«they could
destroy the establishment almost without risk to themselves.'
He feared a raid, not a permanent occupation* Milne too feared
a sudden attack. He told Col, Munro that:
I am the more impressed with this from learning ,.. that the officers of the U.S, Steamer of War 'Keystone State' 
took advantage of her recent visit to St, George not only to take photographic plans of the place, but had even 
sounded by night St. Georges and Castle Harbours,^®
46, ‘Reports of the Garrison at Bermuda», W.O, 17A426,
47* Gov. H. St, G. Ord to Milne, 30 Dec. 1861, ADM 128/20.
48, Milne to Kunro, 28 Dec. 1861, KLN/103/llA. Of course Milne did the same thing. He wrote to the Admiralty on 17 April 1861, that a Lieut, from the Nile had under his orders examined the defences of Portland, Me., when Milne embarked the Prince of Wales from that port in Oct, 1860}MLN/l03/2/D, There are many other examples of this, but in Feb,1865 the Admiralty turned down an offer received at the Foreign Office to furnish them with plans of the harbours of New York and Boston, showing the submarine obstructions. The LCA said.'my Lords do not think it would be proper to endeavour to obtain it in the clandestine manner proposed'; LCA to Hammond,18 Feb. I865, Secret Orders and Letters, ADM 13/7.
If an attack came, the naval commander-in-chief 
believed it might take several forms: light draught boats 
coming from the north or west to attack Ireland Island, a 
landing in force on the southern part of Bermuda and a drive 
from there on Somerset or Spanish Point, - from either of which 
the dockyard would be commanded - an attack on St, George or 
perhaps an occupation of Castle Harbour.^ On the 31st 
Milne complained to the Admiralty that at 'two of the principal 
forts at St, Georges, defending the Narrows, the guns mounted 
are only 24 prs..,. that one Sea Front of Ft, Albert has already 
fallen down, when excercising the guns'. As for the most 
important fort, St, Catherine Point - important because at that 
spot all ships going towards the dockyard had to make a dangerous 
turn to the west and must come under her guns, while they could 
largely avoid the other forts at St. George - here the armament 
comprised only seven 68 prs,, plus some 32 prs, and 'prevailing 
opinion' considered the work 'unstable',-^ After Milne's 
representations, Col, Munro agreed to place four 68 pounders 
close to the sea at the Narrows, white* the vice admiral sent 
Diadem 32, up to St, Catherine’s Point to further bolster defences
49» Milne to Munro, 28 Dec. 1861, MLNA03A1A.
50. Milne to LCA, 31 Dec, 1861, MLNA03/3/C.
there. He also armed ship's boats which would lie off 
the channels in the reefs to prevent an enemy making an 
entrance at those points. The floating battery Terror,16.^ 
and the two 20 horse power defence gunboats with two guns 
apiece, were also av"ilable for this purpose. In addition, 
Milne held in readiness the field pieces and marines from the 
ships who could be landed and used as mobile batteries.
Sir Alexander wrote on the last day in December '••• I do 
not consider Bermuda safe from any attack unless several ships 
are here to afford protection.' ^  As has been said, he had 
from five to about sixteen warships at the island in the period 
December 1861 - January 1862. The naval commander's private 
correspondence reflected this same fear. On 2 January 1862 
he confided to the Duke of Somerset! 51
51, The Terror became, in I857, the first ironclad to cross the Atlantic, Built in I856, she had 4" of iron over 6M of teak, with pronounced inward sloping sides and a 200 HP engine.She had water tight compartments, one of only sixteen ships built up to that time with this innovation. See G.A, Osbon's 'The First of the Ironclads', Mariner's Mirror, L.fl96A^and Parl.Paner. XXHY.6l862l P.829. The Terror remained at Bermuda until 1901, when she w*s broken up.Not a sea-going vessel,she had originally been towed out.
52' Milhd to LCA, 31 Dec. 1861, MLN/I03/3/C.
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.... some superior controlling power is needed here.The Col, of the 39th Reg, is the Commsndant, then there is a Col, of Eng, and a Col, of Artillery with a Lt, Col, of Engineers as Civil Governor. There is no 
superior authority on hand to order, the Col, of the Regiment naturally looks to the rifle practice of his 
Reg, and the real defence of the Island is a secondary consideration, 53
The 'Field Officer' made the same criticism in his 1857 book.
There were three nearly independent authorities at Bermuda, he 
said: a colonel who is the civil governor, another colonel who 
commands the troops and an admiral who is in fact governor of 
Ireland Island, This 'frittering away of responsibility [wasji 
the death blow to all good government,' ^  H  the beginning of 
January 1862 Milne was still angered by the military. At that 
time he wrote to the First Naval Lord, Vice Admiral Grey 
complaining of their 'apathy ... too much pen and ink' and said 
that none of the soldiers were stationed in the Forts until he 
had urged this measure, as one which would render the defenders 
better able to cope with a sudden attack,55 They had previously 
been kept at their barracks, some distance from the forts.
Col, Munro he charged,had no plan for defending the dockyard.5^
53* Milne to Somerset, private, 2 Jan, 1862, MLN/LQ7#
54, / A Field Officer, op.cit,. p,239-240,
55, Milne to Grey, private, 2 J*n,1862, MLN/107,
56, The colonel did,however, as he told Milne on 30 December, plan to re-inforce Fort Cunningham - near St,Georges - with 4 - Sinch guns brought from Ireland I aland. He was also constructing a new battery of 4 - 8inch guns which would bear on the channel at the eastern end of the island, Col.Munro deprecated Milne's fears about a landing on the south coast j he believed that it w*a more essential to hold St.Georges and Ireland Island and anyway,said 
he could only spare a hundred men to guard the south shore.Munro to Milne, 30 Dec, 1861, ADM 1/5787.
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In a note written some ye«rs later, Sir Alexander said that 
the Governor of Bermuda had no military authority unless war 
was declared, the colonel of the troops in the meantime had 
charge of the island defence, ’But wrote home that on the 
appointment of a new governor he should be commander-in-chief 
of the island and in the meantime recommended the Island to be 
placed under the General at Halifax,,,and this was entirely 
approved and carried out,' 57
The naval commander-in-chief was in a dilemma because he 
maintained that the forts «nd garrison, plus the two harbour 
gunboats and the Terror should alone be looked upon for the 
defence of Bermuda, He did not like the idea of keeping his 
ships there solely for the defence of the island. This would 
of course necessarily limit his offensive operations as it was 
apparent that some of his warships must remain there to aid the 
local forces. It is apparent then that neither Halifax nor 
Bermuda were fortified havens, but were themselves quite 
vulnerable to enemy attack. Nevertheless, the Colonial Secretary, 
the Duke of Newcastle, believed that while the colonies ought 
to contribute to their own military defences, 'the Imperial 
Government alone ought to provide naval protection’, 5®
57 Milne HomS papers donated Sept,1965,uncntalogued, at National Maritime Museum,
58v„ Clarke, D,F,, The Attitude of the Colonial Office to the Working of Responsible Government. Ph.D, thesis, London University*
1953, p. 63.
At the time the home government tacitly followed this policy, 
but beginning in I865 and continuing until the later 1880's, 
fortifications were built at Bermuda which made it a genuine 
refuge for British warships,59 Halifax was also strengthened 
*t this time, though not so extensively as Bermuda,
Milne's Plans for War with the North
Thé Trent incident resulted in a world wide alert going to
all British stations. Ships were sent from the home and
Mediterranean stations to reinforce Milne's forces, while others
were held in readiness to sail. The First Lord of the Admiralty
the Duke of Somerset wrote to Sir Alexander on 15 December»
In the event of war I do not send from here any plan of 
operations as you have probably better means of judging what it may be advisable to do. But the first object would probably be to open the blockade of the Southern ports and without directly co-operating with the Confederates, enable them to act and to receive supplies, 60
Commodore Dunlop arrived with his squadron from Havana, at Vera 
Cruz on 6 January 1862, Thus in early January, Mine's two 
main forces were at Bermuda and Vera Cruz, In the event of war,
59./ Willock, op.cit,. p, 123 and passim.
60„ Somerset to Milne, private, 1 $ Dec, 1861, MLN/Ï07,
Dunlop had orders to operate »gainst the U.S, blockaders 
In the Gulf, while Milne would attack the Federal ships on 
the east coast. Sir Alexander suffered from a shortage of 
readily- available ships in the last days of December; for 
a time he had only five at Bermuda,
His course of action, when additional reinforcements 
had arrived was,after crushing the U.S, fleet,to establish a 
blockade from Cape Henry, Virginia, to Maine, Some of the places 
to be blockaded werei the Chesapeake Bay area, the mouth of 
the Delaware, Sandy Hook and New fork harbour, the western end 
of Long Island Sound, Boston and Portland, Maine, Milne would 
enter the Chesapeake, try to cut off all supplies to Washington, 
and ’if possible to get at.the'capital1. He urged the 
Admiralty to give him a double set of colliers, used in relays, 
so that none of his blockaders would have to return to Halifax 
or Bermuda for coal. As a rendezvous for these colliers and 
for other uses, Sir Alexander planned to take possession of 
some harbours in the Martha’s Vineyard area of Massachusetts,^" 
Ihe commander-in-chief contemplated the creation of five or 
six separate squadrons for blockading purposes with & minimum 
of fifty-four ships. Many of these would h»ve to be corvettes 
or frig&tes, smaller »nd handier vessels th»n the battleships,
6l* Milne to Grey, private, n»d,; Milne to Somerset, private
24 J»n. 1862, MLN/1G7.
Useful ^  the shallow waters of the American coast*
Th©
r* Vou^ d be at least sixteen colliers to fuel this fleet.
Jr *0nal craising warships would be required to protect 
■^iah trade in the W, Indies from American privateers, 
less th©n twenty-five ships, said the vice admiral. A 
°hed squadron of ironclads should be formed tor attacking
the Horfwt
n s commercial portsj the defences of which once
®Alenced » . /_* « subsidy could be demanded or an embargo enforced» 2
during the crisis the Admiralty arranged tor increased 
3 of coal to be sent to the station. It was unnecessary
PPly much coal to the northern p"rt of the station 
9 oi the ready supplies available at the Nov« Scotia and
^*pe Bret«
k n »nines • many of the numerous transports which
€kt reinforcements from England «t this time coaled directly
Prom .
38 Jaines. This v*s a real advantage - Vice Admiral
**Une M '
Sreatly concerned with the problem ot coal - it
C°uld nau
*8 the difference between success and failure in «ny 
P^lated naval operations. To speed coaling «t Bermuda,
Hllne eanl *
■ty 1« January 1 8 6 2 , towed the old htilk Dromedary 
Ihto the v
&a*ln, moored her close to the breakwater, cut holes
in hep sides and used her as a »dummy*. Coal v*s placed on
the breaj_
B ^ter frc?a whence it vag taken in barrows throng the 
to the ship into which it w«s to be loaded. This
'  *A Privets Paper’ , KLNAoS*
12 3
greatly facilitated coaling besides giving a roofed place where­
in rope and sailmakers as well as other ship’s artificers could 
work« Using this hulk, Eero was enabled to take in 560 tons 
of coal in three and a half days while Donegal« moored in 
Grassy Bay and coaled by lighters, had required a week to take 
aboard 320 tons.^ At this time of transition from sail to 
limited use of steam, a ship’s coal capacity was speedily 
consumed by largely inefficient engines. The File could steam 
at full speed for only about five or six days. File’s tender, 
Fimble 5» with 50 men, stowed 74 tons, burned at the rate of 9 to 
10 tons a day at full speed. Thus sailpower was ordered to be used 
at every opportunity to supplement a ship’s limited steam power.^
The Hydrographer of the Favy, Capt. J, Washington, sent to 
Milne in January 1862 a report he had compiled on the defences 
of the Forth. Some of this information came from Confederate
63 Milne to Col* Greene, private, 21. Jan, 1862, MLF/l07/3j Milne to LCA, 21 Jan. 1862, MLF/103/4/D.
64 Ship Returns. MLF/1 O8 1 The %ieens Regulations, etc. 
(London,l862)p. 175»
officers in England. The report revealed that New York had 
strong fortifications, though it was thought a successful 
attack might be made by armour-plated frigates which would 
draw the fire of the batteries, while the wooden ships raced 
past. Of course, the only sea-going armour plated warship 
available in December 1861 w*s HM3 Warrior. Palmerston was 
against sending this vessel, Britain's first ironclad battle­
ship, on the Mexican expedition. She had only been completed 
in October 1861 and the Prime Minister believed her defects and 
merits might be more e&sily discovered in home waters,^5 The 
North was not to receive its first ironclads until the seven 
armoured gunboats for use on Southern rivers were delivered, 
in January 1862, The Monitor.ready in March 1862, was by no 
means a sea going ship but its class was of great utility in 
harbour defence, Boston, C&pt, Washit^bon said, could not be 
attacked with any hope of success, while Fortress Monroe -
the blockaders haven - though thought to be very strong, was
• • • «
isolated. The whole tenor of the report is that an attack 
and blockade of the coast could be done if Britain was 
determined on it} but it would be anything but an effortless 
task,^ Somerset himself was against attacking Portland or
65* Palmerston to Russell, private, 6 Oct,1861, PRO 30/22/21,
66,. 'List of the Chief Ports', etc,, op.cit.. MLN/LO5/6,
Boston or any such operation. He believed that *s soon as 
the Federal blockade was smashed, the navy should establish 
it3elf in one of the Confederate ports where coal was avail­
able, He fully shared Milne's ideas on the necessity for 
coal ',,, we should require at least 10,000 tons per month, '67 
Curiously, both the Hydrographer and Milne seemed to believe 
that Maine could be separated from the Union, The vice admiral 
said in January 1862,
'It was my intention not to act against that State in the same manner as I would have done at Boston,,, but rather felt my way whether that State was inclined to change Masters,1
Capt, Washington thought that the people of Maine, if strictly 
blockaded, might 'declare themselves independent and so profit 
by all the advantages that would be derived from railroad 
communication with Canada and the Lakes,* ^
How did the strength of the respective navies compare?
The total might of the N, American and W, Indian Station when 
most of the ships sent as reinforcements had arrived, was*
Ships* 42, Men: 14,551, guns: 1319 and tonnage* 70,456. One 
must subtract from this list the battleship Conqueror 99. 
lost on a Bahama reef on 29 December 1861, The total British
6 7, Somerset to Russell, private, 29 Dec, 1861, PRO 30/22/24»
68. Milne to Grey, private, 17 Jan. 1862, MLN/107; 'List ofthe Chief Ports', etc.. op,cit.yMLN/l05/6,The French naval com­mander of the nothern division of his station thought that Can­
ada needed Portland,Me.,as it was always ice free.French Archives 
MAR BB4,797,Montaignac to Navy Minister,18 July 1861.
naval force in commission on 1 December 1861 vast 339 ships,
61,342 men, 5*304 guns and & tonnage of 324,063.^9 There were 
in addition many more ships in the reserve which would have 
required some time to prepare for sea. The Union navy in 
December 1861 had about 264 ships, 2,557 guns, 22,000 men and 
ft tonnage of 218,016. While it was true that many of them were 
purchased or hired commercial steamers, yet some of these were 
fine vessels: the Vanderbilt - used as Commodore Wilkei* flag­
ship in 1862 - was considered one of the fastest ships in the 
world. Nevertheless, Britain certainly possessed a much 
greater number of heavy duty sea going warships.
That December Sir Alexander wrote: ’The ships’ companies
are in a high state of excitement for war, they are certainly
all for the South. I hear the Lower Decks to-day are decorated
'70with the Confederate colours’. The commander-in-chief took
a more sober view of the possible conflict:
War has no doubt its horrors and its Evils but to make war felt it must be carried out against the enemy with energy and every place must be made to feel what war really is,,, 71
69* Milne Home papers, uncatalogued, op.cit,; Abstract of Naval Force in Commission, 1 Dec, 1861, ADM 8/L40; CWMCf 1861,p,38. 70
70, Milne to Grey, private, n.d,, MLN/107,
71* Milne to Somerset, private, 24 Jan, 1862, MLNA07*
When he left the station in M&rch 1864, Sir Alexander, speaking 
of the Trent affair, rather wistfully wrote it is not 
probable this favourable combination of circumstances will 
again offer,..’ because of the increase in Federal strength 
and the introduction of ironclads
■r
*The Diplomatic Denouement/.
Shortly before he left Halifax for Bermuda, Milne received 
a telegram sent by Lord Lyons, on 16 November 1861. It notified 
the vice admiral that two Confederate envoys had been taken from 
a British mail packet and said that Lyons considered the matter 
’very serious’. Milne replied on the 18th that he was leaving 
the next day for the south but would send Nimble to New York to 
be at Lyons’ disposal.
It was a bizarre fact that this whole episode had been 
anticipated »nd the Law Officers had delivered their opinion 
of its leffility on 12 November 1861. This had come about,as 
Lyons told Milne confidentially on 1 December, because a Federal 
warship, the James Adger 8 , had arrived off the south coast of 
England in early November. The James Adger had then moved up
72» 'Memo Relative to the Civil War in America’,1864, MLN/IO5/6
to Southampton and excited suspicions that she was going to 
stop the packet and remove the expected Confederate 
commissioners, James M, Mason and John Slidell# The U,S, 
Minister, C,F# Adams, gave assurance that the James Adger 
had orders not to remove the ’rebels' from any ship flying 
foreign colours#^ The exact wording of the Law Officers' 
decision of 12 November was that beyond the territorial limits 
of Britain:
The U#S# ship of war may put a prize crew on board the W, Indian steamer, and carry her off to a port of the 
U.S. for adjudication by a Prize Court there} but she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell, and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to 
pursue her voyage, 74
HMS Phaeton was then alerted to prevent the packets being stopped
within the three mile limit, Lyons closed his note to Milne of
1 December by expressing his uncertainty in the matter*
I am not informed that the Law Officers decided that Messrs# Mason and Slidell might be taken out of the packet, but only that we could not prevent the Packet's 
being interferred with (which may only mean searched, overhauled or so). Still this Intelligence confirms 
me in my opinion that I ought to maintain the greatest 
reserve here in the matter of the Trent,,,
While it would seem that the Law Officers had said that Mason
and Slidell could not be removed from the packet, yet the
73» Lyons to Milne, private, 1 Dec, 1861, MLN/107,
74. The Law Officers to lari Russell, Confidential, 12 Nov. 1861 ADM 116/888,
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question was full of legal difficulties, and Lyons 
decided not to express any opinion as to the rights or wrongs 
of the case,
By the 19th Deceniber,the British Minister had two war­
ships, Racer - commanded by his cousin, A.KcL. Lyons - *nd 
Rinaldo, «waiting his orders or despatches at New York, He 
wrote gloomily to Milne on that date that he didn’t think the 
Americans would yield, though they just might if they saw 
British preparations for war. But if he must leave It might be 
convenient to embark at Annapolis, if there was any fierce 
excitement at New York, but after all I am not living among 
savages,’ 75 Lyons made his formal demand for the release of 
the envoys on 23 December, The Americans were given until noon 
of Monday, 30 December to comply or the British Minister was 
instructed to leave the country. Although fearing the acts of 
subordinate Federal naval officers, Lyons did not believe that 
if he left, the Americans, ’would deliberately do anything to 
precipitate hostilities, on the contrary they would endeavour 
to prevent our doing more than break off diplomatic relations,*
75* Lyons to Milne, private, 19 Dec, 1861, MLN/107,
76, Same to Same, private, 23 Dec* 1861, MLN/W7, An interesting view of Lyons’ opinion of colonial statesmen was given on 3 Dec, 1861 in a private letter to Russell, Lyons said that the Canadian finance minister, J,T,G*lt, was in Washington and had frightened him with an account of the defencelessness of Canada; b u t I  did not let Mr.Galt see that I was alarmed about Canada, I do not think it prudent to speak freely to a man, whose interests are all in one colony, and who is responsible 
to a Colonial Parliament.,.’#PR030/22/35.
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On the 26 December, Immortalité.which had returned from 
observing the Union squadron at Port Royal, S.C., left Bermuda 
for Annapolis. She was to embark Lord Lyons «nd his suite 
if that became necessary. Her captain, George Hancock, was 
given strict orders by Milne. On reaching Chesapeake Bay, 
he was to immediately contact the senior Federal officer *nd 
acquaint him with his mission. If the Americans seemed hostile, 
Hancock was to hoist a. flag of trucej but he was to be prepared 
for a sudden surprise,'., at the same time concealing your 
preparations for action so effectually as not unnecessarily 
to wound their susceptibilities by exhibiting any external 
signs of distrust,'?? Because of severe weather,Immortalité 
did not arrive at Annapolis until 6 January 1662, some ten days 
after the crisis had ended. Hancock later wrote to Commodore
S.F, DuPont, who he had met at Port Royal, S.C., telling him on 26April, 
that while at Annapolis he had gone to Washington, Lyons had 
introduced him to Lincoln, Seward - withtfiom, 'I had many long 
conversations' - Gustavus Fox, Cmmdr. Dahlgren, Generals 
McDowell and Burnside and many other dignitaries, Hancock had 
visited several army encampments about the city and sent to 
Milne a detailed report of the Dahlgren gunj shaped like a 
'soda water bottle', which he had inspected while on a tour
77» Milne to Hancock, 2$ Dec. 1661, Sailing Orders, MLN/L10A/cc.
of the Washington Navy Yard at the time 78
As is well known, the Federal cabinet met on 25 and
26 December and finally agreed to release the Confederates,
Lyons w«s notified of this decision on 27 December, three d*y3
before the ultimatum was due to expire. In his despatch
giving the reasons for the release Seward stated;
...  what has happened has been simply *n inadvertency,consisting in a departure by a naval officer free, from any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established, and probably by the several parties concerned either imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the British Government has right to expect the same reparation that we, as an independent State, should expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly nation in a similar case, 79
After a long polemic, Seward finally said that Nason and Slidell 
would be released because ’Wilkes had erred in not bringing the 
Trent. with her passengers into port for trial by an .American
78 Hancock to DuPont, Eleutherian Kills Historical Library,Supra. Ch.II. p^S } Hancock to Milne, 4 Febil862, KLNA04/3. Hancock made friends among both participants in the American struggle, Lt, Col, J,A,L,Freemi>ntle of the Coldstreams visited the Northern »nd Southern states in 1863, While at Havana, Freemantle met Hancock who agreed to take him to Nst*moros, Mexico, Fran there, they both crossed the border to Brownsville, Texas and spent some time as guests of the Confederate General Beej The Freero^ntle Diary. (London,1 9 56),pp, 5-1 6 ,
79* Seward to Lyons, 27 Dec. 1861, ADM 116/838.
Prize Court', In view of his previous statement about the 
uncertainty of the precedents in the case, it is strange that 
Seward reached exactly the same conclusion as the Law Officers 
in their decisions of 12 November and 28 November, both given 
confidentially to Earl Russell, the Foreign Secretary, Is it 
possible that Seward knew of these rulings? E,D, Adams.says 
that Lyons reported on 3 February 1862 that 'Sumner in a fire­
side talk, had revealed that he was in possession of copies 
of the Law Officers' opinions given on November 12 and 28 
respectively, Lyons was astounded'Ad»ms  doesn't say 
whether Sumner had these opinions at the time of Lincoln's 
cabinet meetings of .25 and 26 December. We know he had them 
in early January because in the same report of 3 February,
Lyons told Russell - most confidentially - that Sumner admitted 
receiving the Law Officers? rulings confidentially from England, 
For this reason the Senator said he had been unable to mention 
them in his speech in e*rly January which gave the reasons for 
the release of the Confederates, Lyons believed that Sumner 
wa3 referring to this part of his speech;
but according to the British Law Officers on whose professional opinion the British cabinet has acted, the whole proceeding was vitiated by the failure to take the packet into port for condemnation, 02 80
80. Ad»ms, op.clt,, 1, p.233,
81,, Ibid,, p, 234 (footnote).
82* Lyons to Russell, most confidential, 3 Feb, 1862, F,0,5/824
80
In another letter to Russell of the same date - 3 February 
- Lyons said:
It might have been very *wkwBrd for me Mr# Sumner's h&ving the Law Officers' opinions without my being aware of it, I am extremely Pnxious both on public 
and private grounds that nothing awkward should occur in consetjuence of his h&ving told me that he had them - but I thought it a positive duty both with a view of future discussions to let you know it, and to leave a record of it in the Archives here and at the Foreign Office,03
Palmerston was unworried by Lyons' anxiety; he told Russell 
on 19 February 1862 that he didn't believe that &ny'bre&ch 
of confidence’ had been committed by anyone in the government 
'because the substance of that opinion was pretty generally 
known ip London and if I mistake not, was stated in several 
newspapers,' ^
Charles Sumner, as Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations and a trusted adviser to President Lincoln 
was at the cabinet meetings of 25 and 26 December, It may well 
be,then, that Sumner who was from the beginning an advocate 
of liberating the Confederates, may have given Seward a. way 
out of the dilemma by furnishing him with the Law Officers' 
opinions, Seward would then have seen that the flaw in 
Wilkes' action had been, according to the English legal 
opinion, the fact that the Federal officer hadn't brought the
83., Lyons to Russell, private, 3 Feb, 1862, PRO 30/22/36.
84. Palmerston to Russell, private, 19 Feb, 1862, PRO 30/22/22 
Seward may have received the L.O. opinions from W.Dwight 
of Boston,through Sumner.See footnote 17 in the Appendix.
mall packet as v/ell as the envoys, into a U.S, prize court*
He could then, without fear of a l*ter contradiction by the 
British Law Officers, offer this reason as his own excuse 
for the release. He could also embroider his opinion with 
any additional matter to salvage American pride; as indeed 
he did by insisting, quite rightly, that now Britain was 
obeying American precedents which condemned the taking of 
individuals by » belligerent from a neutral ship,®5
As Imrnortalite had not yet arrived, Lyons on 30 December, 
sent Rinaldo from New York to Provincetown, Mass,, to pick 
up the two commissioners and their secretaries. The British 
Minister cautioned Cmmdr, Hewett not to salute them or treat 
them in any other way than as private gentlemen. They were 
given a half hour to pack their things; Slidell $8, was quite 
ill, and they were sent on 1 January 1862 the forty miles 
from Fort Warren to Provincetown in a small tug, guarded by 
six brines, to Rina Ido, ^  It had been an extremely tempest­
uous winter on the coast of North America, Rinaldo. though an 
excellent sea boat, ran into mounting seas and a terrific gale
8 5. As f*r as the writer can determine, this analysis of Sumner’s possible actions does not appear in any article or biography on this statesman; the last biography of Sumner - which covers the Civil War - appeared more th"n fifty years ago. Similarly, the ’coincidents’ is not mentioned in any of the well-known biographies of Sew«rd. 86
86, Lyons to Milne, private, 28 Dec, 1861, MLN/L07;Milne to Grey, private, 10 Jan, 1862, MLN/107,
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upon leaving Boston for Halifax, where the envoys were to 
take the packet for England. At last,on 5 January, when 
off the Nova Scotian coast not far from his destination,
Hewett,knowing that he was now too late to catch the packet 
for England »decided to turn south to Bermuda. Rinaldo was 
enveloped in ice,short of coal and twelve of her men had 
frostbite. Her logbook reveals that the crew were constantly 
engaged in chipping ice from deck and rigging,hot water was 
sprayed from fire hoses onto sails and other parts of the 
ship, and officers and men suffering from the cold were often 
sent below. The ship lost two boats and was almost unmanageable.®^ 87
87 Milne to Dunlop,private,20 Jan,1862,MLN/I07/3;Log of 
Rinaldo,AIM 53/8149.The ship’s captain,W.N.W,Hewett, 
was accused by the later Admiral George Dewey of Manila 
Bay fame,of being a Confederate sympathizer. He claimed 
that while at New Orleans,Hewett invited Southern ad­
herents to his ship,they sang C.S.songs,ete. Dewey said 
the British officer later became a blockade runner. It 
is true that Hewett left the station during the war,but 
his actions and whereabouts are uncertain. Dewey said 
that when the U.S.heard Hewett was a’runner',they privately 
sent word to Britain that any of her officers found 
serving in such vessels,would be returned to the British 
government in double irons. Dewey.G..Autobiography of 
George Dewey(London;1913),pp.83-84.
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When they arrived at Bermuda, Sir Alexander offered
them the choice of going to England directly via Racer
or of leaving the next day for St, Thomas, to try and catch
the middle of the month packet for England, Mason and
Slidell chose to leave for St, Thomas on the morrow. While
at Bermuda, on 9 January, they met Milne’s family and dined
with the vice admiral, as private gentlemen, 88 This decision
to take the packet raised a question that both the Foreign
Office and Lyons had feared. The British Minister thought
they should be taken to England by a British warship because:
I should not like to trust them on bo«rd a Packet, 
lest some American Captain should test the validity of Mr, Seward’s Doctrine, by capturing the Packet 
and bring her before a Prize Court, 8"
88« Dorothy, Lady Redesdale, told the writer this story recounted to her by her mother, Mrs, Cordes, one of Milne’s daughters. While Mason and Slidell were at Bermuda, Mrs, Cordes *■» then a young girl - was Introduced to them. She asked innocently why they. h*d rings on over their gloves, ’So that they may be seen’, the southerners replied. Mason," writing to C,S, Secretary of Sbate Hunter, noted that ’as we passed the admiral’s ship, the Nile, going into the harbour the band on the quarter decks having the officers grouped around, played what they under­stood to be our national air, ’Dixie’l Milne m«kes no mention of this incident in any of his letters. Mason added regarding the Royal N«vy a common sentiment pervaded all, and which was freely expressed, of warm sympathy with the South and entire alienation from the 
North’, CRN, II, 3, pp* 326-8,
89* Lyons to Milne, private 28 Dec, 1861, MLNA®?*
Sir Alexander however, thought that after the capture of 
the envoys, it was improbable 'that the precedent set 
by the 'San Jacinto' will be followed by other U,S.Cruizers.'90 
In fact when Rlnaldo with Mason and Slidell arrived at 
St* Thomas on 14 January - only four hours before the packet 
sailed - the U,S,S. Iroquois was riding at anchor. The 
Union warship left next day, Rlnaldo made no attempt to follow 
her and two days later the British warship left St, Thomas 
for Bermuda., The southerners arrived in England, at the end 
of January, without incident.
In early January, Milne wrote to Grey hoping that the 
measures taken by Britain had done some good 'if only to bring 
down the pride and arrogance of the American people but it will 
have shewn the necessity for keeping our colonies prepared,♦ 91 
Lyons received the G.C.B, for his delicate handling of the 
affair. On 2? February 1862,he confided to Milne:
my diplomacy would have done little toward settling the Trent question, had not the military preparations come in aid of it,! 92
90,, Milne to Dunlop, 7 Dec, 1861, MLN/103A6/P.
91# Milne to Grey, private, 4 J*n, 1862, MLNA07. 
92, Lyons to Milne, private, 27 Feb, 18 6 2, MLN/L07*
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The Navy and Mexican Intervention
Ever since declaring independence from Spain in 1821, 
Mexico had alternated between anarchy and despotism. 
’Pronunciamento* had followed ’Plan*,the nation had sunk into 
chaos,and by I860 was deeply in debt to foreign merchants and 
bankers.
In June 1861,after three years of civil war, Benito Juarez 
was elected Constitutional President of the Republic. He faced 
almost insurmountable problems. The previous Miramon government 
had stolen 0 660,000 from the British Legation and had saddled 
Mexico with the disastrous Jecker loan. When Juarez promulgated 
the decree of 17 July 1861,suspending all payments to foreign 
creditors for two years,it was the last straw. Ihe English, 
French and Spanish governments decided to land an armed force 
in Mexico. * I
I For specific information on the Intervention sees Grajales,
G.,(ed,),Mexico y La Oran Bretana Durante La Interveneion.
I861-1862 (Mexico.1962); Hoskins,H.L.,♦FrenchViews of the 
Monroe Doctrine and the Mexican Expedition*.Hispanic Amer­
ican Historical Review.IV,pp.677-89;Robertson,W.S.,*The 
Tripartite Treaty*, Hispanic American Historical Review.XX. 
pp.167-89. See also the French Archives; Campagnes.MAR BB4, 
799,806-7,810,812-14,8l9,for naval and much of the political 
background of their operations.
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The Preamble to the Convention of London, the instrument of 
intervention, avowed that their purpose was to obtain protection 
for their subjects and the collection of their claims. The import­
ant second article disclaimed any intention on the part of the 
signatories to interfere with the government of Mexico. 2 However, 
Lord Russell believed that Spain or Prance might be inclined to
r t  *
change the government of that country. Accordingly, he wrote 
to both of his allies and asked to be informed as to the extent 
of their respective claims. Spain readily complied, but the 
Prench returned an evasive answer. The Foreign Miniater,Thouvenel, 
told Cowley, the British Ambassador, that he 'hadn’t enough infor­
mation to form an opinion'. 4 The French Commissioners,ha said, 
could examine the claims, on the spot, in Mexico.
Russell himself wished to keep free of Mexican politics. If 
the Mexicans themselves,however, wished to invite the Archduke 
Maximilian to the throne of that country,Russell believed,'there 
is nothing in the Convention to prevent it'.5 tbr<i Palmerston,
2 Pari, papers,LXIV(I862),pp.80-81. The Convention was signed 
on 31 October 1861.
3 Memo by Russell, 2 Oct.1861,F.0.50/358.
4 Pari, papers.LXIY.op.cit.,p.227.
5 Ibid..Russell to Wyke,27 Jan.I862,p.254;Russell to Wyke 
(draft),27 Jan.I862,F,0.50/363.
the Prime Minister, wrote a few days before the Convention 
was signed,
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: ...  the Day on which a Monarchy on substantial Foundationsand on Constitutional Principles was established in Mexico, would be for the People of that Country the happiest and most fortunate of their existence.? ®
On the same occasion he expressed the opinion of many of the
aristocracy of his time:
*If the example of the Spanish American Republics had not cured every reasoning man of any Partiality for Republican Form of Government, that which is now taking place in the disunited States must have completed the cure.*
The British government did not wish to intervene politically in
Mexican affairs, as much from its own reluctance»from fear of the
United States, but if any other nation wished to establish a stable
regime the British would have no objections.
The Gulf of Mexico was the responsibility of the Jamaica Division 
of the North American and West Indian Station.^ The Commander-in- 
Chief of the Station, Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, K,C,B,, was 
at Halifax in the Fall of 1861, There, in a letter dated 5 October, 
he received the first official intimation that he was to command 
the British contingent in the Allied expedition. The Duke of Somerset, 
First Lord of the Admiralty,informed him that a convention with France' gand Spain, 'to coerce Mexico', would shortly be signed.
6 *
7.
8.
Palmerston to Hammond, 20 Oct, 1861, F,0, 391/7.
Standing Orders for the Squadron feployed__pn the.._N,American a m  West Indian Station. (Halifax 1862).„, nLN/108.
Somerset to Milne, Private , 5 Oct* 1861, MLN/L07,
Milne was ordered to move towards Vera Cruz early in November.
The rear admiral always spent the winter at the Bermuda naval 
base, but his exact departure date to the south was determined 
by the needs of the service.
Milne,nevertheless, postponed his departure from Halifax.
He was awaiting HMS Emerald from Plymouth, with the new long- 
range Armstrong guns for his flagship Nile 86, and another second 
rate, St. George 86. After thirty-eight days with no sign of 
Emerald. Milne could wait no longer; he left Halifax on 19 November
9
for Bermuda. Emerald never arrived. Buffeted and damaged by 
storms, she returned to England.*0
Perhaps the delay was fortunate. While the rear admiral was 
waiting at Halifax,the British Minister to Washington,Lord Lyons, 
telegraphed to him on 16 November the news of the Trent incident. 
Sir Alexander therefore knew before he left for Bermuda that there 
soon might be serious trouble with the U.S. In his absence he 
appointed Commander R.Vesey Hamilton,who he characterized as, 
’decidedly the best Commander on the Station',** to be 
the Senior Officer at Halifax, The action of the Union officer
9 Milne to LCA,19 Nov. 1861,AIM 1/5759.
10 Eardley-Wilmot, Sir Sydney M..An Admiral’s Memories 
(London,n.d.),pp,35-36. The author was a 14 year-old naval 
cadet in Emerald at the time.
XI Milne to Grey,private, 17 Jan. 1862, MLN/I07.
Captain Wilkes in the Old Bahama Channel was to have an
important effect on British participation in the Mexican
intervention* 'I will of course be on the lookout’, wrote
Milne to Lyons on the day he sailed to the south. The British
12Minister was ‘always happier when Milne was at Halifax} he 
could be reached there by a direct telegraph line from Washington.
The only means of communication with Bermuda was by shipj 
a journey of several days, Milne arrived in Bermuda on 23 November, 
It was still his intention to command the forces being sent to 
Vera Cruz, and to act as a British Commissioner with Sir Charles 
L, Vfyke, On the 14th he had been given the local rank of Vice 
Admiral, so that he wouldn’t be the junior admiral on the Allied 
expedition,^ The mail packet of 20 December brought the 
Admiralty’s instructions of 1 December* Because of the American 
crisis, Milne was to remain at Bermuda until further orders,^
He wrote the same day to Commodore Hugh Dunlop, Commander of the 
Jamaica Division, ordering him to assume the command and proceed 
to the coast of Mexico,^ Because of the Trent incident, 12345
12 Lyons to Mill», private,24 April 1862, MLN/L07,
13 Milne to Grey, private, 14 Nov, 1861, MLN/107, Milne lamented his junior status on the day of his promotion. He was confirmed in this rank on 13 April I865,
14 LCA to Milne, 1 Dec. 1861} Milne to LCA, 20 Dec,186l, MLNA03/3/3
15 Milne to Dunlop, 20 Dec, 1861, MLN/103A6/P*
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Dunlop had taken a squadron to Havana to protect British shipping
16In the area from any further U.S. harassment. He had been there 
on Milne’s orders, earlier in the year, but had since returned to 
Port Royal. Milne knew this and was thus enabled to reach him 
more quickly than if the Commodore had been at Port Royal, his 
division’s headquarters. The Commodore had had previous experience 
in Mexico. In 1859 he signed an agreement with the Juarez forces 
at Vera Cruz whereby the Mexicans agreed to pay British creditors 
an additional percentage of the Custom House receipts.
Milne busied himself with plans for colonial defence, as well 
as for offensive and defensive naval operations. On December 29th 
HMS Conqueror 99, which had brought some of the Marines for Mexico 
out to' the station and was on the way to Bermuda, was lost on 
Rum Cay in the Bahamas.^ This was a sad blow, but other reinforce­
ments for the Station were on the'way Sir Alexander, in the
light of American affairs, thought it fortunate that he was at 
Bermuda, instead of Halifax or Jamaica. His central position 
there, he said, ’has enabled me to make any necessary arrangements 
with despatch and to keep up ... communication with Lord Lyons 
much easier than if I had been North when the weather is so severe 
and Gales are heavy,* *9 He regretted, however, that most of his
16 Foreign Office to LCA, 18 Dec.1861, ADM 1 /5768$ Lyons to Russell,2 Dec. 1861, F.O. 5/?76,
1 7 Mill» to LCA, 6 Jan. 1862, MLN/i^/I).
18 LCA to Milne, 6 Deo, 1861, Milne Home papers; cf,Lists of ships in 
ADM 8/U0-U1. 19
19 Milne to Grey, private/a,d^ Dec, 1861, KLN/l07>undated but 
written at the end of Deo.
squadron was in the south because of the Allied intervention.
At Bermuda, in the last days of December he had only five ships;
one of these 'full of defects'. He was 'much vexed, I have no
force at hand ready to act,' 20 With a reduced naval force to
protect it, Bermuda was vulnerable to an amphibious attack. On
8 November, the Federals had captured Pt, Royal, S,C,,by such an
attack, and had landed 16,000 troops there. This port of the
Confederacy was only about three days sail from Bermuda, But
during January, Bermuda was constantly receiving additional
21warships to bolster the Station's fighting strength.
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If conflict with the United States materialized, British 
efforts in Mexico were to be sharply curtailed, Dunlop was to 
retain one ship there and to turn his attention to the U,S, 
Bloekading Squadrons, At the end of December Milne requested 
Somerset to notify Dunlop immediately in the event of either war 
or reprisals being declared against the U,S, The Commodore could 
then, 'take in detail the several blockading squadrons off Texas, 
the mouth of the Mississippi, Mobile jjandjj Pensacola,' 2^
20 Ibid,
21 lists of ships, ADM 8/140 and 141«
22 Milne to Dunlop, 20 Dec,1861, MLNA03/l6/P.
23 Milne to Somerset (Draft) privatela,) Dec,1861,MLNA07*undated but written at the end of Dee,;Mllne to Dunlop,25 Dec ,1661 in LCA to F,0,,20 Jan,1862,F,0,50/370, While Dunlop was at Vera Cruz the Federal warship Potomac visit«! that port. Her captain,L,M,Powell wrote to Secretary of the Navy Welles on 2 March 1862,advising him that he had spoken to Dunlop and that officer had said 'with the utmost frankness, "when I cane down here I confidently expected that in ten days I should have had sy squadronsperating against you on the coast," Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the ^  .f « t i l
Milne believed that Dunlop's force would be sufficient to capture 
or at least to stop most of the Federal ships from reaching the 
Atlantic. He wished to prevent the concentration of the Gulf and 
Atlantic units of the American fleet. The Vice Admiral himself 
would try to prevent U.S, ships in the Atlantic from reaching 
the Chesapeake, Fortress Monroe at the mouth of that Bay was 
the great haven for Federal blockaders on the Atlantic coast.
The Spanish, with a large garrison at Havana, were the first 
of the Allies to land troops in Mexico, On 17 December they 
occupied Vera Cruz and the forts in the area with sixty-five hundred 
men. The Maxican forces retired inland and did not attempt to 
contest the landing,
Dunlop left Havana in Challenger122. and reached Cape San 
Antonio at the western tip of Cuba on 30 December, Here he 
rendezvoused with his ships coming from Ft, Royal, Jamaica, The 
squadron dropped anchor at Vera Cruz on 6 January, and by the 12th 
the British force was complete. It numbered ten ships*
Challenger22. St. George 86, Mersey AO, Sans Fare11 70. Phaeton 5 1, 
Jason 21. Barracouta 6, Plover 5 , Desperate, 8, and Ariadne 26, ^  
Milne originally planned to have thirteen ships in the squadron, 
but the U.S. crisis forced him to reduce the number to ten, ^5 
The death of the Prince Consort on 14 December deprived the force 
of its largest vessel, the St. George 86, Prince Alfred was a Mid-
24 Dunlop to Milne, 16 Jan. 1862, VLH/lOk/3 .
25 Milne to LCA, 7 Dec. 1861, MLNA03/3/C.
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shlpman aboard this y second rate, and when Dunlop heard of
his father’s death, he sent the ship directly to Bermuda* From
there, Sir Alexander gave his permission for the St* George to
proceed to England* Donegal 99, sailed from Bermuda on 8 January
26for Vera Crus to replace the Prince's ship* ° By 9 January all 
of the Allied leaders had reached Vera Crus* On that day the French 
squadron under Vice Admiral de la Graviere sailed into the port as 
did also the Spanish Commander, General Juan Prim*
The British contribution to the allied military forces was a
battalion of Royal Marines under Lt* Col* S* Netterville Lowder,
27They numbered 720, including Lowder’s staff of ten. This force 
was divided into eight infantry companies and one artillery company, 
without however, any artillery* The battalion was intended to
help in the capture of Vera Cruz, if that was necessary, and to^
28garrison the forts during the allied occupation. The Marines
were never intended to march into the interior with the French and 
29Spanish troops. Indeed, without horses, waggons, tents, or 
artillery, they were hardly equipped for a campaign,^0 They were
26 Sailing Orders, 8 Jan* 1862, MLN/L10A/CC,
27 LCA to Milne, 9 Nov. 1861, MLN/105/2 ; Lowder to Dunlop, 6 Jan,1862
MLN/104/3. 28930*
28 Russell to Crampton, 19 April 1862^10414/23 J Russell to 1C A, 1 Nov,1861, ADM 1/5768,
29 Russell to LCA, 1 5 Nov. 1861, ADM 1/5768,
30 Dunlop to Milne, 26 Feb, 1862, MLN/104/3} Lowder to Dunlop, 6 Jan.1862, MLN/L04/3J Dunlop believed he could move the RM inland if Vera Cruz became sickly, also to rescue British subjects or to suppress ^egi£^n ^jland Custom Houses, Dunlop to ICA,24 June 1862,
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meant to be dependent on the ships and to remain close to them*
At the onset of the unhealthy season at Vera Cruz, about April or 
May, they were to re-embark in the ships and leave Mexico. ^
Shortly after his arrival, Dunlop called on the Spanish General 
and received the ominous news that 400 of his men were already in 
hospital. The Spanish allocated the Church and convent of San 
Domingo as a barracks for the battalion, A Marine working party 
landed to clean up these quarters bub found it impossible to remove, 
*large deposits of filth in a semi-liquid state, that had been found 
in a portion of the quadrangle', The stench pervaded the whole 
building, Dunlop and Lt, Col, Lewder also inspected the Fortress 
of San Juan d'Ulloa with a view of lodging their force within its 
walls. They found it damp, dark, gloomy and unwholesome. Sickness 
would soon decimate any troops stationed there. To prevent sickness, 
it was decided that San Juan would be garrisoned on an alternating 
basis, each of the Allies to hold it for a fortnight. The Commodore 
decided not to use either of these places and determined to keep the 
Marines on board the ships until suitable accommodation could be found
To relieve the unhealthy overcrowding in the town, General Prim 
resolved to conduct an armed reconnaissance in search of a suitable 
campsite.because of guerrillas, Prim couldn't send a small force,
31 Somerset to Milne, private.16 Nov, 1861, MLN/L07J LCA Minute,7 Sept* 1861, ADM 1 /5768} Crampton to Russell, 4 April 1862,EO, 414/23. 32
32 Dunlop to LCA, 1 5  Jan* 1862, MLN/104/3,
and so the allies decided to make a unified movement on the 
Orizaba road. As the British contribution, Dunlop on 10 January 
landed one company of a hundred Marines. Shortly thereafter, the 
Allied force, three thousand strong, marched to Tejeria, Prim, 
GraviSre and Dunlop rode out with their men. At this place, about 
ten miles from Vera Cruz, they found an excellent campsite. The 
French and Spanish troops remained, but the Marines, having no 
tents, returned to Vera Cruz on the next day. On 13 January, the 
Allies, with the same Marine company, marched to Medellin, about 
nine miles from Vera Cruz. The British returned the next day. The 
Allies met no opposition fit» the Mexicans on either of these 
excursions. In defending his action, Dunlop maintained that both 
Prim and GraviSre were anxious to show a united front to the 
Mexicans; he fully concurred in their views.
Dunlop did attempt to follow his orders which told him to keep 
the battalion at Vera Cruz. He suggested to the allies that the 
Marines should take the weight of garrisoning the Sea Ports off 
their shoulders. But the French and Spanish demurred, claiming that 
since their depots and flags were at Vera Cruz, they would always 
have to keep a force in that town,^ Somerset had earlier suggested 
that an acclimatized black West Indian regiment might be substituted 
for the Marines who had come directly from England and were thus 
very prone to tropical diseases,^ 34
33 Ibid.
34 Somerset to Milne, private,19 Oct, 1861, KLN/107•
Dunlop believed that this would ’greatly disappoint' the Allies*
The Foreign Office finally turned this proposal down because 
the War Office didn't have such a regiment to spare,^5
As early as 1 5  January, the Commodore asked the Admiralty to 
consider sending a larger force as well as discretionary orders 
which would allow him to march with the French and Spanish, if 
they went inland* He sought 'unity of action' with his Allies*
Sir Charles Wyke agreed fully with his fellow Commissionerb’ 
views, Wyke believed that since British claims were greater than 
those of the other powers, as he believed at the time, their forces 
could hardly refuse to go where the French and Spanish went. There 
might be fighting in the mountain passes, not far distant, and the 
British forces should be with their allies* ■ ■
The Marines were finally landed on 16 Januaryj the entire 
Battalion was housed in a former hospital building in Vera Cruz.
At this time many of the men had diarrhoea, but the deadlier diseases 
had not yet appeared among them. Once quartered, the Marines made 
short marches into the country on every other day,-^ They avoided 
marching in the heat V of the day and were never more than two hours 3567*
35 LCA to Milne, 11 March 1862, «0 0 .05/3 *
36 Wyke to Russell, 16 Jan, 1862, F,0, 50/364.
37 Milne said Dunlop should not have permitted these 'exercise'marches, Milne to Grey, private,9 April 1862, MO0O7.
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from Vera Cruz. A detachment was sent, however, to Medellin, 
which place they occupied from 13 February until 6 March,
Their victuals included fresh beef and vegetables on an average 
of four days in the week, as well as a liberal supply of soft 
bread. Their commander thought them ‘temperate’ but 'young and 
unacclimatized',
Seven days before the Marines landed, the Allies held their
first conference. The other British Commissioner, Sir Charles
Lenno>i Wyke, had spent fifteen years in the tropics in various
diplomatic and consular positions. Dunlop and Wyke, throughout
their Mexican experience, spoke as one voice; they seemed never
to have quarrelled. Sir Charles favoured Juarez’ Constitutional 
39or Liberal party. When, as British Minister, Wyke had first 
arrived in the country, he had scant respect for any Mexican 
government,**® But while negotiating a convention, he had become 
impressed with the ability of Manuel de Zamacona, the then Foreign 
Minister, as well as several other Mexicans, Wyke came to see what 
enormous problems the Mexican statesmen faced,**'*1
3S Lowder to Milne, 1 1  April 1862, in Milne to LCA, 24 April 
1862, ADM 1/5787.
39 Wyke to Russell, 29 Dec, 1061, F.O, 50/354} Boeder, R.Juarez and His Mexico (New York,1947}l4f41i.
40 Wyke to Russell, 17 July 18 6 1, F.O. 50/353} same to same,24 Aug, 1861, F.O. 50/354} Wyke presented his credentials as British Minister on 25 May 1861, in Mexico City, Wyke to Russell, 
26 May 1861, F.O. 50/352. 41*
41 Wyke to Russell, 28 Nov, 18 6 1} same to same, 25 Nov, 1861,
F.O. 50/354.
General Juan Prim, Conde de Reus, hero of the Spanish 
Moroccan expedition of I859, was the sole Spanish Commissioner*
He was straightforward and supported the British Commissioners 
in most of the conflicts within the conferences. His instructions 
affirmed that Spain had no desire to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Mexico.^2 The Count* de Saligny, one of the French 
Commissioners, favoured a monarchy in Mexico and schemed contin­
uously to bring about this end,^ Vice Admiral Jurien de la GraviSre 
was the naval commander and the other French Commissioner, He was 
scholarly and able but tended to defer to Saligny, who soon emerged 
as the chief director of French policy, ^
The first political move was a joint proclamation on 10 January 
1862, to the Mexican people. In it the Allies disclaimed ary 
intention to interfere with the government of the nation. They wished 
only to settle their claims and to provide for the protection of 
their subjects.
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42 Robertson, V,S,, op,cit,. p, 184*
43 Dunlop to I£A, 24 June 1862, ADM 1/5791; Corti, 1,C„ Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico (New York,1928i i 98-9; Wyke to Russell, 27 March 1862, fTO, 50/364, 4*
44 Wyke to Hammond, 14 Jan, 1862, F,0, 50/364; Bancroft,H,H,, The History of Mexico (San Francisco, 1888), V I , 40,
Next, a letter was drawn up to the Mexican President,
giving their reasons for being in the country* This was a
paraphrase of the proclamation. The claims of the Allied
powers were to be appended to this letter. For the first
time then, at the conference of 13 January, the three powers
discussed, at length, their individual claims* M. de Saligny
45included in his demands the notorious Jecker bonds* Jecker, 
then a newly naturalized French Citizen, had given the tottering 
Miramon government 1750,000 in exchange for bonds worth fifteen 
millions*^ The Mexican silver dollar was then valued at 
4a. 3V2d. ^  Neither the British nor Spanish Commissioners 
would sanction this nor other equally exorbitant French claims, 
Wyke believed that Juarez would pay the $750»000, but never the 
paper value of fifteen millions,^
45 Dawson, D,, The Mexican Adventure (London, 1935)#P.l6lj 
Bancroft, QP.cit*» VI,37.
46 Bancroft, F* 'The French in Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine' 
Political Science Quarterly. H  (l8$6)rj»34.
47 Chapman, R.B,, British Relations withjfexlco 1859-6 2. 
'ax.B,Litt., 1934V P.147* This thesis covers much of the political proceedings, but devotes less than a page to the navy's role in the Intervention. 48
48 Wyke to Hammond, 14 Jan. 1862, F.O. 50/364.
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Because of this disagreement, the letter was sent to Juarez 
without the list of Allied claims« Capt. Edward Tatham, 
commander of HM5 Phaeton, was selected as the British represent­
ative in the allied group that rode to Mexico City to present 
the letter« They left Vera Cruz on 14 January 1862,
As the senior British Commissioner, *fyke felt very shaky 
about his position* Because of confusion in the mails, he had 
been unaware of the terms of the London Convention until the 
British and French arrived at Vera Cruz.^ For this same reason 
he was without Bussell's subsequent instructions for a considerable 
time. Neither Wyke nor Dunlop were certain that their orders bound 
them to sustain the claims of the other powers as well as their own, 
Wyke complained of this uncertainty as late as 13 April, when the 
Joint intervention was at an end.51
The British Commissioners had been told to confer with the
allies at Vera Cruz regarding their respective claims* If, when
the Convention was signed, the British promised to support all the
allied claims, Bussell said in defence of his orders, they might
have been committed to uphold some which were 'exorbitant or un- 
k2reasonable', , This cautious policy was shortly to be vindicated.
49 Wyke to Bussell, 16 Jan, 1862, F,0, 50/364$ Wyke to Russell,
29 Dec. 1861, F,0, 50/3 5 4.
50 Dunlop to LCA, 24 June 1862, ADM 1/5791$ Wyke to Russell 19 J*n. 1862, F.O, 50/364.
51 Wyke to Russell, 13 April 1862, F.O, 50/365.
52 Russell to Wyke,(draft),30 April 1862, F.O. 50/363.
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On the other hand, if each power was to confront the Mexicans 
with a separate list, the Mexicans WDuld doubtless have seen 
this as evidence of allied division, Russell believed they 
then would have tried to widen this breech among the intervening 
powers,^ Russell's seeming indecisiveness was partly caused by 
the communications problem. The mail usually took about five 
weeks to go from Vera Cruz to England,-^ By the time Russell had 
Wyke and Dunlop's despatches, the situation in Mexico had often 
changed considerably. Because, of this,neither he nor Milne 
wished to 'fetter' the Commissioners with too detailed instructions,^ 
Another reason for Foreign Office 'indecisiveness' was the rapidity 
with which the Marines were sent out, due to the short healthy 
season at Vera Cruz as well as to the fear that the French or 
Spanish would move first on Mexico, In the event,Wyke and Dunlop 
decided to write home for further instructions and to temporize 
with the Mexicans.5^
Gen, Manuel Doblado, the Mexican Foreign Minister, answered 
the Allies' letter to the President, It was received in Vera Cruz
53 Ibiâ.
54 Chapman, R.B,, op.cit.. p,29,
55 Foreign Office to DCA, 15 Nov, 1861, ADM 128/51j Milne to Dunlop 
8 April 1862, private, MDNA07/3.
56 Dunlop to DCA, 24 June 1862, ADM 1/5791J Dunlop to LCA,17 April 1862, MLNA04/3.
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on 28 January. Doblado proposed that a conference should he held at
Orizaba to discuss the allied claims. A further note from the
Foreign Minister on 6 February was interpreted by the Spanish
and French as an attempt to delay their movement away from the sickly
coast. They stated on 9 February that because of this, they would cease
all communications with the Mexicans and advance simultaneously on Orizaba 
57and Jalapa.
As early as 15 January» Dunlop had determined to accompany the 
Allies on any proposed march idand. Now when the Spanish and French
58decided to move, the Commodore believed that war seemed 'inevitable1 
At this point he began full preparations for putting the battalion into 
the field. The British Commissioners succeeded,however in calming 
their colleagues and Prim met with Doblado in the preliminary 
negotiations at Soledad on 19 February. The French and Spanish 
now fully understood that in any future move the EM battalion 
would go with them. Dunlop believed that this understanding helped 
to conciliate the allies and thus enabled the preliminaries to be h e ld .^  The Spanish and French also found it necessary to provide 
transport for their troops. They had arrived in Mexico with 
virtually no waggons, horses, or mules. This need delayed and
57 Dunlop to LCA,24 June 1862, ADM 1/5791} Wyke to Bussell,12 Feb. 1862, F.O. 50/364.
58 Dunlop to Milne, 2 March 1862, MLN/104/3.
59 Dunlop to LCA, 24 June 1862, ADM 1/5791. That March, Milne told Grey that he had received a letter from Dunlop who believed that a 
Mexican war *appears inevitable and he evidently requires reinforce­ments... Much as I regret this Mexican affair... we could not with­draw as probably a blow may by this time have been struck which will prevent our forsaking the French and S p a n i s h 107«
forced them to exercise * certain restraint until they had 
become properly equipped for the march.
A new complication arose when rumours circulated that 
ex-president Miramon was on the way to Vera Cruz* Wyke and 
Dunlop believed, their own interests aside, it would ‘appear 
to the Mexicans a bitter and unworthy sarcasm,' if such a person 
were allowed to land under Allied protection.^0 Contrary to 
earlier declarations of non-interference, the French now said 
that if Miramon landed, he would be under their protection.^1- 
When the British packet arrived on 27 January, Dunlop ordered 
Capt, Kennedy of Challenger to take Miramon out of the vessel 
before he could get ashore. This was done, and the ex-president 
was sent back to Havana. He subsequently returned to Europe, 
There seems to have been little resentment among the other powers 
over these forthright proceedings.
Meanwhile, by the end of January the majority of Allied 
troops had left Vera Cruz. Most of the French were at Tejeria 
and the larger force of Spaniards was at Medellin. The only 
soldiers still in Vera Cruz, besides the RM battalion, were 
detachments of Spanish and French garrison troops. Some of
60 Dunlop to Milne, 30 Jan. 1862, KLNA04/3.
61 Dunlop to DCA, 24 June 1862, ADM 1/5791.
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Commodore Dunlop's despatches at this time contained sentiments 
curiously at variance with the wishes of his superiors. On 15  
January he wrote*
The step we have taken with a view to the regeneration of Mexico is one from which we cannot withdraw until our object is attained, and under the most favourable circumstances we must look forward to retain a force in this country for some months after the sickly season has commenced, and in all probability 
for a much longer period, ¿2
These were not new sentiments with Dunlop, Six months before the
Intervention he wrote to an English friend at Vera Cruz*
Intervention to be successful must be supported by a considerable military force - in fact A small army of occupation for an indefinite period,«3
He did not think at that tins that either Britain or France had 
the appetite for such a task. He believed then that peace would 
only cob® to Mexico when some 'energetic scoundrel' such as 
Santa Anna became dictator.
62 Dunlop to LCA, 1 5 Jan, 1Ô62, MLN/104/3.
63 Dunlop at Havana, to Lewis Price, 20 July 1861, Harrington Collection, The Papers of Lewis R, Price, Shrewsbury Record Office, 631/3A942, Price was an English merchant in Vera Cruz and a good friend of the Commodore,
The Preach,at least,did not expect to become an 'army of occup­
ation',la an unsigned report prepared in the French naval min­
istry,^ December 1863,the writer said that the reason the French 
arrived in Mexico without sufficient supplies,was that they expect­
ed to be warmly welcomed by the people,but since the Spaniards- 
Mexieo's old enemy-landed several weeks before the French and Brit­
ish, all the allies were treated as invaders and shunned by the 
people. French Archives,MAR BB4,819,'Mouvements et Opérations 
Militaires, I8ÔI-I8Ô3.'
The work of preparing the battalion for the field wag 
now rapidly going forward. Duck wag procured from the shipsj it 
'makes the best and cheapest tents',^' A four gun.battery wag 
completed. The guns came from the squadrons two Armstrong 6 
pounders, and two Howitzers which threw a 12 pound shell,
Dunlop made Lt, Col, Lowder a Colonel on the Staff so that he 
would be the equal of the French and Spanish Staff officers.
The Commodore divided the Marines into a brigade of two batt­
alions, with Lt, Col, Lambrick as commander of the first batt­
alion, The second battalion would be composed of shipboard 
Marines, who would be landed to garrison Vera Cruz if the 
original Marine battalion should move inland, Dunlop on his 
own responsibility planned to increase his force by siphoning 
off Marines from the normal complement of the ships in the 
squadron,^
The Commodore sent Major Digby, RMA,to Havana in Barracouta 
to purchase waggons, mules, and other means of transport*
64 Dunlop to Milne, 30 Jan, IS62, MLN/104/3*
65 On 19 Feb, Dunlop 'borrowedV170 Marines from his ships, to replace those in the battalion who had fallen ill.Pari, Papers, 'Medical Statistics of the N, American and W, Indian Station for 1862», XXXV, Part 2,(1865^ p, 26.
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The Captain General of Cuba, the Duke da la Torre, placed 
all government stores at his disposal. The British Consul at 
Havana, Joseph Crawford was also a great help. Commander 
Malcolm of Barracouta and Major Digby worked together on this 
project. Their probable enthusiasm may be illustrated by 
their industriousness» Barracouta left Vera Cruz on 11 February, 
arrived at Havana on the 16th and sailed for Vera Cruz again on 
the 2 1st loaded with animals, waggons and supplies for the 
battalion, Naval and Marine artizans made all their own harness 
for the mules as well as several pack saddles and carts,^ The 
commodore complained that no work people were to be gotten in 
Vera Cruz, This is hardly surprising when one considers that on 
2$ January Juarez had issued a proclamation promising death to 
any Mexican who aided . the invaders,^ By the end of February, the 
battalion had grown to 360 men. It was completed for field service 
and had rations for fourteen days, ‘Dunlop said proudly that the 
Marines, * are now ready and able, if required, to march from
¿aone end of Mexico to the other'# .
The 'Preliminaries of Soledad* on the 19th of February 
permitted the Allies to advance to healthier locations at Orizaba, 
Cordova and Tehuacan, The Mexican army would offer no opposition 
to this movement. The 15th April was later set as the date for the 
first conference between the Allies and the Mexicans for the
66 Dunlop to Milne, 26 Feb, 1662, KLN/104/3.
67 Dawson, D,, <yp,clt., p, 167-
6S Dunlop to Milne, 2 March 1362, MLN/104/3 .
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settlement of grievances* It appeared that the danger of 
hostilities had passed*
On 1 March, Dunlop received orders from home. They 
informed him of French re-inforcements on the way} they told 
him that a group of Mexicans were to offer the throne of Mexico 
to the Archduke Maximilian} and they reiterated his previous 
instructions not to march the battalion beyond Vera Crux* He 
was still to withdraw his force completely when the unhealthy 
season began* With the prospect of war now apparently at an end, 
and because of the increasing sickness, Dunlop decided to send the 
Marines home,^ Specific orders to do this came from England 
six weeks later* Donegal sailed on the 9th and Sans Pareil 
on the 13th of March with the greater part of the battalion*
The Commodore retained two companies, 131 men, for garrison duty 
at Vera Cruz, The allies, he reasoned, would ’feel aggrieved if 
we took these last troops away from a dangerous service*,^ He felt 
that while Britain still remained one of the allied powers, she
must at least have a token force in the country* The battalions*
accumulated matfirieli 200 mules, 54 horses, waggons, harnesses, 
etc,, were all sold to the French for 148,133 ij2 697012
69 Dunlop to Milne, 2 March 1S62, MLN/104/3*
70 Ibid*. Dunlop believed that the signing of the ’Preliminaries of Soledad’ by the Allies had removed the danger of war, Dunlop to LCA, 24 June 1662, ADM 1/5791.
71 Dunlop to Milne, 31 March 1862, MLN/104/3.
72 Dunlop to Milne, 11 March 1862, MUJA04/3.
.The health of the Marine batallion had suffered from the 
day of its arrival at Vera Cruz* On 19 January there were 87 
on the sick list* By 19 February, 117 sick had been sent out 
to 'Sans Pároli*, anchored at Sacrificios, On 1 March, there 
were 103 sick Marines in Ver» Cruz, Diarrhoea, Dysentery and 
fever were the principal complaints. It was an unusually sickly 
season on the coast of Mexico, Capt, John Elliott, the Marine 
surgeon, said on 3 March that unless the troops were moved to a 
healthier location ’a very large mortality' would result. He 
blamed the open sewers of the town, which exuded a very detre- 
mental, «gaseous exhala t i on ' T h e  Marines used rain water and 
well water from a cistern in the country for drinking; town water 
was used for washing. This last was brackish and full of vegetable 
matter. In these days before the study of bacteriology had 
established the main causes of disease, many medical men believed 
most illnesses were caused by 'fogs, vapours, humidity and 
poisonous exhalations'!^ At one time there were 220 on the sick 
list,^ and from first to last there were fifty-four deaths,^
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When Russell finally received the Commissioners’ despatches
which told of their determination to march with the Allies,
he was a^iast. The last thing he desired was a British
military involvement in Mexico. Milne wrote to Dunlop on
8 April noting that the Admiralty Lords are in a :
great alarm at your joining any land expedition and about your views respecting the regeneration of Mexico,They have ordered me to procede at once to Vera Cruz or if unable to do so to send Admiral Dacres,.,., but tsinciO Mexican affairs {have} so entirely changed since their Despatch ... I leave you to go on ... the only thing remaining to be done is the embarkation of the 2 Cos, ,,, 
if it can be done without a breech of faith,**
In backing the Commodore, Milne explained to their Lordships
that if Dacres went to Vera Cruz he might arrive in the middle
of the negotiations to start at Orizaba on 15 April, ’Much
Inconvenience might result,* he wrote to Dunlop, ’from your
being withdrawn by the arrival of a Senior Officer while they
'78||he negotiations) are actually in progress.
By late March the political situation had grown steadily more 
ominous. At the frequent Allied conferences it became increasingly 
apparent that Saligny favoured a monarchy for Mexico, and wished 
to have as little as possible to do with the Juarez government.
On 27 February, the Mexican general ¿nan Almonte arrived at 
Vera Cruz in the British jacket, He was a member of the Clerical
77 Milne to Dunlop, 8 April 1862, private * MLN/107/3,
78 Milne to Dunlop, 8 April 1862, MLMA^A^A*»
party, which favoured the establishment of a monarchy, Dunlop 
was unaware of his arrival and therefore could not intercept 
him as he had Miramon, The Mexican government objected 
strenuously to Almonte’s presence as well as that of other 
clerical party emigres who were under the protection of the 
French,*^ When the French General Laurencez marched up to 
Cordoba on 19 March, Almonte and his party marched with him.
When Dunlop remonstrated with Saligny, the French Commissioner... 
said that Laurencez was acting 'under direct order of the 
Emperor* in permitting the Mexican general to accompany him,®®
When Laurencez arrived at Orizaba*Prim and Wyke told him that 
his action violated the Convention of London,
The last Allied conference was held at Orizaba on 9 April 
1862, There the joint intervention was ended because the French 
would not send Almonte and the other Mexican exiles out of the 
country,®! Saligny also refused to continue negotiations with 
the Juarez government. He gave as a reason the repeated recent 
outrages on Frenchmen resident in Mexico, by the Mexicans,
He offered, however, no proof of these outrages to the other 79801
79 Bancroft, H,H„ op.clt.. VI.p4L.
80 Wyke to Russell, 27 March 1862, F.O. 50/364*
81 Dunlop to LCA, 21 April 1862, MLN/L04/3, This despatch contains the Minutes (ProcSe-Verbal) of the conference.The Minutes are also in Pari* Papers, Mexico, U&X, (1862).
Writing to his superior,the French admiral said he didn’t want 
to meet the Mexicans for negotiations on 15 April because the 
French had no confidence in the Juarez regime,Further,if the 
negotiations proved lengthy,the troops would be decimated by 
the coming sickly season.French Archives,MAR BB4,799,Adm.to. 
Minister,XI April 1862.
Commissioners, The British and Spanish wished to treat with 
the de facto government. Vftrke believed however, that the 
French wanted to avoid the first joint conference with the 
Mexicans on 15 April. The French Commissioners, he maintained, 
wished to pick a quarrel and upset the present government. 
Believing the Emperor wished Maximilian on the throne, Saligny 
and Gravid re, Nyke thought, were determined to forward his 
wishes, Saligny, Napoleon's Chief representative, made no secret 
of his contempt for Juarez and his wish to replace the present 
government with a monarchy.
Dunlop was taken unawares by the sudden breakup of the 
Intervention. He was in the process of renting a house in 
Orizaba to be used as his quarters during the r&gotlatlons. On 
April 5th, he wrote to his friend Price at Vera Cruz asking him 
to send up his clothing, some furniture, 36 bottles of sherry,
72 of claret, 36 of brandy and IS of champagne/2 The commodore 
apparently believed that hospitality was a sine ^ qu^ „flon for the 
success of negotiations.
Now however, the British and Spanish Commissioners prepared 
to return to Vera Cruz* Dunlop ordered the two Marine companies 
to embark for Bemuda. They left Vera Cruz in eM 2 S H S £ '  on 
17 April. General Prim wished to evacuate his troops as soon as
82 Dunlop to Price, 5 April 1662, Harrington Coll., on.cit..
631/3A951.
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possible for Yellow Fever had now made its appearance on 
the coast Because of a shortage of Spanish ships,
Dunlop sent 1600 Spanish soldiers to Havana in his men-of-war.
Prim left Mexico on 2 May. The official end of Intervention 
came on 24 April, when the Spanish and English flags were taken 
down at Vera Cruz. While Dunlop and Wyke were preparing to 
leave Orizaba, General Doblado offered to negotiate a claims 
convention with them and the Spaniards. They agreed and the 
Convention was signed at Puebla on 28 A p r i l G e n e r a l  Prim 
sent his secretary who returned to Havana with the draft treaty, 
Dunlop decided to accompany Wyke to Mexico City to be present 
at the ratification of the document by Juarez, The Commodore 
then planned to return to Vera Cruz and send the treaty off 
by the packet.
Because of the danger of bandits, a troop of 'Naval Cavalry* 
was formed under Marine Lt, C.P. Heaslop to escort the 
Commissioners to the capital. The men, volunteers from the 
squadron, were 'rigged in Sombreros, red Marine jackets, riding 
breeches and top boots'. They were armed with naval cutlasses, 
revolvers and 'boarding pikes in lieu of lances'. This motley group
83 Dunlop to LCA, 18 April 1862, ADM 1/5791} Dunlop to Milne,
11 April 1862, MLN/104/3. 84
84 Dunlop to DCA, 28 April 1862, MLNA04/3.
rode for 500 miles and returned to the ships in 'efficient 
condition',85
Dunlop re-entered Vera Cruz on 28 Kay and sent the 
ratified treaty to England. Alas, it was never approved by 
HM government. As the money to pay British creditors was to 
be derived from a possible U.S. loan to Mexico, Russell feared 
international complications. 86 In the event, the American loan 
never did materialize.
The Commodore soon resumed his command at Jamaica. Sir 
Charles VJyke remained in Mexico City 'as a private individual'
— to protect British interests - until January 1863 when he 
returned to England. The French,freed from the restrictions 
of the London Convention, went on to establish their short-lived 
and tragic empire of Maximilian*
The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Rear Admiral Sir Thomas 
Maitland, had played a passive r8le during the entire Intervention 
He was to have occupied several Mexican ports in the Pacific if 
Wyke thought this expedient.8^ Difficulties of communication 
blunted his effectiveness. Distressed by his scanty knowledge of
85 Fraser, E. and Carr-Laughton, L.G., optCit., ii,p.$30.
86 Russell to Wyke, 27 June 1862, F.O, 50/363? Russell to Cowley, 17 June 1862, F.O, 414/24* 87
87 Foreign Office to LCA, 18 March 1862, F.O. $0/370.
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what was occurring in the Gulf# he wrote on 8 April# that he
had 8 ships, about 2700 men and 2$0 guns, »whose movements
*88entirely depend on information from the other side, Wyke 
finally told him that the Intervention was at an end and 
Maitland retired to Vancouver Island, his base in the north.
When Russell had received further despatches from his 
Commissioners, he praised them both. On 3 April he wrote:
Although Commodore Dunlop neglected his Instructions, yet inthe peculiar circumstances in which he was placed 
his readiness to march with the Marines aided the negotiations of Sir C, Wyke and tended to maintain the 
reputation of the British Arms.BV
Later he approved of the «straightforwardness* and »honesty» of 
Commodore Dunlop’s conduct. 90 Milne, Russell decided, had 
exercised 'a very wise discretion» when he disobeyed the Foreign 
Secretary’s orders and refused to replace Dunlop with Dacres.91
It will be seen then, that the initial lack of transportation 
and British insistence on negotiations held the Allies together 
until the French decision to overthrow Juarez became apparent to 
all. Without Dunlop's promise to accompany the allies in any future
88 Maitland to LCA, 8 April 1862 in LCA to Foreign Office,
15 May 1862, F.O, 50/371.
89 Memo, by Russell, 3 April 1862, F*0# 5®/370, ICA to Milne, 
10 April 1862, >00.05/3.
90 LCA to Milne, 9 June 1862, KLNA05/3.
91 LCA to Milne, 2 May 1862, MLN/L05/^*
movements it is doubtful whether the British would have been
able to exert any substantial influence on their colleagues.
If the Spanish and French had advanced without British support - 
as they avowed they would on February 9th - the Mexicans would 
almost certainly have tried to stop them. After hostilities had 
taken place, the Spanish and French might have been irrevocably 
linked, placing the British in a compromising and dishonourable 
position.
By their diplomacy, Wyko and Dunlop delayed the moment of 
final Mexican - French military confrontation and thus enabled 
the Spaniards to see the real purposes of the French, Since 
fighting had not begun, both the Spanish and British could then 
honourably decline to continue their participation in the London 
Convention,
The Commissioners had shown surprising energy, considering 
their physical condition, Myke suffered from a liver complaint 
and was more or less ill during the whole of his time in Mexico»^2 
Dunlop had suffered the previous spring from a crippling attack 
of gout. Yet the Commodore said proudly that he had travelled 
700 miles in Mexico,400 of which were on horseback,^
On leaving the Station in March 1864, Milne advised his 
successor that British withdrawal from Mexico seemed to have had
92 Chapman, op.clt.« p, 331 Ifyke to Russell, 12 April 1862, 
F,0, 50/365,
93 Dunlop to LCA, 29 Miy 1862, MLNA04/3,
no effect on ’the good feeling which happily exists between 
the French and English officers in the Gulf of Mexico'^
By May 1862 then, Britain was safely out of a situation 
that was to prove a costly blunder for the French» The 
,Trent* crisis had been resolved} Milne felt that the U,S, 
would not stop a British ship in such a manner again,^5 
Lyons believed that U,S, - British relations were very 
satisfactory, as proof of which he left Washington in June 
for four months leave in England*
94 'Memo, Relative to the North American and West IndianStation/ MLNA05/6.
95 Milne to Dunlop, 7 Dec. 18&, KLN/103A6A.
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CHAPTER V
The Station and the Belligerents, 1862 -  1863
After the outbreak of hostilities between the North and
South, Milne had given some thought to those British possessions
close to the American coast. In order to keep a closer watch
*
oft the area, the vice admiral, in August 1862, transferred the 
Bahamas from the Jamaica Bivision’s control directly to his own.
0n 19 January 1862 he had urged the Admiralty to forbid the 
erection, by either belligerent, of coal depots in any British 
colony. Commodore Dunlop, then at Nassau, reported on 1$ December 
186l, that two coal laden U.S. vessels had arrived at that port. 
The coals were consigned to the U.S. consul. Shortly thereafter, 
the attorney general of the Bahamas ruled that the coal should 
not be used by either U.S. or C.S. warships.1 Milne noted on 
*4 January 1862 that the C.S. raider Sumter had received coal 
Trom the French authorities at Martinique and that a U.S, warship 
'«hich had come into the harhour, was required to stay there for 
twenty-four hours after the Confederate had left.Sir Alexander 
said at the time that he knew from his experience
1 Milne to LCA, 19 Jan. 1862, MLN/IO3/4/D1 Dunlop to LCA,
19 Dec. 1861, ADM 1/5791*
Of no British rules of this nature, although it had «been 
advocated by Professor Martin in his Summary of the law 
of Nations.* 2 The previous November, Milne, 
initiative, had instructed Capt, Hutton, Command r 
Bermuda dockyard, to refuse supplies to any Private 
foreign public ship unless given the vice admiral«* special 
permission. That same month the commander-in-chief as
, fictions to deal with the the Admiralty for some definite in
,, +« >>«1 live rent warships visitingproblem of furnishing supplies t
British possessions.3 Sevnrd hid =o»pl*msd to the Brl 
»mister m  November 1661 . U *  the Snster M  eteyed Tor
.. «• q secretary of state chidedseveral days at Trinidadj the U,S.a i  . 1 1  other European nations Lyons and said he believed that all
4« in their ports for only twenty-permitted privateers to remain in
* ■,« a Engird was the first power tofour hours, Lyons replied that 
x -«a into her ports of the place any restrictions on the entra
bv forbidding - onarmed ships of either of the com a *
'..i. permission to carry their1 June 1861 - belligerent warships P
prizes into British ports,
2 Kilne to LCA, 14 Jan. 1862, ADM ifclW*
3 Same to Same', 12 Nov.1861, M L N A ° 3 ^ ‘
,, +4-i k and 9 Nov. 1861,h Lyons to Russell, confiden #
F.O. 414/17.
own misgivings »boot loophole, in British roles eoncerning
oi Tflwii/ifv 1S621 issued iina neutral’s duties, Russell» on 31
xu ¿h «« in all Britain's possessions.order to the senior authorities in a.u.
+Via R»hama islands were closed By the terms of this instruction th
+ Hvr npmiisslon of the local to belligerent warships, except by p
authorities or in oases of need during severe weather. Both
sides were also prohibited from using British possessions
, • _* for any warlike purpose,’'as a station or place of resort f
ahit5S leave a British Port withinnor could U.5. or C.S, warships
, ship of the othertwenty-four hours of the departur
t «-vessel. M l belligerent war-side, whether merchant or war ves
fftr only twenty-four hours in ships were permitted to remain ior
, .wnintelT necessary supplier orany British port, unless for absolu 7
. ui it S or C.S, warships wererepairs. The supplies available to u, .
«-Hales needed by the crew and: limited to provisions or like art
-v be sufficient to carry. ..so much coal only as m 7_ her own country, orsuch vessel to the nearest P° eo^i shall be againto some nearer destination; a privateer,.# withoutsupplied to any such ship or ^ rthQ expiration of three special permission, untli- have been lastmonths from ths time when »’Bh coai 
supplied to her ...' 5
Because of these n-.Ungs «  well «  on »=co»t of his
5 Russell to IXH, 31 Jan. 1*62,
These rules were to be evaded on many occasions, 
Principally by the Federals who had by far the largest naval 
force. They would usually station themselves off Abaco - 
frequently violating the three mile limit - in order to 
intercept the blockade running vessels heading north out 
°f Nassau for the Confederacy, Belligerent warships would also 
purchase coal from, for example, Bermuda and then a month or 
less having passed, they would go to another British colony 
and fin up again. Later in the war, the governors of the 
colonies would notify each other when a belligerent warship had 
received supplies at their island, thus effectively excluding 
that particular ship from further supplies for three months.
Sir Alexander believed - despite the governor's protests - 
that it was impossible to stop Union warships from anchoring 
among the more than a hundred small islands comprising the 
Bahamas. He did however object to blatant infractions of the 
rules, by Rear Admiral Wilkes, for instance, in late 1862,^
^he commander-in-chief disliked selling government coal to the 
Belligerents, but he favoured their being allowed to buy it 
°n the open market. He realized that if his warships were to 
remain on the American coast - at Fortress Monroe, New York 
*nd elsewhere - coal supplies must be readily available, other- 
^ee the vice admiral said it would greatly impede my
^ Milne to Grey, private, 19 Bee, 1862, MLN/107»
. j f ««at 7 Additionally, if any 
communication with Lord Lyons •
, . „ ^ m r e d  to launch a surpriseFederal expedition was being P F1
_ a  \ t could hardly be done in
attack on Halifax or Bermuda, it.
. . .  -Tmost constantly riding at 
secret, with British warships almo
, Milne’s 'lenient* policy 
anchor in the major northern P° *v- no instance where coal waswas wise, as the writer has seen
. ln ,ny Union or Confederate port refused to English warships in any . I» C T1ÛÏ* C.S#
during the Civil Var. Whil® neither
,.h its own twenty-four hour rule, the on British men-of-var with its ownr l662 stop the export of cattle to
U.S. did, in the summer of 1862# v- J the blockade running
Bermuda; hoping to cut off f°° J„.ce to the commander-in­
crews* This was a serious inconve
depended on the U.S, for fresh 
chief and the governor as they Ve ...
u ui a salted beef and pork fed to their meat to supplement the bland s ■ ' »a in lonit as Milne was . «j A« force as r*wmen. This prohibition remained ina ,, hi, successor took the command. *a
on the station and even when his .nd naval personnel tad to be
a result cattle for the military g
. c m  a considerable extra expense.
imported from Nova Scotia, at a
7
8
Milne to LCl, 13 Jan, 1862, MLNA03/4/13.
i, _ r>.»4T War in America', WLNAOj/d.Memo, relative to the shorts waa that theAnother reason for ths ban on eau v eouM g,t. Secretary 
Union armies needed ® *"„th9 vice admiral visited
£ i;l'itan a Sw^ilmslon of Pennsylvania in July
thought the Southerners could not have
m a y ,  1862 t o  U.S. restricted trade with the Bahamas, 
requiring Bonds for t o  shipment of some goods and Banning
for a time the export of others, e .g .,c o a l , « *
v. i,ofld bv the runners or for fear that such supplies would he used oy
would he transhipped into the South.
With t o  surrender of Mason and Slidell, Britain was
mollified hut t o  people of the US Became very hitter.
« the does not like the look Seward was now the great peaceraa }
,. a ,int said Lyons of the secretary of the Spirit he has called up > sa J
. 9  Eariy in 1862, Seward saw of state at the time of the crisis. Early
«ijons with Britain and at the same time 
a means for bettering relations
x ' orowing anti-slavery feeling give greater expression to the gr S
' ' ft-rample of this changing attitudewithin the country itself. An
' ■ „ , „W _ was ths hanging on 7 Tohruary 1862- much applauded in England
i x x master of the Saver Erie. He wasof Nathaniel Gordon, convicted mast
+T.ndina ship to be executed in the first captain of a slave t
^  +Vlft aiave trade had been an abrasivethe U.S, For many years the sia
, a lean statesmen. Though hy thesubject between English and Amer
. . n Treaty of 1842 the U.S. had
terms of the Webster - Ashhurto
■ _a+roi of the west coast of agreed to participate in the pa«Vavers. the Americans were still
Africa in order to intercept sla » 9
9 Lyons to Russell, private, 23 Eec . 18 6 1, n o  30/22/35.
very sensitive to British interference with any vessel 
flying the Stars and Stripes. Given the arrogant British 
attitude to their flag which had brought on the War of 1812, 
this American reaction was certainly understandable. But old 
memories die hard and as late as the first months of 1862, 
a slaver could escape a British search simply by hoisting the 
U.S. flag. On the North American Station, none of HM warships 
had specifically sought out slavers since I858, principally for 
this reason»^
Vice Admiral Milne was acutely aware of the anomaly of 
the situation. In February 1861, he wrote to the Admiralty?
if officers are to attempt to suppress the Slave Trade, they must of necessity give chase to strange vessels then in sight, or approach those passing near to them -■ and if a vessel makes sail away, and is in consequence chased, the Master of the vessel, if American, will immediately report the fact of his having been chased by a British Ship of War# and the United States papers will again teem with articles on the subject and renew the cry of British outrage by HM Naval officers on American Merchant Ships,11
With the outbreak of Civil War# some two months after Milne 
wrote the letter quoted, the U,S, withdrew its West African 
squadron, now needed in home waters. This left the British as 
the only power with ships on the African coast directly charged
10 Memo, of Stewart to Milne, March I860,^DM 128/114,
11 Milne to LCA, 8 Feb. 1861, MLN/l03/2/fe,
with the suppress ion of the slave trade. It was an 
enervating and monotonous duty. Palmerston said in 1862 
that no Board of i.dmiralty had ever shown any interest in 
halting the slave trade and only grudgingly kept their 
ships there. The Prime Minister charged that:
If there was a particularly old alow going tub in the Navy it was sure to be sent to the coast of Africa to try to catch the fast sailing American clippers - and if there was an officer notoriously 
addicted to drinking he was sent to a station where Rum is a deadly poison. Things go on better now, but still there is at the Admiralty .... aversion to the measures necessary for putting down the Slave Trade, 12
Even granting the truth of Palmerston's remarks, it was 
* thankless task on a fever ridden coast. Whatever the reasons, 
there can be no doubt that the slavers were getting through, 
given U.S, indifference and Spanish complacency. From 
30 September I859 to 30 September I860, 30,473 slaves were 
landed in Cuba. But after that year's impressive figure, the 
number of slaves landed went into a steady d e c lin e ,^  Milne 
believed that there were three reasons for this: the stoppage 
of slaving enterprises at New York and Boston, whence they were
12 Palmerston to Russell, private, 13 Aug, 1862, FR030/22/22,The 'Abstract of the Naval Force in Commission' ADM 8/141# shows in April 1862, a force of 18 ships and nearly 2000 men stationed on the West Coast of Africa,
13 Milne, A.T., 'The Lyons - Seward Treaty of 1862,' The American Historical Review. XXYvtli, (1933), P.I56,
chiefly organized; the civil war giving other employment to 
the men formerly in the trade, and the signing of the Lyons - 
Seward Anti-Slave Treaty of 1862.14
This treaty was really a diplomatic coup for Lord Lyons 
hut he submerged his share of the credit and it seemed to the 
U.S, public that Seward had conducted a successful negotiation 
with the somewhat reluctant British minister. Lyons had initially 
submitted a draft treaty to Seward, who rejected it on 21 March 
1862, on the grounds that the first move in any such agreement 
must come from the U.S, The secretary of state was not essentially 
seeking personal credit for starting the negotiations - although 
that may have been part of his scheme - but, as a shrewd states­
man, he realized that the Senate would look with dissatis­
faction on any British initiative on a subject that rankled in 
American memories. For the chief clause in any treaty of this 
nature must be the unqualified right of British warships to 
search American merchantmen, Lyons agreed with Seward's views, 
and after sane small changes and a manufactured conflict over 
several clauses, the treaty was unanimously passed by the Senate, -^5
14 'Memo, relative to the N. American and W, Indian StationJ MLNA05/6.
15 Milne, A.T,, op.clt,. p, 5H ,  The author of this articleis no relation to Admiral Milne, but is the present secretary and librarian of the Institute of Historical Research,London.
The British minister wrote to Russell on 8 April 1862,
'Yesterday was the anniversary of my arrival three years 
ago at Washington. I celebrated it by signing the Treaty 
for the suppression of the Slave Trade.' ^
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was the only one in 
the administration who was initially against the treaty. He 
believed that Lyons had manoeuvred Seward into agreeing to 
limit U.S, belligerent rights of search. Welles held that 
since the treaty confined permission to search ships to certain 
areas, it therefore robbed U.S. warships equipped with warrants 
under the treaty, of the right of searching for enemy ships 
in any sea. He believed that by the terms of the treaty,U.S. 
warships could only stop suspected slavers and not any 
merchant vessel as they had been doing. Lyons maintained 
that the powers conferred by the treaty were in addition to 
the regular belligerent rights. After receiving this informat­
ion, Welles made no further objections but he continued to 
suspect Lyons' motives. The secretary of the navy was certain 
that Seward was much too anxious to avoid conflict with 
England, 'Lord Lyons, 1 he wrote in his diary, 'is cool and 
sagacious, and is well aware of our (Seward'¡0 infirmities, 
who in his fears yields everything almost before it is asked,* ^
16 Lyons to Russell, private, 8 April 1862, PRO 30/22/36,
17 Beale, H.K. (ed.). The Diary of Gideon Welles (New York,I960) 
i, PP. 398-9.
Seward, for his part, complained that Welles could only with 
difficulty be brought to see anything beyond the immediate 
interest of the navy department,^ Lyons'relations with
the navy department were never very cordial, Welles and his 
assistant, G,V, Fox, were bitter at the building of C,5, 
warships in England, at the English government’s countenancing 
of blockade runners and at many other grievances that they 
- with much of the U,S, public - considered unneutral and 
unfriendly.
But the completion of the treaty did not immediately 
stop the slavers. The month after its’ signing, Cmmdr,
W,C,F, Wilson in Spiteful 6, arrived at Truxillo, Honduras,
There was a screw steamer under Spanish colours in the harbour* 
From information he had received Wilson believed it to be a 
slaver. The governor of the area, who Wilson thought was in 
league with the slave traders, refused the English captain’s 
request that a prize crew be put aboard and the ship sent for 
adjudication to a court of law. The vessel was searched 
and it was noted that a quantity of human excrement was reported 
to have been taken out of her holds. The captain and crew 
'profess total ignorance of the name of the owner,' the plate 
showing the maker's name had been removed from the enginesj
18 Stuart to Russell, private, 6 Oct, 1863, PRO 30/22/37.
it >ri3 certainly a suspicious ship. Wilson took a statement 
from one Alfred Lee who had been employed in the brig which 
had lately provisioned the suspected vessel. He had been, as 
he coyly termed it, in the ’African trade1 and was convinced 
that the ship was a. slaver. Lee saw in the after holds a 
large quantity of pans, several barrels of tin pots and 
'a very large galley for the size of the vessel’. He had 
been offered $ I50 advance to ship as a crew member, although 
the captain refused to tell him where the ship was bound.
Without the governor's permission Wilson was powerless to take 
the ship and had to sail away. His immediate superior on the 
Jamaica Station, Commodore Dunlop, promised Milne that he would 
send a warship ’as often as possible' to the Honduran coast 
'to watch these proceedings',^ Such were some of the frustrat­
ions encountered by a naval officer in the pursuit of his duty. 
That summer the British Consul General in Cuba, Joseph Crawford, 
reported that about 2370 slaves had lately been landed in the 
island, with the collusion of the Spanish authorities. Some of 
these slaves were sold at an average price of $306 apiece,^
Because of the war, the Federals maintained that they could 
not detach special warships to hunt for slavers. Those in the 
vicinity of Cuba, however, would be told to keep a slurp look-out
19 Dunlop to Milne, 22 June 1862, ADM 1/5791.
20 LCA to Milne, 4 Sept, 1862, MLNA05/3*
and the British were now welcome to search any suspected 
American vessel, Milne noted on 1 October that he had just 
received the warrants empowering his men to search suspicious 
U0S, ships; they would, he promised, be immediately issued «nd 
a system of cruising organized to watch the Cuban coast. While 
it is true that Sir Alexander’s ships were always watching for 
slavers, Landrail, in May 1862, was given the first instructions 
since Milne arrived on the station to cruise specifically for 
the suppression of the slave trade, ^  Prom October 1862 the 
commanders-in-chief h«d four to five ships constantly cruising 
for this purpose, and now no slaver could hide behind the 
American flag; their last protection had been stripped from them.
Nevertheless, in the four years that Sir Alexander was on 
the station, none of his officers ever captured a slaver, 
though the vice admiral thought that they were very zealous 
in trying to find these elusive vessels, Milne said that when 
he was serving in the West Indies in 1837 and 1838, deliberately 
looking for slavers, he never saw one. However, when he was 
otherwise employed on & passage from one place to another,hej 21
21 Stuart to Russell, private, 9 and 16 Oct, 1862, PRO 30/36/2; Milne to LCA, 1 Oct, 1862, MLN/l03/$/E; Milne to Landrail.
6 May 1862, MLN/llO/2/bD,
• • - succeeded in detaining four vessels with upwards of 900 slaves, and it is by no means a solitary instance of ships making passages being more successful in the suppression of the slave trade than the Bhips specifically employed in this service. 22
During the civil war the trade went into a steady downward 
spiral from which it never recovered. In the period I864 - 65 
only 143 slaves were landed in Cuba, and all of these were 
subsequently rescued; by 1870 ’the transatlantic1 Slave Trade 
had virtually disappeared.’ 23
The Blockade Runners
In the years 1862 and 1863, blockade running, to and from 
the Confederacy reached its zenith. The main ports from which 
these swift vessels emerged were Nassau, Bermuda and Havana,
For a tdme, Nassau was the chief centre of the trade. Only 
about 5OO miles from Charleston and $70 from Wilmington, it was 
the closest neutral port to the Confederate States, Secretary 
of the Navy Welles gave vent to his feelings about this place 
in August 1862. Telling Seward that he had just received a 
report from the U.S, consul at Nassau - who said there were
22 ’Memo, relative to the N.Amerlcan.’eto.. op.cit.. MLN/IO5/6 Milne to LCA, 26 Kirch I864, MLN/103/8/li.
23 Milne, A.T..op.cit.. p. 5 16.
twelve ships there preparing to run the blockade - Welle3 
charged that the port w«s a 'perfect magazine' for the 
Confederacy;
a perfect system of violating the blockade is there in execution •*. our officers and people are openly insulted in the streets ,., while the rebels are encouraged and favored by the officials and the inhabitants... Shall this go on without remonstrance, 24
The runners, a3 has been amply shown elsewhere, carried at 
the beginning of the war, luxuries as well as necessary 
supplies required by the South, Later, however, they were 
forced by the Confederates to take in mostly articles that 
were in short supply; medicines, boots, clothing, artillery 
harness, arms, munitions, and the like. As the South had 
only two iron works and little experience in the rolling of 
large iron plates - needed for their ironclads - the runners
took in British made iron. Commodore DuPont, commander of the 
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron wrote to Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Fox in November 1662, 'they have driven the 
'Economist' off twice £from Charleston| with the iron plates,,, 
X feel indignant at the conduct of England*. ^5 One of Milne's 
officers reported in February 1863, only two days after C,S.
24 Welles to Seward, 7 Aug, 1862, ADM 128/58.
25 Thompson, R,K, and Wainwrlght,R,(ed,), The Confidential Correspondence of Gustavua Vasa Fox (New York, 1918)', i, p,l67
ironclads had attacked Union blockaders at Charleston, 
•Iron plates for the new steam rams are brought in ...
o fabout 200 for every vessel that conies in from Nassau1.
Though the British often objected to U.S, men-of-war 
using their belligerent right of search in an offensive 
manner, yet they were not insensible to the very real menace 
that their colonies presented to the success of the Union 
cause, Lyons became increasingly anxious over the problem.
He believed that the Bahamas' people were unreasonable to 
expect U.S, cruisers to be always in 'good humour with them.'
He seconded some of Milne's officers' views of the Bahamanians 
unreliability when he said that the case of a suspected blockade 
runner would have been put to Seward more forcefully 'had I not 
so often seen Bahama cases break down.' 7^' Lyons also, as
26 VTatson to Milne, 2 Feb, 1663, MLN/104/4. A good description of blockade running and the kind of supplies sent to the C»S, is to be found in Vandiver.F.« Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda 1861-65 (Austin, 1947J7""Taylor¡¡T,!, Running the Blockade (London.1696) gives a lively personal account,"'¿Iso"see the series bf articles by Marcus Price in the American Neptune. There are many journalistic accounts of varying worth, e,~g,, Carse, R., Blockade, The Civil Vhr at Sea (New York, 1958).
27 Lyons to Russell, private, 30 Dec, 1862, PRO 30/22/36,
the war progressed, complained of U.S. transgressions. In the 
summer of 1863, he felt th*t although the senior Union officials 
wished to stop violations of neutral rights, there was a want 
of firmness in dealing with individual Federal officers who 
committed offensive acts, Lyons thought that only the prompt 
exhibition of their superior’s displeasure would stop some of 
the more careless officers. In most of the blockade cases, 
the British minister confided to Milne, ’there appear to be 
a great deal of hard swearing on both sides - though I am afraid 
I must confess that the blockade-runners lie most and swear 
hardest,’ The Governor of the Bahamas, C,J, Bayley, was 
constantly calling for warships to prevent the Federals from 
lurking about, waiting for blockade runners to leave British 
territorial limits. In December 1862, After Wilkes’ trouble­
some visit, Milne agreed to station a warship there permanently; 
before this he had only sent one to the islands when they could 
be spared from other duties,2^
Cmmdr, G.J, Malcolm of Barracouta - then at Nassau - 
reported to Milne in May 1863, The commander said that he 
had scant faith in the people of the place any story
or report is believed, as long as it is against the Federal 
Cruisers,’ Malcolm mentioned the ’capture’ of the merchantman
28 Lyons to Milne, private, 31 July 1863, MLN/P/8/l(M),
29 Milne to LCA, 24 Dec, 1862, MLNA03/6/F. Milne dislikedkeeping a ship at Nassau because of the prevalence ofTellow fever in the Bahamas,
Blink ■ Bonny as a good example. She was from England for
Nassau with 'wine for the Governor ... dresses for the 
Colonial Secretary ... a horse for Mr. Adderley's son-in-law', 
the family were C.S, ««gents at Nassau, and many other articles 
for the colony. A report of her capture had been received, then 
a schooner captain arrived and said that a ship answering the 
description of the Blink" Bonny, with a horse on bo«»rd, h^d 
been fired into off Abaco and two of her crew killed, A protest 
was hurriedly sent to England, the outcry w«s great, people 
said there was no safety in the English flag, etc. 'Well lo 
and behold, a few days afterwards the Blink" Bonny arrived, 
having simply made rather a long voyage and had not been 
interfered with at all!1» Malcolm added that when he had 
arrived, the Harbour Master told him that the Stonewall J*ckson 
had only a few d-'ys before been fired at as she was crossing 
the bar into Nassau harbour, and had been chased off. This w*s 
obviously a violation of territorial waters *nd Malcolm 
promptly made enquiries. It w*s true, he found,that the 
Stonewnll Jackson had been some time ago chased and fired 
at when off Abaco - some fifty miles from Nassau - but no U.S. 
Cruiser had been within six miles of Nassau while Malcolm w«s 
absent from the port.-^ 30
30 Malcolm to Milne, private, 11 M**y 1863, MLN/P/A/i(b).
The commander-in-chief saw many of the blockade runners 
when he spent the winter at Bermuda. Milne believed that the 
Southerners who, ’have a regular agent here, a Col, Walker', 
were making the island a warehouse for their suppliers. He 
castigated the Bermuda custom officers for their acquiescence 
in giving false clearances to the runners ’,,, for instance 
the Cornubia clears for Nassau but goes to Wilmington or 
Charleston, then comes here,’ 31 Again and again he complained 
of the failure of the home authorities to adopt strong measures 
against blockade breaking. Speaking of the Federal rear 
admiral, Charles Wilkes, who had run afoul of the Bermuda 
officials in his attempts to evade Russell's orders of 31 
January 1862, Milne said that Novembers
If we change positions with Adra, Wilkes, I dare s^y we would feel annoyed to see several steamers full of contraband of war in a harbour of a neutral power re*dy to break our blockade. I cannot comprehend the value of our Queen's Proclamation when vessels openly visit «nd sail here with cargoes of eras and powder and when there is now stored here in St. Georges, 80,000 Stand of Anns 31
31 Milne to Grey, private, 23 April 1863, MLN/107, In October 1862, Sir Alexander wrote that ships arriving at Bermuda from the South, with cargoes, 'are liable to capture until they complete their voyage, that is their destination, which is England', Milne to Grey, private, 1 5 Oct, 1862, MN/107/3.
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with over 100 tons of gunpowder landed by order 
of the authorities, ready for reshipment, and 
a law has just been passed here to prevent 
the exportation of Arras "however it is not 
my business". 32
The law which Milne referred to was passed on 2 August 1862 
by the General Assembly of Bermuda and confirmed by the 
Queen on 17 December 1862. It empowered the Governor in 
Council to prohibit the export of ‘arras, ammunition, and 
gunpowder, military and naval stores'. It provided for 
penalties of £509 the forfeiture of the ships, boats, 
carriages, etc., implicated in the violation of the law, 
as well as a £200. fine for any person hindering the arrest 
of anyone employed in exporting the forbidden articles. It 
is strange that this stringent legislation was enacted and 
then not acted upon. As it also had a clause prohibiting 
the export of 'provisions or any sort of victual which may 
be used as food by man', perhaps it was an attempt to 
persuade the Federals to lift their recent ban on supplies 
of cattle to Bermuda.^ If so, it failed.
Milne believed that the Queen's Proclamation of 
Neutrality of 13 May 1861, if enforced, would Itself stop 32
32 Milne to Grey, private, 2$ Nov. 1862, MLN/107*
33 Gray, B., Acts of Legislation of the Islands of Bermuda 1690 to 1883 
(London, 1§84)p"p "*473*-5. The B.3.purchasing agent in Bermuda,J.T. Bourne wrote to Maj ,Huae and to Fraser,Trenholra and Co., C.S. suppliers in 
England, on 7 Jan.1863 and said that the colony's Attorney Generalhad assured him that the law came into operation only if Britain 
was at warj meantime it wouldn't effect Bourne's operations,Vandiver.F.(ed), Confederate Blockade Bunnirn? Through Bermuda 1861-65
. . . .  (Austin, *347/ I P?3»V "  ” "  '' J' ';T  , r i r ™' II. ■ » ... i : f r r r m m n„m r _
the blockade running traffic. The proclamation stated in 
simple language*
And We do hereby further warn all Our loving subjects ... that if any of them shall presume, in contempt of this Our Royal Proclamation... to do any acts in 
derogation of their duty, as subjects of a Neutral Sovereign in the said contest, or in violation or contravention of the Law of Nations... as for example, by breaking or endeavouring to break any blockade lawfully and actually established by or on behalf of either of the said contending parties) or by carrying... arms military stores, or materials 
or ... contraband of war, for the use or service of either of the said contending parties, all persons so offending will incur and be liable to the several penalties and penal consequences by the said Statute or by the Law of Nations... 34
The law certainly seems clear enough. Lord Palmerston how­
ever, summed up his attitude to the contraband trade in the
phrase he used to U.S. minister Adams, '... catch *em if you 
35can.* ■' On 27 November 1863, Russell replied to Adams after 
the U.S. minister had furnished him with new proofs that 
there was a Confederate depot of naval stores at Bermuda.
The foreign secretary declined to interfere in the matter 
an he held that international law entitled British subjects 
to trade with either belligerent, and the only penalty they 
could legally suffer was the capture of their vessels.J
34 *HM Proclamation of Neutrality*, 13 May 1861, F,6*414/17.
35 Palmerston to Russell, private, 25 Aug. 1862, PRO 30/22/22 The Prime Minister told the foreign secretary to inform 
Adams that he was quite unauthorised to report to Seward this phrase. Falmerston*s flippant remark greatly angered the Federals.
36 Moore, J.B., History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to which the U.S. has been a Party 
("Washington, I898),i, p.588.
One of the central points of the British case at the Geneva
arbitration of 1872 was that!
The government neither did nor could prohibit subjects».o from engaging in trade ••» By internat­ional law the right of blockade and the enforcement of it belonged to the belligerents and not to 
neutral powers, and it followed that to the blockad­ing power must be left the task of making the blockade effective,-^'
This had been the British rule throughout the civil war. It 
was not until 1870 that Britain changed her Foreign Enlistment 
Act of 1819, upon which the Queen’s Proclamation was based. 
Even this new act waB directed almost exclusively to prevent­
ing the building of belligerent warships, i.e^ Alabamas in 
British ports} it contained no provisions barring British 
ports to blockade runners.
The position that the U.S. adopted towards foreign sea­
men serving in blockade runners - after the 1861 Savannah 
incident - was outlined in a letter from Welles to Bear 
Admiral Farragut in May 1864« The secretary of the navy 
pointed out that all bona fide foreign citizens - including 
pilots and seamen - captured in neutral ships were entitled 
to immediate release. If the foreigners however, had no 
papers, if the vessel bore the Confederate or no flag or if 
they were in the C.S. service, then they were to be treated 
as prisoners of war. All U.S» citizens captured in neutral 
or C.S. ships were to be detained. If passengers on such 
intercepted vessels would take the oath of allegienoe, then
they might he released. These rules were generallyfollowed 
throughout the war and resulted in many British blockade runn­
ing seamen being captured, liberated and captured again. They 
would often, for the high wages and adventure, return to one 
of the neutral ports and sign on again to run the blockade.
Of course, if a runner’s crew fired on or attempted to 
defend themselves from a pursuing Union warship, then - 
British subjects or not - if captured, they became prisoners 
of war0 The blockade breakers had the advantage of surprise, 
speed and a low silhouette} but they were compelled to play 
the role of the fox rather than the lion in this game. The 
presence of British warships at Northern ports sometimes led 
to embarrassing situations involving Her Majesty’s subjects.
One night in May 1862, eight British seamen from the captured 
runners Camilla and Fingal, - later C.S.S, Atlanta - rowed 
out past the Union ships to HMS Rinaldo, then anchored at 
Fortress Monroe. They complained to Cmmdr. Hewett that they 
had been detained by the Federáis. Hewett - who had received 
Mason and Slidell that January - informed Flag Officer 
Goldsborough, who was the senior Union naval officer in the 
area at the time. Goldsborough suggested that Hewett keep
38 Bernard, M,, A Historical Account of the Neutrality of
Great Britain during the American Civil War ¿London»“' 1870)
■. P. 324.'"-.. .
the men, which he did and said he hoped to get them all
passage to Britain. Milne, always alert for information,
offered a free passage to England to the Fingal's engineer
as he had been aboard the Merrimac. The condition was that
the engineer would 'attend at the Admiralty office' to
inform their Lordships of the contest between the
Monitor and Merrimao andthe details of the latter's constr- 
39uction. ^
There were very few instances of Sir Alexander com­
plaining to the Federals about treatment of British subjects 
caught aboard runners. As has been seen the commander-in­
chief believed that these men were violating the Queen's 
Proclamation - in spite of the sophistry of the home govern­
ment - and he may have felt that they should be left to their 
fate. Milne did however, complain to Lyons on 28 October 
1861 of the unnecessary cruelty of putting British subjects 
captured in a runner, into irons. The U.S, subsequently 
ordered its officers to refrain from using irons except in 
cases of imperative necessity. ^
The principle of a belligerent’s right to Bearch merchant 
vessels of all nations in the blockaded area was accepted by
39 Milne to LCA, 24 May 1862, ADM 1/5787I same to same,
24 May 1862, MLN/103/4/D. 40
40 Milne to LCA, 28 Dec. 1861, MLN/103/3/C.
Britain from the date of the issuance of HM Proclamation of 
Neutrality on 13 May 1861. One of the most significant additions 
to maritime law during the war was the extension of the doc­
trine of continuous voyage. This had been invented by Lord 
Stowell earlier in the century,at the time of the French wars.
At that time,U.S. neutral merchants took sugar from the French 
colonies to France. When Britain began seizing these vessels, 
the U.S. traders then stopped at an intermediate port,such as 
New York. As their Journey was now from a neutral port to 
France,they felt they could be seized only by the British 
blockaders off the French ports,but not on the high seas. Lord 
Stowell however, held that the Intermediate destination was 
fraudulent and the ships could be taken,but only on the last 
part of the trip,from New York to France. But after the Civil 
War,the doctrine that emerged as a result of such cases as the 
Springbok,the Bermuda and several others,was considerably more
■ ■ 4i
comprehensive than Lord Stowell's original dictum. Thé United 
States now maintained that a ship carrying contraband to an 
enemy could be seized at any stage of her voyage. 41
41 Pitt,M.5. .Great Britain and Belligerent Maritime Rights from 
the Declaration of Paris.1856 to the Declaration of London, 
1909,Ph.D. thesis,London University,1964,p.46, See also Ber­
nard, M.,o£jj!it_.,pp.309-3II;Elliott»C.B. j’The Doctrine of 
Continuous Voyages’.American Journal of International Law,
I.(1907).pp.6I-ICW; Scott,J.B..Prize Cases Decided in the 
U.S.Supreme Court, 1789-1918(0xfo"rd7l9£3Ï ,
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This enlarged rule focused on the intention of the 
shippers and the character of the cargo« If the shippers 
intended to send contraband cargo forward to a blockaded 
port, or even overland to the enemy - as in the Matamoros 
cases - then as far as the law was concerned, the fact that 
the goods were to be transhipped was of no consequence 
and the cargo was liable to condemnation. The ship, on 
this voyage from a neutral port to a neutral port, was 
equally culpable, unless the owners could prove they were 
ignorant of the final destination of the cargo. For 
example, the Bermuda was captured in April 1862, on a 
voyage from Bermuda to Nassau, and subsequently condemned. 
After this case*
neither Nassau or any other neutral port could be 
used any longer as a cast iron alibi to avoid con­
demnation when travelling on the first stage of a 
journey between neutral ports, when the original 
intention of the voyage was to reach an enemy destin­
ation by means of a subsequent journey. 42
Welles claimed in March I864 that the U.S. had the right to
search *ubique*, and to capture enemy property in merchant
vessels anywhere except in neutral waters. Further the
secretary of the navy said that his ships would seize any
merchant ship returning from a blockaded port such right
to exist at any time during the return voyage*. ^
42 Pitt, op.cit.t p. 68.
43 QSN* I, 21, p. 174.
Matamoros was a Mexican port situated on the Rio Grande
river opposite the Confederate town of Brownsville, Texas. 
The blockade runners felt that by going from Havana to 
Matamoros they could escape capture as they came from and 
unloaded at a neutral port® At one time forty and more 
ships were anchored off this harbour - sometimes for months 
- waiting for return cargoes of cotton to come from the 
interior of Texas* The first one captured by the Federala 
was the Labuan in February 1862. She was the subject of a 
great deal of correspondence between Britain and the U.S. 
and the initial reason for Sir Alexander sending a warship 
to the area. Lyons told Milne on 24 April that he had 
privately informed Seward that Britain was sending warships 
to the Mexican port to protect her merchantmen from unlawful 
seizure«^ After the British withdrawal from the allied 
expedition to Mexico, in April 1862, one of Milne’s ships 
was usually stationed at Vera Cruz. From that port the 
ship would come up to Matamoros for a few days and then 
return to the south. The Admiralty, in November 1862, 
ordered Milne to send a ship frequently to the Mexican 
portj this was done for most of the period 1862 - 1863. ^
44 Lyons to Milne, private, 24 April 1862, MLN/107.
45 Dunlop to LCA, 24 Nov« 1862, MLN/l04/3| Hancock to Dunlop 
2 March 1863, MLN/IO4/4.
The U»S. later released the Labuan because she had been
taken in neutral waters and issued orders to its cruisers 
to refrain from capturing vessels in similar circumstances» 
Milne*s opinion - in I864 - was that the U«S. often 
captured merchantmen at Matamoros just for trading with 
the *rebels* whether their cargoes were contraband or not, 
and in violation of the three mile limit» He believed 
that the prize court at Hew Orleans, which handled most 
of these cases, was ’dilatory* in detaining the seized 
ships for an unnecessarily long time» ^
There is little to add to the voluminous printed 
material available on the various civil war prize cases» 
Milne’s view of the navy’s r<5le in these proceedings may 
be seen in his instructions to Commodore Dunlop in 
December 18611
•»« questions as to how far our National honour 
may be compromised by any undue exercise of 
Belligerent rights by either party in respect 
to our Merchant Vessels ••• tho’ of, I admit, 
very grave importance, are rather of a class to be 
determined on by HM Government than to be resulted 
on the spot by HM officers».» 47 467
46 ’Memo, relative to the Civil War in America* MLN/105/6.
47 Milne to Dunlop, 7 Dec. 1861, MLN/l03/l6/P»
Following his policy of having as little to do with the
runners as possible» Milne - at Halifax - wrote to Captain 
Glasse at the Bermuda dockyard in August 1863» telling him 
not to give any coal or assistance to 'these doubtful 
vessels'. The commander-in-chief was surprised then, 
to learn in a casual conversation with the governor of 
Bermuda that December, that the naval yard had repaired 
several blockade runners during the previous summer. Calling 
for a report of the vessels assisted, Milne found that some 
eight or nine well known runners, e.g.,Venus, Juno and 
Cornubla had been repaired. ^  Sir Alexander was much 
annoyed at Capt. Glasse and forbade any repairs or coal 
being furnished to vessels suspected of breaking the blockade 
unless they were in actual distress. As long as the civil 
wrar lasts he said, bonds would be required henceforth from 
any sea-going ship repaired at the naval yard. These bonds 
were to be furnished by substantial persons in the colony 
who would swear that the vessel assisted would not, within
the three months following the repairs, attempt to run the
■■■-. *50Federal blockade. Milne was overruled in this matter by
48 Milne to Glasse, private, 20 Aug. 1863, MLN/107/3#
49 same to same, 2 Dec. 1863, MLN/l03/2l/U.
50 Milne to Lyons, 2 Dec. 1863» MLN/l03/l2/l«
the Queen’s Advocate who held that a British merchant ship
♦should not he allowed to remain helpless at the island,
merely because she has been or may again be engaged in
attempting to run the blockade of the Southern ports*» ^
In a private letter to Grey, Milne said *it may be law but
5 2it is not Common Sense*» The vice admiral persisted 
in complaining to the Admiralty and at this point Bussell 
agreed with the commander-in-chief of the station. The 
foreign secretary instructed the Admiralty to issue 
instructions that if a blockade runner sought assistance 
at a naval yard the captain of the vessel should be told 
»that the means at the disposal of the Dockyard are limited 
and must be reserved for the use of BM Ships of War.* This 
was done in March I864. ^
Milne was anxious while he held the command, that 
neither side would be able to assert that British naval, 
military or colonial authorities were unneutral. Given the 
generally lax foreign office rules, the possibility of making 
fortunes in the blockade breaking business, and some colonial 
officials who were often only too happy - for trade’s sake -
51 Baxter, J,, ’The British Government and Neutral Bights’,
op» ci to, p. 23.
52 Milne to Grey, private, 13 Feb. I864, MLN/107.
53 LCA to Hope, 11 March 1864, MLN/IO5/6.
to give the widest interpretation to Palmerston’s ’catch 'em 
if you can’ philosophy, and the task of Sir Alexander and 
Lord Lyons was a formidable one.
The Oreto and Cmmdr, Bickley
The first English built Confederate raider was the 
Oreto or Florida. She was constructed in the fall and winter 
of 1861 - 62 under contract to James D. Bulloch, the C.S, 
agent who was soon to be responsible for the launching of 
that most successful of commerce destroyers, the Alabama.
The Florida was built in the Liverpool yards of W.C,Miller 
'from the plan of a contemporary British wooden gun-vessel.' ^  
The vessel, powered by 200 horse power engines and capable 
of more than nine knots; certainly resembled the Royal Navy's 
smaller ships, many of whom were on the North American 
Station in the war years. Compare the photographs of HMS 
Nimble and the Florida - except for the latter's twin funnels 
- they are remarkably alike. Union naval officers were 
shortly to be deceived into a dissastrous hesitancy because 
of this similarity.
54 Wardle, A.C., 'Mersey Built Blockade-Runners of the
American Civil War *. Mariner's Mirror. XXVIII 79»
See also» Merli, F.J., Great Britain and the Confederate 
Navy 1861-1865. Fh.D.thesis,'"Indiana University.1963* 
Written in l8aj and still the best account of the C.S. 
raiders is* Bulloch, J.D., The Secret Servioe of the 
Confederate States in Europe(New' York»1959T.TAIt'ho^ h 
he was provided with several million dollars to purchase 
warships in Britain, when he died at Liverpool in 1901, 
the scrupulous Bulloch left a total estate of £200. 2. 3. 
Several sketches of the Florida are in CWNC(1862}photos 
of RMS Nimble are at the National Maritime Museum,
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On 22 March 1862, despite AdamS!, protests, the Oreto 
left Liverpool, without even a signal gun for armament,
British builders could, by the terms of the Foreign Enlist­
ment Act, build ships for anyone, provided they were not 
armed or equipped in England. Bulloch therefore built his 
vessels largely in that country and equipped them with 
British guns outside of Britain’s territorial waters.
The Oreto reached Nassau on 28 April consigned to Henry 
Adderley and Co., agents of the great house of Fraser, Trenholm 
and Co., of Liverpool, the English financial agents for the 
Confederacy. On the 29th, the ship removed to Cochran’s 
Anchorage, about nine miles to the east of Nassau. On $ May 
the U.S, consul at the port demanded that an enquiry be 
held on the suspicious ship. The governor received the 
first report regarding the vessel from a Boyal Navy officer 
on 28 May, This was from Cmmdr. H. F. McKillop of Bulldog 6.
McKillop believed that the Oreto was preparing to become a 
warship, but he did nothing as he had to leave soon after for Halifax,
His place as senior officer in the Bahamas was taken by Cmmdr.
<55H. D. Hickley of Greyhound 17«
55 Cmmdr. Hickley while commanding Gladiator, was attacked in the 
St. Charles Hotel in New Orleans in the fall of i860. He had just 
landed some seventy of William Walker’s filibusters. They had been 
captured that September by Cmmdr, Salmon of Icarus at Trtaillo, 
Honduras, The Honduran authorities had executed Walker, but in an 
agreement with Salmon, had permitted the British to return the re­
maining filibusters to the United States. Hickley had gone into 
the hotel to obtain change to pay a cabman, when he was set upon 
by some of Walker’s sympathizers. He barely escaped serious 
injury. ’New York World’, 10 Oct, l860j Hickley to Milne, 1 Oct.
1860, ABM 1/5734P.
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Hickley’s initial visit to the Oreto on 10 June aroused 
his suspicions} nearby lay the notorious C.S.S. Nashville 
which was giving her supplies. On the 13th, during a second 
visit, Hickley was told by members of the Oreto*8 crew 
that they refused to raise the anchor until they knew the 
ship’s destination. The commander seized the vessel on 
the 16th but released her the next day because both the 
governor and the attorney general of the colony believed 
that it would be very difficult to prove that she was a 
warship} there was no armament aboard her at the time. How­
ever, on the 16th, Hickley pointed out to the governor that 
the Oreto;
... was equipped as a vessel of war ... she could 
be made ready for battle ... in 24 hours, that other 
vessels then lying in the harbour could steam out 
with her and help to arm her within a few miles off 
this Port... her real destination was openly talked 
of ... I [said the governor! thought that a strong 
prima facie case was made out for a judicial 
Investigation... 56
The governor was still apparently loath to interfere 
against the advice of his attorney general. He put the 
responsibility squarely on the naval officer when he said
56 Bayley to Russell, 21 June 1862, FO 5/1313» Most of
the correspondence regarding the Oreto is in this document.
to Eickley 'your proper course undoubtedly is, on 
seizing the Oreto to submit the question of her condemn-
57ation to the Vice Admiralty Court of this colony*. •''After 
having released the ship because of the colonial authorities 
doubts, Hickley again took charge of the vessel on the 17 
June. This time be acted on his own initiative. When 
Milne heard of his subordinate's action at Nassau, he praised 
Hickley's 'great zeal ... in giving proof that our neutrality 
between the Belligerents was a reality...’ The commander-in­
chief said that if the Oreto was an actual belligerent war­
ship, the governor would have to take the initiative in 
seizing her, but the Foreign Enlistment Act 'specifically 
arms naval officers with the authority to act under it with­
out reference to the Civil Power', Though he thought 
Hickley acted in a 'right and proper* manner, Milne agreed 
with the governor in admitting that there might be great
difficulty in proving exactly which 'Prince, State, Potentate,
58etc,’ in whose service the Oreto was to have been employed.
The case was heard in the Vice Admiralty Court at 
Nassau in July 1862. Cmmdr. Hickley stated at the investigation
57 Bayley to Hickley, 16 June 1862, FO 5/1313*
58 Milne to LCA, 24 July 1862, MLN/103/5/E.
that he found the ship*
..... in every respect fitted as a war vessel, 
precisely the same as vessels of a similar class 
in HM Navy. She has a magazine and light rooms 
forward, handling room and handling scuttle for 
powder as in our vessels, Bhell rooms all fitted 
as in men of war. 59
Further the commander avowed that the Oreto had no room 
whatever for stowage of cargo. The judge said he would 
hold Hickley's evidence to he conclusive except that all 
these fittings had been made in England and this would not 
subject the vessel to forfeiture at Nassau. If the home 
authorities had seen fit to permit the Oreto to sail, he 
could hardly stop the vessel ** still unarmed - at a 
colonial port. The Oreto's steward gave a description 
of what was undoubtedly a Confederate flag which he 
claimed was in the captain's cabin. He had overheard 
Mr, Lowe, a passenger, tell the captain 'that he treated 
the slaves on his plantation better than he (the captain) 
treated his men*. ^  Lowe was actually one of Bulloch*'s 
men and was entrusted with handing the ship over to the 
Confederates. But the judge swept all of the evidence
59 '^ Decision of the Court on the Oreto' Nassau Guardian. 
9 Aug. 1862, MLN/108.
60 Ibid.
aside. Although it was true he said, that the Oreto
may not he able to carry the regular bulky cargo of a 
merchantman yet she might carry, for example, hundreds 
of shells, muskets, pistols and other warlike stores.
She might, he insisted, be used as a blockade runner 
’... an employment which, however improper in itself, 
would not subject the vessel to forfeiture here*.^
On 2 August 1862 the judge freed the ship on the grounds 
that the attorney general had not proven the three points 
needed for condemnation*
1. ’equipping* within the court’s'/ jurisdiction,
2. intent to employ the ship in the service of the
Confederacy, 3
3. intent to commit hostilities against citizens 
of the U.S. 62
The governor of the Bahamas said on 11 August that 
he did not believe that *we shall ever obtain stronger 
proof against any vessel than was produced against the 
Oreto..,* and he now feared that the Federals would 
virtually blockade Nassau to stop any more C.S, raiders 
from arriving at the port. ^ O n  the day the verdict was
61 Ibid.
62 Merli, op.cit., p. 38.
63 Bayley to Newcastle, 11 August 1862, FO 5/1313.
delivered at Nassau, Bussell wrote to William Stuart, who was
charge d'affaires at Washington in the absence of Lyons, 
then home on leave* The foreign secretary, speaking of the 
seizure of the Oreto. said that he hoped the U.S. would see 
that Britain had the strongest desire to fulfill her inter­
national obligations, and would therefore hesitate to issue 
letters of marque. Adams had just told Eussell that the U.S. 
might well do this, in order to provide a larger force to 
hunt down the Confederate warships.^ That July a bill 
authorizing the President to issue letters of marque was 
introduced into the Congress. Seward, wrote . Stuart, was 
'much gratified at the seizure of the Oreto, which he called 
the first friendly act of the British Government'. Because of 
this 'friendly act* andi
.....in the expectation that HM Government would 
pursue the same course with regard to other vessels 
which were fitting out in British ports for a similar 
purpose a recourse to the Letters of Marque would not 
for the present be resorted to, although he fSewar<f| 
could not assure me that such a measure might not here­
after be found necessary. 65
This statement seems to sum up the canny secretary of state's 
attitude to the letters of marque, whose use Britain greatly 
feared. The threat of their issuance was used by Seward
64 Eussell to Stuart, 2 Aug. 1862, F.O, 414/19 .
65 Stuart to Bussell, 16 Aug. 1862, FO 414/19.
throughout the war, in an attempt to halt the "building of 
Confederate warships in British yards. Despite the 
opposition of Adams and Welles to this mode of warfare, 
the letters of marque bill, introduced in 1862, was passed 
in March 1863. This was in direct response to the building 
of the Laird rams in England. However, the bill only em­
powered the President, at his discretion, to put the law 
into force, and Lincoln never acted upon it.
The later career of the Oreto. now the Florida.is well
known. She left Nassau, received her armament that August
at Green Cay in the Bahamas - about 75 miles south of
Nassau - and left the area. Milne told the Admiralty that
she had government stores, hoses, pumps, etc., "marked
with the broad arrow1, as part of her equipment. The naval
storekeeper replied that there was no evidence of this in
66his records. Nassau was sickly with Yellow fever at this 
time and many of the Florida1» crew fell ill. Having lost 
several of his men to the fever, with many others sick,
without rammers, spungers, sights ... elevating screws 
and other indispensible articles - his gunsvvwere therefore
66 Milne to LCA, 17 Sept. 1862, A D 1/5788,
useless - the Confederate captain, J.N. Maffitt, elected 
to run for Mobile.^ On 4 September he appeared off that 
port and steered directly for the bar. His ship flew the 
Royal Navy red ensign and pennant and made no attempt 
to evade the Union blockading vessels,. Although by this 
time Milne’s warships had stopped investigating the 
efficiency of the blockade, they would occasionally 
visit Southern ports to deliver and pick up consular 
despatches as well as to protect British subjects in the 
area. Their practise was to hove to and communicate, in 
the first instance, with the Union ships off the port.
With Federal assent, which Milne explained in a circular 
to his ships in February 1863j was 'permissive only', they 
would send in a boat or the consul would come out in a truce 
boat.
The Union officer in charge offMobile was Cmmdr.
George Preble in Oneida. The commander hesitated for just 
a few fatal minutes upon seeing the not unfamiliar lines 
of the warship together with her British flags. The Winona. 
Rachel Seamen and Oneida then fired on Maffitt. But, 
although heavily damaged, the Florida gained the sanctuary 
of Mobile. Preble was summarily dismissed from the navy
Soley, op. cito. p. 184-5«67
for his error in judgementj many Union naval officers became
embittered on having to decide quickly whether an approaching
vessel was genuinely British or really a disguised Confederate
Capt. Turner of the U.S.S. New Ironsides lamented to Capt.
Boss of HMS Cadmus in February 1863*
Our cause and arms have suffered so many disasters 
especially of late, from advantage taken of the 
policy of our Government to permit Foreign Vessels 
of War, to pass the Blockade. 68
Sir Alexander may have had the unfortunate Preble’s fate 
in mind when he gave orders, which Union naval officers 
were informed of in June 1863» that HU warships when 
approaching blockading squadrons, were to take every 
care in steaming, regulating speeds, etc., so as to give 
no grounds for the Federal cruisers to suspect that a 
deception is being practised on them*.  ^ When she had
68 Turner to Boss, private, 4 Feb. 1863, Milne Home papers.
69 Lee to Boggs and Case, 6 June 1863» SSI1 1» 9» P* 65. 
Cramdr. Hewett of Binaldo wrote in Nov. 1862, to a Union 
naval officer in order ’to alleviate the censure* on 
Preble. Hewett said he had seen Oreto at Nassau, his 
signal man reported her as being an English warship, 
she was painted as such and if he had seen her at sea, 
he would have taken her as one of HM men-of-war.’Papers 
Belating to Foreign Affairs 1861 - 1862*(Washlngton,l862)
refitted, the Florida escaped from Mobile and ultimately 
destroyed thirty-two ships and bonded four others.
This Confederate raider was one of four - the others
were the Alabama, Georgia, andjherandoah - which the 
Geneva arbitration of 1872 ruled had been carelessly 
allowed to leave British jurisdiction. They said*
.... it likewise results from all the facts 
relative to the stay of the Oreto at Uassau, 
to her issue from that port, to her enlistment 
of men, of her supplies, and to her armament, 
with the cooperation of the British vessel »Prince 
Alfred* at Creen Cay, that there was negligence 
on the part of the British Colonial Authorities. 70
Because of these cases the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 
specifically placed the responsibility of proving that
«V suspected vessel £ £ £  *  “sed P°"Sr
iirectlv on the ship-s builders. The WoriM then, was 
the first of the British built Confederate raiders end
was stooped by naval officer, Cmmdr. Hickley
70 Moore, po.cit., pp. 45V Eoundell Palmer, one of 
HM Law Officers at the time of the Oret_o affair, said 
he could never understand how the Geneva arbitrators 
could have blamed Britain for negligence in this case. 
Palmer notes that the Oreto did not receive her arm­
ament until she reached Mobile* Palmer, it.,..¿^ mortals 
(London, l B $ 6 ) , ii, PP« 418, 420. As we have seen, the 
raider did, in fact, receive her guns at Green Cay in 
the Bahamas, thus violating the Foreign Enlistment Act.
who saw clearly through the legal obstructions to the 
essentialsctf the case» He was hacked up by his comm- 
ander-in-chief and as seems probable by the sympathy, 
if not the active encouragement of the Governor of 
the Bahamas, C.J. Bayley, All of these good intentions 
were defeated by the intricacies of an obsolete pieoe of 
legislation, as well as by the disinclination of Parliament 
to change it, ' If British legislators had amended what was 
obviously an inadequate law, they could have saved the 
country fifteen million dollars, the sum awarded to the 
U.S. by the Geneva arbitrators,and also have avoided the 
immense animosity of the Federal government. But the 
Palmerston government failed to act after this first test 
case, and other raiders were soon to follow the Florida 
down the ways of British shipyards. One of the most 
important results of Cmmdr, Hickley’s seizure of the 
Oreto was that it persuaded Seward to delay the passage of 
the letters of marque blllj when the Alabama escaped from 
Liverpool in July 1862, Federal fury was perhaps mitigated 
to some extent over yet another British built raider 
appearing on the high seas.
Wilkes« Milne and the Governors
The long career of the Alabama began in the summer 
of 1862« With great courage and decision, Capt« Semmes 
went about the business of commerce destroying with 
singular success« On 5 September - the day after the 
Florida ran into Mobile - he seized and burned his first 
prize. For almost two years this raider terrorized U.S. 
merchantmen before she was sunk by the U.S.S. Kearsajtfa. 
in June I864. Many U.S. commercial craft registered under 
the Union Jack to escape Semmes’ guns, thereby enriching 
Britain by the payment of insurance, registration and 
other fees. On 8 September 1862, Secretary of the Ravy 
Welles commissioned a 'flying squadron* whose duty it was 
to search out and destroy the Alabama, the Florida and any 
other Confederate raiders it might encounter. The force 
was commanded by Acting Rear Admiral Charles Wilkes of Trent 
fame* composed initially of seven warships, at its greatest 
strength it numbered sixteen men-of-war. The story of 
Wilkes* unsuccessful search for the raiders has largely 
been told elsewhere. But Milne’s reaotion to the Union 
officer’s conflicts with colonial officials and with British 
naval officers, has never been recounted. Its importance
lies in illustrating the Commander-in-chief’s views of his 
officers* duties vis-a-vis colonial authorities and the 
belligerents, as well as showing how the governors differed 
with Milne in their understanding of the functions of 
British naval officers.^
Acting Bear Admiral Wilkes arrived at Bermuda in his 
flagship Wachusett 9» cm 27 September 1862, four days from 
Fortress Monroe. With him were the Tioga 8 and Sonoma 7j 
the latter cruised off the island looking for blockade 
runners, while Wilkes went into St. Georges with the other 
two ships. Thereupon followed a series of ’incidents** 
there was no British flag hoisted at the fort for Wilkes 
to salute| the fort did not immediately salute his ship} the 
Lieut, governor later said the guard sergeant had been 
punished for failing to do this. Then a person in ordinary ; 
dress, an officer from the conviet establishment, brought 
the governor’s message to Wilkesf Governor Ord said there 
was no one else available at the time, etc,, etc. Milne said 
that he had heard that Wilkes wrote four pages of complaintj
71 Some sources on Wilkes* Hill, J.D., Sea Dogs of the
Sixties (Minn,, 1935)J Jeffries, W.W., ’The Civil War 
-Career of Charles Wilkes’, Journal of Southern History,XI 
(1945) PPo 324-348| ORTsi. passim.
there was much ill-feeling on both sides
The governor agreed to permit the Wachusett and 
Tioga to coal and make repairs. On the morning of the 
fourth day of his visit, Wilkes requested a further 
twelve hour extension as be had just broken a boiler 
tube in Wachusett while he was preparing to leave.
Governor Ord acquiesced. Tioga meanwhile,left the harbour 
and proceeded to cruise back and forth off the entrance. 
Sonoma now came in for coal and supplies. On the evening 
before the Sonoma entered the harbour, Cmmdr. A.T. Thrupp 
of Desperate 8, at the governors request, sent an officer 
aboard the Union warBhip. The governor was Irritated at 
Sonoma*s anchoring each night at the Fairway Buoy and - 
though Wilkes denied it - virtually blocked the harbour 
entrance. Desperated officer told Sonoma*s captain either 
to go into St. Georges or to go to sea but not to anchor 
in the Fairwayj if the Federal ship didn’t go in at once, 
said the British officer, he would not be allowed to later. 
Cmmdr. Thrupp reported ’ I cleared for action and loaded
72our guns in case it should be necessary to use force...*
72 Milne to Glasse, 16 Oct. 1862, MLN/103/18/R.
Cmmdr. Stevens, captain of the Union gunboat, refused
•in light of so irregular a method of transmitting
orders* to accede to this demand and went in his gig
into theKharbour to consult with Wilkes. By then it was
dark and the Sonoma anchored in the Fairway, in defiance
of the governor. Milne cautioned Thrupp on 16 Octj he
saw no reason why the commander should use foroe against
73the warship of a friendly nation. But he apparently
changed his mind, for writing to Lyons about a month
later, Sir Alexander said*
I feel that I would have been perfectly 
justified after due warning in using force 
to prevent his vessels from taking up this 
anchorage, however great would have been the risk 
of bringing on hostilities between the two 
countries# 74
Now the governor told Wilkes, * I have to instruct you 
that this vessel £the Tioga which had just coaled and was 
now cruising back and forth off the island^ cannot be permitted 
to return within these waters.* Governor Grd was following 
Russell’s instructions of 31 January 1862 which prohibited 
a belligerent warship from coaling more than once in three
73 Ibid.
74 Milne to Lyons, private, 11 Nov# 1862, MLN/107.
months. Wilkes countered with, 'This I cannot permit,
my government has« alone the power of instructing me.*
Bussell later termed this a defiance of the colonial 
75authorities. ^
Milne was then at Halifax, his summer station, and 
did not arrive in Bermuda until 20 November 1862. By that 
time all of Wilkes' ships had departed. Sir Alexander 
wrote to Grey saying he understood the Union admiral had 
complained while at Bermuda that no attention or courtesy 
was shown to him by the colonial officials and Wilkes had 
said the English officers Hatteras and Fort 
Monroe were receiving every attention that could possibly 
be shewn to them*. Milne added »This is quite true and
*7fiby none more than Admiral and Mrs. Wilkes.' The
Wachusett left Bermuda on 2 October but Wilkes had ordered
the other two Union warships to cruise off Bermuda as long
as they could, while saving enough coal to reach Havana.
In his report to Welles, the acting rear admiral called
77the Bermudians *a pack of secessionists',
75 Hill, op.cit.. p. 113j LCA? to Milne, Confidential,
15 Nov. 1862, MLN/105/3.
76 Milne to Grey, private, 2$ Nov. 1862, MLN/107.
77 Wilkes to Welles, 12 Oct. 1862, ORN, I, i, p. 502-4.
The blockade runners were afraid to leave while the 
Federal:- steamers were there, both the Minho and Harriet 
Pinckney - whom Milne rightly believed to be runners - were 
chased back into the harbour« Governor Ord sent one more 
•instruction* to the U,S. ships, vi& Plover 5» He informed 
Cmmdr. Rodgers of Tioga that neither ship could communicate 
with the shore except by Ord*s previously obtained permission 
Sonoma and Tioga steamed away from the islands on 18 October
Acting Rear Admiral Wilkes was also at Nassau in the 
fall of 1862, where he became embroiled with Governor Bayley. 
Milne sailed from Bermuda and arrived at Nassau on 13 Dec­
ember, He had heard Wilkes was there and hoped to see him,
*1 do not expect any trouble with him,1 Sir Alexander
confided to Grey. ^  But the U.S.officer had already left • •
the area. The commander-in-chief never met Wilkes, but 
before the Federal officer*s recall, they exchanged a 
guardedly cordial correspondence concerning belligerent 
rights#^ While in the Bahamas, Wilkes was told by a 
Nassau pilot that he wouldn’t be allowed to anchor, and 
thus annoyed, he refused to allow a boat from Barraoouta 6 -
78 Milne to Grey, private, 19 Dec. 1862, MLN/lOT*
79 Milne to LCA, 30 July 1863, ADM 1/5820.
which was quite close to his ship - to communicate with 
him. This greatly angered Cmmdr. G. J. Malcolm of 
Barracouta and he told the local U.S. consul, on 20 Nov­
ember, that if the Union ships anchored without the
governor’s permission, he *..« should fire upon them 
00at once*. Milne censured Malcolm telling him that if 
U.S. vessels anchored without permission, it was for the 
governor to decide what should be done ’and not the Naval
O'!
Officer*. Several days later near Stirrup Cay - some 
miles north of Nassau - Barracouta met Wilkes’ ship and 
they warily watched each other with their crews at quarters 
for twenty-five minutes. Then Malcolm steamed away, 
neither commander having attempted to communicate with the 
other. Though the Barracouta is a ’much heavier armed 
vessel than the Wachusett* said Wilkes to Welles, ’that 
Is of little consequence. You may depend upon it, we
A?shall fight with a good will*. ’ In both the Bermuda and 
Bahama incidents the secretary of the navy upheld Wilkes* 
actions) Welles throughout the war urged a firm line with 
Britain. But Welles was not blind to his subordinate's 
faults. He characterized Wilkes as one who ’has abilities
80 CRN,, I, i, p. 555.
81 Milne to Malcolm, 16 Dec. 1862, MLN/IO3/I8/E
but not good ¿judgement in &H respects * 83
In all of these disputes or discussions, Milne feared 
that his officers would become involved as ♦middlemen* be­
tween the belligerents and the colonial authorities»
Governor Bayley thought that HM Ships were the ’most 
appropriate vehicle* for communicating with belligerent 
men-of-war. Though he would if necessary, furnish a boat«
Sir Alexander said that the colonial officials themselves 
should actually speak to the Union or Confederate officers. 
Even if it became necessary, in the governors opinion, to 
resort to force against a foreign warship, Milne believed it 
to he the ‘Universal Custom of all Nations that the firing 
upon any foreign vessel should coroe from HM Ports - and not 
from any of HM Ships*. The commander-in-chief wished to keep 
the navy in the background until the civil element had been 
exhausted, which he held would remove fa great cause of 
irritation and contention*. ^
Sir Alexander also endeavoured to convince the civil 
officials - and he even included Lyons in this — to make
83 Jeffries, op.clt., p. 327.
84 . Milne to LCA, 22 Leo. 1862, ADM l/57S3j Same to Baroe,
28 Nov. 1862, MLN/103/6/Fj *Memo relative to the Civil 
War in America*, MLN/IO5/6.
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requisitions of his men, and not to give them direct orders«
Speaking of Governor Ord he wrote*
.... he is the third governor I have had to write 
to expressing my opinion and telling them that 
their requisitions would always have attention 
hut they have no power to give orders. 85
This may seem a niggling point hut it reappears again and again
in Milne’s correspondence. If once colonial officials became
used to giving orders to naval officers, the commanders-in-chief
as well as his men would he placed in an awkward situation}
divided responsibility would be highly undesireahle in such
critical- times. The home authorities agreed with most of
Milne’s conclusions and on 13 April 1863,the Colonial Office
issued the following circular to their governors*
Any notice or direction conveyed by the authority 
of a Governor to the Commander of any Foreign 
Vessel, should be conveyed through the officers of 
the Colonial Government and not through the Officers 
of HM Navy, whose intervention should not be applied 
for, unless the directions conveyed through the 
ordinary channel should fail to produce any effect. 86
These events raise the question of Sir Alexander’s 
attitude to the colonial governors. Of Harry St. George Ord, 
Governor of Bermuda, Milne said in a confidential note to 
Captain Glasse, in October 1862, that the governor hadn’t sent
85 Milne to Grey, private, 1 Jan. 1863, MLN/10 7. We have 
seen how Admiral Wilkes objected to receiving instructions•
which he construed to be 'orders* from British colonial authorities.
86 Circular No. 41M, 13 April 1863, ABM I/5848.
him the correspondence between Wilkes and Ord be tells
me nothing*. ^  To Grey that same month he confided,
. . 88 _... he is rather a fussy personage’» Some two months
later Governor Ord wrote to his superior, the Duke of
Newcastle* .
the Vice Admiral has been in the habit of comm­
unicating to me in the most unreserved manner 
his official and other correspondence on 
public affairs. 89
The governor noted that Milne had a document defining the 
limits of British possessions, which he himself did not 
possess and he asked to be kept more fully informed on 
all such matters. The Colonial Office thought that Ord 
had no real grounds for complaints of this nature. Of the 
Governor of the Bahamas, C.J. Bayley,Milne had little better 
opinion. In the fall of 1862, Yellow fever was very 
prevalent among the shipping at Nassau, but Bayley said there 
was no fever among the inhabitants. ’This is all nonsense*, 
said Sir Alexander, ’the place is very sickly, but His
CQExcellency is afraid of driving away trade’. y
87 Milne to Glasse, confidential, 15 Oct. 1862, MLN/IO7/3 .
88 Milne to Grey, private, 15 Oct. 1862, MLN/107/3.
89 Ord to Newcastle, 22 Dec. 1862, C.O. 37/183.
90 Milne to Grey'iprivate, 21 Sept. 1862, MLN/10 7.
The same month Milne told Capt. C.J.F. Ewart of Melpomene
that Bayley appeared to believe that U.S. warships hadn’t
a right to search British vessels outside the three mile
limit} he ’writes to me about Insult to the Flag, this is
all nonsense*« ^  Milne criticised Bayley on several
other occasions} the vice admiral seemed to have little
regard for this particular official. One is reminded of
a letter that Milne wrote when he had been on the station
for only about two months« In May 1860 he told David
Milne Home, his brother*
It made me laugh when the Governor .{bol.Freeman 
Murray of Bermuda]asked me to stand on the right 
of the Throne. His speech was received with 
a salute of 21 guns from the fort. It is 
rather absurd but forms and etiquette must be 
kept up, 92
Although Milne’s relations with most of the colonial officials 
were good, including, for example, Viscount Monck of Canada, 
Governor Darling of Jamaica, Governor Hincks of the 
Windward Islands, etc., his antipathy to some of them may 
possibly be traced to his dislike of the slow and easy 
ways and the red tape of colonial life. In April i860, 
the month after his arrival, Milne wrote from Barbados to 
friends in the Admiralty, ’There are some slow coaches hare
91 Milne to Ewart, private, 8 Sept« 1862, MLN/107/3.
92 Milne to D. Milne Home, private, 30 May i860, Milne Home 
papers.■ ■
my fingers tingle sometimes at the apathy of some people*«
We have seen how annoyed he was at the authorities at 
Bermuda and the Bahamas, when they - with Foreign Office 
approval - allowed blockade runners to use their islands 
as depots and bases.
But Wilkes was certainly provoking,and Lyons told 
Bussell in May 1863 that the two things he was most anxious 
to obtain were the removal of Wilkes from the West Indies 
and the withdrawal of the U.S« squadron from St« Thomas, 
where it had created animosity among the Danish authorities 
by hovering about the place« That morning Seward promised 
that Wilkes would be sent to the Pacific« * I am particularly 
anxious that it should not appear that I had anything to do 
with this,* wrote Lyons«*^  Recalled in June 1863 j Wilkes 
hadn*t found any raiders but he had checked blockade runn­
ing, captured a slaver and antagonized the British, Danish 
and Spanish authorities« He was court martialed in March 
I864 for publishing a letter defending his conduct} re­
primanded and reduced in seniority, the courageous but 
erratic officer’s naval career was ended.
93 Milne to Romaine, private, 4 April 1860, MLN/l07/3„
94 Lyons to Bussell, private, 11 May 1863, PBO 30/22/37.
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Commander Watson and the Palmetto State
British warships carried despatches to and from their 
consuls in the Confederacy all through the year 1862 and Indeed 
until Benjamin expelled all the British consuls in October 
1863» It was on this duty that Commander George W, Watson 
of Peterel 11, found himself in December 1862» Lord Lyons 
sent his despatches to the British officer who was anchored 
at Portress Monroe waiting on the minister’s requisitions.
On 3 December Peterel steamed out of the Union base for 
Charleston« Approaching the ’seat of the rebellion* as the 
Federals termed it* Watson was confronted by the U.S.S.
Quaker City« which left the blockading line and with her 
men at quarters, swiftly approached his vessel. The British 
officer was surprised at the Union warship’s menacing 
attitude as he had been in the area since the previous day 
and had anchored for the night less than two miles from a 
Union steamer, which had shown no interest in his presence« 
lor was he prepared for action« Peterel*a fires were out* 
her screw was up and she was consequently not quite in 
fighting trim. Watson hove to in order to communicate, 
nothing untoward happened} but the foregoing is a rather 
common example of the hazards which HM warships were accust­
omed to in the blockaded area.
That evening he delivered his despatches to Consul
Bunch who was on board Cadmus 21» a British frigate* Both 
ships were then anchored outside the harbour, Cadmus 
sailed the next morning and Watson agreed to stay off 
Charleston until Bunch had replied to Lyons* despatches* 
PetereX lay alongside the Federal warship Powhatan*
Capt, Godon of this vessel said that his officer of the 
watch had, one evening, complained that Peterel was showing 
a bright light on her mainmast. But Godon deprecated his 
officer’s anxiety, it being, he said, nothing more than 
the light from the officers' mess, Nevertheless, Watson 
promised to cover his sky lights and told Milne that he was 
reporting this fact 'just to show how very suspicious they 
are of every little thing we do*. ^  Watson eaid that he 
could even see lights on some of the hlockaders, which was 
prohibited for security reasons* Visits were exchanged with 
the Federal officers and except for this one incident, 
cordiality reigned* Some four days after Peterel*s arrival 
Bunch came out in the truce boat, gave hie despatches to 
Watson and ths British sloop left for Fortress Monroe. There­
after Watson personally conveyed the official correspondence 
direotly to Lord Lyons in Washington, This trip illustrates 
the typical duty of one of Milne's officers during the 
Civil War.
95  Watson to Milne, 11 Pec, 1862, MLN/IQ4/3
On 22 December, Lyons asked Watson to return to 
Charleston as Bunch feared a possible rising of the slaves 
and the possibility of a Federal attack on the town. The 
British officer was to furnish protection to HM subjects 
in the area. Watson left that day, having filled his coal 
bunkers to capacity from the Federal depict at Fortress 
Monroe. * I am at liberty to coal whenever I want it,1 he 
reported to Milne, ’from either the Military or Naval Stores* 
Arriving off Charleston on 30 December, Bunch asked him to 
enter the harbour, something which British warships were 
forbidden to do by the commander-inr-chief’s specific orders. 
They were supposed to send in despatches by one of their own 
boats or the consul would come out in a truce boat» But 
Bunch said that since the Emancipation Proclamation would 
come into effect the next day - 1 January 1863 - he felt that 
a slave rising might occur and that a British ship must be 
at the town to give refuge to British subjects if this dread­
ful event should take place. The possibility of a slave 
rebellion was strong in the minds of the British consuls in 
the South, although this never did happen. Milne often 
sent ships to New Orleans after it fell to the Federals, 
because the consul there greatly feared this possibility,
96 Watson to Milne, 26 Dec, 1862, MLN/104/3,
Consul Bunch also thought a Union attack would he made by- 
land from the direction of Beaufort and said it could 
take place in forty-eight hours. If Watson was outside 
the harbour it might be days before he could be reached.
The Confederates, anticipating an attack, would put their 
harbour torpedoes and obstructions in place and then it 
would be impossible for Feterel to enter the harbour. After 
all, said Bunch convincingly, the French corvette Milan
97had been for some time, inside the harbour of Charleston.^ '
The next day, 1 January 1863» Watson having agreed
to comply with Bunch*s request} Peterel steamed slowly inside
and anchored off the city of Charleston. The British officer
had been there for almost a month, when on 23 January, he
told Bunch that he now felt there was little probability of
either a Federal attack or a slave rising. As Milne would
not, he added, wish him to prolong his visit to a Confederate
port, Watson said he would leave in five days. Though he
still feared a Federal assault on the town, Bunch said he
oAwould not positively object to the Peterel*s leaving.
97 Bunch to Watson, 31 Doc, 1862, MLN/104/3.
98 Bunch to Watson, 23 Jan. 1863» MLl/l04/4« As early as Dec­
ember,1861,M.de St,André,the French consul at Charleston 
had asked for the presence of a French warship,as he feared 
either a Federal attack or a slave rising,The captain of the 
Milan thought these fears exaggerated,and said HMS Racer’s 
captain,who had just been to Charleston,said there was no 
foundation for the consul’s assertions, French Archives,
MAR BB4,798,Capt.0f Milan to Crin-C.,27 Dec.1861,
However, on the 27tb, the day of Watson’s departure, 
the consul became more excited. He pleaded with the naval 
officer to remain ’... upon my responsibility1, as he had 
newsrof the gathering of a formidable Federal ironclad 
force at Beaufort - less than sixty miles from Charleston 
— and the papers said that a fleet of $2 ships and 52,000 
men were in the Beaufort area. Actually there were some 
Union ironclads not too far away. On 27 January they were 
about a hundred miles south of Charleston, engaging 
Confederate batteries at Fort McAllister, Georgia. Commodore 
DuPont was there, preparing an ironclad squadron to attack 
Charleston« This was done on 7 April - against DuPont’s 
advice ** and was beaten off by the strong Confederate defences 
On the 28 January, Watson agreed to remain in the port for
OQa further indefinite time*
Cmmdr. Watson’s actions while he was at Charleston, 
even up to this time were questionable. One day the 
Confederate General Bipley came aboard Feterel. As the C.S.A. 
were not recognized by Britain, Milne had forbidden his
99 Watson to Bunch, 27 Jan. 1863, MLN/l04/4| CWHC. 1863. 
pp. 17, 59 i Watson to Bunch, 28 Jan. 1863, MLN/IO4/4.
The Illustrated London Hews for 28 Feb. 1863, has a 
picture of Peterel and the French corvette Milan 
at Charleston.
ships to salute its flag or representatives} yet when 
Bipley left the ship, Watson rather ludicrously burnt three 
signal flares in his honour* On five occasions the 
British commander sent his men on liberty into the town*
Surely this was a dangerous proceeding if Bunch was
correct and Charleston might be attacked at almost any time."^
On the evening of 30 January 1863» General Bipley 
offered to take Bunch and Watson out to Fort Sumter so as to 
enable them to see the attack planned for that night on the 
blockading fleet. Watson, who was on shore, agreed and made 
his first error by not going directly to his ship, knowing 
that an attack was about to be launched. Vizatelley, the 
famous artist of the Illustrated London Kews was aboard one 
of the two Confederate ironclads, Palmetto State and Chicora. 
that crept out in the early hours of 31 January, towards the 
Union ships. The actual damage to the blockaders was con­
siderable« Mercedita was rammed and nearly sent to the bottom, 
Keystone State and Quaker City were heavily damaged while 
Augusta was less seriously damaged# Yet not a single Federal 
ship had been sunk} both the Confederate rams returned 
safely to port. Crnmdr. Watson, accompanied by General Bipley, 
went in a tug immediately after the action and boarded the
100 Log of Peterel. 21 Hov* 1862 to 12 August 1863» 
ABM 53/8312.
returning Palmetto State» That day the British, officer
reported to Milne that Mercedita was ’totally destroyed*
and two other steamers, though much damaged, had escaped.
The whole Union squadron he claimed had been ’driven to
sea* and the ’Blockade raised by a superior force’. Later
that day he went with Bunch in the Confederate tug
Chesterfield out to where the Federal warships had been,
’from which position, with good glasses, no sign of a war
vessel was to be seen*. He closed his despatch to Milne on
the 31st by saying that at about sunset two vessels,
probably Federale, could be seen} Poterei’a log for that
date reads, *5»30 (Sunset) five of the late Blockading
101vessels in sight outside the harbour*.
Bunch seems to have been trying to ensnare a not urn* 
willing Watson in a strange scheme, for on that day - the 
31st — he urged the officer to send one of his men to
101 ftatson to Milne, 31 Jan. 1863, MLN/104/41 Q2ffl,l863, 
pp. 18 - 20, In the Charleston paper which celebrated 
the victory of the rams, there is an entry which may 
cast a melancholy light on the glory of the C.S* arms* 
’Notice and Reward ~ One Hundred Dollars •- Macon and 
Western Hail Eoad Co., Macon, Ga., December 10, 1862 ~ 
Bunaway from this Company, on the <Hh of August last, a 
negro man named Hardy, and on the 23rd of November a 
negro man named Mathews. These negroes were brought from 
North Carolina ... I will pay One Hundred Dollars 
reward for each of them lodged in jail in either North or 
South Carolina. Isaac Scott, President’. Newspaper in 
Milne to LCA, 18 Feb. 1863, MLN/IO3/6/F,
Washington viS Richmond with intelligence of the ’partial
destruction and total dispersion of the squadron of the 
102U.S.* Watson agreed and on 2 February sent Sub.Lieut.
Samuel Pulley overland to the Federal capital with, his and 
the consul’s despatches. Enclosed in Bunch’s report was a 
notification from the C.S. secretary of state announcing 
the raising of the blockade. Benjamin wasted no time} 
his declaration was written on the very day of the action. 
Watson reported to Milne on 2 February that the Confederate 
ironclads ’will run out and disperse the IJ.S, Ships at 
anchor there, whenever they find them obnoxious’.
The British officer was oversanguine} the two rams saw no 
further action and were destroyed when the Confederates 
evacuated Charleston in February 1865» Peterel’s log 
for 1 February showed 13 ships - supposed to be Union 
vessels - off the bar. It must be said that Bunch re­
ported to his superior Lord Russell that same day, that 
11 U.S. ships were to be seen from Peterel’s masthead.
But both Watson and Bunch apparently believed that the block­
ade had been legally raised and a new proclamation from the
102 Bunch to'Watson,. 31 Jan. 1863» MLN/IO4/4. Bunch held 
strong pro-Southern sentiments. See Adams, op.cit.. i.p.19^
103 Watson to Milne, 2 Feb. 1863, MLh/l04/4.
104 Bunch to Russell, 1 Feb. 1863, F.O. 414/21.
U.S« was necessary before it could be reimposed. On 
2 February Watson said, 'No notification of a renewal of 
the blockade has up to the present time been made and I 
conclude that the several ships now in port will proceed 
unmolested to their destinations', y The consul and the 
naval officer's actions and opinions were certainly pre­
mature and seemed to indicate an animus towards the Federals
On receiving the messages from both British representat 
ives, Lyons, on 13 February asked Watson to quit Charleston} 
if it was absolutely necessary for Feterel to remain, then 
she should anchor outside the harbour. As Bunch still pro­
fessed fear of a Federal attack, Lyons ordered the Consul 
to come away from the town.^^ Since Bunch's exequatur 
had been withdrawn by Seward in October 1861 - the consul 
had been detected 'negotiating* on Bussell’s orders, with 
the Southerners whom he urged to sign the Declaration of 
Paris - Lyons feared that the U.S. would treat Bunch harshly 
if Charleston fell» Accordingly, when Capt, Boss in Cadmus 
arrived off the port in early February, the consul and his 
family went aboard and left for Bermuda and England« Capt» 
Turner of the U.S.S. New Ironsides told Ross that be feared 
when Bunch came out that some Confederates might come with
105 Watson to Milne, 2 Feb« 1.863, MLN/104/4»
10$ Lyons to Watson, 13 Feb« 1863» MLN/IO4/4.«
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him 'to obtain flying information of all they can collect...
I shall absent myself on that occasion ... I do not choose
to be inspected by my enemies even at a distance'. In this
letter Capt* Turner said he would have been glad to see
Watson again and complimented Ross's 'marked neutrality in
action and speech ... a course of conduct which has won for
you the confidence and respeot of us all*# Turner then
invited Ross to dinner and promised him the same menu as
107he had had on previous occasions. The senior U0S. officer
off Charleston, Capt# Godon,said in December 1662 that bis
relations with all the neutral officers were 'most friendly*
1 Oftand singled out Ross for bearing a truly neutral attitude,4'
On 10 February however, all of the Union commanders off Charleston
signed a statement condemning Bunch and Watson's 'deliberately
109and knowingly false* report of the rams* action. 7
Neither Lyons nor Milne approved of Cmmdr. Watson's 
conduct. Lyons regretted that Peterel's SuboLieut# had made 
such a long and uncomfortable journey only to confirm what the 
newspapers bad said about the blockading squadron being
107 Turner to Ross, private, 4 Feb. 1863, Milne Home papers#
108 Godon to DuPont, 12 Dec., 1862, Milne Home papers#
109 'Statement of U#S# Officers', 10 Feb# 1863, F#Q# 414/2 1#
110*out of sight for some hours’* The U«S. papers
roundly castigated Watson and Bunch. Seward* on 14 
February, asked the British minister to remove Peterel 
from Charleston»
He was going on, I thought to read some tittle 
tattle information as to the sentiments of the officers 
... but I stopped him and said that considering the 
circumstances under which Her Majesty’s Ships visited 
the Blockaded Ports it would only be in a very 
peculiar case that I could hesitate to do what depended 
upon me to withdraw one, on the slightest expression 
of a wish from the Government of the U.S. but
that it was quite useless to tell me stories about 
the conversation of the officers and matters of 
that kind... Ill
Lyons sometimes became entangled in his own diplomatic
language, but he obviously was upset by Watson’s acts,
'... I am not a little scandalized by some of the goings on
at Charleston while the Peterel was there,’ he wrote
112privately to Milne. As for the commander-ii>*chief, he 
sharply reprimanded Watson. Sir Alexander chastised 
Peterel’s commander for ’indiscretion in mixing himself up 
so conspicuously and unnecessarily with the Confederate 
authorities...* instead of staying aboard his own ship,
110 Lyons to Milne, private, 15 Feb. 1863, MLN/f/b/i(M).
111 Ibid.
112 Lyons to Milne, private, 27 March 1863, MLli/p/]}/l(M).
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1 1  "iwhere he should have been, while an action was in progress. 
Commander Watson is not a wise man*, Milne wrote to Grey,
*and I am now sending him to Barbados to cruise as I cannot 
trust him either at Nassau or on the American coast.
Cmmdr. Watson excused his conduct — which he 
characterized as *strictly neutral*- on the ground that 
he wished to inspect the Palmetto State solely in order to 
tell Milne the details of her construction and to observe 
the damage she had sustained. As to his opinion that the 
blockade had been raised, he had only written this to 
Milne and Ross0 Several English ship captains at 
Charleston had asked his views on that score, and he had 
declined to give advioe or to express any opinion on the 
subject. The commander did furnish Milne with a plan of 
the harbour, details of the C.S.navy given to him by flag 
Officer Ingraham and other information of naval and 
military importance.
On 16 February 1863, Vice Admiral Milne ordered 
Cmmdr. Thrupp of Desperate to take Watson’s place at
113 Milne to LCA, 20 March 1863, MLN/103/6/F.
1 1 4  Milne to Grey, private, 20 March 1863, MLN/10 7.
1 1 5  Watson to Milne, 12 March 1863, MLN/IO4/4.
Charleston« Sir Alexander told him to ‘cultivate the 
most friendly relations with all American authorities, 
whether Federal or Confederate ... taking care to maintain 
at the same time the most strict neutrality ...' Milne 
ended his instructions to Thrupp with the warning that if 
Charleston was attacked,1 it is my desire that you limit 
your observation to what can be seen from your own ship,
which would clearly be your station while an action is going
m  , 116 on... *
Once before Watson had been censured by the commander- 
in-chief, The previous summer a merchantman, the Adela .was 
captured by the Federáis and taken to Key West for adjudic­
ation. Cmmdr. Watson, while at that Federal base, received 
in a clandestine manner, a mail bag which belonged to the 
ship. As all the Adela*s papers were impounded, this 
seemed like an attempt to remove vital evidence. Milne told 
Watson he should have given the bag up to the Union flag 
officer and to have claimed it only ‘openly and officially'.'^ 
Watson was to be the cause of yet another unpleasant 
incident while he was on the station. In September 1863, he 
was angered because a cabman at Trinidad would not take him,
116 Milne to Thrupp, confidential, 16 Feb, 1863» MLM/1 10/2/DD.
117 Milne to Watson, 8 Aug. 1862, MLl/l03/l7/0.
as the man was waiting for a previous fare<> The commander 
is reported to have promised his boatfer crew a sovereign 
apiece if they would ‘thrash the fellow*. The sailors 
later sought out the man and taking ropes out of their 
pockets, gave him a severe beatingo Before Watson could 
be charged by the incensed colonial authorities he had 
sailed away.^® This hot headed naval officer would have 
seemed to be the British equivalent of Bear Admiral Wilkes. 
These incidents do not appear to have affected Watson's 
career. In 1888 - 92 he was himself a vice admiral and 
commanded the station.
The Palmetto State affair was the only occasion in 
which Seward made a specific derogatory reference to an 
individual British naval officer and the only time that the 
U.S. secretary of state asked Lyons to remove a particular 
British warship from the American coasto An important aspect 
of the episode lies in the effect it might have had, not 
only on British - U.S. relations, but also on Milne’s 
accessibility to American ports. We know that the 
secretary of the navy and bis assistant were anti-British, 
or at least they believed that Britain was careless in
118 LCA to Milne, 2 Nov. 1863, MLN/i05/4} LCA to Milne, 
15 Jan., 1864, MLH/105/5.
fulfilling her neutral obligations. U.S. public opinion 
was rabidly anti-British in early 1863 because of the 
Alabama1a successes as well as the news of the building of 
the Laird rams in Liverpool. Lyons said that April, »the state 
of things here so far as peace with us is concerned, more 
alarming than it has been since the »Trent* affair»* If
Watson's actions were not promptly repudiated by Lyons 
and Milne, Lincoln might have been persuaded to close 
American ports to-British warships. This action would 
have left Milne »blind*, not only to U.S, operations 
against the Confederacy, but more importantly, to any 
contemplated movement against British possessions.
For example, the commander—in-chief would have little means 
of knowing if a Federal expedition was fitting out at 
Fortress Monroe or Port Boyal, for a lightning attack on 
Bermuda. But prompt disavowal of Watson’s actions ended 
the matter.
The British Admiral Visits the Borth 
The eight article of the Standing Instructions for
119 Lyons to Bussell, private, 13 April 1863» PBO 30/22/37
the North. American and West Indian Station stated*
’You are strictly to abstain from entering any Port of 
the U.S., unless absolutely compelled to do so by the 
necessity of the service’« We know that during the Civil 
War, for reasons of national interest Vice Admiral Milne 
kept some of his ships at Federal ports and these vessels, 
on occasion, visited the ports of the Confederacy. But 
official policy was to hold contacts with the Americans 
to a minimum.
The French squadron in North America ~ with bases in 
Martinique and Guadeloupe - ranged in size from five to 
about fifteen warships. These vessels were frequently to 
be seen in both Federal and Confederate harbours and their 
admiral was a welcome guest in both North and South. 
President Lincoln once paid a courtesy call on HIMS Gassendi 
while that ship was at Washington. The French dould do no 
wrongj their help during the Bevolution had endeared them 
to both sections of the United States. The spirit of the 
times was heavily influenced by France. The popular Zouave 
regiments were modelled after French units} the Imperial, 
a favourite style of beard — North and South ** was copied , 
from Napoleon III, while the first Napoleon’s campaigns
were closely studied at West Point. Some of France's 
nobility served actively for a time on McClellan’s 
staff} no British officer fought for the Union, though 
there were several British observers in the Federal 
armies at one time or another. Many of the Southerners were 
of French descent, e.g., General P.G.T. Beauregard,
Even the Empress Eugenie’s taste was followed. She was 
responsible for the popularity of that pervasive aberration 
in woman’s dress t the crinoline. The French minister at 
Washington, Henri Mercier, was a proponent of mediation 
and recognition of the South, while Lord Lyons held strong 
views on the necessity for neutrality on Britain’s part.
Yet outside of northern governmental circles, Lyons got 
little praise for his opinions. National sentiment is 
often stronger than political reality. Although Napoleon 
Ill’s personal popularity suffered for a time in the fall 
of 1862 when it became known that he had tried toinuuce 
the other European powers to join France in offering an 
armistice to the combatants, the French remained welcome 
visitors on both sides throughout the war.
By 1863, Sir Alexander believed it was time to 
modify the eight article of the Standing Instructions, 
and he apprized the Puke of Somerset of his intention to
call at lew York} bis superior did not forbid tie visit.li:0
Milne’s trip was made at a time when U.S. anger against
Britain had temporarily subsided., Federal confidence
bad been regained that summer by the twin victories of
Vicksburg in the west and Gettysburg in the east. Though
still vexed by the depredations of the Alabama and Florida.
they bad been calmed by the announcement in early September
1863 that the dreaded Laird steam rams,were to be detained
by Lord Russell,. These warships - equipped with the new
Colei! revolving turrets -were considered in the North
as ’floating fortresses’, capable of breaking the blockade
and laying Northern cities under contribution. Eventually
sold to the Royal Navy, Somerset tbroughtthem overrated
121and not very seaworthy.
Milne sailed from Halifax on 24 September in his 
flagship Nile,accompanied by Immortalité and Nimble.
Lady Milne and his brother’s daughter, Miss Milne Home 
came with the vice admiral’s party. On the 29th he 
arrived at New York City and met Lyons who was on the 
way back to D.C, from a Canadian vacation, and who had
120 private memo by Milne, n.d,, KLN/P/c/l(C).
121 Somerset to Russell, private, 8 Feb. I864, PRO 30/22/26,
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arranged, to meet Milne at New York. Admiral Reynaud, the
commander-in-chief of the French squadron in North
America had arrived the day before in HIMS Ouerriere.
with three other French warships. Milne wrote of the
French officer *... we came up the River in company.
We are most excellent friends in every sense and also
122with the officers of his ships.* The two admirals 
always co-operated closely. Turing the Traft riots that 
summer in New York, Negroes were attacked and killed 
in the streets, Milne profoundly thanked Reynaud for : 
giving refuge to some seventy coloured British subjects 
on his flagship, which was then in New York harbour..
HMS Challenger was speedily despatched and arrived off .
New York on 19 July 1863., after the riots had ended.
Both Milne and Lyons were surprised to see a Russian 
admiral's flagship and five other Russian warships in the 
harbour. The British had received no information nor 
intimation of their coming. 'I know nothing about them
122 Milne to Grey, private, 30 Sept. 1863, MLN/107* I have 
to thank Dorothy, Lady Redesdale for kindly giving 
the writer access to the 1863 diary of Sir Alexander 
Milne, which furnished some information used in this 
section.
123 Milne to LCA, 31 July 1863, MLN/l03/7/o.
or even where they are from or where going' wrote 
Milne privately to Grey.12^  The British charge in 
Lyons’ absence, William Stuart, reported that Seward 
had told Mercier that the U.S. had nothing to do with the 
Russian visit and didn’t even know they were to come 
until they arrived,12-5 The Russian minister, Lyons said,I
always believed that a U.S. - British war was inevitable,
but that dignitary, M, de Stoeckl, denied to Lyons
that a Russian - U.S. alliance was to be made. The British
minister thought it improbable that the Federáis would
entangle themselves in such an alliance} ’... though if
England were engaged in the serious war in Europe,• he
added gloomily, ’there can be little hope but that this126country would help her enemies.*
The Russian squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral 
Lisovskii was specifically sent from Russia so as not to 
be bottled up in its bases if war with her late adversaries 
materialized. In the event of a conflict with Britain and 
France,the Russian warships were to attack the commerce
124 Milne to Grey, private, 30 Septo 1863, MLN/10 7.
125 Stuart to Russell, private, 6 Oct, 1863, PRO 30/22/37,
126 Lyons to Russell, private, 20 Oct. 1863, PRO 30/22/37.
and colonies of their enemies. The excesses of Russian
soldiery in repressing the Polish rising early in 1863
had inflamed Britain and Prance} the Russians well
remembered how, a scant eight years before, the allies
had kept the Russianlleet locked in its fortified Baltic
harbour at Cronstadt. Palmerston reacted with typical
aplomb to news of the Russian squadron’s presence at
Hew York. If war broke out, he told Russell, they
might try to intercept British gold laden ships from
Australia or attempt to destroy British merchantmen,
'••• but their ships would be sure to be overtaken ...
1 9ftat last.’ The New Yorkers were just as surprised 
as Milne when the first Russian steam frigate Oslyabla 
arrived in their harbour on 11 September 1863» to be 
followed in the next few weeks by five other warships of 
the Czar, To the Federals, ignorant of the real reasons
127 For information on the Russian visit see* Colder, F.A., 
’The Russian Fleet and the Civil War* American 
Historical Review, XX. (1915)» PP« 801-12} Tarsaidze, A,, 
Czars and Presidents (New York, 1958)« This book contains 
in an appendix the complete sealed orders of the
Russian admiral sent to New York.
128 Palmerston to Russell, private, 19 Oct, 1863,
PRO 30/22/22. .
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for the visit, and "bereft of European allies, this looked 
like a thinly disguised Russian offer of assistance, to 
the Union, and they were heartily welcomed. The Hussian 
admiral in the Far East, Popov, fearing entrapment by the 
superior numbers of French and English warships in the 
area - if war did break out - decided on his own initiative 
to sail to the U.S. He arrived with six ships at San 
Francisco on 12 October 1863. Strangely enough, the 
British commander-in-chief, Pacific, was also in San 
Francisco in October 1863. There was however, on the 
British side, no foreknowledge or even a hint of the 
Hussians arrival on either coast.
Milne’s flagship, the Bile, anchored downstream, away 
from the city itself. Sir Alexander wryly noted that the 
local vessels wouldn’t come near his shipsj but he didn’t 
think the British would be molested on shore, though he 
did feel there might be a demonstration against them#^ 2^  
Lyons wrote that the New Yorkers were showing great hospit­
ality to the Russians. ’There is,’ he said a bit regret~ 
fully, ’no danger of our Admiral being troubled with 
anything in this way, I should think’. 130 X t did talce
129 Milne to Grey, private, 30 Sept., 1863, KLN/10 7,
130 Lyons to Russell, private, 29 Sept. 1863, PRO 30/22/37.
a considerable degree of moral courage to come un­
invited to the Northern States. The vice admiral was 
impressed with the activity of wartime New York,
I never was in such a town or place in all 
my life. The go ahead system is astonishing.
The most surprizing to me is their Steam Boats. 
for sizef management» etCo, you see 50 to 70 
steamers all at the same moment towing, Ferrys, 
etc., etc., in all variety and size. 131
Milne had originally intended only to visit New York, hut 
once arrived he decided to accompany Lord Lyons on to 
Washington. While at New York, Sir Alexander, Lady Milne 
and his niece stayed at the Brevoort Hotel, which a guide 
to the city at the time called *one of the most expensive 
in the city ... ministers from abroad, consuls and 
diplomats are generally found on its register, and 
persons of title are very common among its patrons.* The 
visitors attended the opera, dined with Consul Archibald 
and also with Cyrus Field at his fashionable home in 
Gramercy Parkf still today a quietly wealthy section of 
New York. Field was famous as the guiding spirit 
behind the abortive Atlantic cable Of 1857 as well as the 
later successful one of 1866. Sir Alexander toured
131 Milne to Grey, private, 4 Oct. 1863, MLN/107.
the Brooklyn Navy Yard, met Rear Admiral Farragut,
Major General McDowell and other dignitaries» While 
at the Yard he visited the 50^ 0 ton seagoing ram 
Dunderburg, then being constructed. She had a planned 
speed of 15 knots and was covered with 4i inch iron 
plates. The Nile had no armour, displaced 2622 tons and 
had a top speed of about 12 knots. Though every courtesy 
was extended to him, the.vice admiral felt constrained 
not to ask for the exact measurements of the vessel. The 
commandeivdn-chief observed with admiration the mag­
nitude of New York’s harbour defences and also those on 
the Potomac protecting Washington. He told the Admiralty*
I was forcibily impressed with the state of 
their Government Establishment and with the 
activity displayed in the numerous workshops 
as well as with the very strong and efficient . 
manner in which the work was turned out of hand. J
Before he left New York Milne exchanged visits with the 
Russian admiral and said their ships seemed to have a 
great many officers. He noted that there were rumours 
in the city to the effect that the additional officers 
were to man any ships purchased there, in the event of war* 
The Russian Ships left both coasts of North America in the
132 Milne to LCA, 18 Oct. 1863, MLN/IO3/7/G
2^8
spring of I864, their government having concluded that 
the crisis had ended»
Travelling to Washington by train, Milne met President
Lincoln, Welles, Seward, the other members of the cabinet
and many government officials» Seward said of this meeting*
The just, liberal and courteous conduct of the 
Admiral in the performance of his duties while 
commanding HMS's Naval Forces in the vicinity 
of the United States, was known to this Govern­
ment before his arrival, and it therefore 
afforded the President a special satisfaction to 
have an opportunity to extend to him an hospitable 
welcome» 13 3
The vice admiral visited Washington*a tomb, a camp for freed 
Negroes and toured the Washington Navy Yard where many 
officers of the Potomac squadron were on hand to pay their 
respects* While in the capitol*Lyons hold a dinner at 
which Welles was seated next to Milne. The secretary of 
the navy's diary quotes Sir Alexander as saying that he is 
'the first British Admiral who has visited New York since 
the government was established, certainly the first in 
40 years'. Milne said it was Admiralty policy to stay 
out of U.S, ports for fear of desertion by their men.
The British admiral added that 'he had tried to preserve 
harmony and good feeling and to prevent, as far as possible
133 Seward to Lyons, 3 Dec. 1863, KLH/p/c/l(C)
irritation and vexatious questions between us*. Sir 
Alexander complimented the energy and forebearance of 
the U.S. and expressed admiration of the Federal*s 
administration of naval matters. Welles thought him 
•exceedingly attentive and pleasant’. The secretary of 
the navy hoped that Milne’s visit was ’the harbinger of 
a better state of things, or rather of a change of* A
policy by the English government’. This was certainly
correct as the stopping of the Laird rams that September 
had shown that Bussell was beginning to separate the 
needs of national policy from questions of legal pre­
cedence. Lyons, who was enthusiastic about Milne’s 
reception by the U.S. authorities, said ’even Mr, Welles
thanked him for the way in which he had treated the
135questions concerning the two Nations’. The British
minister pronounced the visit most successful and stated
to Bussell that the members of the U.S. government!
seemed anxious to shew that they were not un­
aware that to nothing more than to the excellent 
judgement, and to the firm but temperate and 
conciliatory conduct of the Admiral is owing 
the maintenance of harmonious relations between 
the two countries. 136
134 Welles, op.olt., 19 p. 467*
135 Lyons to Russell, private, 16 Oct. 1863, PRO 30/22/37.
136 LCA to Milne, 4 Nov. 1863, MLN/p/c/l(c).
Sir Alexander’s party left Washington on 12 October,
arrived in Hew York on the 13th and sailed the next
day for Halifax. The vice admiral himself was quite
pleased with his visit and said that all of the
officials were polite ’beyond expectation', while»
Mr. Seward has himself devoted two days to 
shewing Lord Lyons and myself all the eights 
of Washington ... in a steamer to visit the 
home and tomb of Washington some 14 miles 
down the river in Rebel Land and ordered 2 
gunboats to be there to defend us from any of 
the Confederate Guerrillas who might be about. 137
It is difficult to assess the practical value of any
visit of this nature. It may be argued that a truly
neutral commander-in-chief of the station would have also
visited Richmond and met Confederate officials. But, as
Lyons said at the beginning of the war, there must be a
distinction made between the Confederates who Britain
recognized de facto and the U.S. whom Britain recognized
1 ^Aas de facto and de jure. . Britain might confer bellig­
erent rights on the South, but official visits, ministers 
in residence, etc,, were the prerogatives of recognized 
states. Milne’s tour did, at least, give U.S. officials
137 Milne to Grey, private, 11 Oct. 1863, MLN/107.
138 Lyons to Milne, private, 10 June 1861, MLN/107,
their first look at the man responsible for the
power behind Lyons* diplomacy} they were evidently
impressed. Four months after Lincoln's assassination,
which nearly ended in the death of Seward as well,
the secretary of state wrote to Sir Alexander, then
at his home in Inveresk, Scotlandi
I accept your felicitations upon the end 
of our civil war with great satisfaction, 
for I know that through all its ... progress 
you were sincerely friendly to the cause of 
peace... Let us hope that we can both meet 
again. 139
139 Seward to Milne, private, 22 Aug.18 6 5, Milne Home
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Kaval Administration» Maintaining a Taut Ship
The actual procedure used by a colonial governor to 
request assistance from the navy may he illustrated by an 
incident which occurred in the latter part of i860. Governor 
Darling of Jamaica feared* in October 1860, that American 
adventurers might attempt to seise the Bay Islands. Located 
in the Bay of Honduras, the Islands had been ceded to the 
Honduran Bepublic in that yearj British troops were stationed 
on them in order to forestall an expected attack by the 
notorious American filibuster, Silliata talker. That September 
Cioridr* 3?,- Salmon of Icarus' 11 .captured talker, who was then 
handed over to the Hondurans and promptly executed by them.
But Salmon and Me crew contracted Yellow fever and had. to 
leave the Central American coast» The only other British 
warship in the area, BPS Gladiator 6, sailed to Hew Orleans to 
land the remnants of falker*a'group.
On 22 October i860,' Governor Darling wrote.to Commodore 
Hugh Dunlop, com^sder cf the Jamaica Division of the station. 
Seriijgg asked that a warship he rent to the Honduran coast 
a» »oon «0 pcseitlej the governor feared that other filibusters
»ere not far away. Cn 25 October Dunlap replied., that when a... , 
;vseesl:wa» avaiUUe" it would he went* Darling then wrote .to;f:;
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his superior, the Duke of Newcastle, secretary of state for 
the colonies, on the 31st, Yellow fever was prevalent at 
Port loyal, he noted, and this would seriously limit the 
commodore's ability to furnish any naval assistance,
J, p, Elliott, assistant secretary of the Colonial Office 
next wrote to Edmund Hammond, permanent under secretary of 
the Foreign Office on 2? December i860 and enclosed Darling's 
correspondence» The Colonial Office believed that * naval 
protection should he afforded, to the Central American coast'• 
Hammond contacted tbs Admiralty on 2 January 1861« Lord 
Bussell, .he »id, had desired hi« to show the correspondence 
to the Admiralty and asked their Lordships to make arrange— 
rants for keeping a vessel of war on the noiimiran coast.
Lord Clarence■Paget, parliamentary secretary of the Admiralty, 
told Hammond shortly thereafter.that there.would have been a 
warship on the Central American coast except for the outbreak 
of Yellow fever which had crippled three of the commodore*«
atipa. 'Severth«!#**, Lord Paget *»4d ^ A% -'Una1« attention "
would bs called to Darling*#.' repeat. •' A despatch to this 
affect *.»4 anclcsir^ alltha eorreepondenc* «a» »ant- to Mil«» 
°a 4.January IBS! and received on 5 February. 1 The «ntirt 
*epusriC;# Lad. taken more" than ..three month».-. Colonial. official#. 
°ft«n received e.ch faster aarvica from the navy whet*-the ■
%? -ta to U l m M  Jan.
facilities were available. But scarcely two months after 
lîilne received this instruction, the American Civil War broke 
out and his force, about eighteen warships - plus five others 
sent out that summer-was to be fully employed Inspecting the 
blockade, etc. There were fortunately no further filibuster 
attempts on the Bay Islands. The colonial governors would 
often ask the naval commander-in-chief for protection and if 
it was not speedily given, they would write to their superior, 
the Duke of Newcastle, seeking his assistance* Lord Russell 
of course, could order Milne to send a ship immediately to 
any place he wished. The First Lord of the Admiralty, the 
Luke of Somerset, said in 1859*
I find that the Admiralty do not send instructions 
except in connexion with a letter from a Secretary of 
State.  ^The Admiralty forward a copy of a letter from 
the Secretary of State to them and direct the Admiral 
to take such measures as may be requisite to accomplish 
the object pointed out, etc. 2
The relations between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty 
were usually very cordial| Palmerston and Ruseell appreciated 
the problems faced ty the navy in attempting to serve 
Britain*a world-wide interests.
The one ultimately responsible for giving orders in the 
chain of command was the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston.
 ^ Somerset to Russell, private, 1 Pec. 16-59s PRO 30/22/?4»
Russell, the foreigh secretary followed, then Somerset, 
the first lord of the Admiralty, Beneath the first lord 
were the commanders-in-chief of the individual stations, 
which in 1860, numbered eight. If the station was divided 
into several divisions, as was the case on the N.American 
and W, Indian Station, those who commanded these divisions 
were the last authority before one reached the commanders 
of the individual warships. When a ship captain on one of 
the divisions had important information on any subject, such 
as the existence of slavers in a particular area, he would 
notify the division commander, the commander-in-chief of the 
station and often the Admiralty simultaneously. While this 
practice involved some paperwork, it had the merit of short 
circuiting the chain of command in the interests of prompt 
action. Whenever more than one ship was cruising on a part 
of the station, e.g.,Nassau, the highest ranking officer 
became the Senior Officer for the length of his stay. If 
there was only one ship in the area, usually the case in the 
Bahamas, her commander became the Senior Officer. The local 
governor usually made his requests - Kilne adamantly refused 
to allow governor» to give orders to his men - to the Senior 
Officer at the time. The naval officer was free to refuse, 
but if possible, he usually tried to aid the civil power.
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Some eight months after he arrived on the station,
Milne complained to the Admiralty about the confused state of 
the regulations, circulars and other paperwork which abounded 
on his coOTtand, Sir Alexander's officers were sometimes un­
certain which orders were actually in force, and which had been 
cancelled. There were three manuscript volumes of Standing 
Orders which had to be copied by each ship on arrival from 
England, The St, George had to copy out no less than sixty 
written orders, which Milne ©aid. might have been conveniently 
printed.^ The navy, Milne wrote in November 1860, was governed
1» Queer* Regulations . ,
2* Paymasters Instructions
3. Acta of Parliament 
4* Admiralty Statutes 
5* Gunnery. Books .
6« Entry of.Seamen Act 
T* Eertelets Treaties 
8, Various periodical or other Returns 
$ • Confidential papers
10, Private Signals and General and. Vocabulary 
Signal. Books in .3 vols, 4
Sir Alexander.urged that all.circulars b# brought together} . 
•t- that time each branch of,the Admiralty,.e,g#,Store Dept,, 
dockyard, etc,., sent out to the.station« their, own circulars,
3» Milne to MCA, 14 March lB6l, AjSI l/
4* Milne to MCA, 14 Sov, i860,. AhL l/515$*
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Be proposed a yearly index and directives of a standard 
size as some were in foolscap and others in octavo and thus 
they could not he conveniently hound together. As it was, 
papers got lost or misplaced. Milne told of an ‘intelligent 
officer* who said that he was ‘unaware of the existence of 
a State Paper, very materially modifying the Slave Trade 
treaty of a country, where he had been very prominently 
employed.*  ^that is needed he said was to ‘simplify everything'. 
The Admiralty did reduce its paperwork on 1 August 1861. As of 
that date, all general orders and regulations were to he divided 
into two classes*
1. Those of a permanent character, to he termed
‘circulars1.
2. Those cf a non-permanent character, to he designated 
*General Memoranda*. 7
In addition, all circulars, general memoranda. Acts of Parliament, 
Orders in Council, and confidential letters were to he printed 
in a uniform else, and an index was to he regularly issued.
Mo documents were to he treated as confidential orders unless 
there wa® actual need for so treating them. Milne believed 
tkat there were too easy Instructions tut" need m w  have U m
5 . Xbiav
 ^ Milne to Orey, private, 1 1  July 18 6 1# MtS/107»
 ^ ’ Official"Bole»,* 'etc.# 1 Aug* 1861, ATM 1/575*5* ‘ '
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on the secret list. He cited the case of one of his 
gunnery officers who was ignorant of an important
confidential order regarding fuzeB, because the ship’s captain
8considered it ’most scrupulously as a Secret Document’.
The Station Orders were printed at Halifax in July 1862* thus 
obviating the necessity of each ship having to copy them when 
she arrived from the home ports.
Even with this simplification the commander-in-ehief had a 
great deal of paperwork to deal with. Hot only did he keep up 
an extensive personal correspondence» hut as the Halifax 
•Evening Express* noted on 13 Kay 1862*
Indeed we believe the amount of correspondence 
which the commander-in-chief of the Kavy has to maintain 
not only with the flag officers under his command, hut 
with the Minister«, Governors, and Consuls of the 
station - with all the public departments at home, to 
say nothing of the Admiralty itself - is something 
fabulous and would make a stranger believe that our 
admirals were merely sent out as diplomatists, instead 
of to fight battles, $
sir Alexander would often work aboard his flagship, HIS Kile,
In his quarters aft ha had ample room, a long gallery where 
he could take the air and sufficient overhead for his six 
foot atature.8 *10 The fact that he was frequently aboard may
8 mine to LCA, 14 Sov, i860, ADM 1/5759*5 M ilne Home papers.
10 c«pt. E. K..1U, «up.rint.Bi.rt of tt. E.wtant S»vy ^ . I r «  
School, occurui m i™** 4u*rt«r. ■—
was the schoolehip KM3 Conway. Be ha» shown the writer.two -,
full-roo»» of furniture that he claimed were all' fitted comfort­
ably aboard hi» quarters .on the «hip. The hill *a® * whool- ; _
' chip from 1875-to 1951*
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explain why, except for a short period when he had an attack 
of an unspecified fever, Milne was never ill during hie four 
years on the station. At Havana, a notorious pest hole, he 
wrote to his stepmother*
Basil K&llQhds Flag. LtQ and Secretary have gone 
on shore to the Opera hut X have enough to do on board 
and attend to a cost voluminous correspondence relative 
to Mexican affairs - 4 letters - 4 enclosures and 33 
enclosures, etc. However, I will go to my bed and get 
up early so good night. 11
As has been seen in the first chapter, Sir Alexander waa 
able in 1S60 to make an extensive tour of the station. But 
*k«n, in Kovember 1661, be arrived at Bermuda from Halifax, 
the Trent crisis compelled his to remain at that centrally 
located base. In lay 1862 he left Bermuda for . the north and 
tkat summer visited Brines Edward Island, Sydney, C.B, - where 
ks inspected the coal mines - St. John’s, Newfoundland and 
then returned to Halifax for the remainder of the season. The 
commander-in-chief in Site» he was usually accompanied by two 
°r threw of his warships os the»# journeys, left Halifax for 
south on 15 November 1562.12 The distance between his 
norther» and southern headquarters was usually covered i n s 
five or «lx day#, fhil* he was at Bermuda that fall, Milne 
made only one #wlft trip* to the Bahamas. He had. hoped, to see *•
** Milne to the Bowagsr Lady Milne, private, 8 May i860,.
. Milne Host paper«. . .
. 1 2  . Adsiral’s Journals, AIM ^/30>5, .tell where the O-inC.
**• at ary particular moment. ,
Acting Bear Admiral Wilkes mho was giving annoyance to the 
governor| but the U.S. officer had already left when Sir 
Alexander arrived at Bassau* Because of the problems raised 
by the Civil War in America, Milne decided to stay at Eermuda 
during the fall, winter and spring of 1862 - 63.13 His ships
however, continued to cruise widely over the Station, then 
agitation against Britain was strong in the U.S. during the 
spring of 1863, as a result of the Alabama*a depredations 
and the building of the Baird steam rams for the Confederates, 
&iln# confided to Grey that »... if any show of force was 
necessary I could not collect the f. Indies ships in less than 
elx weeks*, The station was so.large and cosnunlcatlon so 
Paor that it was a difficult task to have a ship »here trouble 
®lght occur. , e.g„ Matamores, lew Orleans, etc., end still be 
able to gather-the« together in an emergency. The Admiralty 
ordered min® in April 1863, to remain at Bermuda because of 
th* threatening aspect of American affair®. Be was to stay 
there for five or six weeks after 10 Kay when Sir Alexander 
utu&Hj went to the north.^ But the coJsnander-in-cMei told 
Bunlop *.,, I have taken on oyself to go to Halifax* as he
13 Milne tola, B2 March ^ ^
14 Milne to Grey, private, 19
15 LCA to Uln*» 1$ April ' L : . - ■;
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believed himself *eo isolated and so backward in everything 
in regard to American affairs*.^ He left on 22 Kay and re­
ceived the Admiralty’s assent to his move on 29 Kay, the day 
he arrived at Halifax.
Although he was due to he relieved in March 1863, having
served the normal three year. tour, the home authorities extended
Milne*e command for another year *#.. in consideration of the
very able and zealous manner which you have conducted the
ardorous and delicate duties.•• on the lorth America and
West Indian Station*. ^  Sir Alexander was pleased with this
extension} Lord Lyons was equally gratified* In February 1863»
Lyons told Bussell, *1 have myself implicit confidence in all
he £ Milne] does and this is and has been an taarusa comfort
to ms in any trouble her.'. 18 Soma ell oontha before mins
was to depart in 1864» Lyons wrote to the foreign secretary,
*X am very much grieved at his leaving the conmnd. So change
of admiral® could be for the better*. ^  In late September
and early October 1863, Sir.Alexander came down fro» Halifax
with three of. hie warship* to visit lew fork and Washington.
16 Milne to Dunlop, private,.21 May 1863,-ULK/107/3*
H  LCA to. mine, 2 F # V  1863* MLH/p/C/l(c).
18 . -Lyon® to Mussel!, private, 16. F « W  1883, K 0  10¡22/11*
15 Lycrji to BuzseU, private, 16 6ct. 1663, ISO 30/r?/}7.
After returning to Halifax on 14 October* he left that naval 
base for the last time in November and arrived at Bermuda 
on 21 November. A Halifax newspaper recorded Milne*a 
departure*
The wharves... were lined with interested 
spectators ... the ships bands ... playing ’The Girl 
I Left Behind Me*, *Auld Lang Syne’, ’Home Sweet Home* 
etc... the Citadel saluted with 15 guns •*• The jolly 
old ’Nile* ... led the starboard division and almost 
shaved the wharves in passing. The Admiral and his 
officers were on the poop, the marines under arms were 
drawn up in ... the quarter deck, the blue jackets 
manned the Yards ... a jolly sailor stood upright upon 
either truck of the fore, main and ®iz2en royal masthead, 
each waving a miniature flag ... The responsive cheers 
from these fin® fellows were timed by the boatswain’s 
whistle ... And thus the worthy Admiral and the happy 
’Nile* spoke a thrilling farewell to the citizens of 
Halifax, as the noble ship passed out to breast the 
billows of the broad Atlantic. 20
Leaving Bermuda in early December 1863, Milne made his last 
tour of the West Indies. He called at St. Thomas, Antigua, 
Barbados, Martinique, Jamaica, Havana, and finally returned 
to Bermuda in February I864, to await the arrival of his 
successor.
But while Milne was usually stationary at either Halifax 
or Bermuda, his ships were constantly on the move from place 
to place, according to the needs of the service. One of Capt* 
Hancock’s cruises will give an indication of the nature of 
the service performed by the navy at this time. ITis ship,
20 Halifax paper, rud., Milne Home papers.
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the frigate ImmortaXite 5 1, left Vera Cruz for the Eio Grande
in early 1863 to watch for infractions of Britain1s neutral
rights hy the Federal warships at Uatamoroe ' where as
usual nothing whatever had occurred calling for my
interference’# He then moved along the American coast
to Galveston, Texas, and communicated with the British consul.
The port had "been recaptured "by the Confederates on 1 January
1863# They had forced a Union army detachment to surrender,
captured the U.S#S. Harriet Lane and compelled the Federals
21to destroy another one of their warships# Though the port 
was again Blockaded by the U.S.S. Brooklyn and two gun boats, 
Hancock sent in a boat, through the ’labyrinth of Torpedoes 
and other obstructions#.«’. He then returned to Katamoros 
until 25 February, when having received mails and specie 
for Vera Cruz, he sailed for that port, arriving on 1  
March 1863. There was, he said, no reliable news regarding 
the French armies, then marching on Mexico City# As he had 
only one week’s bread left, Hancock was about to proceed to 
Havana. The ship also badly needed caulking, it was 
’leaking in every part'. His vessel was one of the new 
long and narrow frigates which though powerful, had a 
tendency to roll and work in heavy seas. The health of the 
crew was generally good, with only a few cases of dysentery, 
one of which was fatal. The sickly season in the Gulf was 21
21 CWffC# 1863,''.p. 3.
not due to begin for about another month. The Medea 6, having
taken Sir C. L. Wyke, former British minister in Mexico, to
Havana, on his way to England, had just arrived at Vera Cruz.
Capt, Hancock ordered her captain, Cmmdr. D.'A. S. Preston to
visit Matamoros between the 1 5 th and 22nd March and to return
to Vera Cruz by the 28th. There were many similar reports by
Milne’s warshipsj it was a great advantage to the British
government, having their own men at or near the scene of any
22important event in locations all over the globe.
The two most endemic problems of the Horth American and 
West Indian Station were desertion and Yellow fever. This 
station had always been a place where desertion was rife} 
the lure of high wages and broad opportunities in Canada and 
the U.S. were the principal reasons. A Parliamentary Return 
for 1863 noted that desertion was greater here than on any 
other foreign station. Before the Civil War, HM ships 
had specific orders to stay out of U.S. ports chiefly for fear 
of desertion. With the coming of the war, desertion was made 
more attractive than ever, as enlistment bounties tempted 
British sailors to join the Union forces. When Sir Alexander 
was at Hew York in 1863, each of his boat4 crew was offered
22 Hancock to Milne, 2 March 1863, HLN/104/4.
23 ’An Abstract cf the Crimes and Punishments’, etc., 
MLN/P/B/2(K).
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$  600 to desert. None of them took advantage of this, and 
hearing of their loyalty, some English merchants of the city 
sent Milne l$Q to be divided among these men.^ But the 
visits of HM warships to the U.S. were usually marred by 
the loss of many of their complement. After Medea and 
Landrail had lost a total of 16 men at New York in the early 
months of 1862, '«.. the very sentries quitting their posts 
at might' lamented Milne, the vice admiral said he would
25abstain as far as possible from sending ships to that port. J 
On several occasions Boyal Navy deserters were returned by 
the New York police as well as by U.S. warships, wherein they 
had sought to enlist. Sir Alexander was gratified by this 
co-operation and in January 1863 asked the Admiralty if it was 
not time that the U.S. and Britain entered into an agreement 
for the mutual return of each others deserters, The home 
government did not approve of this suggestion and the matter 
was dropped. Men did not desert only from the Boyal Navy.
In June 1863, Capt. Kennedy of EMS Challenger reported that 
when he was at Fortress Monroe he had received many appeals 
from U.S. navy deserters seeking to escape| he took no 
notice of them.£
24 Milne to LCA, 11 Nov. 1863, MLN/103/7/G.
25 Milne to LCA, 29 April 1862, MLN/l03/4/X>.
26 *Memo relative to the N.Ameriean and W.Indian Station} KLN/l05/6j 
Milne to LCA, 3 Feb. 1863, MLN/l03/6/Fj LCA to Milne, 
confidential, 17 Feb. 1863, MLN/l05/4| Kennedy to Milne,17 June 1863, MLN/104/4.
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The navy also lost men to the blockade runners at Nassau
and Bermuda. In 1862, the Ordinary Seaman's pay was about
£24 a yearj he could make more than that in just three or
four trips in a runner. One of the largest merchants in
the trade at Nassau, J.B. Lafitte, told Cmmdr. Malcolm of
Barracouta that he had given orders that no British sailors were
to be shipped in his employ and if any of his captains did so
27he would be dismissed. But many others were less scrupulous 
and were only too glad to welcome experienced naval seamen.
During the Trent crisis the Admiralty drew up a notice which 
promised, in the event of a U.S, war, a full pardon to those 
deserters who would return to the service within six months.
Milne thought it a 'curious document’ and in the event, he
never received it until February 1862, when the trouble had
, , 28 6nu.0u#
There were several ways by which a man was adjudged a 
deserter. If he was absent more than twenty-one days after 
his leave had expired, he was deemed to have deserted.
Absence for seventy two hours after expiration of leave 
resulted in the forfeiture of all his wages. The men were 
given liberty passes - often for 48 hours - which were marked
27 Lewis, M., The Navy in Transition 1814-1864 (London,1965),
p. 213} Malcolm to Milne, privateYTl 18 6 3» MLN/P/A/l(b). 28
28 »Precis of Papers relating to the Civil War in America', 
KLK/IO5/6J Milne to Scott, 26 Feb. 1862, MLN/l03/l6/P.
with the date and hour when the liberty expired. But once 
a man had left his ship it was often difficult to find him.
There were no photographs in their service records and they 
could only be identified by their physical description and 
any tattoos or other marks on their persons. These were 
usually noted in their records. An example of a typical 
description was that of one William Sparrowgrass, deserter 
from BMS Tartari 'Age* about 26 years, Height! 5f7”i 
Hair* black, Eyes» Black, Complexion» Fresh, lower part of 
face very thin.' It was certainly not very explicit. If 
captured the seamen were often disrated! under the Kaval 
Discipline Act of 1861, a deserter could be discharged with 
disgrace. If he was absent with the intention of deserting, he 
could receive up to forty-eight lashes, the maximum amount of 
corporal punishment then allowed in the service. For absence 
without an intention to desert he could only be imprisoned - 
with or without hard labour and solitary confinement*^
The punishment meted out to the individual offender was often 
mitigated by other factors» the man*s rank, whether he was in 
the first or second class for conduct, etc., so there were few 
hard and fast rules, even with the new discipline acts. It was 
often difficult to prove that a man intended to desert while he 29
29 Milne to LCA, 17 Aug* 1860, MLK/103/i/A| »Description of 
Summary Punishments', etc., 6 Aug. 1861, Milne Rome papersj 
Milne to LCA, 14 Aug. i860, MLM/103/i/Aj 
Milne to LCA, 26 Kov. i860, IILK/IO3/I/A.
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was still within his leave period. However, if he was found 
outside the seaport, aboard a merchant vessel, or in disguise 
on a road to the U.S., he was usually considered culpable.
The Naval Discipline Act of 1861 said*
Every person subject to this Act ««• who shall at 
any time and under any circumstances when absent from 
his ship do any Act which shows that he has not any 
Intention of returning to such ship or Place shall be 
deemed to have deserted. 30
There were few desertions in the West Indies where little leave 
was given| in North America the men received an almost unlimited 
amount of it, with on many occasions, the inevitable consequences.
Thus Halifax became, for a time, the great centre for desert­
ion. There were five or more desertion posts established by 
the military on the main roads from Halifax and in some of the 
small coastal harbours, in a circle from five to twenty-four 
miles from the town. The soldiers were given £3 for apprehend­
ing deserters. Sometimes the seamen would go in gangs of ten or 
more, overpower the soldiers and escape by sea or into the 
interior. The Maritimes and Quebec were plagued with ’crimps*, 
people who would get sailors drunk (often on drugged liquor) 
and then deliver them - for a price - to an outgoing merchant 30
30 Bills, Public, II, Pari, Papers, 1861»
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ship.51 An Ordinary Seaman from the File went ashore while the 
ship was at Quebec in the summer of i860. While in a public 
house, a stranger asked him to play a game of cards for a 
pot of beer. The seaman lost the game but the man still 
offered to buy the beer. The stranger left the room and 
returned with the beverage *.«» end giving it to me desired 
that I should drink hearty - immediately after X became un­
conscious.* When the sailor woke he was on a merchant ship, 
sailing down the St. Lawrence, bound for Liverpool. His 
uniform was gone and he was dressed in a red shirt and dungaree 
trousers. The Quartermaster of the File. was also aboard, having 
been abducted under similar circumstances. The roaster of the 
ship told the two men that they had been regularly shipped 
land being on board at sea must ...work.1 At Liverpool, the 
Ordinary Seaman was paid £2. 10. 0. and discharged without a 
certificate of any kind. He then reported to the.naval base 
at Levonport and was eventually returned to the Hie. The 
Admiralty told Milne that the removal of the letter E - »run*
- from the man’s service record must depend on his future
conduct.^
31 Ha). O a r .. Trollop, to m » ,  2« ^
Milne to LCA, 13 June 1861» A^- U u /1 9 *  32
32 LCA to Milne, 15 Oct. i860» HL$/l05/U
Sir Alexander fully appreciated the extent of the dangers 
at Halifax, a port where many of bis ships remained during the
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slimmer months® Ee warned Nile’s Capt. Barnard, in June i860, 
that his men would be ’beset by crimps'. Milne said that if 
a man had been spirited away he should not fear the consequences 
but should return at once to his ship *... it is only the actual 
deserter who can fear punishment,' said the commander-in-chief.
Ee issued a public order in June 1861, apprising his men of the 
dangers and deceptions that they faced. Anyone who tried to 
induce a sailor to desert was, the notice said, liable to a 
£20 fine and anyone concealing or employing a deserter could 
incur a penalty of £30® Milne believed that too much leave was 
the great evil on the station *... The men get into debt on shore 
sell their clothes, are afraid to come back and they desert*. ^
In the Eummer of 1861 occurred an incident that Lyons 
said could have aroused the hostile U.S. press with 'the old 
cries of 1814'.^ On 15 June 1861, Sir Alexander determined to
33 Milne to Barnard, 17 June i860, MLN/l03/l5/0} 'General Memo* 
29 June 1861, Milne Home papersj Milne to Pelham, private,
29 Nov. i860, MLN/IO7/3 I Capt.Basil Hall in his Fragments 
of Voyages and Travels (London, I840),p.l49i said that one of the great defects of the service at that time was that 
not enough leave was given. 34
34 Lyons to Milne, private, 8 July 1861, KLN/10 7*
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search all merchant vessels - British or foreign - which were 
about to leave Halifax. He moved the receiving ship pyramus 
to Meagher’s Beach, MacNah’s Island, effectively narrowing the 
harbour’s exit. Maval boarding parties remained aboard the 
Pyramus and inspected each departing ship for deserters. As a 
result the commander-in-chief believed that owners and masters 
of merchant vessels exercised more caution in shipping men and 
said when he was reporting this, that not a man was absent from 
any of his four warships and only one deserter was at large,^
Albert Pillsbury, the U.S, consul at Halifax,told Milne 
on 17 June that a U.S, ship about to leave could be Inspected 
by his men, But as the ship was light and not easily managed, 
once she had left the dock he would not permit her to be stopped
1... without civil authority or superior force1,^ Milne regarded 
such expressions as ’mere ... bravado’, but accepted Pillsbury’s 
offer. Several days later the U.S. consul returned to the subject. 
Unless Milne’s notice of intent to search was to be taken as a 
’proclamation of martial law’, he denied the naval authorities 
’right to search American merchant vessels in Halifax harbour, 
and promised to uphold his views
35 Milne to LCA, 22 June 1861, KLE/103/2/B.
36 Pillsbury to Milne, 17 June 1861, AIM 128/19$ Milne to
LCA, 22 June 1861, KLfl/103/2/B.
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•even to resistance’. Previous to this ultimatum, Milne’s 
men had taken nineteen deserters from U.S. vesselsj but the
commander-in-chief wrote to the Admiralty for legal advice.
Sir Alexander believed that every foreign merchant ship within 
the territory of a State was subject to that State’s' jurisdict­
ion and he quoted some American sources, Wheaton, etc., which 
supported this view. Milne said that the civil authorities 
were often too slow to act and the suspected vessel might 
escapej thus he held that the navy could intervene without the 
consent of the colonial government. He claimed that this was 
ancient prescriptive right which ’never having been questioned, 
it had not come before any court of judgement*. ? That August 
the Admiralty said that Milne bad no right to inspect foreign 
merchant ships at Halifax.^ 'I am much taken aback if we are
37 Pillshury to Milne, 19 June 1861, ATM 128/19» That summer, some
Midshipmen of St.George tried to steal the eagle over Pillsbury’s 
office, and carry it to their ship as a trophy. They were caught 
and fined, Milne was not amused. Harris, Adra, Sir R., From Naval- 
Cadet to Admiral (London,1$13)»PP»75-76. This seems to have been 
a particular sport of the younger officers} they stole the
U.S,Consul’s eagle at Honolulu in Aug. I865. ADM/ 50/312.
38 Milne to LCA, 25 June 1861, MLU/103/2/B.
35 Milne to LCA, 22 June 1861, MLM/IO3/2/B,
LCA to Milne, 6 Aug..1861, MLK/IO5/6.
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38
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not to have power to search for Deserters without an appeal 
to the Civil Court} I can find no law to hack me up,’ and 
Sir Alexander added, to Grey, that he did not wish to resort to 
force.^ He had acted because some immediate strong measures were 
needed, several warships had just arrived from England and many 
of their men were slipping away. The St, George 86, for 
example, lost $8 men, although about a third of these were 
recovered. The crisis only lasted a few days and when the 
warships sailed, Milne cancelled his order to board all out­
going ships.^ Lyons told the station commander that he was 
gratified that Milne did not argue with the U.S, consul and 
ignored his intemperate language. 'I always find,1 said Lyons 
speaking of the Americans, * inflexibility in deed, combined with 
imperturbable civility in manner to be what succeeds with thera1.^ 
There was little U.S, reaction to this episode, possibly because 
that July saw the first large battle, Bull Hun, of the Civil War, 
and official Washington had more Important things on its mind,
On 11 July 1861, Sir Alexander said that desertion had been 
entirely stopped at Halifax.^
41 Milne to Grey, private, 24 June 1861, MLH/107.
42 Milne to Dundas, private, 24 June 1861, MLK/107/3.
43 Lyons to Milne, private, 8 July 1861, V L S / lO T »
44 Milne to Grey, private, 11 July 1861, KLSi/107»
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The Law Officers belatedly gave their opinion of the 
commander-in-chief's measures. Speaking of a general right 
of searching for deserters, they saidi
where the object is not to apprehend any particular 
individual, there is not to our knowledge any legal 
authority. No such right is stated to exist in any book 
of law to which we have been enabled to refer, we may add 
that no reference to what may have been the practice of 
officers of the Royal Navy on the high Seas, can support 
a General right of searching Foreign Vessels for deserters} 
over such vessels no such right can be exercised, unless 
when they are within British territorial jurisdiction, 
inwhich case' its exercise, to be lawful, must depend on 
the local law. 45
This opinion seemed to have ended the navy’s old ’prescriptive 
right* of search, which so angered the Americans. Sir Alex­
ander never again, while he was on the station, searched foreign 
merchant ships for naval deserters. The years 1860-61 were 
the greatest for desertion while Milne held the command. In two 
months during the summer of i860, three warships lost 50 m®n in 
this manner. There were fifty-six court martials for desertion 
in the years that Milne served in North America} an average 
sentence being 14 - 18 months hard labour and forfeiture of 
all pay and time. The convicted deserters sometimes, according 
to the circumstances, received 48 lashes in addition to their 
prison sentences. VYhile desertion was the main crime there 
were others committed on the station, principally drunkenness, 
insubordination, theft, assault and indencies,^
45 LCA to Milne, 6 Aug. 1861, MLN/105/6.
46 Milne to LCA, 17 Aug. i860, MLN/l03/l/A| ’Court Martial Book», 
MLN/IO5/1/AA and BB.
These were the years of transition in many ways. It was 
in 1860 that the first change in over a hundred years was 
male in the harsh Articles of War. The Saval Discipline Act3 
of i860, *61, ’ 64 and *66 sought to define the limits of 
discipline, in order to restrict the wide; latitude that could 
he exercised hy brutal and capricious captains. The Act of 
1866 is the basis of modern discipline in that it lays 
down a list of punishable offences and regulates the scale 
of punishments, ranging from death to loss of pay.’ 4 The 
Continuous Service system, whereby a man signed on for ten 
years instead of the usual three year period of a ship's 
commission, was established in 1853. This system gradually 
filled the navy with reliable men who wished to make the service 
a careerj and when they had completed 20 years service, received 
a pension. Ey I864, of the 23,000 seamen in the navy, 19 ,500
jQ
were Continuous Service men.4 The commissioning, in 1854, of
the first training ship for ratings helped to reduce desertion,
for now a man's whole life from boyhood on was centred around
the navy. When he was at the Admiralty in 1849i Sir Alexander
created the Good Conduct Badge which added a penny a day to
a seaman's pay, for each badge he held. In the 1860's,■ the first
one was earned after three years of good service. Though there
was yet a long way to go, the sixties saw a great advance toward
40a more humane and livable naval service.
47 Llyoyd, C., The Kation and the Davy (London, 1954 P^* 211.
48 'Eaval Expenditure from i860 to 1866*,p.73, lüJi/P/£/l(d).
49 'Awards* KL!î/p/b/2(^).3ôo Lewie,të.>op.cit,for information on pay, 
advancement, etc., at this time.
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The southern part of the station was especially prone to 
sickness} from April to September or October of each year, 
the threat of Yellow fever was ever present. The years 1861-62 
were very sickly ones in the West Indies. Havana was an almost 
constant source of infection, while Nassau and the Mexican 
coast were also places to be avoided. At this time little was 
known of the bacteriological basis of various diseases. Yellow 
fever was ascribed to 'dampness*, 'exhalations', 'high temperat­
ures', etc. A Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy for 
i860 said of the sicknesst
• • .whether it arises exclusively from an infectious 
virus or from some other physical agent in connexion with the soil or climate is a question which has not yet been decided, though a belief in the former is rapidly gaining ground, but until the causes which give 
rise to endemic and epidemic diseases are better under­
stood, there is little chance of our arriving at any 
satisfactory conclusion on the subject. 50
It wasn't until 1881 that the cause of both malaria and Yellow 
fever was traced to the bite of mosquitos. Not until the early 
twentieth century did two U.S. army doctors show that Yellow 
fever wasn’t contagious, but that ships could carry it from 
port to port, since the mosquitos could breed in the ships
51themselves.
50 'The Health of the Navy', printed by the House of Commons,1863, The Admiralty Library,fiv.
51 Lloyd, C. and Coulter, J.L.S., Medicine and the Navy,I200 - 1900 
(London,1563),IV,p.192.
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In i860 Milne gave confidential orders to Capt. Hutton
of the Bermuda dockyard to send all Yellow fever ships to
Halifax. The comraander-in-chief had given his ships* captains
the discretion to take their vessels directly to the north
when the disease appeared on board. Milne believed that only
a change to a colder climate could halt the spread of the malady.^
Admiral Sir David Milne, Sir Alexander’s father, who served 66
years in the navy, held that dampness was the great generator of
the fever. He seldom allowed decks to be washed, cleaning them
instead with sand. After a rain storm, he used portable stoves
53to dry the decks as soon as possible. Perhaps the smoke 
helped to drive the mosquitos away and thus, after a fashion, to 
avoid the scourge. Sir Alexander, who believed the disease was
caused by atmospheric conditions, followed this practice and he
54was also a great advocate of adequate ventilation. ^ Some of his 
suggestions were incorporated into ships which were being built 
or overhaied in the home yards. There was a naval hospital at 
Jamaica} but located in an area often rife with disease, it was 
not the safest place for patients. At Havana in the summer'of 
1861, the Spaniards lost 5?$ of their fever victims.At
52 Milne to LCA, 15 Hov. i860, MLN/l03/l/A.
53 Ealfe, J., The Haval Biography of Great Britain (London,1828), vi, pp. 458 - 9,
54 Milne to Grey, private, 21 Sept, 1862, MLN/107/3} Milne to LCA, 15 Aug. 1863, MLH/103/7/G. 5
55 Milne to Grey, private, 25 July, 1861, MLN/1 Q7,
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Bermuda there was a hospital and also a quarantine establish­
ment for Yellow fever viotims at Ports island, which was isolated 
from the main islands. Except in cases of real need, Kilns’s 
officers had orders not to stop at Bermuda if they had Yellow
fever aboard as the inhabitants ’dread the arrival of HM ships
56from the West Indies! ^ These islands were generally exempt 
from the fever, although there was an outbreak there in 1856 
and a severe attack of the disease in the summer of 1864. At 
Halifax, the dockyard - barely half a mile in length - was 
located in the town itself. There was no specific place for 
Yellow fever sufferers, so Milne was forced to use the hulk 
Pyramus as a lazaretto. The healthy men of an infected ship 
were lodged in make shift barracks in the sail lofts and else­
where! while there was a small hospital there and a larger one 
being built in Milne’s time, Yellow fever cases weren’t admitted 
because of fear of contamination. The sick ship was cleaned, 
fumigated and the black bilge water - a fertile breeding ground 
for mosquitos - was pumped out. Those who were ill were cared
for by volunteers among their shipmates as well as by the Nile’s
57surgeon, ship’s doctors and their assistants. . The civil 
authorities at Halifax, early in 1862, asked that Yellow fever 
patients be kept as far from the town as possiblej the medical 
society of Nova Scotia asked the navy to build a hospital for 567
56 Milne to LCA, 15 Nov. i860, KLN/103/1/A.
57 Milne to LCA, 11 July 1861, KLN/103/2/B.
279
Yellow fever sufferers away from Halifax. This was not done, 
but the city was never attacked by the disease. During the 
worst attack of the fever, Sir Alexander frequently visited 
the sick in the Pyramus. In August 1861, the crew of the 
Firebrandt which had sustained 49 deaths from the fever wrote 
to the commander-in-chief expressing ’our heartfelt thanks to 
you and your kind Lady for the interest you both have been 
pleased to take...’ ^
Though the summers of 1861 - 62 were the worst periods for 
Yellow fever while Milne held the command, yet there was, in i860, 
great infection at Jamaica as the result of one ship. The 
Icarus, fresh from the coast of Honduras after capturing Walker’s 
filibusters, was carrying Yellow fever. She arrived at Port 
Boyal, Jamaica on $ October i860. While at sea, the ship was 
so afflicted that for one whole day it drifted ’absolutely from 
want of sufficient hands to keep up steam or make sail...* The 
captain was himself obliged for a time to act as ’Nurse as well 
as Engineer’. ^  At Port Koyal, which had been healthy until then, 
a small boat manned by ten young sailors rowed out to Icarus to 
help bring off the sick. A short time later, five of the boys 
in that boat had died of the fever.^ The disease raged for
58 LCA to Milne, 30 April 1862, MLN/105/3.
59 Capt, Bruce to Milne, 24 Aug. 1861, Milne Home papers.
60 Milne to LCA, 5 Dec. 1860, MLN/l03/l/A.
61 Milne to Dundas, private, 15 Jan. 1861, MLN/107/3.
58
280
six weeks, infecting the guardship Imaum and Hydra 6. It took
a total of 24 lives, besides the 37 dead from Icarus. Finally,
Dr. E.R. Kinnear, chief surgeon of the Jamaica naval hospital
said in early December that he felt that the epidemic ’brought
62by the Icarus’ was now at an end. During Milne’s command, the 
worst single period for Yellow fever was the summer of 1861*
132 men died of the disease. Eight ships were struck by it and 
they hastened to the cooler climate of Halifax, Unfortunately, 
it was an unusually warm summer in the north. Firebrand lost 
49» Spiteful! 37» Jasont 17» Barracoutat 4» Racer1 20, Rinaldoi 
2, Ariadne1 1 and Mersey! 2. Besides these fatalities there were 
many others who had the disease and subsequently recovered} but 
while they were ill the station’s strength was sharply reduced.
For example, Firebrand had 167 sick. Spiteful! 88 and Jasont 79«
As these ships were needed to inspect the newly established 
Federal blockade, Milne’s surveillance was somewhat curtailed. J 
The station commander summed up the situation in a latter to 
Grey, written in early September l86lt
62 Kinnear to Dunlop, 3 Dec. 1860, ADM 1/5759«
63 ’Summary of Yellow fever cases,1861*, Milne Home papers* The 
US navy was also hit by the disease. U.S. Bear Adm. Bailey 
told secretary of the navy Welles in July 1864 that there was a Yellow fever epidemic at Key West, Florida, 'The squadron 
is much crippled,' he said. CTOC, 1864« P» $2» ■
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So I now have Spiteful, Jason, Racer and probably Barracouta to clean out entirely and fumigate. This is heavy work and it is impossible for me to send them to the West Indies until this is done and until their crews are recovered and get some weeks change of climate to 
recruit them. 64
The Marine battalion which had served in Mexico in late 1861
and early 1862 is another illustration of the effect of the
disease on the efficiency of British forces in the area. It had
lost 54 men from a combination of illnesses, but there were so
many others sick that Sir Alexander said the ’... whole detach-
* 65ment are completely broken down.
The symptoms of Yellow fever were a general lassitude, an
inability to take solid food, yellowness of the skin and ’black
vomit* (Haemorrhage of the stomach), as well as pain in the back
and limbs and a high fever. The Kile’s surgeon in the 1861 cases
gave calomel as a purgative at the outset and then quinine, which
seemed to have little effect, as the patient grew worse. Champagne,
66brandy and beef tea were also administered. But onoe the 
disease had taken hold of a seaman, little could be done for him. 
Although many did recover, the physician could hardly be credited 
with the cure. The sick men might also be giveni
64 Milne to Grey, private, 5 September 1861, MLN/107*
65 Milne to Drummond, private, 24 April 1862, MBN/107/3.
66 ’Memo, by "Doctors Lewis and Reid*, 1 Oot. 1861, ABM 1/5759«
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Brandy, ether, ammonia, turpentine, champagne, draughts containing creosote, chloroform and camphor . ..Qthese]] were generally thrown from the stomach as 
soon as swallowed. 67
Among Milne’s books was one entitled* The Scale of Medicines with 
which Merchant Vessels are to be Furniehed (London, I8 5 1) by
T.S. Wells, F.B.C.S., Surgeon EM. It included cures for many 
ailments euch as suggestion, that a toothache might be 'kept 
easy* by filling it with common wax from a candle. For Yellow 
fever it advised that free prespiration should be induced if 
possible on the first day of the attack*
. . . by a hot foot bath, warm drinks and an extra 
blanket, seating the patient in a chair, covering him 
from the shoulders downwards with blankets, which reach to the deck all around and then burning a saucerful cf 
spirits beneath the chair... 68
Of the other chief killers of seamen, typhus was still a threatj 
but scurvy had been all but eliminated in Milne’s time by the 
universal adaptation of liberal quantities of lime juice in the 
sailor's diet.
Sir Alexander said in March 1863 that as far as possible, 
be tried to withdraw his ships from the West Indies during the 
sickly season,^ As has been seen in the case of the Florida
6? ’Medicine», p. 15, MLli/P/B/2(h).
68 ’The Scale of Medicines,’ etc. p. 135» KLJf/172. The only valid treatment for Yellow fever is the present day vaccine, which gives immunity for up to seven years.
69 Milne to Grey,private, 31 March 1863» MLN/107#
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"both the Confederates and Federals also suffered from this 
tropical disease. During the summer, New Orleans, Charleston, 
Savannah and other points on the southern American coast were 
often subjected to the ravages of Yellow fever.
Seamanship was a talent especially needed on the North 
American and West Indian Station. There were Admiralty charts 
for most of the region, hut they were often outdated and inacc- 
urate. There was a continuing naval survey of a large part of the 
station being carried out at this time by several officers} it 
covered the area from Newfoundland to the West Indies. Most of 
the American coast was shallow and treacherous} the turbulent 
Cape Hatteras region had long been known as the grave yard of 
ships. In the West Indies and Bermuda there was very little tidal 
rise and fall which meant that if a ship ran aground, there was 
a good chance that the vessel would be lost. Milne's correspond­
ence frequently refers to his ships grounding* at Havana, at 
Bermuda, along the coasts of the Maritimes, etc. He ascribed this 
in many casesio the youthfulness, negligence and inexperience of 
his officers. 1 The station commander favoured the smaller, 
shallow draught vessels for general use. He especially desired
70 Milne to Grey, private, 21 July 1863, MLN/107.
284
paddle wheelers, for their roominess and ease of handling.
The Federals made great use of paddlers during the Civil War
on the inland waters, for their manoeuverahility - they could
turn and hack quickly - and for their shallow draught. But on
the station in the years i860 - 64, there were never more than
two or three of these vessels. They were replaced by the
more powerful screwdriver warship, whose machinery was better 
71protected.
Sir Alexander was always a proponent of his ship captains
having a thorough knowledge of navigation. A prevailing opinion
in the service at this time however, Milne thought, was that
the captain should not be held personally responsible for the
navigating of the ship. This was normally done by the Master,
and captains often saw their role as one of exercising overall
command without actually doing the detailed work of ship manage- 
72ment. This attitude resulted in the loss of two of the navy1® 
ships, both in 1861*
The first was the paddle sloop IJliS Driver 6. of IO56 tons 
which had arrived from England in June 1861. She was lost in 
fair weather on a smooth sea. Sailing at full speed she struck
71 Milne to Dundas, private, 26 July i860, MLN/107/3.
72 Milne to Grey,private, 18 Feh. 1862, KLN/l07/3o
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a reef off Mayaguana Island in the Bahamas at 7*30 pm on 
3 August 1861. The ship was a wreck tut not a man was lost and 
much of her stores,as well as her Armstrong guns, were recovered. 
Her captain was Cmmdr. Horatio Kelson, no relation of the admiral's, 
though it was an unfortunate name to tear in this situation.
The court martial found that the Master had changed course 
while the commanding officer had neglected to bring the ship tack 
to her original and safe course. Doubtful bearings taken by the 
Master (navigating officer) the day the ship struck had not teen 
verified by the captain. Cmmdr. Kelson was reprimanded and 
advised to be more careful in future while the Master was also 
reprimanded and forfeited all of his seniority.^ Milne was 
surprised at the leniency of the sentence. The ship, he said, 
had certainly been navigated carelessly. Sir Alexander believed,
'it would be for the advantage of the Service If officers in 
command were held more personally responsible for the loss of 
their ships,' ^  The commander-in-chief said that he had 
invariably navigated every ship ha had commanded and thought 
that the sooner the doubts about who was responsible for a war­
ship’s navigation were resolved the better it would be. Milne 
noted that he took the Kile's position - latitude and bearing -
73 Milne to LCA, 5 Sept. 1861, ADM 1/5759«
74 'Court Martial Book*, MLK/lOo/l/AA and BB.
75 Milne to Grey, private, 8 Oct. 1861, MLK/i07/3» Milne to Drummond, 24 Feb. 1862, MLK/107/3«
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whenever she was near the landj he felt that this was a good 
check on the Master»
On 29 December 1861 , the 99 gun line °£ battleship
Conqueror« with a complement of almost 9^0 men was sailing
through Crooked Island Passage in the Bahamas, scarcely 150 miles
north west of Mayaguana Island. She had just come from England
with part of the Royal Marine battalion for the allied expedition
against Mexico. Raving landed the troops at Havana, she was
on the way to reinforce Milne at Bermuda aa the outcome of the
Trent affair was still uncertain. At 5 a® on ik® 29th, the
Conqueror, which drew 27 feet, struck a reef 23 feet below her
76keel off the island of Rum Cay in the Bahamas. Again no men 
were lost and much of her gear was saved. The court martial was 
held at Bermuda on 8 February 1862. Capt* E.S. Sotheby, C.B,, 
the Conqueror1s commanding officer was acquitted, the officer of 
the watch admonished and the Master reprimanded, Capt, Setheby 
believed he was not responsible for checking the Master’s 
navigation.^ Sir Alexander laid off the Conqueror’s route and 
showed the ship to have been three miles from the shore. He 
asked Capt. Drummond, fourth lord of the Admiralty*
76 Milne to Hamilton, private, 17 Jan. 1862, MLI/IO7/3,
77 Milne to LCA, 17 Feb, 1862, ADM 128/7.
287
what prudent man would have allowed his ship to have been placed in that position in the night, but the 
Captain a good man too waa ignorant of her position except through the Master. He never verified the Master’s work, 
he never asked a question aa to the current, leeway, course, etc., he was no check on the Master, nor was there any 
check by a second party on him. 78
Milne told Drummond that this ship also was carelessly lost| he 
said that in all the Packet steamers two reports and independent 
reckonings were kept. The Admiralty backed Milne, their Lordships 
contending ’that it is the duty of the Captain to take every 
precautionfor the safety of the ship he commands’. 7 They regretted 
that Sotheby’s views seemed to have been accepted by the members 
of the court martial board. As a result, the Admiralty issued 
a memo on 20 March 1862 which added this phn*se to the Queens 
Regulations, Chapter XIX, Navigation and Pilotage» 'The Captain 
is responsible for the safe conducting and steering of the ship'.
In addition, the memo now included the words shown in quotes*
If it shall appear that the Ship has been run on shore, or brought into danger of being run on shore, or wrecked, "and that there has been any want of due care or 
precaution" or that the foregoing orders have been dis­obeyed, the captain will be held responsible for the same. 80
This can only have been a source of gratification for Milne as
he had lately said that since he had held the command, 18 ships
81had grounded, some unavoidably but others ’most negligently.’
78 Milne to Drummond, private, 24 Feb. 1862, MLN/107/3.
79 LCA to Milne, 15 March 1862, MLN/IO5/3 .
80 Milne to LCA, 17 Feb. 1862,ADM 128/7.This Admiralty record 
includes the later memo of 20 Maroh 1862.
61 Milne to Grey,private, 18 Feb. 1862, MLN/107/3.
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After Sir Alexander’s representations and the prompt action 
of the Admiralty, there were still occasional groundings, but 
no further ship losses while Milne was in American waters«
In the years i860 - 1864» the station commander took a 
continuing interest in improving both his ships and the conditions 
of his men. He published and distributed to the squadron a 
pamphlet on the first principles of steering and casting the lead, 
in 1861. His suggestion for a new system of night signals was 
not adopted, but his ideas on improved ventilation were. These 
included cutting holes in the closed iron bulkheads of the stoke 
hole so that air could circulate freely throughout the ship} 
the stoke hole of the Lily registered a temperature of 124 degrees 
during one August 1863 day in the West Indies, so this improve- 
ment was certainly welcome. £ Milne redesigned the canvas wind- 
sails, which were then the only means — besides the hatches — 
of introducing fresh air into the danki lower regions of his 
ships. Though BM3 ffitnble had fixed metal funnels for this 
purpose, they were still rare in the navy. At his urging, all 
vessels of the Rlnaldo and Greyhound class had shelters built 
on their forecastles to protect the men from heavy seas breaking 
over the bows. The upper deck guns were in many-oases too close 
to the rigging, when fired there was a great danger of igniting 
the ropes. Milne complained about this on several occasions}
82 Milne to Grey, private, 1 August IO63, KLN/107/3.
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the continuing changes in shipbuilding and the use of wire 
rigging seemed to have solved this problem. In February 1863 
he suggested that launches be fitted with engines as in the U.S, 
and French navies. The Admiralty said they were then being 
tested and were shortly afterwards put into service. This elim­
inated the tiresome row from ship to quay and back: for supplies, 
etc. In 1863 he proposed that white linen cap covers for the sea­
man and officers be adopted in place of - for the sailor - the 
heavy straw hat, in tropical areas. This change was approved 
as was Sir Alexander's suggestion that lime juice would be more 
conveniently obtained in the West Indies than, as was previously 
done, sending it from England, He also urged that the Admiralty 
send out to Jamaica hospital some hooks, a small organ and a few 
pictures to relieve the monotony of the patients* existence.
This was partially accomplished. The foregoing are just a few of 
the many improvements that the energetic and kindly commander- 
in-chief put forward during his years on the station.
The everyday life of the seamen had improved considerably 
since the Kelsonic era, though the ship's routine was sub­
stantially the same. The men turned out at 6,45am. At 8 am 
hammocks having been stowed and decks cleaned, mesa tables were
83 'Schedule of Propositions which have been made to the
Admiralty by Vice Admiral Sir A. Milne...,' uncatalogued
tillne Home papers at the National Maritime Museum.
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lowered from the overhead between the guns, and the crew was 
piped to breakfast. The high point of the day and the beet 
meal w$s at noon, when the ship's position was also entered in 
the log. Grog - 50$ rum and 50$ water was also dispensed at 
midday, each man receiving a bit less than ^  of a pint. This 
ration had been considerably reduced since Kelson's days} the 
spirit ration in the U.S. Navy was abolished in July 1862, the 
men being paid a small sura of money instead. Supper was at 5P% 
work having ¡finished an hour before, and 'lights out' was piped 
a little after 8 pm. Of course, the individual seaman's life 
was not so regular, be had his watches at all hours and could 
be turned out to trim sail, etc., at any time. The daily routine 
varied according to the location of the ship, and might also
O j
reflect personal views of the captain. 4
If a vessel was at Halifax, the admiral's flagship would 
hoist a signal at 8 am giving the drill order fer the day. This 
might be drill at the great guns and if they were to have target 
practice, the ships usually moved up to Bedford Basin for this.
Sail, spar or boat drill might also be held. A resident of Halifax 
at this time said that every boy ashore knew the different signals 
and watched the drills - the boatswain’s pipe giving orders -
84 Fordyce, Lt. A.B. Outlines of Naval Boutina (London.1837)
pp.$0 ~ '3j Boyd, J.h'Seil. A Manual for ■■Naval Cadets (London. 1S6^r 
p.347« I am indebted to Cdr. G.Kaish of the National Maritime 
Museum for help with this section.
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with keen interest and delight. The ships often competed 
with each other to see how fast each crew could unfurl the 
various sails and then hurry to the deck which completed the 
exercise. Later in the day they would race to furl and secure 
the sails. On the larger ships, the spar drill usually meant 
that the two yards above the main top sail yard - the Kile had 
four yards - were sent down to the deck. The topgallant masts 
on the fore, main and raizzen masts were also sent down. These 
exercises helped the men to act quickly when the sails, yards 
or spars were damaged in action or because of weather. Visitors 
were allowed aboard on Thursday afternoon, the traditional sailor*® 
holiday. The seaman made carvings from ivory, wood or bom and 
sold or gave them to the visitors. On the summer evenings 
the local boats would cruise about the warships, watching the 
various activities aboard. Flags were lowered at sunsetj the ship’s 
band might be playingi
and the sea songs of the sailors assembled on the 
forecastle decks, their splendid deep voices frequently 
accompanied by a violin or other musical instrument, while 
the lights flashing from the cabin windows or through the 
hundreds of open port holes cast their cheering gleams upon 
. the water,,, and the nine o’clock gun from the Admiral’s 
ship followed by the beautiful bugle call, the ’Hatreat’
... rang over the waters, £brlngingj the reluctant dispersal 
of the floating audience,,, 85
«hen the ships were at sea the men were also drilled at the gun®,
85 Storey, D.A, ’K.K. Kaval Yard, Halifax, in the Early Sixties’, 
Collections of the Kova Scotia Historical Society, XXII,(l$33), 
p. 6 4 . An interesting and quite accurate account of Halifax 
in tlilne’e time.
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small arms and cutlass, ate. They ’picked oaltum’, the ancient 
naval task of shredding ropa for use as caulking material} 
they whitewashed the engine room, bilges, etc. The carpenters, 
sailmakers, ropemakers, etc., were busily employed} the chief 
engineer might be supervising the repair of the engines and the 
Midshipman might be learning navigation by taking sun shots on
the poop. There were at this time some 114 different ranks and
86ratings in the navy from captain to yeoman of signals, 0 As Lady
Milne said when she was aboard the Kile en route from England
to Bermuda in the spring of i860, ’A ship is a busy place -
it is quite like a beehive, by day there seems to be so much to
do, scraping, cleaning, polishing, scrubbing. The Band plays on
87the Main deck for the sailors to dance by night, . . 1
The larger ships ordinarily carried provisions for three 
months, and biscuit for a lesser period, The food was usually 
wholesomej at this time salt beef and pork were still in use, 
but vegetables, tinned beef and raisins, mustard, tea and chocolate 
were also issued. Water for drinking and washing was then available
86 1 Complement of KM Ship ’Terror*, ABM 128/22, For everyday 
aspects of shipboard life see the ABM 53 series of ships’ 
logbooks. 87
87 Lady Milne to the Dowager Lady Milne, 5 June i860, Milne 
Horae papers.
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as the steam condensing apparatus was in general use. Sir 
Alexander, in 1364, ordered soft bread to be purchased from
the shore when vessels were in harbour as the ship’s biscuit
60became especially ’weevily* in the tropics, Capt, Hancock wrote 
from Vera Cruz in January 1863:
... our Bread is all perishing... I have over four 
months on board still and it is so full of weevils that 
in 6 weeks time there will be none fit for food! The 
whole ship has become full of weevil, they are in coal 
bunkers and everywhere... 89
Though when they were in port, the men usually received one or 
more days issue of fresh meat, yet the constant diet of bland 
salted beef or pork led thenv when on liberty, to favour spicy 
food, chilli, etc. Kiln» advocated, in March I864, the establish­
ment of a system of canteens aboard ships. This was one of the 
reasons, he said, why the U.S. Bavy was so popular with British 
sailors. On his initiative, both Challenger and Medea had set 
up canteens. Stores were sold at less than the prices available 
ashore or from ’bumboats*. The men were very pleased with the 
arrangement which provided such articles as sweats, fruits, soups, 
sugar in large quantities to make lemonade and a limited quantity 
of beer in the evening. When in earlier years he had commanded
88 Milne to LCA, 20 Feb, and 8 March 1864, MLB/103/8/H. An 
entry in Icarus log for 15 Aug. i860» *394 pounds biscuit 
condemned and thrown into the sea*. AD 53/7888. This was 
not unusual.
89 Milne to Glaeee, 28 Feb. 18 6 3» MLB/l03/l9/S.
ships in the West Indies, Milne said he always allowed this 
latter practice*
... it is far better that men should spend their 
money on board upon harmless luxuries and upon a glass 
of good wholesome beer when smoking their pipes than 
in going ashore, bent only on spending their money as 
fast as possible and ending in getting beastly drunk.. $?Q
By thus checking the smuggling of spirits into ships and the
breaking of leave because of drunkenness, the commander-in-
chief said the canteens would make the men *regard their ships
91more as their homes than they now do*. But the Admiralty told 
Sir Alexander in February 1865 that they would not authorise this 
measure, as the ships were often in harbour and men could go 
ashore, etc.*^  Milne’s enlightened measure was however, adopted 
later in the century.
Each battleship carried a library of about 400 volumes and 
many of the smaller ships had libraries as well. The increasing 
use of these shipboard libraries indicated a corresponding 
increase in literacy. For the year ending 1865» of 27»685 seamen 
in the navy, 16,471 could read well and only 3,000 could not 
read at all.^ The books most in demand were those which
90 Milne to LCA, 21 March 1364, MLK/IO3/8/H,
91 Ibid,
92 LCA to Milne, 23 Feb. 1865, ADM-1/5873.
93 *L’avy (Education and Religious Denomination) for the year 
ending 3 1  Dec. 18 6 5...’, m T/P/B/2.
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appealed strongly to the imagination such as ’Robinson Crusoe’ 
and 'Pilgrim’s Progress'. The Victorian emphasis on morality 
and individualism was patently obvious in the titles of some of 
the works carried*
Deeds of Naval Paring.
Dickens' Works 
Edgeworth's Moral Tales.
Life and Voyages of Colombus.
Karryatt's Works.
Noble Traits of Kingly Ken.
Smiles' Self Help.
Swiss Family Robinson.
Tales of Christian Heroism»
Tales of Christian Endurance.
Two Years Before the Mast.
Uncle Tom's Cabin.
94Young Benjamin Franklin.
They also had books on exploration and elementary science.
The U.S, Navy generally maintained the same routine as that 
of the-Royal Navy. The day started at 5.30 am. Breakfast was at 
eight, dinner at noon, work was secured at 4 pm and 'lights out* 
at 8 pm. On the Union blockaders 'from sunset to 8pm all hands 
assembled in groups on the forecastle to sing or listen to old
94 *Ships' Libraries', 29 July 1562, ADM 1/5792.
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salts*.  ^Music bands and coloured entertainers were very 
popular. The USN also had ships* libraries. Some of the 
volumes carried by the USS Penobscott were Cooper’s Naval 
History of the United States, Washington Irving*s biographies 
of Washington and Columbus, text books on gunnery, books on the 
U,S. Constitution, etc. The rations were somewhat similar* salt 
beef or pork, dried apples, potatoes, vegetables, tea, molassas, 
rice and butter, hard crackers, pickles, etc,'' Despite the 
monotony of blockade duty, there was always the chance of capt­
uring a blockade runner and gaining a share of the subsequent 
price money. On inland waters there was frequent action against 
the Confederates and occasionally a major battle on the coast, 
e.g.jthe battles of New Orleans, Mobile Bay, attacks on 
Charleston, etc. Both navies were paid monthly* the Ordinary
U.S. seaman received about $ 216 a year, while his BN counterpart 
earned about £24 or | 120 at the rate of exchange then prevalent.
The U.S. sailor was generally paid a large bounty to enlist and
his additional pay reflected the shortage of seamen. Vice Admiral
95 Merrill,J.M.,’Men,Monotony and Mouldy Beans’.American 
Neptune.XVI,(1956)tp.52.
96 Ibid.. pp, 55-6. See also Luce, 5.B..Seamanship (New York,1863) 
for information on daily life in the USN, Flogging had been 
eliminated from the U.S, navy, while it had all hut ceased
in the EN by the l870*s.
95
Milne said during his visit to the U.S, in September - October 
1863*
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Mo Seaman can be got for the US Kavy. Their ships are 
detained for weeks and months quite helpless, and they are 
still without means of going to sea. The Crimping system 
here is quite awful, my Galley’s crew have been offered 
600 dollars each and are pestered all day long with people 
of all classes to entice them away. Some as substitutes 
for those drafted for the Army, etc., etc. 97
The relations between the officers of the Royal navy and 
the American belligerents have been noted previously in this 
study. On many occasions they were friendly, sometimes they were 
not. Captain Hancock of . Immortalite made firm friends among the 
Federal officers at Port Royal, S.C. in 1861j Cmmdr. Watson of 
Peterel infuriated Union officers by his actions at Charleston 
in January and February, 1863» Cmadr. Ross of Cadmus was lauded 
by the senior U.S. officer at Charleston, in 1863, for his truly 
neutral conduct* Cmmdr. Hickley tried to stop a C.S, raider 
from leaving Hassau, while Cmradr. Malcolm — who came close to 
firing on the U.S, officer Wilkes - also castigated the people at 
HasBau for their Southern sympathies. Sir Alexander himself said 
of Rassaut ’Southern views and feelings are so strong there that
98
all reports against the Rortb are magnified...*
97 Milne to Grey, private, 4 Oct. 1863, MLH/107.
98 Milne to Somerset, private, 1 Jan. 1863» Somerset papers, 
the County Record Office, Aylesbury, Bucks,
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Milne mentioned several instances of the friendliness of 
northern officers, including Wilkes, indeed the officers of
rank have in almost all cases been particularly obliging*.^ There 
were few contacts between El officers and the Confederates simply 
because there were few C.S. ships and these were usually harbour 
defence craft or swift raiders who were seldom long on the 
station. Milne’s orders to avoid Southern ports also contributed 
to this situation* Cg.pt* Semmes of the Alabama received 
hospitality from a planter at Jamaica in 1863. When the raider 
entered Port Eoyal harbour, IIMS Greyhound’s band played 
’Pixie hand’«. Semises added that after a U.S. protest, the ship
• 1 Q 0played »Yankee Poodle’ the next evening. Sir Alexander praised 
Commodore Punlop for censuring the Lieutenant who had ordered 
the Southern tune played as well as other Eoyal navy officers 
who visited the Alabama before Semmee had communicated officially 
with Punlop.In January 1863, Milne criticized an officer 
of BS5 Galatea for singing the ’Bonnie Blue Flag’ - a Confederate 
song* in the streets of Union occupied lew Orleans* The 
Federale arrested the officer and he was fined. One of the
99 ’Memo, relative to the Civil War in America*, ULK/lQS/6,
100 Senses, H., Memoirs of Service Afloat (Baltimore,1869)£P.581-2.
101 Milne to Punlop, 28 Feb* 1863, MLU/l03/l9/S*
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most unusual acts of co-operation with the belligerents involved 
Cmmdr. Hood of Fylades. In July 1863, he took a letter from the 
Confederate Erigadier General Bee, commanding at Brownsville, 
Texas, to the French naval commander in the Gulf. The French 
had seized a merchant ship containing arms which they believed 
were destined for the Mexican forces of Juarez, thsn opposing the 
French occupation of Mexico. The officers of the ship claimed 
that the guns were, in fact, going to the Confederates. General 
Bee confirmed this statement. The Confederate wrote to Cmmdr. 
Hood*
I will be under great obligation to you Captain 
for your good offices in this matter, so important to 
our safety, and to our efficiency as an Army in Texas. 103.
The entire correspondence was sent to France and orders were sent
in December 1863 to release both the ship and its cargo. In the
104event, Milne approved of Hood's proceedings.
An incident worthy of note because of it's rather bizarre 
illustration of some aspects of international law was the case 
of the Confederate Acting Master's Mate, J. Hester. When Captain 
Semines left the Sumter at Gibraltar in the spring of 1862, there
102 Milne to LCA, 2 Feb. 1863, ADM 1/5819.
103 Hood to Milne, 31 July 1863, ADM 128/52.
104. Olffi, II, 3, p.977. Minute by Milne in Hood to Milne.op.eit.. 
ADM 128/52. Capt. Hancock visited General Bee in April 186 3, 
when the British officer was in the .Gulf; Fremantle, J.A.
The Freemantle Diary (London, 1956),p. 15*
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were two of bis officers who remained aboard, as well as a few
of bis men. Tbe second officer, Hester, shot and killed his
superior on 15 October 1862, for being as be said, *a traitor
to tbe Confederate cause*. Hester then surrendered to tbe
British naval authorities at Gibraltar, and believed that be
105would be tried in that colony. y Mason, tbe C.S. Commissioner
in England, after receiving a report, believed that Hester bad
been pilfering government property from tbe Sumter and that bis
contention that the other officer was a traitor bad no basis in
fact. Mason and the C.S. Commissioner in France, J. Slidell,
agreed that the British should handle the matter, for as Mason
said to Benjamin, tbe C.S, secretary of state, *1 should be at a
great loss to know how to bring tbe prisoner to trial and what to
do with him in the meantime*• But the Law Officers of the Crown
decided he should be returned to the Confederate States to stand
t r i a l . S e w a r d  said, in May 1863, that be had no objection
to Hester being freed or given up to the U.S. government 'to which
108his allegience was due*. But the U.S, secretary of state would 
not permit the Confederate to be sent through the Union blockade 
to the South. Hester was then sent to Bermuda in BUS Shannon,
105 Capt. Ormanney to LCA, 18 and 21 Oct. 1862, ABM 1/5794»
106 ORB, I, 1, pp. 688-51.
107 LCA to Milne, 4 May 1863, MLK/105/6.
108 LCA to Milne, 6 July 1663, MLN/IO5/4.
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to be banded over to the governor until tbs international
complications could be resolved* Then on 16 May the Admiralty
sent Milne a confidential note ordering him to keep Hester aboard
Shannon. ^ On 11 June 1863» Sir Alexander told Grey ’The Governor
writes me be [^Hester) can apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus and
be released, such is the opinion of the Attorney General and
Chief Justice of the I s l a n d s ' T h e  dilemma was pointed out
by the Law Officers on 1 July 1863 when they said that since the
U.S. wouldn't let Britain deliver the man to a Southern port,
'the Prisoner being a person over whom no British Court has
jurisdiction ought not to be detained in custody by a British
authority longer than may be necessary for the purpose of
disposing of him on shore'.^ Accordingly, on 22 July 1863,
the Admiralty ordered Milne to set Hester free at Bermuda. The
Confederate was sent ashore from the Shannon on 29 July 1863J
wanted in North and South, an accused murderer, he quickly die-
112appeared from sight. The entire case had lasted more than 
nine months.
109 LCA to Milne, Confidential, 16 May 1863, KLN/IO5/4.
110 Milne to Grey, private* 11 June 1863, MLN/107.
111 LCA to Milne, 6 July 1863, MLN/105/4«
112 Milne to Lyons, 14 Aug. 1863» MLll/l03/l2/L.
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J.P. Baxter, in his 1928 article, writes of Milne*
On his squadron, whose officers were for the most part Southern sympathizers, he kept a tight reign, meting 
out praise for conciliatory treatment of the belligerents 
and stern censure for indiscreet or unneutral conduct. 1 1 3
There can be no quarrel with the second part of this quotation.
Baxter says that the statement of Milne's officers being mostly 
'Southern sympathizers' was made to him by Admiral Sir W,
Henderson, K.B.E. Prof. Baxter gives no further proof of this 
contention other than a reference to Semmea* Service Afloat.p.31S. 
wherein the Southerner says that 'the Army and Navy of Great 
Britain were with us, almost to a man* and he adds that British 
officers often denounced the 'coldness and selfishness of the 
Palmerston - Bussell government'.11^ In 1860 Admiral Henderson 
was a 15 year old Midshipman in File and he also served for a 
short time in Styx . He was on the Station from i860 to 1864»
Henderson was perhaps 17 - 15 years old when he left the-, area j 
his records of those years - in his papers - include a Midshipman's 
practice logbooks, several dozen letters and some photographs,11^ 1345*
113 Baxter, J.P., 'The British Government and Neutral Rights,I66I-I865', American Historical Review, XXXIV (I928),p. 21,
114 Semmes, op.cit., p, 315»
115 Admiral Henderson's papers are at the National Maritime Museum,
His letters while on the station reveal a great desire for war with the Forth, though this may be attributed to a boyish 
enthusiasm for action, '¿'ben he was at New York in October I863, 
he liked the people, but deprecated the 'mob'*
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Surely, speaking to Baxter at a distance of perhaps fifty years 
from the events. Admiral Henderson may have Been mistaken*
Writing to U*S, Commodore DuPont in April 1862, Capt* Hancock 
blamed the Hew York newspapers for much of the animosity of 
Britain to the North*
*.* could you know the general sentiments of our 
service and indeed our people in general you would feel 
no bitterness against us - but against those unprincipled rowdies who hy their vulgar abuse of us and loathsome flattery of everything French - are trying and with only too 
much success to estrange our best sympathies and feelings from the cause, which every Englishman would naturally have upheld - that of liberalism, progress and honour - as against slavery and Fillihustering. 116
There can be no doubt however, that many of the British upper 
classes, including naval and military officers, were decidedly 
sympathetic to the South. In the early years of the war the 
Confederates seemed to he a people fighting for their homes against 
an arrogant and wealthy North. Semmes told Capt, Hillyar of HIS 
Cadmus in August 1861 that the war was a means of enriching the 
north etc,| Hillyar said he had thought that the struggle was 
over slavery,11^ The British then, were never entirely taken in 
hy the Southerners, and by 1864, Britain’s view was less clouded 
by sentiment and more concerned with practical realities* When 
the Alabama was sunk in June of that year, the ’Illustrated London
116 Hancock to DuPont, private, 26 April 1862, Eleutherian Mills 
Historical Library, Greenville, Del*, U*S»A* 17
117 Semmes, op* clt*, PP* 186 - 7«
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News' reported the fact in its issue of 25 June. The paper
praised Semrnes for his courage hut commented that he had once
lured a U.S. gun vessel nearhtbe Alabama by pretending to be
XlSEnglish, 'and then sunk her with a broadside'. Further it
said 'England will not allow him to obtain another warship if 
she can help it.'
In a confidential return prepared for the Foreign Office 
at the time of the Geneva Arbitration of 1872, it was shown that 
British colonies on the station were extensively used by the U.S. 
navy in the years 1861 ~ 65» Bermuda was visited 16 times, 5 ships 
coaled and several were repaired at the naval dockyard. The 
Bahamas reported 37 visits, two for coal and none forjepairs. 
Barbados had 21 visits, 3 coaled and one was repaired. The 
Dominion of Canada received 29 visits, no repairs and two ships
coaled. Jamaica had 10 visits, 3 coaled and no repairs were given. 
St, Kitts, Trinidad and the Leeward Islands also reported 
occasional visits by U.S. warships. Often these were the same 
ships, making a tour of the area, and then returning again to, 
say Barbados. The Federal ships usually remained for only one 
or two days, but some because of the necessity for repairs, stayed 18
118 This was a reference to Seomes* sinking of the USS Hatteras 
off Galveston in Jan. 1863. When the Union ship asked ''What” 
Ship is that' the reply was 'Her Majesty's ship Petrel*. 
Seranes, R., The Cruise of the Alabama and the Sumter (London^  
I864),p. 46. HMS Peterel was then on the station.
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for longer periods. ^ The Oreto. Alabama and Nashville 
were some of the few Confederate warships seen at British 
colonies on the station during the war years. The C.S. warships 
received a total of only 'about 2800 tons' of coal from 
British ports in those years, while the US3 Vanderbilt in less 
than six weeks took aboard 'no less than 2,018 tons at three 
British ports'.
There were various other incidents of a minor character,
involving British and belligerent naval officersj Lyons told
Milne in May 1863 that many of the U.S. officers would favour
a war with England as they were envious of Serames and 'would
rather roam about picking up prizes, than go on with the dull
121and harassing work of blockading*. The writer has found few 
cases other than those mentioned of British naval officers taking 
'sides' and therefore concludes that whatever their real 
sympathies, they acted for the most part in conformity with 
Milne's neutrality orders.
The role played by the navy in administering justice and 
maintaining the British 'presence' in the Maritime fisheries 
cannot be overlooked. Since the Treaty of Versailles of 1783, 13*
113 'Beturn of Visits of U.S. Ships of Wax', etc.,Feb.l872,MLN/P/B/li/(M)#
120 'Report of the Admiralty Committee', 3 April 1872, KLIJ/p/b/i/(M),
121 Newton, Lord, Lord Lyons (London, 1513)»11» P* 1^5*
119
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the French had the right to fish on the Newfoundland and Labrador 
coasts. By the Reciprocity Treaty of I854 - cancelled by the 
U.S, in 1866 - the Americans were given the liberty to take 
all except shell fish on the coasts of Canada, New Brunswick, 
Prince Edward Island and the islands thereabouts, without 
restriction to any distance from the shore. They could dry their 
nets and cure their fish on shore. Because of this treaty’s 
generous terms, Kline’s men had no trouble with U.S, fishermen 
in the years i860 - I864. The French fishermen however, in Sir 
Alexander’s view, seemed to be claiming territorial rights in the 
area and were fishing in the rivers, ..not'just on the coast as the 
treaties stipulated. There had usually been a British war­
ship, for many years, on the fisheries during the fishing season 
which lasted from Kay to October. Milne himself had this duty 
when he commanded HIS Crocodile in I84O.
. As had been done then by previous station commanders, . Sir 
Alexander sent the paddler Styx in May i860, to look in at the 
various harbours and bays on the coasts of Newfoundland and : 
Labrador, The Styx returned in October, with little of signifi­
cance to report. Milne:.had become impressed with the French 12
122 ’Memo relative to the N. American and W. Indian Station’,
KLN/IO5/6. See also Graham, W.,*The Fisheries of British North 
American, and the United States Fishermen*« Collections of the 
Nova S cotia Historical Society^!?, (iffiLO)«
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practice of leaving the same officer on the fishery patrols, 
year after year, so that he would become known and it was 
hoped, trusted by the fisherman. The station commander suggested 
this change to the Admiralty. A man must be appointed, he 
intimated, who would be a match for the clever Frenchmen,
Their lordships acceded to this request and Capt. R. Vesey Hamilton 
was selected for the postj he served in this capacity in 18 6 1,'¿2, 
‘63 and •64. For this work, Capt. Hamilton commanded the puddle 
sloop Hydra 6, and later the Vesuvius 6, also a paddle steamer.
Many of the merchants in the area,had written previously to the 
Admiralty asking for a ship during the fishing season as ‘there 
is no established authority whatever police or otherwise for 
the protection of life or property*, in Labrador.The 
increase in violence they said was due to this absence of 
authority. There were no roads or communication by land on tbs 
coast, only the sea could be the source of aid. The merchants 
wished a warship to visit the area between the Straits of Bell®
Isl® to Cape Harrison, which was : the region covered by Hamilton . 
on his patrols. He also observed many other places on the New­
foundland coasts. Some idea of the magnitude of the fishing 
operations carried on for salmon, cod, herring and mackerel on 
the Maritime coasts can be gained by Hamilton’s report of
1^ 3 Milne to Pandas, private, 2 May 18<$1, MLb/107/3«
124 LCA to Milna, 10 June 1861, LTLTJ/lO^ /2.
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9 October 1861. He said that no less than 5000 boats, employ­
ing about 20,000 men and boys were operated, and probably 3 or
4,000 women and children were employed on shore, during the 
12*;season. "
There were always personal Quarrels among the fishopmenj
1'ilne wrote that on one occasion some of them had armed them-
X 26selves with seal guns for their personal protection. At the 
commander—in—chief1s suggestion, Capt. Hamilton and his Senior 
Lieut, were made Magistrates of the Feace by the governor of 
Newfoundland in June, 1861» But Sir Alexander warned Hamilton 
that he would not permit naval officers to act as magistrates 
where the civil government could appoint magistrates from among 
the inhabitants. Further, he was not to land men to aid the 
civil or military power unless the latter was Insufficient and 
then only on their joint requisition.12  ^It was no easy task 
being a magistrate, in addition to his naval duties. On one 
occasion, albeit unusual, Hamilton had to walk four or five miles 12567
125 Hamilton to Milne, $ Oot« 1861, ADM 128/20,
126 Milne to LCA, 13 June 1861, MLN/103/2/B.
127 Milne to Hamilton, private, 1^ Sept. 1861, MLM/l0?/3i 
’Schedule of Propositions’ etc., op.cit., Milne Home papersj 
Milne to Bannerman, 18 Sept. ..1861, Papers of Adm. B.V. 
Hamilton at the National Maritime Museum*VHM 7/b.
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to fores sons men who had rented summer houses from an old 
widow, to pay what was due# He told the governor that a 
magistrate's powers on such an unsettled coast, were insufficient*
...  how impossible it is to comply with all the
legal forms laid down for an English Magistrate particularly with regard to the evidence of the portion of the population 
of Irish descent whose talent in evading direct answers 
has not deteriorated by migration# 128
At the close of the 1861 season, Milne hoped that the navy's 
advice, friendly aid and medical assistance would help to 
reduce the animosity between Roman Catholics and Protestants 
which 'divides and embitters so large a portion of the Newfound­
land p o pu l a t i o n ' T h a t  same year, Hamilton wrote*
• •• in 6V©ry plsc$ W6 visiiQd ih.8 lt$dic&l officors 
found* considerable work ready for them took two
Bick men to St. John’s because he believedj that my doing 
would have a beneficial effect on the fishermen, by showing 
that although a Man of War was prepared to uiDhold the law, 
it was also ready to be of any assistance# 130
The appointment of a permanent officer to tour the fisheries
was a great success# Capt# Hamilton earned the respect and
gratitude of the inhabitants of the bleak Newfoundland and
Labrador coasts during the years that he spent in the area.
128
129
130
Hamilton to Sir A# Banna rmanjnflpct* 1862, Milne Home papers,
Milne to LCA, 28 Oct. 1861, MLH/l03/3/C#
Hamilton to Milne, 31 July 1861, ABM 1/5759-season of 1861, Hamilton's surgeon treated 'not less than
500 cases, scurvy is not uncommon'. Hamilton to Bannerman,
30 Sept. 1861, ABM 12 8/20.
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CHAPTER VII
Technical Details! New Weapons » New Defences
When Milne's Immediate predecessor, Vice Admiral Sir Houston 
Stewart, K.C.B., left Bermuda in the spring of I860, he sailed in 
HHS Indus. This battleship was the last warship driven solely by 
sailpower, to serve on the station» That same year saw the 
launching of HMS Warrior, the first British built armoured 
battleship with an iron hull» During the American Civil War, 
there were never any British ironclads-’ with the exception of 
the floating battery Terror- on the North American Station.
The ships that Milne commanded in the years 1860-1864 had 
auxiliary engines and were capable of steaming for short periods 
but were mainly dependent on sails for their propulsion. There 
were few paddle ships because of the vulnerability of the paddles 
to gunfirej they were being rapidly replaced by the more efficient 
screw driven vessels whose machinery was better protected. But 
the paddlers were excellent for shallow water; Capt. Hamilton 
used two of them in his years on the fisheries, neither of which
exceeded 16 feet in draught. 1
I 'Confidential-List of Ships...Draught of Water' ,Nov.1861,
' ADM 128/6.
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During the Trent crisis when the station reached its 
greatest strength for the war years, Sir Alexander commanded eight
wooden, screw driven battleships as well as numerous smaller vessels.
Of these larger ships Milne said, 'If these ships of the line now
here were cut up into small vessels they would he of use to me,
hut except for Demonstrations clear of Merrimac and Monitor, they
are no use. . . * 2 3 4* These ships were driven by a single, two bladed
propeller, which could he retracted into the vessel when not
in use. When steaming, the screw was lowered and fit into a
slot on the engine shaft. The funnel was also raised at this time,
hence the common expression, 'Up funnel, down screw*. The funnel
was usually composed of four sections which telescoped when
not in use. These sections fit into each other and were raised
and lowered by means of chainsj one section lifted out the next.
This arrangement reduced wind resistance, as the raised screw
reduced water resistance. The lifting propeller was invented about
1850 in order to provide existing battleships with auxiliary screws
without the necessity for major alterations in their hulls.*
As a result of this rather make shift arrangement and the low
revolutions of the engines, vibration weakened the steering yoke,
2. Milne's 'Notebook*, uncatalogued Milne Home papers at the 
National Maritime Museum.
3 Milne to Drummond, private, 24 April 1862, MLN/IO7/3.
4. For information on ship's screws, «chlnery»^etc., see Spr**tt,H.P., Marine Engineering (London, 19$3) and Anderson, B.C.
Catalogue of S M p  Models at the National Maritime Mugsum (London .1952)
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the stern posts and supporting members. Among Milne’s ships there 
were frequent reports of these defects. In 1864» while the 
flagship of the Channel squadron was undergoing trials, the caulking 
was seen working out of her seams, the rudder posts vibrated 
violently and the Master Shipwright shouted, 'For God's sake, stop 
those engines, or you'll drive the stern-post out of the ship*, ~
Another disadvantage was that when the screw was lifted, the 
ship was often difficult to steer because of the open space forward 
of the rudder, which seemed to diminish the effect of its action,^
One advantage was that once lifted up, the screw could be cleaned 
and repaired. There was an Admiralty regulation stipulating that 
the screw was tc be raised at least once a month, or after steaming 
for 2000 miles,^ In practice, it was lifted much more frequently.
The device was extensively used at the time» Nile, Mersey, Icarus.
QSinaido. Warrior and many other ships were fitted with it. The 
U.S, navy used the lifting screw in Roanoke, Richmond and other
Qvessels, while Semmes' Alabama also had it,
5. Penn, 0., Uv Funnel T Town Screw, (London, 1955), P»60»
6 Masefield, J., The Conway (London, 1953)» P. 302.
7 The Queens Reflations and the Admiralty Instructions for the
Government of HM Naval Service (London, lSo2), p, 177» ' '
8 See Adnu-53 series, ship's logbooks for information on this^type of propeller and its defects. Before ?Tlle came out, Emeralds was 18 feet in diameter and, with its frame weighed 13 tons.
Milne to J, Milne Home, private, 29 March 1860, MLS/107/3. 9
9 Archibald to Russell, 17 duly 1861, FO <f4/20j Bulloch, J,B,The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, (ft V,1'959),i.pjSl.
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It was discontinued in the late 1860's when twin screws were 
introduced into the navy} they had the advantage of added speed 
combined with easier manoeuverbility.
The Agamemon 89» which served under Milne, was the first
battleship built - in I852 - from the keel up as a steamer, though
it still retained a full set of sails. The ships' engines used
in the early sixties were large, inefficient and consumed great
quantities of coal. They seldom exceeded seventy revolutions per
minute so that smoothness was not one of their virtues. The Nile 78,
stowed 250 tons of coal, which at top speed - approximately 13 knots
- she expended at the rate of 48 tons daily. Thus,full speed for
about five days, covering perhaps 1200 nautical miles. But this
was seldom done, as the engines and ship could rarely sustain such
a hammering for so long. The Mersey 40, stowed 850 tons and
burned - at full speed - 130 tons per day. The small gun vessel
Nimble 5, stowed 74 tons, consumed at the rate of $ to 10 tons
daily, at full speed.10 1 There was an Admiralty regulation limiting
the use of steam to those occasions when sails alone would not
11suffice to perform necessary duties. This generally meant
10 'Ship Returns', MhN/108.
11 The Queens Regulations, op» cit., p. 175.
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entering or leaving harbour, in treacherous waters or in action.
Sir Alexander was very strict in holding his officers to this rule} 
on one occasion he criticised a captain for using steam while
XV 12making a passage in fair weather on the open sea*
Another factor limiting the speed of the warships at that 
time was the rather primitive boilers in use. They used sea water, 
obtained through Kingston valves which were fitted below the water 
line. The incrustation of salt in the boiler's iron pipes - though 
copper was sometimes used - led to a reduction in the pressure 
available. The average pressure was 35 pounds or less, which was 
just as well for it was found that the box type of boiler employed 
was unable to stand pressures above 40 pounds to the square inch. 
With only this limited pressure available to the pistons, the speed 
attainable was correspondingly low. The Nil©, could reach 13 knots, 
the Warrior 14r but the average cruising speed of most warships 
was then about 6 - 8  knots under steam alone, and a bit higher 
with sail and steam. In the later sixties, improved hollers 
and the use of condensed superheated steam enabled higher pressures 
to he maintained with a consequent increase in speed. Some of the
12 Mine to Ward, 13 Feb. 1864, MLN/l03/2l/U| Milne to Vessey, 
21 April 1860, MUf/llO/l/CC. 13
13 fiobinson, C.W., The British Fleet (London,1894») P. 302.
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larger ships, for example,the Nile .had, four boilers, called 
•kettles*j they were supposed to be cleaned every month or 
after twelve hours of steaming.^ Even with this care, their 
average life was only three years. They were fitted with condensers 
which furnished desalinated water for the crew. The only protection 
afforded the ships* engines and boilers were the iron bulkheads in 
the stokehold and the practice of piling coal in the spaces around 
the machinery.1-* Thus when the coal was consumed the ship's 
critical motive power was virtually unprotected. This was doubtless 
one reason for Kilns's and the Admiralty's concern about the 
consumption of coal* When the C.S.S. Palmetto State attacked the 
Union blockaders off Charleston in January 1863, Sir Alexander 
sent a special despatch to the Admiralty noting that each of the 
disabled U.S, warships *sufferedfrom their boilers being unprotected.*
14 'Circular No. 11', 15 April 1862, ABM 1/5795*
15 Ship's interior plans, illustrating machinery, details of construction, etc., are at the National Maritime Museum. The captain of the Keareage, before he sunk the Alabama, covered his ship's* sides with lengths of anchor cable to 
proteot his machinery. 16
16 Milne to LCA, 18 Feb. 1863» KLN/103/6/F.
The station commander experimented with different types of coal,
Pictou , Sydney and the anthracite used by the U.S. navy. He
concluded that Welsh was the best and continued to have it sent
out from England.^ While at Nassau in December 1862, he saw a
blockade runner leave the harbour and was struck by the *entire
l8absence of any symptom of smoke from her Furnaces** Upon
enquiry, Milne found that these vessels used a certain type of 
Cardiff coal which was hand picked when put on board. He asked 
the Admiralty to send some of this brand out for his ships.
The Orlando. Mersey and the slightly smaller sister ships, 
Immortalité and Melpomene were four of the new, long frigates 
recently introduced into the service.^ These ships, all of which 
served in North America, were not a great success. They rolled 1789
17 Milne to LCA, 1 3 Oct. i860, MLN/l03/l/A| Storekeeper Generalto Milne, 6 Aug. 1861, ADM 128/20* Milne to LCA, 12 Jan. l863,ADMl/5821
18 Milne to LCA, 22 Dec. 1862, M/103/6/F.
19 Orlando and Mersey were specially huilt to counter the new large 
U.S. frigates* Minnesota, Roanoke, etc., built in the lopO’s.The Americans favoured large ships because ‘before the Civil War ours was a navy of single isolated cruisers and should therefore be stronger than a corresponding vessel built by other 
nations. Mahan, A.T., From Sail to;.StgMj[y»w York, 190?), p.30.
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heavily, worked in rough seas and therefore leaked considerably. 
Milne said of Immortalité, »these fine bowed ships plunge
20heavily and wash everything away as are all afloat forward'.
Capt. Ewart of Melpomene complained in January 1863 of the
excessive working of his ship, which resulted in her taking in 30
21inches of water every 24 hours, while at sea. Due to the station's 
lack of facilities for major repairs, these were usually done in 
the U.S. Milne advised his officers to use private yards, if 
possible. The ships usually served for three years on the station, 
although individual officers might be promoted and go home early, 
as was the case with commande® Lyons and Lewett *
The expansion of knowledge and inventiveness caused by the 
Industrial Revolution had a great effect on the navy. The invention 
of steam, the shell gun, the screw propeller and the French armoured 
batteries used at Kinburn were all illustrations of the changes 
that had come about since the Napoleonic wars. Then in March 1862, 
the Monitor and Merrimao battled to a standstill in Hampton Roads, 
Virginia. This contest aroused great interest in Europe. News of 
the action - the first between ironclads - reached London while the 
Navy Estimates for 1862 were being debated in the Commons. As a
20 Milne to Grey, private, 19 Sppt.1861, MLN/107/3} Milne to LCA| 
21 March 1862, KLN/103/4/E* 21
21 Ewart to Milne, 3 Jan. 1863, AIM 1/5819«
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result, though the estimates were not increased, indeed they were 
slightly reduced, the major emphasis was placed on building 
armoured warships»22 By June of 1862, Britain possessed four 
operational ironclads* Warrior, Black Prince, Resistance and 
Defence.2-* That Kay, Somerset asked Milne to obtain as much 
information as possible on the new type of American warship} 
he believed this might save the Admiralty »some expensive 
experiments here» .24 The First Naval Lord, Rear Admiral Sir 
Frederick Grey, minuted on an entreaty by Capt. Coles in January 
1862 for consideration of his turret plans* »Acquaint Capt.Coles 
that in the present uncertainty as to the value of his invention 
for Naval purposes my Lords are not prepared to make any offer 
for the purchase of his rights*. 25 But that November the Admiralty 
purchased Coles* full patent rights and work shortly began on 
his revolving turret. From 1 May 1859 to 1 May 1862, 590 ironclad 
plans flooded into the Admiralty from hopeful inventors, 37 were 
then being seriously considered.
22 »Naval Expenditure from i860 to 1866», pp.32-33, KLN/p/B/l(d).
23 'Iron cased ships... Return to the House of Commons*,
30 June 1862, ADM 1/5794.
24 Somerset to Milne, private, 3 May 1862, MLN/107.
25 Colesto Paget, 25 Jan. 1862, ADM l/5794*
26 'Navy (Shot Proof Ships) Return to the House of Commons»,
12 June 1862, ADM 1/5794.
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Somerset said he had received letters advising him to build ships
•to imitate the scales of the crocodile, the hide of the rhinocerous,
i 27the quills of the porcupine, the wings of the beetle, etc., etc. 
Though the French had led the way with the ironclad frigate Bloire 
in 1859 and Britain had countered with the Wajrrior in i860, the 
Americans had given the needed impetus by showing how vulnerable 
were wooden warships and how impregnable were armoured ones. Sir 
Alexander believed that the Monitor - Mexrlmae duel would lead to 
••total change in naval warfare, and in the material of our ships 
employed on an enemy'e coast.’ 27 8 * This proved to be the oaee for 
In the later years of the Civil War, the American coast wae no
longer exposed as It was at the time of the Trent affair. By Becember
29I864, the U.S. had 671 warships, 62 of them ironclads. While 
few of these latter were capable of sailing in heavy seas, yet - 
combined with the forts built in those years - they effectively 
denied U.S. harbours to any potential enemy. Many of Britain’s 
ironclads had to be seagoing because of the empire’s world wide 
commitments! but they were then of too deep a draught - Warrior 
drew 27’ - for use in the shallow waters of the American coast.
27 Somerset to Palmerston, private, 27 April 1862, Palmerston papers, used by permission of the Trustees of the Broadlands
Archives.
28 Milne to LCA, 3 April 1862, MLB/103/4A*
QMZ, 1864, P. 140.
Since there werero naval or military attaches in the U.S. 
or C.S. at that time, the government relied on the reports of 
consuls, Milne's men and occasional visite by British officers, 
for information on American methods and materials of warfare. As 
has been seen, Sir Alexander usually kept one or more ships at 
Fortress Monroe. HMS Rinaldo arrived at that port two days after 
the historic action. Her captain wrote that there was a great 
buildup of men and supplies in the area because of McClellan's 
spring campaign. On 11 April he was anchored in Hampton Hoads 
when the Merrlmac came out and cruised unchallenged in the Hoads, 
passing within 200 yards of the British warship. Capt. Hewett 
closely observed the vessel and latsr said th3t she appeared 
to handle easily and he believed the ironclad could do seven knots 
which was faster than the Monitor. The British captain held that 
Merrimac was superior to her Union antagonist because MonUorU 
turret would be disabled by a concentrated fire, she could be 
boarded easily, while her opponents steep sides precluded this 
form of attack, and lastly because of Merrimaojs greater speed,
U.5. Flag Officer Goldeborough told Hewett that be also believed 
that the Merrimac was the better of the two armoured ships, and 
agreed with the British officers’ assessment of their qualities.30
30 Hewett to Milne, 26 April 1862, MLH/104/3* Bog of Rinaldo 
from 4 Jan. to 6 Sept. 1862, AD 53/8149» A full description of this report is in Baxter J.P., The Introduction of the Iron Clad Warship (Cambridge, 1933), PP« 259“300.
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Cmmdr. Lyons of Racer went aboard the Monitor on 1 April 1862 and 
sent Milne a full description of the Union craft as well as a 
report on the damage she had sustained '... some plates cracked 
and bent««, struck about twenty—six times..«1 Sir Alexander
said in August 1862 that it was becoming difficult to collect
32information on the ironclads outside of newspaper articles.
That June he had sent home details of the Monitor and Merrirnac 
as well as the action at Drewey'e Bluff between ironclads and 
shore batteries«, This information was obtained by the British 
consul at Richmond from an 'informant' who was given «5 hy Milne
i33as a 'gratuity'.
But the home authorities wished to gain an even greater 
knowledge of the whole expanding fi®!^  U.S, defences and ship 
building. With this objective, a Capt. J. Bythesea visited the 
U.S. in September and October of 1862. This naval officer went 
aboard the U.S.S. Michigan," the only U.S. warship on the Great 
Lakes. He visited factories, machine shops, coal depots, the 
Springfield arsenal, fortifications in most of the Northern ports
31 Milne to LCA, 26 Aug. 1862, ABM 1/5,788.
32 Milne to LCA, 26 Aug. 1862, lUJi/103/5/E.
33 Milne to LCA, 2 Feb. 1663, V Z M / l 0 l / 6 / l \ 'Expanses incurred
in obtaining information', etc., MLN/llO/3/FF.
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and many other places of military and naval interest* He boarded 
those 'IronClad ships as were accessable'. He gave a good 
description of many places, e.g.*Boston Navy Yard, which he said 
was capable of receiving the largest ships, had a foundry/ and a 
machinery repair shop. The captain noted 'on 1 September 1862,
U.S. had 14 Iron Clad ships afloat mounting 153 guns and of 14*375 
tons... 38 were in course of construction ... maximum Jplating] 
being 4| inches'. Bythesea was aboard the New, Ironsides, in 
Philadelphia as well as the ironclad Nahant at Boston and sent 
home a good description of the armament and construction of both 
vessels. He passed on the opinionsof many U.S, naval officers, 
including Capt. Dahlgren, on the qualities of U.S. ordnance.
Though forbidden to visit the Boston fortifications, he nevertheless 
B.nt a very detailed report on U.S. shipyards, forte and ironclads.34 35
That Bovemher, the Secretary of State for far, 0. Cornewall Levis 
said - doubtless speaking of Bythesea - that when a British naval 
officer had lately visited the North, be had seen 'all their naval 
establishments. They were very civil to him, and willing to shew 
everything’.”^  It seems incredible that an English officer -a 
potential enemy - could obtain information such as the above in 
wartime U.S. But as Lyons said when he urged Bussell to send 
out another naval officer, 'openly ... without bustle or fuss,,.
34 Bythesea to LCA, 8 Nov. 1862, ABM 1/5791»
35 Lewis to Palmerston, private, 6 Nov. 1862, Broadlands papers.
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Indeed in military and naval affairs as well 
as inmatters in general, the national tendency 
here is towards publicity, and men with competent 
professional knowledge knowing how to observe have 
little difficulty in acquiring whatever information 
they may seek* 36
In the winter of 1862 -’63, Capt. Vansittart of Ariadne found little 
trouble in entering the workshops of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. He 
•loitered* about-presumably in plain clothes — and though without 
a pass, was admitted by a *Scotchman* into the Yard. He got aboard 
the Keokuk (lost in the Charleston action of April 1863) two days 
before her launching and sent Milne a complete report on this 
newest of U.S. monitors. ^  But it was not all so easy. After the 
unsuccessful ironclad attack on Charleston in the spring of 1863,
Sir Alexander said *as this is the first real attack by a Squadron 
of Ironplated vessels after long preparation against heavy batteries, 
it will be of considerable interest to get all the details of the 
Action which I will procure and send home*. That June, Capt. 3678
36 Lyons to Russell, 3 Nov. 1863, ABM 1 /5852. However, Lyons told 
Russell in December 1863 that be hardly dared mention to Seward 
the idea of sending a British officer to the C.S. The British 
Minister thought that if he did so, Seward would probably 
agree to admit British officers only on condition that they 
stay out of the South. Lyons to Russell, Private, 7 Dec.1863, 
PRO 30/22/37. Lyons never did ask Seward if British officers 
could go to the Confederacy.
37 Vansittart to Milne, 10 Dec. 1862, ABM I/5819.
38 Milne to Somerset, private, 11 April 1863, MLH/107.
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Kennedy of Challenger, told Milne that the Union naval commander
39at Fortress Monroe had forbidden visits to his monitors# In 
response to Sir Alexander’s memo of 22 June exhorting him to find 
out about them, Kennedy said lamely on 13 July that the U.S. 
government would not allow strangers on board these vessels,
Admiral Lee refused me permission point blank.’^  let Kennedy 
talked fto U$ naval officers who freely complained to him that the 
monitors were only useful for harbour defence and that both officers 
and men disliked to serve aboard them. In the fall of 1863, HMS 
Vesuvius was in the U.S. Navy Yard at Bofiston, repairing her hull 394012
which was damaged by grounding on the Labrador coast. Her captain, 
R. Vessey Hamilton, after talking to U.S. officers, confirmed both 
Kennedy’s and Hewett’s reports that the monitors were very unpopular 
with the men because of cramped quarters and poor ventilation. 
Through these and other communications, Milne was usually kept well 
informed on American turretted monitors as well as their broadside 
ironclads. While on the command, Sir Alexander criticised the lack 
of a proper dockyard. In 1866, Sir Frederick Grey told Milne, then 
first naval lord, that there should he an ironclad on the station 
but the lack of a dock capable of handling such vessels was a good 
reason for not sending them.^ In 1869» a large floating dxydock
39 Kennedy to Milne, 17 June 1863, MLN/IO4/4«
40 Same to same, 13 July 1863» MLN/IO4/4*
41 Hamilton to Milne, 3 Lee. 1863, ADM 1/5821.
42 Brey to Milne, private, 15 Aug. 1866, MLH/P/A/l(a),
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suitable for ironclads was towed out to Bermuda.
The station commander stated his views on the new types of
warships in Kay 1863 and also in a memo written when ha was
about to leave for home in 1864. Milne believed that the monitors
as a class were a failure. Some of his reasons were» the slowness
of their fire, the ease with which the turret jammed, the stunning
of the crew hy the concussion of their guns and the effect of
Bhot on their sides which often broke off the interior rivet heads
and these would fly about inside. He also criticised their want
of stowage space and their unseaworthiness. But he added, after
seeing Secretary of the Navy Welles» report for 1863,that every
43day »brings forth changes if not always improvements •
In i860 the most powerful gun in the Royal Navy was the 68 
pounder which weighed over five tons and had been introduced in 
I84O. There was usually only one to a ship, mounted on a revolving 
carriage on the upper deck. They were supplemented by guns such 
as the time tested 32 pounders - the normal broadside gun of 
the time - as well as hy 40 and 24 pounders. Ships might also 
carry the short barrelled oarronades for close work and one or 
more light field guns for the use of landing parties. A ship’s 
armament varied according .to her size and mission* All of 43
43 »Memo relative to the Civil War in America», MLN/IO5/61 
Milne to BOA, 22 Kay 1863, MLN/103/7/G.
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these guns were muzzle loaders, some were rifled* These usually 
had three or four spiral grooves and the shells had studs which 
fit into the grooves. The ammunition was composed of solid shot, 
round shells, case, grape, molten and redhot shot. The last two 
were especially destructive to wooden ships. The molten shot 
consisted of molten iron - the 68 pounder held 26 pounds of it - 
poured into a shell, sealed with a plug and fired. The red-hot 
shot was ordinary solid shot heated in the ship’s furnace and brought 
swiftly to the gun in a special bucket held by two men. The powder 
bags were first inserted, then the shot or shell} with red-hot and 
molten shot, one dry wadding and one damp wadding was placed between 
the powder and the shot so as not to explode the charge prematurely. 
After the serge powder bag was first put in, the ordinary shot - 
if this was to be fired - was pressed home with a rammer. Then 
a piece of rope wadding was inserted. This held the shot in place, 
for it was often rusted or deformed and didn't fit the barrel 
exactly. As in Faison’s day, the shot was painted or greased to 
retard its rusting. The difference between the size of the shell 
and the bore of the barrel was called ’windage’. The gunpowder 
magazine was in oneroom in small ships and there were usually 
two - one fore and one aft - in larger vessels. Elaborate safety 
precautions were taken. The magazine was lit by a lantern in 
the next compartment placed so that its light shone through a 
glass window into the room, thus eliminating one source of fire.
32 7
The powder was kept in pentagon shaped leather cases which
fit against each other and therefore usually stayed in place
regardless of the ship's motion* The powder» when needed» was
taken into handling rooms and put into Berge hags whose size
varied according to the charge desired* These rooms had leaden
floors to stop an accidental spark and were covered with water
44during an action, for the same purpose.
At this time the flint lock had been replaced by the friction 
primer as the method of firing the guns. This primer was used in
45the British, French and U.S. navies, for all types of guns*
It consisted of an ordinary bird's quill of varying length. The 
quill was filled with fine mealed powder and the tapered end left 
open. At the other end a circular metal ring was inserted and 
passing through this was a Jagged piece of wire with a loop at one 
end. The other end of the wire was held solidly in place by a leather 
band around the entire top of the quill. When a gun was ready to 
fire, the quill was inserted into the vent hole and a lanyard 
attached to the loop of wire. When the lanyard was pulled sharply,
44 'Gunnery Instructions, 1863' KLS/l81, contains complete 
descriptions of guns, fuzes and ammunition used at the time. 45
45 Ibid.i Hamilton to Milne, 3 Dec. 1863» ADM 1/5821$ Milne to 
Grey, 23 Sept. 1863, MLN/10T. The U.S. and Britain also 
used the percussion cap.
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the jagged wire passing through the metal ring created sparks 
which ignited the powder in the quill and fired the charge.
There were many different types of fuzes used with the 
ordinary cannon. One of the most common was the wooden or metal 
plug type. This was in the form of a tapered cylinder with 
numbered holes on one side, which corresponded to the number of 
seconds of flight before the shell exploded. These had to be bored 
into with a bit and drill at the desired hols and then inserted 
into the shell. The end of the fuze at the front of the shell was 
covered with paper and when the gun fired, the flames from the 
powder ignited the paper and the powder in the plug behind it.
This burned for the time required and then the flame exited from 
the fuze and set off the powder in the body of the shell. Capt. 
Hamilton said the U.S. had a simpler hard paper fuze, which didn’t 
require a bit and drill. In this type the paper was broken by hand 
at one of the bands which circled it and denoted seconds of flight.^  
There were many other types of fuzes in use as the government 
was continually experimenting with them at this period, Except 
for some small arms, there was no ’fixed’ ammunition, i.e.,powder 
charge and shell in one containerj they were inserted into the 
gun separately. Accidents with the muzzle loaders were rare as the 
drill was simple and the gun uncomplicated. There was one mishap 
at Quebec in i860, when several men were killed while saluting 46
46 Hamilton to Milne, 3 Tec. 1863, ATM 1/58 21,
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the Princ'e of Wales,4  ^ Besides this instance,the writer can recall 
no other serious accident involving these guns, while Milne held 
the command.
In 1861 a new type of weapon was issued to the fleet. This 
was the Armstrong gun, the first modern, breech loading cannon.
It was a complete weapons system, with Its own ammunition - 
unusable in any other gun - its own tools and drill. The gun 
itself was a great advance on the old cast iron types. Heretofore 
the great stress while firing had bean confined to the region of 
the powder chamber. Thus only limited charges could be used as 
the gun - cast all of ona piece - might otherwise burst as a result 
of the uneven stresses placed upon it. The new gun used a wrought 
iron barrel, surrounded by wrought iron spirals shrunk on it while 
they were heated, which when cooled, compressed and strengthened
the piece throughout its length. Michael Lewis has called this 
method of construction »probably the key invention in all modern 
gun-building*.47 8 49 By May 1862, every class of warship in the 
Cavy carried Armstrong guns from the 9 pounder used in launches
49to the 110 pounders carried in the larger ships. Besides
47 Milne to officers of ten ships, 30 Aug. i860, MLN/l03/l3/M.
48 Lewis, K., The Navy of Britain (London, 1949) P* 580.
49 »Armaments of HM Ships, 1862* ABM l6o/l57» For information 
on the practical defects as well as the advantages of this
gun see Parl.papers, VI, (l862)and XI (1863) Keports from the Select
Committee on Ordnance.
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the strength of the barrel,ite principal virtues were greater 
accuracy,range and penetration. Its ammunition was elongated,with 
a flat base and came in the form of solid shot,common and seg­
ment shell. The cast iron common shell was filled with powder, 
while the segment shell was composed of a series of thin segments 
which had the effect of shrapnel when they exploded. It could fire neither 
red hot nor molten shot,but as these were only effective against 
wooden vessels,they fell into disuse with the coming of ironclads.
A disadvantage of the Armstrong ammunition WB3 that it could not 
destroy by ricocheting from the water; when it hit the water 
it went nearly straight up. The Armstrong fuze was also of mod­
ern design. Made of brass it was protected by a fuze cap. When 
this was loosened,a metal band with an arrow on it could be turned 
and stopped at any place on the scale opposite,which was numbered.
After turning the arrow to face a number-which indicated the 
seconds of flight before the shell burst-the cap was tightened 
and this held the arrow in place. Only a fuze wrench was required 
for this work,thus eliminating the bore and bit used with many 
other fuzes.
The gun’s fire was superior for several reasons. The shell, 
coated with lead for the purpose,was grasped firmly by the rifling-
eliminating the effect of windage-and it rotated as it emerged
from the barrel. In the large muzzle loaders,shooting was un­
certain beyond 1500 yards and usually only accurate under 1000
331
yards. ^  The 32 pounder Armstrong made good practice at 2000 yards 
and it could reach a distance of five English miles. At 3000 yards 
the Armstrong’s accuracy was seven times better than the common 
muzzle loader.^ The elongated shell presented a smaller frontal 
area, increasing the range while it lost less motion through the 
tumbling effect of windage on a missile as it left the gun. Thus 
practically the whole energy of the powder charge was utilized. 
Another advantage was that the gun,being served from the rear, 
didn’t have to be partially run in to be loaded. This was a great 
boon while firing in heavy seas as the less movement of the gun, 
the easier it was to handle. In addition, the men were leas exposed 
to an enemy’s small arms fire. Further advantages were that the 
possibility of double charging the gun - not infrequent in the 
heat of action - was eliminated as was the probability of burning 
fragments from the previous charge igniting the next round.
The 40 pounder, a typical example of the gun was loaded by 
eleven men in the following manner. The hollow breech at the rear 
was unscrewed, but not removed. The vent piece was then lifted 
out and its horizontal firing hole primed. The shell was now put 
in through the hollow breech and rammed home hard so that its 5012
50 'Gunnery Instructions 1063’, Sir
The Story of the Guns (London, lo&4;> p. -Uf.
51 Turnent, Sir J.E., op. clt., p» H7*
52 Jane, F.T.f The British Battle Fleet (London, 1912), p. 172.
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leaden coating was just started on to the rifling of the barrel»
The powder hag followed. This was fitted at the front with a 
round wooden lubricating wad with a groove at its edge, filled with 
tallow to grease the rifling. When the shell, lubricator and 
powder bag were in, the vent piece was placed carefully in its 
slot, the powder being directly in front of it. The breech was 
then screwed up, locking the vent piece in place. A friction primer 
was inserted into the top of the vent and the gun was ready to be 
fired. The vent piece had its firing hole at a right angle so 
that it was necessary first to prime the horizontal part with 
a piece of match and lastly, put a friction primer into the 
vertical part. This drill seems to be relatively straight forward, 
but operationally on shipboard, it proved quite a different thing.
The main trouble was the vent piece. Originally made of
53
steel, in 1861 they were changed to wrought iron. There was a 
copper ring on the side facing the powder which fitted into
a corresponding ring inside the barrel. When handling the vent
piece the gunners often bent the soft copper ring, which led to 
incomplete sealing of the powder chamber. The result was a 
tremendous and uneven pressure on the ventplece, often splitting 
it and driving it out of the gun.53 4 The seamen often neglected
53 W.0. to L.C.A., 21 Aug, 1861, ADM l/5?69.
54 Lloyd, E.W, and Hadcock, A.G,, Artilleryi Its ^ o g r e s s ^ a n d ^ ^  
Position (Portsmouth,1893),P.39» The 110 pounder Armstrong used, 
in' lieu of a oopper ring, detachable tin bottoms which fit over 
the back of the powder bag.
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to screw up the "breech tight against the vent piece, it then 
flew out) sometimes wounding the gunners# Rear Admiral Eardley-* 
Wilmot saidi
I believe it occurred more than once that the 
block [vent piece! found its way into the main top to the discomfort of men thereJ Another defect was the liability of the lead to strip off the projectile on discharge and fall into the water in front of the 
gun. 55
The lead covering of the shell also »puffed out*, sometimes making
eg
it impossible to fit it into the gun# If a ship sank, The 
Armstrong might lose some of its vital parts, as happened when the 
Driver grounded in August 1861. Both the vent piece and det- 
achable sights wars last, rendering the gun inoperable.5 67 58 The 
single piece muzzle loaders had no detachable parts and could 
usually be reused immediately upon recovering from a wreck.
Sir Alexander’s ships received Armstrong guns in l86lj 
altogether about 3500 were manufactured, Ry May of 1862, the 
Nile had two 110 pounders, four 70 pounders and ten forty pounders 
in addition to her regular guns,for a total armament of 78.
55 Eardiey-Wilmot, Rear A dm. Sir S.M., An Admiral’.B^famoriea 
(London, n.d.), pp. 119-120*
56 ’Naval Ordnance’, a symposium in the Journal of the U.S.I,,VIII, Feb. 1864, p.H., MLN/P/B/3(d), A good discussion of the merits and faults of the Armstrong gun with a leading article by Capt. 
E.G. Fishboume.
57 Milne to Grey, private, 3 Oct. 1861, MLN/107.
58 Lloyd, E.W, and Hadoock, A.G., oj^oity p, 39»
33*»
The Kersey and Orlando had eight Armstrongs, four of them the 
large 110 pounders, out of a total of 40 guns. Thirteen of 
Immortalite*s thirty-five guns were Armstrongs. Even the lowly 
Third class harbour defence gunboats at Bermuda, Onvx and Nettle, had
59two 40 pounder Armstrongs, their sole armament. The man sent
out by the Armstrong factory was at Bermuda In February 1862
and told Milne that his tools alone weighed about two tons.
The commander-in-chief was skeptical about the gun from the time
of its introduction. He believed they were too complicated and
required »more care than Ever will be given in quick firing what
60with tin Bottoms, lubricating wads, etc.1 Despite the 
impression the gun made in 1861 on the Union naval officer, D.D. 
Porter, Sir Alexander said in February 1862 that »the Americans 
won’t look at them».61 While the U.S. used some rifled Dahlgren 
and Parrott guns, none of these were breech loaders. Lyons told 
Russell in January 1862 that the U.S. thought the Dahlgren»s 
»simplicity and solidity' stood up better to »rough treatment» 
and they had »no confidence' in the breech loading cannons.
Writing to the Confederate purchasing agent in Britain, J.D,
Bulloch, the C.S, secretary of the navy said in May I863,* Should 596012
59 »Armaments of HM Ships, 1862», ADM I60/15 7.
60 Milne to Grey, private, 7 Fehl862, MLN/107/3.
61 Ibid.
62 Lyons to Russell, 30 Jan. 1862, ADM 1/5798«
send the Whitworth in preference toyou send us any navy guns, 
Armstrong guns’.6^
Afterthe Armstrong had been in use for a time, Milnete 
comments on its performance became increasingly critical* On 
27 May 1862 he did admire its excellent accuracy at ranges of 
up to 3500 yards, yet at the exercise he witnessed, one of the 
vent pieces blew out. Sir Alexander asoribed this to a want of 
care in screwing up the breech and he then issued a standing 
order to the squadron.63 4 65 This cautioned officers to be careful
when loading the gum
As the vent pieces of Armstrong Guns in ships are 
frequently injured by being roughly handled by the men at drill - the facings in some cases having been so much dented as to render it likely the chamber would not be perfectly air tight when the breech is screwed up. Accidents are likely to occur if greater care is not taken 
to prevent ill-usage to the vent pieces, op
The vent pieces were modified in 1862 so that iron facings helped 
to protect the copper ring. In his despatch of 27 May 1862, the 
station commander asked that each gun be furnished with three 
spare vent pieces, instead of the regulation two, and said 
there were then no spare vent pieces at either Bermuda or Halifax
63 Mallory to Bulloch, 7 May 1863» Qg£» Ir» 2t P» 417.
64 Milne to LCA, 27 May 1862, MLH/103/4/T.
65 ’Standing Orders* etc. 1 MLN/llo/6/2.
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The Admiralty agreed to this addition* Almost a year later 
Milne advised the Admiralty to send out wooden vent pieces 
to he used for practice work only. 6 7 68970This request was refused as 
their Lordships felt that a wooden vent piece — even weighed with 
lead - would he too light for the job. But Somerset himself, 
in 1861, had expressed decided reservations about the Armstrong.
In August of that year he told Palmerston that he had recently 
witnessed some experimental firings of the guns '... two of them 
were at once disabled hy bursting of the vent piece. I have 
before this, seen so many small disarangements of this gun,,.»
Sir Alexander’s officers frequently complained about the gunj 
a large percentage of their remarks centred around the vent piece.7' 
There .ere other faults. In July 1861 Milne said the gun carriages 
were too low and the men had to etoop in order to aim the gun.
66 'Schedule of Propoeitione connected with BM eervioe which have _ _ been made to the Admiralty by Vice Adm. Sir Alexander Milne, K.C.B. uncatalogued Milne Home papers at the National Maritime Museum.
67 Milne to LCA, 31 March 1863, MLN/103/6/F.
68 LCA to Milne, 5 <^ne 1863, MLN/IO5/4.
69 Somerset to Palmerston, private, 19 Aug. 1861, Broadlands papers.
70 Jones to Milne, 5 Aug. 1863, KLN/l03/7/a| Tatham to Milne,
29 May 1863, MLN/103/7/G»
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Replacement carriages were sent out to correct th is defect.Both the rubber washers in the fuzes and the tallow f i l le d
7 2lubricators deteriorated in  the heat of the tropics. In
7i
February 1863 S ir  Alexander wrote that the breeching holts in the ships1 sides were unable to re sist the strain  of the Armstrong. Because of Milne*s complaints, the Admiralty said , that A p ril, that they would increase the strength of the bolts in order to cope with the gun’ s r e c o i l . O b s e r v i n g  gun practice in Immortalité in  December 1863, the commander-in-chief said the *18re co il was*so exceedingly violent that the gun and carriage was l i f t e d  bodily from the deck and came in  with a crash, enough to tear everything to pieces, the men were obliged to re tire  from near the gun. '■ ~• - - -- fand the en were74
Milne was convinced that only a slide with compression, instead of the old truck carriages then used,would solve the reco il problem. 5^ In  September 1863, Capt. Key of the gunnery ship % ce n _ent  advised the Admiralty that the recently authorised powder reduction should
71
72
73
7475
Milne to LCA, Propositions’ , 24 July 1861, MXJi/1 0 3 /3 /C. o^ jjcit, 1 Barnard to Milne, •Schedule of 2 Oct. MLH/104/3.Milne to LCA, 5 Ju ly  1862, MLBT/l03/5/®l Milne to LCA,18 Sept. 1862, ADM 1/5788.Milne to LCA, 26 Feb. 1863, MLN/103/6/Fj LCA to Milne, 6 A pril 1863, KLU/1 0 5 /4 .Milne to LCA, 2 4  Dec. 1863, ML3?/l03/7/G.Jiln e  to Grey,private, 25 Oct. 1863, MLR/107. This was the type o f carriage later to be used for a l l  large guns.
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limit tbs recoil and be said that Milne should lengthen his 
breeching ropes to give the gun more room. Later in 1863,
Sir Alexander wrote that though they were 'admirably manufactured 
and of great precision', yet because of their defects the 
Armstrongs were ’not suitable for naval service afloat • He 
preferred the muzzle loader and believed that the men had more 
confidence in them. 76 7 »Our 68 pounder, 95 cwt is decidedly our 
best gun,'was the admiral's opinion, referring to the muzzle 
loading smooth bores then in use. 78 One writer, comparing this 
68 pounder with U.S. guns, has said*
There is no doubt that the Dablgren 11" gun when firing 
eo2id shot with 30 lbs. of propelling charge had an 
armour-smashing effect superior to that of the British 
gun but it was not known until the latter part of the 
Civil War that such large charges could he safely used. 79
Yet at short range (approx. 200 yds.) the 68 pounder could penetrate 
4§" armor, which was the average thickness of the U.S. ironclad's 
protection. The Armstrong, said a report, in 1863, was 'useless
76 LCA to Mine, 19 Jan. 1864, MLU/l°5/5«
77 Milne to LCA, 24 Dee. 1863, MLN/103/7/G*
78: Milne to Grey, private, 25 Oct# 1863, MLU/l07»
7 9 Brodie,B., Sea' Power in the Machine Age (Princeton,1944)p.182. Milne had pasted a note in 'Gunnery instructions 1863* KLU/181, 
that said in the U.S. attack on Vicksburg in July 1863, they 
had used 38 lbs. of powder in tbs 15 Bahlgren.
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fioagainst ironclads'. This statement was reinforced by the
report of the Director of Ordnance in Kay I865. He noted the
gun’s inability to be used with effect against ironclad vessels
8lof war (for which it was never intended...’
The only ma;jor combat situation in which the Armstrongs
were used was the attack at Kagoshima* Japan* in August 1863«
Vice Admiral Kuper decided to chastise the local warlord after
that prince’s men had murdered an Englishman and then fired
on the British warships which had come to seek redress. Five
vessels used their Armstrongs on this occasion. Four of them
reported trouble with the vent pieces, while the fifth noted that
the tin bottoms of his 110 pounder - they came in two sizes -
did not fit properly. The Gunner of Argus said the ’vent piece
continually jamming, and its great weight is a serious drawback
to quick firing.,.*The captain of Racehorse summed up his experience*
X am of opinion* that for general service it ia not so 
effective as the 68 pounder* 95 gun... the smooth 
bore guns which were being fired under the same adverse 
circumstances* kept up a continuous and rapid fire, 82. 60
60 Sandler, S,.The Emergence of the Modern- British Capital Ship. 
1863~3870. Fh.D. thesis, London University, 1965» ~P. 123.
81 ’General Report of the Director of Ordnance for 1864-.65'*W,0. 33/15»
82 ’Adm. Kuper’s Official Report of the Performance of the 
Armstrong Guns in the Action of Kagoshima’, KLN/105/6.
3^0
Finally on 23 November 1863» Sir Alexander said that it was 
impossible to fit the fuses to the shells at night or in action* 
He was disgusted with the whole Armstrong Bcberoe and thought all 
his captains agreed that*
*•• they are far too delicate» refined and complicated 
for Ships use, and for General Service* That our old 
Guns up to 2200 yards and X really might say, some of 
them up to 3000 yards are equally efficient and better 
adapted for the Service. 83
Though agreeing that one might be retained on a ship for use at 
long range, Milne felt that - in action - the navy was less 
efficient with Armstrongs than with the old guns, ’altho I quite 
admit their accuracy of fire’ . 84 In early 1863, production of 
the gun was halted and in 1864 the navy returned to the mu^le 
loader for her main armament.8  ^ This situation lasted until i860 
when an improved hreech loader was introduced, ending the long 
reign of the muzzle loading gun. Turing the Armstrong’s brief 
life the amount of modifications in vent pieces, changes In 
carriages, reductions in powder, memos, tools, etc., must have been 
a storekeeper’s nightmare. Its failure can be laid to an in­
sufficient knowledge of metals, the i.fadlty engineering of the 
vent piece and perhaps the inability of the seamen to handle a rather 
sophisticated piece of ordnance. Britain was engaged in no major
83 Milne to Grey, private, 28 Nov. 1863, MLN/l07v
84 Ibid. ,
.. . . .  m__+•!«a on Ordnance and Armour, (hew York,85 Holley, A.B., f Treatise on wr--—
1865), p. 25} Bewis, a«» P»
struggle during the American Civil War, so that except for short 
exercises, e.e.,Kagoshima, she »as lacking In that type of experienc 
with men and weapons which could only he gained under battle 
conditions. If the Ü.S. had fought Britain in the years 1861-1864, 
before the Armstrong had been discontinued, the fact that part 
of the main armament of almost every British warship was unreliable 
might have had a telling effect on the war.
The first visit of any importance to the Ü.S. ordnance works 
at Washington was made ty Capt. Hancock of Immortalité in January 
1862. He had gone to that city to convey lord Lyons away if Kason 
and Slidell weren't given up, but due to bad weather didn't reach 
Washington until 6 January 1862, whan the Incident had been settled. 
Hancock took advantage of this trip to vi.it Commander Bahlgr.n and 
the Wavy Tard. Ha regretted that the Union officer refused to 
discuss a new type of fuse end he was hampered by the fact that
86•I could take no messurements, end make no notes on the spot'.
Tet Hancock,, sent a very observant report. The captain noted that 
Dahlgren guns, both fijlai smooth here, were being turned out 
at the rate of thirty per week. This gun, be considered 'among.t 
the most efficient weapons of the day'. The new model, be told 
Wlhe. wae cast without that great weakness in all guns 1 trunnioua 
- on which the barrel pivoted, thee, were added later. They were
86 Hancock to Milne, Feb.1862, M W / 1 0 V Ï .
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in two pieces, one on top and the other on the bottom. When they 
circled the barrel, the two half »ears’ were held together with a 
band of metal. The U.S, reported great success with this method 
of attaching trunnions. The Dahlgren could be elevated higher than 
the comparable British gun because of its Bbort carriage. In 
addition, Hancock said that the centre of gravity of these guns, 
when mounted on shipboard was not so near the ship’s outer wall 
as similar British guns. This was an important advantage when 
firing in heavy weather as it reduced the ship’s rolling. The 
British officer cited several other advantages of the Union weapoh, 
among them the fact that since the tmmle extended further outside 
the port than the Boyal Navy’s guns, they could be fired with 
more training without fear of burning the ship s side * As b«s 
been seen, Milne complained several times to the Admiralty that it 
was unsafe to fire his upper deck guns, their muzsles being so close 
to the rigging that he feared it would be ignited.87 8 Hancock also 
noted that in some of the U.S. frigates there were small covered 
holes in the rear of each gun. The powderxwas passed through these 
from below directly to the gunners, thus eliminating the confusion 
of men rushing up the main hatchways with powder as was usually 
done. Altogether Capt. Hancockseemed much impressed with the U.S. 
equipment. In September 1863, Stuart, British chargfd’affaires
87 Ibid.
88 Win. to LCA, 24 Oct. 1863, KM/lM/7/O. Moot of hi. .hip.,
Milne said, suffered from this defect.
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at Washington, told Russell that the Russians were using 
Dahlgrens, having some time previously obtained the plans from 
the U.S.®^  When Milne was aboard the Russian admiral's flagship 
at Mew York in October 1863, he said their guns were of the Dahlgren 
90pattern*
When HMS Vesuvius was at Boston Navy Yard in the fall of 1863, 
Cfapt. Hamilton spoke to many Union naval officers. He said that 
every one he met opposed the prevalent system in the USN of arming 
large vessels with only a few heavy pivot guns. This he said, was 
the plan of Admiral Dahlgren,an officer 'whose sea service consists 
of only eight years'. 91 The blockading ships, the U.S. officers 
confided, had difficulty in casting loose and working the 11” gun 
in heavy weather. They wanted more and smaller broadside guns 
which were easier to handle. Hamilton told Milne that because of 
these protests, the Niagara, built to carry only a few heavy pivot 
guns was now armed with thirty smaller broadside cannons and only 
two pivots. He had heard, said Hamilton, that the New.Ironsides 
- a broadside ironclad - was much feared by the Confederates, 8901
8 9 Stuart to Russell, private, 28 Sept. 1863, PRO 30/22/37.
90 Milne to LCA, 18 Oct. 1863, MLN/103/7/0.
91 Hamilton to Milne, 3 Pec* l863> VS021»
besides being a good sea boat. This latter advantage was one 
possessed by few of the monitor class, which carried their guns 
in round turrets. The New Ironsides, could, said the British 
officer, keep up a steady fire because of her numerous guns, while 
the Confederates were often able to evade the heavy but slow 15" guns 
of the monitors and recommence firing while they reloaded. The 
Federals were then introducing 'very much larger charges for their 
guns the Ordnance (Navy) officer told me...* Hamilton 
admired the Union’s eight shot repeating rifles and thought them 
excellent for repelling boarders. Milne also saw and liked this 
weapon as well as the U.S. Minie rifle whose ball he said was
93i , , . +v,nM +hat of the British service rife. Jlarger and more destructive than tnax oi
When Sir Alszander »as in the North in the fail of 1863,he believed 
that the U.S. was asking great strides in gunnery end admired their 
safety type fuze. He procured several hooks on Union .guns, among 
them a work on experiments with the casting of guns which was
privately printed for the government and not on puhlio sale.
Milne also toured the Washington Ordnance Department at this time 
and was ,much struck with the 1 5 w Oun, of large size Intended for 
the Monitors and likewise for Harbour defence’. The rifled 
Parrott gun, he said, ’appears to be considered by the authorities 923
92 ' Ibid.
93 Milne to Grey, private, 11 Oct. 1863, MLN/l0?»
3^ +5
as the most serviceable gun in their Service*. The station 
commander always urged his officers to obtain as much information 
as possible on American equipment. Lyons also wanted the home 
authorities to secure information on U.S. guns, though he said
95that if »bribery* was to be used, he didn’t want to know about it.
The attitude of Sir Alexander on the U.S. ironclads and arms 
might be called one of growing awareness of Federal strength and 
an apprehension lest Britain fall behind in development. Although 
Milne did not believe that the monitors were effective sea going 
warships, neither he nor his officers denigrated Union naval and
military weapons.
This was a period of trial and error in weapons, ships and 
armour. Costly experiments were in progress in all of the 
industrial countries in an attempt to gain the lead in one or all 
of these vital fields. But the Americans were the only ones 
whose arms were being constantly tested in the crucibile of 
laree scale war and thus their progress was carefully watched.
94
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Milne to LCA, 18 Oct. 1863, MLIl/l03/7/0. The larger Parrott 
guns had a tendency to burst.
ons to Bussell, 30 Jan. 1862, F.O. 5/828 • In April, 1864,Capt. 
>.Goodenough,RN,who had been sent to report on the North’s 
r effort,told Lyons that the U.S. was preparing for a for- 
gn war.Lyons believed that these preparations were directed 
ainst Englend.Lyons to Russell,25 April 1864,F.O.5/948.
CHAPTER VIII
Sir Alexander Leaves the Station
The commander-in-chief arrived at Bermuda on 
6 February 1864 after completing his last tour of the West 
Indies. That January his successor had been named: Vice 
Admiral Sir James Hope, K.C.B., the hero of the China wars. 
Sir Alexander told the Admiralty when about to hand over the 
command that he was enabled to leave ’without a single 
question of importance,which has not been finally brought 
to a close*. 1 Milne left Vice Admiral Hope a long memo­
randum on the Civil War, including the various problems he 
had encountered and the probable new ones that would arise. 
The incoming commander thanked his predecessor for ’the
very ample information* afforded to him on all aspects of 
the station.1 2 On his departure Milne received numerous 
laudatory addresses from various places: Bermuda, Nova 
Scotia, St. John's,Newfoundland-special thanks for protect­
ing the fisheries- Jamaica,etc., all testified to his 
dedication to duty. The address from the city of Halifax
1 Milne to LCA, 19 Feb. 1864, MLN/I03/8/H.
2 Hope to Milne, 15 March 1864, MLN/I05/6.
was signed by 1200 citizens and said, that * • » • • lour father 
defended the coasts of these Provinces during the last 
American War'.  ^ . With his family in HUS j^ ile» Sir
Alexander sailed for home on 17 March 1564» after an absence 
of. more than four years.
The Civil War was to end almost one year after Milne 
left? Professor Baxter'has' characterized Vice Admiral Hope ’s 
command as «uneventful». 4 With regard to the American 
struggle this was certainly correct; minor legal!otic 
matters were the only incidents. The Confederate raider 
Florida was ordered by Hope to pledge'that she wouldn’t des­
troy British prizes without sending them to a prize court.
The Admiralty frowned on this arrangement» holding that if 
a British merchantman was destroyed by a 0,3. warship, 'the 
proper remedy was diploma tic action by the British govern­
ment«.^ The vice admiral’s command was marked•by several 
unfortunate episodes. At Bermuda in 1064» there occurred 
the worst outbreak of yellow fever for many years; the 
famous race riots took -place- in- Jamaica in 1Ç65# ..while. 
desertion again became rife» .the.station commander’s.flag--
3 »Various Addresses', , JHi/*/w/1 (c^•
4 Baxter, J.P., on. cit.t p.24 This is also the judgement 
of the MB on Hope’s.years in North America,
Baxter, J.P,, on. cit. ,p.?5.
Ship lost 106 men in this way. Hope was the first comman­
der of the Worth American and West Indian. Station to have an
7ironclad - IIVI3 Favorite - among his warsnips.
On 17 July, 1865, mi Minister at Washington, Sir F. Bruce 
told Hope that the services of a vessel at .Fortress llonroe 
were no longer required. 8 fhe end of the■wot marked the
withdrawal of British warships from American barhoura and the 
overall reduction in the number of vessels on the station. 
While, Sir Alexander held the command his force ranged from a 
low of 20 ships and 2503 men in April I860 to the OVgot 
crisis strength of 42 warships and 14,088 men in January 1862* 
the greatest naval force then on any of Britain's eight foreign 
stations. V/Iien he left in 1064, the command consisted of 31 
ships and 7 , 13 7 men. 9 In the latter year the Federate 
reached parity with the two great naval powers of the world.
The U.S, had in December 1864, 671.ships, including 71,iron­
clads and 51,000 men; France had 376 shim, with 10 iron­
clads - including chips'building - and 51,558 men, while 
Britain hed 417 ships, with 30 ironclads, also including 
those ships being built, end 6 0 ,8 1 1 men. 10 General lee
6 'liooort of Sir J: « 3  Hope, II,1067', A2;l 123/114.
7 Story, P.A., • El Keval Yard, IMifax, in the Surly Sixties’,
Collections of -Bis, Hova. Scotia Historical . ^ ocigtj, XXII. 
(1933} p.yo.
8 ’Admiral’s Journals«, m  50/305. lord Lyons had returned
to Bnglnnd in. December 1864.
9 'Lists of ship.?«, ad:.: 0/135-14 3.
10 ’Comparison of X;vies of Fuglend, loanee and the V.O.,
Dec, I864’, Palmerston papers, Broedlands Archives,
surrendered in April 1865 and on 22 June,.'Secretary of the 
Navy Yfellea announced that Britain and $ranee had 'withdrawn, 
from the insurgents the character of belligerents* * The 
next month dalles ordered a reduction in the number of war­
ships on.the Atlantic:coast to ten and a further diminution 
of tr.S, ships in the Gulf to twelve.1 2 134 Thus began.the rapid 
decline of the formidable.Union navy, a force which had dona 
so much to secure victory. The Atlantic cable was completed 
in 1866 and by 1069 Havana was linked to the mainland by 
cable. These advances in communications, reduced the ability 
of the station commander to exercise his personal, judgement 
in many areas, both naval and diplomatic. Kroa the late 
1860*0 the commander-in-chief was more the servant of the 
Admiralty than, as he had been heretofore, the master of a 
send-autonomous command. The North American and felt Indian 
Station was abolished along with the South American and 
Pacific Stations in Admiral Fisher*« reforms of 1904. Therr 
place was taken by a cruising souadron and by 1900, over 80 
per cent of British battleship strength was concentrated in 
or nenr homo „atera in order to face the Goman « w . , M
1 1  2125, 1065, p. 10?*
1 2  u i a . ,  p . i u .  a * »  « •  « *  eE<lsd;  ? * * ■ ’ ? "  S / h fon the station, none of the® ironclads, 0/l<t4.
13 #illock, n.T Bulwark of Bmplre (Princeton, 1962), pp. P'h-?0»
14 hlahan, A.J., Naval k ^ i x x i a t ^ U o n m A J M ^  (tondon,l,9fi.6) 
P. 311.
Thera can be no doubt that the years Milne spent on the
station were among the most critical for Anglo-American
relations during the Civil V/ar. Besides the Trent affair,
the possibility of British recognition and/or mediation
was the major continuing danger to the North* H.C. Allen;
believes this peril was greatest in.the fall of 1062.
E.D. Adams.says of Russell’s mediation plan, which the foreign
secretary urged on tb® Cabinet' in November 1862, ’Hud that
plan been adopted ..... war would have ensued! between
England and the North’, and after the plan was shelved, ’Never
again was there serious governmental.consideration of meddling
16in the American Civil »ar.’ P.L. Owsley held that
Britain - despite the distress of the cotton operatives - was 
making so much money from the war that there was no economic.
17 .■motive for intervention. 1 Because of the danger of 
European intervention, .the writer .believes.:that" the/period:,; 
October-Noverabcr 1062 was the time of granteat peril for the 
Union. Gladstone favoured action of come kind and in a 
secret memorandum of 25 October, 1062, said that Russia was
15." ..Allen, -H.C., Great Britain and the United States a:i ./v-'-- 
. (London,vl954)»; PP. 478-9, 482. ;
16- " Adams, E.D. . a Great' Bri tain and the American Civil" far':T;v;:Z- 
(New. York,/196i7Tii» .;PP* 73-74-
17 Owsley, F.L., King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago, 1959)
•Zp-557.
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the »vital element, otherwise deficient, of traditional18and unquestioned friendliness/to America.* Bussell
agreed, that without Russian cooperation an armistice
19invitation would fee; sure to fail» J . But the .Russians had
told the British Ambassador on 8 November;that,they did not
wish to offend the-North and therefore would decline to join
20the contemplated .British-Prench scheme. ..That fall, Lord 
.Lyons also deprecated any attempt at mediation while 
Palmerston and most of the Cabinet were also against inter­
ference at that particular moment} and oo tho throat came to 
nothing. 21 • Tic© Polish rising in early 1063 and the 
Schleswig-Holstein crisis soon.after turned liiglish thoughts
to the Continent, The public could readily grasp these 
issues; the Poles were heroic, the Russians oppressors} the 
Danes were a. small nation being crushed by Bismarck»© Germanic 
hordes. But the issues in the American struggle were never 
so clear cut. Many of the British people abominated slavery, 
yet admired tho courage of tho Southerners, They might hate 
the »Mobocracy * of th© North, .but. their .whole.tradition 
favoured the abolitionists. These complexities of the Civil
10 »lb?. Gladstone on the War in America», secret, 25 Oct. 10o2,
Palmerston papers, Broadlands Archives,
19 Sari Bus,soil, Confidential Shno,1 24 Oct. 1062, Palmerston 
papers, Broadlands Archives,
20 Adams, on, clt,, ii, p.66.
21 Bussell to Palmerston, private, 25 Oct, 1862, Palmerston papers,
Broadlands Archives. Lyons’views ct the time ere outlined in
Lyons to Russell, private, 24 Rov# 1862, PRO 30/??/36,
V/ar accounted■for a great deal of the British hesitation in. 
dealing,with the ¿Eterican belligerents.
In the bitterness engendered bj the fierce fratricidal
struggle, when Britiah-Americanrelations were often at a
critical point, Sir Alexander was never seriously accused by
either side of favouritism. The reason for his unique
success is that throughout the war, Milne remained decidedly
ooneutral and tried to hold his officers to this course. • ■ - ■
‘ He told Hope in 1864 that it was his practice? whenever possible 
to reach a decision at once on all accusations against his 
officers, without:
waiting even for the formal complaint, thus 
the delay of reference home has, been avoided 
■ and I am satisfied that by placing the remedy 
at once in Lord Lyons hands and enabling him 
to give the explanation at•the same moment 
that he receives the complaint much needless 
irritation has been avoided and the best 
results have followed, 23
A good example of this policy was the caso of tho Vesuvius.
Capfc. Hamilton had gone hot,10 on leave and left a Lieutenant 
Croke in command of the vessel. Bhile communicating with 
the consul at Mobile in January I863, that diplomatic 23
22 llilne to tCAr. 11 fob, I8 6 4», ML!i/lQ3/0/n, ; ./
23 'Memo relative to the Civil Mar in America', MLN/103/6.
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officer told Croke that he should taka £40,000 in specie to 
Havana,for transhipment to England. This sum represented money 
owed to British bond holders by the state of Alabama. Unversed 
in the international complexities of the situation and relying on 
the consul's word that this was a proper thing to do,Lieutenant 
Croke took the gold out in the truce boat,through the Union block­
ade. As soon as Milne heard of his subordinate's action,he censured* 
him and wrote to Lyons,giving the details of the unfortunate trans­
action.24 25That February,the commander-in-chief issued a circular 
to his captains saying that'EM ships visiting blockaded ports 
'...are not invested with a shadow of right to embark any property 
with the object or passing the blodcads’. Lyons showed thl. 
circular'unofficially' to Seward.26 On 14 February,Lord Russell
wrote Lyons telling him to inform Seward as soon as possible of
'the whole particulars of this transaction»as well as the fact that
the consul's services were being dispensed with.27 28That March
Seward told Lyons that the President was satisfied}
' with the prompt and just vindication by the British 
Government of¿its authority and honour,and of its 
determination to compel respect by i^ s agents for 
the authority of the United States.
24 Milne to LCA.24 Jan. 1863,MLN/I03/6/F; Milne to LCA,£6 Jan, 
1 8 6 3 ,MLN/I03/6/F; Milne to Croke,26 Jan.1863,MUJ/I03/I8/R,25 B arter.op. c l t .,p .2 2 .
26 Lyons to Milne,27 March 1863, ADM 128/60,
27 Russell to Lyons, 14 F s h .  i 1863, AIM 128/60.
28 Seward to Lyons, 2 March 1863,AIM 128/60.
What could have been a very unpleasant incident wars thus 
amicably settled in. less than two months.
Sir Alexander never lost the confidence of the home 
authorities, which they showed in 1663 by extending his 
command from the normal three year period to four, Russell 
said in September 1861, of Somerset’s pi gw to put Milne in
charge of the British force being readied for Mexico,
" ■ ■ 29■I shall have perfect reliance on his discretion’,
When the vice admiral was about to leave the station, the
Lords of the Admiralty said in April 1064, that they could no
allow hin to strike his flag:
. without expressing to you the very high
sense they entertain of the manner in which 
you have invariably discharged the duties of 
that important command, The war between the 
Federals and so-called Confederate States of 
. Horth -America added much -to the reaponsibili- 
ties of those Duties, and my Lords have 
observed with great satisfaction the sound 
judgement displayed by you in the treatment of 
the numerous questions of difficulty which have 
arisen, as well as the able manner In which you : 
have carried out the Instructions of the 
Government for preserving a strict neutrality ■ 
between the belligerent Parties, 3^
This does not mean that there was never any criticism 
of Milne. The »Saturday Review' carried an article in ita
29 ' Russell to Somerset, private,: 30 Sept, 1861,;Somerset
papers, County Record Office, Aylesbury,; Bucks,o-■ ... 30
30 LCA to „Ulne, 8 April 1864, p/o/l (C).
issue of 13 February I864 which stated that the essential 
difference between Milne and his successor was that Hone
•is a fi¿Siting, man' and 'he is more of a warrior than of a 
diplomatist and of more proved capacity for firing on an 
enemy than for negotiating a compromise or smoothing a , . 
difficulty'. Of Sir Alexander it said, 'He has been, we 
suspect, the Admiral rather of the Foreign Office than of
the Admiralty. Ha was selected for his tact, patience, tern- 
per ate demeanour and courteous bearing. dip orders, tne 
article continued, might have been 'cooperate with Lord Lyons 
to preserve peace by all means in your power. Lon t be 
irritated into a quarrel'. It Trent on to say that these 
orders were fully carried out because 'they were in exact 
harmony with his sentiments, his convictions and his predilec­
tions •. The writer of the article believed that possibly 
peace between England and the Pedarals 'was purchased very 
dearly,.,,. by a temporary abdication of national aeIf 
respect and a temporary abnegation of national honour *,
Further it stated that tho chief characteristic of the labours
of Lyons and Milne was;
...... to have refused to take offence when
i t * was deliberately offered; to havo dis­
regarded impertinence, and not to have 
resented insolence.,»»* to have boon muxl — 
forest net only to personal slights but even 
to affronts heaped upon their flag..,.,....
The unsigned article ended .with, a hope that MiIns’s 
successor would carry with him ’the.same.temper which 
animated him in the waters of the Peiho', and 'Possibly 
there may be those who would like to inform mankind that the 
successors of Hawke and Nelson have learned other lessons 
besides those of turning their cheeks to tne sraiter..,«'
This attack on Milne was answered soon afterward by
•Vindex* in the »Naval and Uilitiary Gazette'. ,. Stating that
he knew Vice Admiral Hope well» the writer’ s,dd that the
admiral would «spurn the assassin who stabs his absent
friend»* Pointing out that an ’Admiral liko any other
subordinate, must obey the orders he received without comment»
the anonymous writer claimed -that .oir, Are-Candor ’has gained ■
by do facto experience and solid service to th©•profession, ..
its sympathy and confidence....’ Both of those .articles
were printed in the ’Bermuda Royal Gazette« ox Ip *w.ixch lo64*
The editor of the .Gazette said of the .»Saturday ueview'
piece that it was ’erroneous in its facts as in its references
He believed that • both ■ Federal' and• Confederate governments
would 'agrees ' /v'’ :,"d
that Sir A. iiilno has, ill the honourable mmly 
v and etraightforward'.manner in;which he has , ■ .  M 
conducted his arduous and delicate duties proved, 
himself„to.be sans tache'et sans repyoebe.^  ■ : . 31
3 1 ■'’The ; Bermuda- Hoyal Gazette’, 15 march I064, Milne Home .
capers, uncatalogued at the National Maritime Museum. . . 1
Russell told Somerset in January I864 that the Admiralty 
should give Hope strict instructions to be ‘cautious and 
prudent' in his new command for:
It has required all Sir Alexander liilne's. 
prudence and discretion, to keep us on good, 
tho* not very friendly terms even at the best with the Yankees, S ir Jmes Hope is in my 
opinion a rash and injudicious officer.... I 
shall tremble for peace if he is not very 
sharply cautioned not to take^any important 
step without referring home.
As C.J. Bartlett has pointed out, in his earlier career 
Ililne 'outstayed four changes of ministry.....' Besides
general competence, another reason for his oucccsa may have 
bean as he told Grey in 106 3, 'I entered the Admiralty under 
distinct understanding I was to havo nothing to do with 
Politics.' 34 attitude was shared by Lyons, who said
in 1871*
I have lays elf always thought that a regular 
diplomatist could only impair his'efficiency, 
by taking/part in home politics/ find i:have ; : ;
■ throughout acted upon--'this,conviction, 33 p p; -
Russell to Somerset, private, 7 Jan. I864, Somerset papers.
33 :Bartlett, C.J., Great Britain' and Sea Power 
(Oxford, 19 6 3). p.O«
34-.. Milne to Grey,' -private, 20 laarch. 186.3* 1111/107.
35 Hewton, Lord,' Lord;Lyons (London, 19i3)»'3U/'-p,ll,/-
She.following description of Lord Lyons,'who - worked so closely 
and well with Milne, would it seeras, also apply to Sir 
Alexander and is tin illustration of the finer points of toe 
Victorian character:
The force of Mil, the power of self-devotion, 
the dignity, the reticence, the minute regula­
rity, the sense of order, the degree of submis­
sion to authority and the undoubting assertion 
of his own authority towards others -all were 1
elements in a strong personality. ou 
Milne continued to serve his country for another decade.
From «July 1856 to December 18o8 he v»as first .naval lord of 
the Adairaltyj then cormmindsr—in-chief in the Mediterranean 
from 1069 to 1070, aid,finally first naval lord again.from 
1872 until hi3 .retirenient in 1876. \ By that date; he: was; a 
G.C.B. and had been made a full Admiral. In 1031, Milne ; 
now a baronet, was promoted to Admiral of tne xieet, the 
highest rank: in the service, ■ In; these later years he served ; 
as an, advisor on naval.matters*. IJ1 10J9 wIr A lex .index w.u.3 
chairman of a committee which enquired into the stace oi 
colonial defences and in 1081 he was a member of the Royal 
Commission on the Defence of British Possessions awl Colonies o 
Abroad. ^  The Canadian statesman, Sir John Dose, thanked 367
36 Ibid.. p. 4-23.
37 ’Auto-biographical Material’, j.-Xb/i'/c/l-3 end the D1«'B 
for information on ¿.¡line’s career.
Milne in 1000 for letting him read the admiral's Civil War 
despatches. .Rose said .that they had an increasing histo­
rical interest;
I always knew that to your conciliation and 
firmness we owed an escape from the many 
perils that so often threatened to involve the 
two countries in strife»Seward'more than 
once spoke to me in grateful and appreciative 
terms."" The Despatches ought somehow to see 
the light when the history of that critical 
time is written as it will be» I am not sure 
that Walpole’s next volume will not cone near 
it. 38
But it was not to be. Sir Alexander retired to.his family 
home at Inveresk, Scotland, and died.there on. ¿9. December , 
1896. Ko had served sixty years in the navy, eighteen of 
: them at: the Admiralty.The Reverend íhoraas; Hannan said ; p 
at the funeral that, 'His guiding principlej ..the star hf his 
life, has been '»duty"....' 39 Although line's only son, 
Admiral A.B, Milne died unmarried,;, the family's, naval .■ 
tradition is carried on by his brother's branch of the 
family, one of whose sons is now an of floor on ori tain's 
first nuclear powered submarine."..?■ »flieroas.-' >uir ..Alexander mvad 
concerned primarily.;: with tÍ3e protection -of British posses-' 
sions, his descendant has a much.wider responsibility,^ for V 
the Royal llavy now shares in the defence of many countries 
all over the free world.
33 .pose to Milne, private, 10 June. 1030, IJlM/'i’/ c f x.(C),
39 ’Funeral.of Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, ;Bart.*,■ ^
; The Scotsman, -4 Jan. '1897*; M; vd-g-h oh
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A. Boyle, Major General H-atinys, couuKWling the forces' In
the Marl times, to his cousin,- 9-14 November • 1861.
The North papers, pp, 225* &-d* the Rhodes Library, 
Oxford. A valuable document as it affirms/Boyle*a 
fears for the safety of the provinces at the,time 
of the Trent affair.
B. Bunion - Price correspondence« SItO 631/3/1935) - ,1954*
the County Record Office, Shrewsbury, Salop. ,
Lewie Price- was a merchant at Vera Crua, Moxico, 
and a friend of Commodore Dunlop, Those letters 
written, during the years 1059-3.^ 62, are a record of 
Dunlop's ideas on Mexican problems, etc,
C. Du Pont oorrosnondeneg with Britl,ah,..p.f.ficerni, Jlcntheriau
hills Hist a leal Library, Groonvale, Dal, U.3.A. 
Commodore Du Pent’s letters to and from Uncock,
Capi. Iliny-Hall ■ and otter British naval officers in 
the period 1G50-1065. An interesting exchange of 
views on various topics. Civil v/ur, etc,
* Hamilton, Admiral Richard Vosey; papers at the
Rational Maritime Museum. , , Papers, relating'-to the 
Crimen, W. Africa, Newfoundland and Bermuda, ■- U /  
1054-1064, YHT.l/7b, Letters received by Ramil ton 
1859-1895, TZ.l/() . Hamilton was on the fishery 
patrol frora 18 6 1 to I864. : , - 1 ;, i a
tendarson. Ad;-d r-:l V .H,, papers at the Rational Maritimeh; 
■Museum..- Henderson was a 15 year-old. iitdahipraan- in, ,', 
H.lt,S. Rile in 1060 and served for four years on tha 
station. Logbook of Rile, IB2J/14} Bettors lo6o-y'Jj;.- 
1884, -HEjr/l/3} and Letters HSH/1/4.U This, last is . a. 
fine collection of letters, shewing the everyday lifej.J 
on Rile and Styx. There lo also & photograph album H ; 
with-views of. Halifax,. ships, etc..-
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end are available through the M a t  Sussex County 
Kecord Office, Chichester, Sussex, , Lyons was 
British minister to Washington from 1059 to 1064. 
Letters from M s  cousin, one of Milne's officers,1861-62, L.
Lyons, 1853-82)
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almanachs, 1859-65, L,436-443.
Various, photos, L.31Q*, Letters from 
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The mine papers are at the national Maritime Museum,
Greenwich, This is an extremely : voluminous collec­
tion of family papers donated to the museum by Capt. 
A. liilne Hono, BÏÏ, in 1949«: Hie captain contributed
an additional collection in September 1965, although 
ha still retains som of M s  family’s papers, The 
writer-has been given access to all of these.mate­
rials at the captain’s residence in Scotland,
Some of the sources quoted in the thesis are attri­
buted to tho 'Mine Homs papers’. This moans th--t 
the writer has read the paper' in Scotland but has : ? 
not seen it at Greenwich among those papers donated, 
in 1965 and which arc quoted as 'uneatalogued, 
llilno Home papers at the National Mriti,.«e Museum'. 
However it may be at the. museum, those papers given 
in 1965 are quite extensive. The . following itéras 
from the 1949 collection have been consulted:
1. Letterbooko, Mine to Admiralty, j.Dfi/10 3 /1 (a) 
to 9 (l)> 1 86O-64..
2. Latter;?, to Ambassadors, Coyernors, - Consuls - and 
Civilians, etc., ¡.Lp 103/10\,J) to If (L},. I860—
. I864. '
3.  Memoranda to Squadrons, L3Jj/lO3/l3{t!0 to .21(H),: 186-64.
4. Miscellaneous Hegistera Cc-ntainin 
of Officers, I.utN/l03/22(v) to 24 y Appointment (X), ieoo-64.
8
5. .: Acknowledgement of Admiralty La fetors"■>rrv/i 01 / 25(y) and 26{n), 1062.64. ’ ■'Wy
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' 6, Letters 'Received.by Sir.-A* Mine - originalg 
General letters, LLK/104/l to 5, 1860-1864} 
Admiralty letters, MLH/I05/L to 6, I86O-64. 
MR/ 105/& usrked ’Very Impcrtont Letters on ;
■ 11, American Commend'is one of the most ■ impor­
tant group,of papers for these years, as it 
deals with some of the chief, problems of that 
period, e.g,,Civil War, etc,
7 . Returns of Foreign .Vessels of war, North 
American and ’Vest-Indian Station, iiLN/106, 
1860-64«
8. Private Letters, MLH/l07/l-3, IO6O-64. 
Correspondence to.and from Somerset, Grey,
. Lyons, V/. Stuart, Mine’s family, etc,
A most valuable source of information,
9. North American .Station Returns, MR/103,-
i860-64. Includes Standing Orders for the
station and details -of ships, etc.
10. CourtA&rtials, fOi4/l09A{M) and 2(BB), .
1860-64. ;
11. Sailing Orders, KLN/llO/l(CC) to 5 (iOi)# 
1860-64* Includes contingent account booh, telegrams from comtaemder-in-chief and a
rough index to his records.
12. - Private Letters received, Mli/p/A/l(a)-:and
(b) 1R53-1881. Correspondents include 1 
Palmerston - one letter of little, interest - 
Derby, Coles,: etc.} : some draft replies, /
1 3 . Memoranda, etc,, spanning many: y&ara:of 
Mine’s:career, r :Each'--subject:le- Infan-paper' 
folder, .
. :A, - Admiralty Policy ^/i/s/l.
(a) Ad-nisalty circulars, J834-I854,
(b) Organisation of the Board of Admiralty, 
general papers, 1068-1872 and a report ^-i* i on/i
26?
(c) State of the Navy and ship building 
policy I858-I876.
(d) Naval Estimates, 1852-1075*
(e) Ordinary Establishment* 1848.
(f) Naval Reserves, 1052-1867* '-
(g) Distribution of Ships, especially the 
Channel eouadron.
(h) Polar Orders, 1849-1876, the search 
for Franklin, etc,■
0 ) 8.1 avery 1848-1868, Cuba and Africa.
(K) Naval Policy in North America XOol-lGuu. 
Defence plans during front affair, etc, 
most important.
(l) Deport of the Kwfoimdlend Fisheries by 
Capt. A. hilne, 1040,
(ci) Alabama Case, -papers and correspondence •. 1863-1872} contains mmy private letters 
to and from Eilne and Lyons in IS63.
B, Personnel ELN/p/b/2,
(a) Manning 1059-1877* These - are "important.-
papers covering the transition from : 
•voluntary' to 'continuous service'.
(b) Naval Cadetships 1869-1870.
(c) '-" Greenwidi'-'Kaval'Hospital'.-and School,--
1065-106?.
(d) Merchant Service 1336-1-072,
(e) Pay, including widow's pensions I652-IQ64,
(f) Victualling,1858-1864. Interesting 
letters by Milne on ships' canteens 
and one by a victualling official on 
the seaman's diet.
(g) Uniforms,1853-1857, The changes pro­
posed by Milne in seaman's uniforms.
(h) Medicine-papers on scurvy Cholera,etc.
(j) Awards,1849-1868, Milne's Good Conduct 
Badge scheme,etc,
(k) Naval Discipline,1850-1870. Contains some 
valuable comments on the loss of HMS 
Conqueror,etc.
C. Materiel MLN/P/B/3.
(a) Lists of Ships in Commission, 1840-1870. 
Number of vessels launched from 1855 to 
1876, with their names,class,etc. Also 
maps of the different naval stations in 
foreign waters in the I860's.
(b) Evolutions and Manoeuvres,I85I-I888, The 
' navy's steam tactics in 1865,a formative
period in steam development,etc.
(e) Loss of the Captain,1870. Milne was then 
C.-in-C..Mediterranean,and these papers 
are valuable for an understanding of 
naval reaction to the loss of this import­
ant experimental vessel.
(d) Shipbuilding, 1850-1875,many pamphlets 
of interest.
(a) Lists of Ships Building, 1866-1875.
(f) Signals,.including Sir Alexander's 
'scheme for ni£^t'signals. •
" (£) ■ Papers on Transport and Trooping,
I83I-IS6O5 details on sending troop» 
ships to the Crimea, 1659i etc,
(h) Coaling, 1852-1870, valuable papers on 
mine’s "Interest in coaling stations , etc
(j) Hydrographical Department, 1059-1833*
The working of the dept., paper on the 
Channel tunnel, etc,
(ji) Dockyards, 1849-1870, papers on dockyard - 
organisation, etc. One item on wrecking 
' in the Bahamas.'-
tatobio/praphical material, iJiIl/p/c/l-3. 
includes booklet 'Times of Service .of Admiral 
of the Fleet Sir Alexander Milne, Bart, h which 
suras up mine's contributions, . ' y
Admiralty Circulars 1834-1857»1 1^/1.3 3.
Papers and Reports of-the Royal Coardssion on 
the Defences of British Possessions and Cora» 
aevee'Abroad, 1879 to 1882, l.M/141*
The Reports of Royal Commission on the Defence 
of British Possessions and Commerce abroad » : 
printed books » ¡.D;h/l?o/i-4«
Th* Goals of Medicines with which Merchant h 
■irTTTDpI a -• g r e~ -to~b e ihrnl Sh ed 7 Weld.3. r£",sTT pThT C 
yurgoon' id», (Rondon\1 ¿5'1 ), * X.l/172.
Haval pamphlets, i'iLli/lOO. : The defence of.. Canada, etc,, none later than 1047* . .
Gunnery Instructions, 18o3, »a-id/lGl.
AAM-naity Administration - Its Fault» and its;; 
ItefaulTsw ^
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’Milne Home papers', donated in 1965,seen in 
Scotland but not at tbe National Maritime 
Museum, though they may be there:
1. 'Evidence of Sir James Graham',covers 
Milne’s role in the Admiralty during the 
Crimean War.
2. Milne to the Dowager Lady Milne,8 May I860.
3. Milne to David Milne Horae,30 May I860.
4. Lady E. Milne to the Dowager Lady Milne,5 
June I860, describes trip from England in Nile.
5. 'General Memo’,29 June IQ 6 I ,o a desertion.
6. Milne to the Dowager Lady Milne, 12 July 1861.
7. 'Description of Summary Punishments,etc,’,6 Aug. 
18 6 1,illustrates practical working of the new 
Discipline Act,
8. Capt. Bruce of Firebrand to Milne,24 Aug,1861,
9. 'Summary of Yellow fever cases’,1861.
10 . 'Halifax Evening Express’,13 May 1862.
11. Capt.R.Hamilton to Gov.Bannerman,n,d.,Oct,1862,
1 2 . U.S.Capt.Godon to U.S.Commo.DuPont,12 Dec,1862.
13. U.S.Capt,Turner to Capt. Ross,RN,4 Feb.1863.
14. ’Bermuda Royal'Gazette',IS March 1864.
15. Halifax newspaper,n.d..describes Milne’e departure.
16. N.S.Sec.of State Seward to Milne,private,22 Aug.1865.
'Milne Home papers,uncatalogued,at the National Mar­
itime Museum’; donated in 1965,seen in Scotland and in NMM,
1. Milne’s ’Notebook’.valuable for his opinions, 
information on the Station,details of his career,etc.
2. 'Schedule of Propositions Connected with HM Service 
which have been made to the Admiralty by Vice Adm­
iral Sir Alexander Milne,K.C.B,’
M l S i r  David. She writer has located anti read at 
a solicitor*? office in Edinburgh a collection of 
letters from Sir David to George Home of.Wedder- 
burn'in the years 1811 to 1818. There are 13 2  
letters there, 54 of them are quoted in 
Report on the Manuscripts of Col, .'David Mine Homo 
o f‘ v/edderburn Ca'gt.le R. B. ^ (fondon, 1902). 'a 
publication of the Historical .Manuscripts Commis­
sion. These letters are a valuable guide to life 
at sea, the I. American Station, the War of 1812, 
etc,
The writer is indebted to other members of the Mina 
family for material used:
Dorothy, Lady Rede_p_dal.e._for Sir. A. M l  ne'e Mi ary-for > 
2.863 and photographs;
Mrs. J.B.'Hotham for several ■■photograph albums as well 
as ■sane"lither materialsjt - and ■ .-■'■m ;'V : f '•■'■'
Col, and Mrs, Hone Robertaon for various items. v .
Palmerston papers, at the Historical■ Manuscripts f -
' Commiflsionr London; by" permission of the Trustees- 
. of the Broadlands Archives, 1859 to I865, 
Correspondence with Russell, Somerset, Lewis end ■: 
various Cabinet documents. Also Palmerston 
Latter-books, Mdl, MSS, 48582-3'at the British v 
Museum, .■
Russell. Lord John, at the Public Record Office,: > a. ; 
complete list of materials consulted will: be found 
in the FRO section.
Somerset, iSdward A.Seymour, 12th luke of ■ .papers'- at the; 
County Record Office, Aylesbury,■-.Rucksf f -OorresMa 
pondence with Palmerston, Rusaell, Newcastle, Lewis 
Luke of Cambridge, Mine, Grey,..Ptomaine,; Eor>e and 
Dunlop. Hie correspondence . with: llilne to interes* 
ting hut adds little to that found in the Mine
papers. ■ ■
The writer has attempted to trace»largely through the 
'principal Probate.Registry,.Somerset House, the 
descendants of persons connected with this study. 
For various reasons, little information has been 
gained about the followings
Captain'V/.w.T/. Bewett, Commander B. Salmon,
Sir F. Grey, Col, W. Monio, Frederick F. Fogen 
(Milne’s secretary), u om*uOQore ¿1» Tunlop,
Lt. J.3. 
Sir C.L.
Trotter, Paymaster J.T, 
ïïyke. ,
Suetor and
Three ex-Ccnfederates died:In England but, as far 
as can be determined by the writer, they left no
personal papers, '"They were the Confederate 
purchasing agent, J.D. Bulloch; the C»S, Secretary 
of State, Judah Benjamin, and the C.S* Comaiosionor 
to France, John Slidell, In the care of tliree of 
the :Nile *s officers, some information has been 
found,. The writer has visited the descendants of ' 
Milne's flag Lieutenant, Caot# Basil S, ucdios.llall, 
Capt* F.li, Barnard, commander of the hile, and the 
ship’s Iks ter, C.J, Polkinghorns, They have furni­
shed some letters, books, and ..quite a f aw  rave yhoto- 
grauha of the ships and men of Milne tg command*. •
Il.li.S. Nile was a schoolship for the merchant navy from 
18 7S until her accidental destruction in 19 53.
The writer has visited the merchant navy training 
school,H.I4.S. Conway at Bangor, ■Wales, and spoken 
to the captain superintendent, Cart, E, Hewitt.
The captain spent many years on the Nile when she 
was a schoolship and has given thowitor informa­
tion on the warship as well as scrao i*hotogr«pha 
of her equipment.
Fh.N. nnd k,A, thence;
Anderson, M.A,, F d m u n d . -Vndo?. Rfic.reta.ry o f  3t»fre fo r  F oreign  A f f a ir e
Ph.b. thesis, ■ University of London, .1956*
Sullen, II., British Policy IVm rds a Pottleur-nt 
v.i th Aianri c a, 186 5- 7 2, ■
Ph.D. thesis, University of London,,1956. 
Ghanmn. R.B..• British Relations with tloxlcn. -
B. Litt, thesis, University of Oxford, 1936.
Clarke, B.P.. The Attitude of the Colonial Office 
to the Working of Responsible (lovornment.
Ph.L. thesis, University of London, 19 5 3,
Illasu,: A., file Role of Free Trade Treaties in ’ 
British Foreign Policy 1899-1871.
Ph.U. thesis, University of London, 1965.
llerli, F.J., Great Britain end, the Con fed, or1 a to 
' ” Maw. 1061-186!?,
. Ph.L. thesis, Indiana University, 1964*
Pitt, II.R., 0re*t Britain nnd Belligerent
IPritime Rirbta fro-r.i the Loci amtton of Pwis 
1BS6. to the -Declaration of London 1
PfuL. thesis, University of London, I9C4.
Sandler, S.L., --'The of the Modern British
Genital Shin. 10o3~i8?0t
Fh.D, thesis, University of London, I965.
Schurmnn, B.M.', Igjferial.Upfengft 1868-188?,
Fh.U. thesis, Cnxabridje, 1995#
Taylor, II., ih-mnlna the „Royal Havyt The Reform 
of the Recruitin/r Lystmit 101?~l96l.
II. A. Thesis, Bedford College, 1954. ■
Official and Private Priors consulted in the Habile 
Uncord Office ■ ■■■•.■
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P. ''OFFICIAL- AND FRIYA7B PAPERS CQ3CTLT6D IfT THE PUBLIC 
RjJCOM) OFFICEi ~~
ADLI 1/5582...  1647 - prom Secretary of State,
5590.. ... 1848 - Jan.-June - from Admiralty Department 
5734P.••• From Admirals- Jamaica I860
5741.. ... From Admiralty - Jan.-liar. I860
5742.. ... From Admiralty - Apr.-June i860
5743.. ... From Admiralty - July - Bee, 1060 
5744**... C.O,:to Admiralty I860
5745.. ... F.O, to Admiralty I860
5748.. .*. India Office, Foreign Consuls,■i860;
5753.. ... Promiscuous, A-II, I860,
5755....L.O. opinions 1857-60
5759?..*.'-From Admirals - Jamaica 1861'
5765.. ...From Admiralty, Jan - Juno 1861
5766.. ... From Admiralty, July-Dec, 1861 : - -
5767.. ... From F.O,' to Admiralty, Jan.-Juno 1661
5768.. ... From F.O. to Admiralty, July-i'ec, 1861
5769.. ... From i/.O, to. Admiralty, -1861 ^
5770.. ... From C.O. to Admiralty, 106l
5777 * * * • • B.U. « Hospitals ¿ ilioo, - ■
5782.. ... L.O. opinions 1861-65 -.
5787?.... From Admirals - Jamaica 1862 
5708P.,., From Captains 1862 .
: '5791,.... From Captains 1062.
5794.. ... From - Dockyards, Foreign,Brit. & For, Consul's."'
5795.. ... From Admiralty-.-Jan»-June. 106;> a ■ . -
5796.. ... From Admiralty - July-Dee.- 1862-'-
5797*.... From C.O. • to Admiralty, 1662 .
5798.. ... From F.O. to Admiralty,■Jan-Juna IG62 ' -Fr
5799.. ... From F.O, to Admiralty, July-Bso, 3,862
5800«.».. .
5804»-.... From Puli. office & -divisions 1862 —  -
5 3 1 9 P .-From Admirals - Jamaica. 1663 
5020?,... From Admirals - Jamaica I8 6 3  
5821?.... From Admirals - Jamaica .,1663 - " ■
5 8 2 6.. ... From Admirals, E» I m i & a ¿2 Pacific I863
5823.. ... From Captains - H-II, -1863' : r -
5831.... From Dockyards, Foreign I86 3■*" ‘ * t » - . n i . T ..
From .7.0, to Admiralty, 1062
^.043....Prom C.O. to Admiralty, Jan,-Juno 1863
5849.. ... From C.O. to Admiralty, July-Dee,, I8C3
5850.. ... From F.O. to Admiralty, Jan.-3.fer.1863 "
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A M  1/5252.'. 
5354.. 58?IP.
5072P.5073?.
5082..
5833..
5034..
5902.. 
59221-.
ADI,I 7/ 624*. 
A M  8/ 139. -
140..
141..142..
: 143*.
144-. 
A M  13/ 7.. 142. .  
143-.
ADI,I 50/303..
304..
305..
310..
313..
332.. 
A M  53/^425*7299.
7069.
7902.
7904.
0149.
■ 8205. 
8312. 
0393.
A M  INI) 12536 
ADAI 128/1... 
6 ...
7.. .8. .  .
■ 18...
19.. .
' 20...
Prom P.0, to Atolr-ilty, Snpt.-Joc., 10u3
Prom W.0. to Admiralty, Jan.--ay, 1063 
Proa Admirals,. Jamaica, 1004 
Prom Admirals, J-mnica, loH 
From Admirals, Janaaca, .l.>c4 .
Prom Admiralty, tfan.-iob., 10&r .
From Admiralty, Mr.--my, 18u4
From Admiralty, June-Aug*., -U*4 ...
t^omF.O. to Admiralty, April-July, IO0 4. .
Prom Admirals,'-Jamaica, 1065
Defences, Lalr.es & Favors of Canada «1- 0,
Lists of Ships in Commission I860 
Lists of Ships in Commission Ibol 
Lists of. Ships;in Commission louJ 
Lists of Ships'in Commission 1063 .
Lists of Ships in Commission ieS<+
Lists of. Ships in Couraissimlo^
Secret Orders & Letters, 18^ p-1067
Board Room Journals, Jan.-Juno 1361
n^-srd Room Journals, July-^ oc. 1861
Admirals * Journals, 26 Feb. 1260-31 Deo. 1661 -
Admirals’ Journals, 18o4-67
Admirals’ Journals, Pacific IGol
Admirals’ Journals, Pacific 1662-64 
*arpirals' Journals, Paei^ lc. 18up-67,,. 
i Z  A  - 12 ‘“w  M5T-4 *». 1853
LorboS HLffi. 25 Apr.-22 July 1062 
logbook £ESffiE.U> Jun" Ft1""!«!) 1 1 ^
lo g b o v l H E .  21 l89 F  ft9«®“2r rt/sir ivincildo, 4 Jan. —6 uopt. lOus.
Logbook 16 ^ c. 1061-31 Doc. 1062
Lopbook 21 Nov* 1862-12 Aug. 18o3
S C i  f eSS! 17 Dec. 16C1-22 Sept.1862
Index to Admiralty Board, 1062-1363 .
Station Records NA & WI, 3 AVb.I8I'w-14 Dec*.,, 1844 
-htlon Kocor.18 XA * V/I, 21 Esc. 1859-31 Jen. 1362
sill™ Record HA & SI. 10 Feb. 1062-3 W , ,  » 1
St-ition Records KA & NI, 11 m -r. 1^ 63-6 Lee. Mu.r
-t^ tion Records NA & Y/T, 3 I’ob. 1857-1 S‘>v. 1059,
Station Records NA ¿5 «, 13 Nov. 1859-26 Sec. 10o0
St ition Records NA & iu, 27 Dec. IHoO—19 Apr. 18o2
3?2
ABU 128/21....Station Records HA & 7/1, 14 Apr, 1862-27 June 1 8 6
22.. ... Station Records HA & .WI, 18 Kay 1063-H  Sept. 186
26.. ... French & American Fisheries, 1055-6?
44.. ... Station Records HA & WI, General -
31 Oct. I859-9 June 1863 
45»»...' Station Records HA & WI, General -
3 Jan. * 62-11 June I863
46.. ... Station Records HA & WI, General -
14 Feb, 1862-27 Jan. 1866
51.. ... Station Records HA & WI, ■ Jaraaica-Iiexico -
8 Feb. 1060-16 Ayr, 1063
52.. ... Station Records HA & WI, Jaraaios-Mexico• - •
1 Apr# 1862-8 Sept, I865
55.. ... Station Records HA & V/I, C.A. & Greytown -
.. 7 f-'-.r. 1860-7 Jan. IO63
56.. ... Station Records' HA' HI, Corn, res R.S.C.W, -
22 Dec. 1660-21 Sept, I063
57.. ... Station Records HA & ’.VI, Corr, res Ti.S.C.W, -
Apr. 1861-3o Aug. .1063
58.. ... Station Records H A 7/1, Corr,v.re; IJ.S.C.'y.
29 Uar. 1862-5 Feb. I863
59.... Station Records HA A WI, Corr, re U.S.C.W.
29 Juno 1061-13 Gov, 1863
60.. ... Station Records HA & V/I, Corr. re 11,3. C.y, : .
3 Jan. 1063-3 Feb. IO64
61.... Station Records HA & WI, Corr, re U.S.C.W,
31 Aug, 1861-29 Hov. 1865
62.. ... Station Records HA & .WI, General -
15 Apr. 1863-17 Jan. 1068
114.. ... Reports by C.-in-C. 'a on relinquishing command
HA & lil - 1060-89.
jW:.[ 160/152.,.. Proportion tables of ord, stores for II..4. Ships,
1053-60
157.. .. Armament of E.li, Ships, 1 Hay 1062
F.O, 5/739....From Lyons A Irvine, 27 Aug. to 20 Nov,,I860
763....From Lyons, 23 Apr, to 12 ¿fey, 1861
764.. ... From Lyons, 13 Kay to 31 Kay, 1861 - 
765.... From Lyons, 3 June to 10 June,106l
76 8  ..  From Lyons, 16 July to 9 Aug., 1861
7 6 9  ..  From Lyons, 12 Aug. to ?C Aug., 1863
774.. ... Froia Lyons, 1 1 Hov. to. 19,Hbv»,: 18 6 1 .
824.... From Lyons, 27 Jan. to 6 Feb., 1862
895....Pro» Lyons ¿5 Stuart, Oct, IC63
vn w
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F.O. 5/947.. 
943*.: 949-- 
993- 
1313.. 
1314.< 
F.O. 50/351. 
352.
353-
354-
355.
356.
357« 
353-
359.363.364.365.
366* 
367-360.369.
370.
371.
372. 
374.
F.O. 391/7.*
F.O. 414/17.
13.
19.
20.
21 .
22 .
23.
26.
29.
Pnoi F'cnSi 1—11 April 13o4
From Lyons 19-25 April 4864 (Goodanough’s Report)
tv,iti Larons 3-1? May 1964
Cass' of the Alllanee & I8CI-64
r-P of the Oreto or Florida,. 1662-63
& £  of tU & .  «' Florida, 1864-71 
To 'ither & i&ST Jan. to Doc. 1861, .'lorico 
*¥oit tiather '& «Tyke, Jan. to May lu6l, Mexico 
Xi’rora Sir C.L. Wyhe, June to 23 Aug. IBol, hexxeo 
From Sir C.L, Jyke, Aug. to Lee. 1861, ^ x.too 
From Consuls, Jan. to Dec. 186.1,^ i o o  ? .
tv™*) rnn^uXs. Borneotic, Jan. to jjec. lOol, Mexico 
From Domestic, Various, Jan, to.Aug, 1661, Mexico 
From Domestic, Various,. Sept, to Dec. 1861, mexico
From Bondholders, Jan..'I860-Jan. 18bl, Mexico
iv, Sir C L. .tyke, Jan. to Deo, 1062, Mexico
won Sir o k . V e ,  Jan. to Barch 1862, Uoxloo
•JJt  ^r. C L tyke» April to :,tey,10o2, Mexico 
Z*Z rV  '-„vice, June to Sept,, 1662, Mexico 
£om Sir Q . C  W * >  °ct. to Dec,% 1062, Mexico 
_ ''nnt'iiiB. Jan. to Dec, luo2, Mexico 
rv-n Consuls, Domestic, Jan, to Deo, 1062, ¿lexica 
SnneJic Various, Jan. to April 1862, Mexico 
5 : ; Various; May to June 1862, iloxico?™**tic Various, July to Dec. 1862, mexieo
Prcn"sir*C.L, ’tyke & Yfalchain, Jan, to June 1863, jixwii Mexico
PrlvntB . Wo, RuooeU to
Civil war, D.3, printed -Kg;:;.
■ 'Kov, 1860-Jan,::1 0 6 2 ; . 
Civil J:-x, D.S., Printed.''p-np 
; Jan. V.Fob,; 1862 f
Civil Jar,: U.3,» printU  ¡ j 
: ■. May 1862-, Feb • ,1863 . .
Civil War,' 1J.3.V printed'' .
May ;i66l-dFeb.; 1862 
Civil vfer, TJ.3,, printed
■ Mietr. v1862 1Feb, 1863;;; ;
Qcnrxaenviux ,
Confidential.Mexico, ju. . v_...;
Confidential rat Interference with J^ad« .• . ■ ■ ;
r- ' ■. ‘b^ tv/89n B&h.£tfU38*i«fay62*rJuly- .-
Confidential'res. : Civil: 1&r,:\F.S*VVprin^ed g ;/M
Confidential - res 
Confidential - res 
Confidential - res 
Confidential - re? 
Confidential - res 
Co fid t al Mexico
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C.O. 23/I69..,,, Gov. to 0,0,, Bahamas, June-Dee, 1062 ;
34/9...Gov. to C.G., Bay Islands, I860
37/179... Gcv, to C.O., ■ Bermuda,. Sept— Doc.', 186.1
180.. . Bermuda,Offices (except '»fee/ correspondencewith C.O, lC6l
181.. . Bermuda, War Office & Individuals, 1061
182.. . Govt, to C.O, Bermuda, Jan.-June 1862
183.. . Govt, to C.O, Bermuda, July-Dee. -1862
184.. . Public Offices, Bermuda, J.'-n.-Boc. 106?
200.. . Govt. toC.O., Bermuda, 1870.
33/ 35... C.O, to Bermuda, Letterbook, 1 Hov.'62~16 ilr, >71 
42/629... Offices ; Adinty., Foreign, etc,, Canada 1861,
630.. . Daw Officers & War Office Corr., Canada 1861 
I37/39I... Govt, to C.O., Jamaica, Sept.-Bee. I860 : 
217/228.,, Govt, to C.O., Dova Scotia, Jan,-Doc. lC6l
W.O. 17/1425..,. Monthly Returns of Bermuda Garrison 1861
1426.,,, Monthly Returns of.Belinda Garrison I062 
33/5..... Defences, home and foreign, etc., 1858
8.. ... Defences, home and foreign, etc., 1859
1 5 ..... Defence of Canada, etc., I865 
47».,,, Halifax Defences, 1007
44/235... Canada Defences, 1051 
55/15 5 1.. Defences of Bermuda 18.11-1857 
73/5404.. Bermuda Defences, Maps, etc., I866-9I
RUSSELL P M 3
2/19...-*20.......
21....
2 2 ............... ..
23.....
24...****
25.....
26. .....
30
34
3536
Corr. June 1859 *» Dec, I863.. - Gladstone ' L-h 
Corr, June-Dee, 1859 - Palmerstoh ■ ;
Corr. 1060-1861 - Palmereton 
Corr. 1863 ** Palmerston
Corr, Jan.»64-July '65j Jan. »63-Sept. '65, - ^
. . ' Palmeroton & Gladatone : ^Corr, July '59 - Dec, -^62 - Somerset'-^  M .•
Corr, June »59 Dec. *62 ^
Corr, Jan"'63 - Oct, '65 - Cabinet - :
■ Feb. '63-Oct. »65, - Somerset." -The Queen (Drafts } 0 Oct. »64,. at. * 50.jn1,, ,r>
„ ‘ : Cabinet ^ " 5 ~Corr, Legation in 'Washington, July:-»5q.i)SC W ,/ 0 ■ 
Corr, Legation in WaaMnyton, '1861.a-''■ ;.0: - - 6U; 
Corr, Legation in Washington, 186? - 
Corr, Legation in Washington, IC63
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FRO/2 2 /3 3 ...........
39....
PRO/30/ 2 2/7 4 ...
95» ••
96, • • 
97...
PKO/30/36/I....
2....
10...
Corr. Legation in Washington, Jan, '64-liov, «65 
Corr. Legation in .Washington, Aug, '59-Sept, »65 
Corr. Aug. »59-Jan. '65 - Mexico 
Corr, Sept. '59-Oct. '65 (Drafts) C.A., .
- ; Mexico & 3,A.
Corr, July »99-Dec. '62, Legation in- W'ashirvjton 
Coit. Jan. »63-Oct. '65, July '^-October »65 -
. i/,3. Legation in tf.K',
Corr. Stuart, W, Chargé- d'affaires in D.C.,
to Eussoll, 17 Juno 1862-19 Sept. 18 6 2.
Corr, Stuart, 23 Sept. '62, 11 Nov, '¿2? 15 Au*«u3-
9 Oct,. »64, 12 Seat, 23^ 07" 
Corr. Stuart, 7 June »50-20 Soy . * fl, fron Ü.3.
& other countries.
ft. Records of the French Archives,Paris.
MAR BB4 series:
779.. .Communications Ministerielles,Affaires Etrangères,
19 Dec.1859-6 Dec.1861,
786.. .Lettres Reçues:Divisions Navales ; Terre Neuve,29 Fev.-
23 Oct.I860jAntilles et Mexique,28 Jan.-II Dec.I860.
795.. .Mouvements de la Flotte.Minutes-Stations I86I;Terre
Neuve,Antilles et Amérique du Nord.
797.. .Lettres Reçues : Divisions Navales:Terre Neuve,18 Fév.«
29 Oct.1861.Lettres de M. de la Ronciers,commandant 
des îles St.Pierre et Miquelon,8 .Juil,-24 0ct,I86I,
798.. .Bureau dea Mouvements,I86I-I862.Division Navale des 
Antilles et du Golfe de Mexique.This document contains
-French reactions and naval orders concerning the 
first two years of the Civil War;blockades,Trent affair, 
maps and descriptions of French warships on G.S. ooaat, , 
' etc. ;
799.. .Expédition du Mexique,I86I-I862.Lettres Reçyea.’V.A.
Gravier^Cren-C.tles forces expéditionnaires français 
en Mexique.Notes of the allied conferences are here.
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810.. .Expédition du Mexique,I86I-I867.Lettres Reçues:Corr-
espondance de3 Ministères,Affaires Etrangères,27 Sept.- 
1861-30 Mars 1867{Ministère d'Etat(et cabinet de 1* 
Empereur, 23 Juin 1862- 14 Ayr il 1865),
Correspondance des Consuls,Vera Cruz,I9 Nov.I86I- 
3 Dec.1867. The French papers on the seizure of the 
British blockade runner Caroline Goodyear are here.
8 12.. .5.ations:Antilles et Amérique du Nord.Lettres au C.A,
Reynaud,3I Jan.-5 Dec.1862,
Mexique:Lettres au V.A.Graviers et du Roze,commandant 
les bâtiments français à la Vera Cruz,9 Jan.-3I Dec.1862.
819.. .Expédition du Mexique,1862-1865.Lettres du Ministre des
Affaires Etrangères,14 Oct,1862-14 Juil.1865,Histoire 
de l'expédition Mexicaine,I86I-I863.
825.. .5.ations:Antilles et Amérique du Nord,Lettres au C.A. 
Reynaud,I5 Jan.-I3 Nov.I863,et C.A,Bosse,Mexique,14 
Jan.-27 Dec.1863.
Circulaire aux Stations,6 Jan,-I8 Sept,1863.
828.. . St at ions .'Antilles et Amérique du Nord.Lettres Reçues:
C.A.Reynaud,II Jan.1863-24 Nov,I864.
1047.. Rapports de l'Attaché Naval à Londres,1856-1869,has 
unfortunately been destroyed.
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Anderson, H.C,, Ca t a B * <; 1 on al
Maritine Lin scum, GrnenvdchTLonoon. 1952)
Anon,, The Ar^ment.at Geneva (How York, IO7 3)
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III. LITfiARI'-S. ARCHIVES AND OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATTOtt
Admiralty Library, London,
A valuable repository!of-rare books on tho service, 
maps of the stations, etc.} has a good index card 
system*
Archives of. Nova Scotia, Halifax, 11.S,
Bermuda Historical Monuments. Trust, Hamilton, Bermuda. ;
Mr, H.G, Middleton has been.extremely helpful, furni­
shing lists of books, microfilms, etc.
Confederate Historical Society, Loigh-on-Sea, Essex,
: A serious amateur group which produces, several times 
a year, an informative journal.
Confederate Memorial Literary Society, Richmond,-Virginia*
Hydrographer of the Havy, London? ; for maps.
Imperial far Husoun, London, has an enormous colloction of 
ship photographs, not very many for .the. 1850's, but 
excellent coverage-from the .1880’s to the present, a
Maritime Museum of Canada, Halifax*
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, ; :
Mr..A."MH. .Pearsall, the Custodian of Manuscripts, and 
many other people at the museum have given valuable 
assistance to the writer. There is a large.library . 
as well as ship plans, models, etc,, covering the entire 
period of British-maritime history* An extensive colloc- 
tion of private papers is also at the museum, .'
Naval Reference Library, Halifax, N.3.
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Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
A diligent staff have answered every enquiry promptly 
and completely.
Public Archives of France, Paris.
The writer paid a short visit to this repository. There was 
in Milne's time,a French naval station in the same area as 
his own: La Division Navale des Antilles et de l'Amérique du 
Nord, and I wished to cpmpare the two forces. Since the 
minister of the navy also had charge of the French colonies, 
one can read political as well as naval material in these 
records. M.Audouy,chief of the naval ministry's 'Service 
Historique', indicated the relevant materials for my study 
which are available in the Public Archives. The Custodian 
of Naval Archives at the Public Archives,M.Taillemite,said 
that to his knowledge,only one study had ever been done on 
any of the eight foreign naval stations that France main­
tained in the I9th century. This is;Faivre,M..L'Expansion 
Français dans la pacifique.1800-1842(Nouvel Editions Latin, 
Paris,1953). While in Paris,the writer also visited the 
Musée de la Marine,which has a fine collection of ship 
models,ordnance,etc.,pertaining to the years of my study: 
the beginning of the ironclad era.
Royal United Service Institution,London.
Mr. D.Erskine furnished information as well as copies 
of naval officers* photos from Milne’s personal album.
Science Museum,London.
A fine collection of models: engines,boilers,paddle 
wheels,the lifting screw,etc.,as well as some rele­
vant publications. An indispensible aid to a knowledge 
of the technical side of the navy,which was tC  such 
importance in the I860’s.
Toronto Public Library,for maps of the Maritimes.
